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• Decisions to enter into “letter use” or “Queen 
for a Day” immunity agreements with three 
witnesses; 
• The use of consent agreements and “act of 
production” immunity to obtain the laptops used 
by Clinton’s attorneys (Cheryl Mills and Heather 
Samuelson) to “cull” her personal and work-
related emails; and 
• The handling of Clinton’s interview on July 2, 
2016. 
With regard to these investigative decisions, we found, 
as detailed in Chapter Five, that the Midyear team: 
• Sought to obtain evidence whenever possible 
through consent but also used compulsory 
process, including grand jury subpoenas, search 
warrants, and 2703(d) orders (court orders for 
non-content email information) to obtain 
various evidence.  We found that the 
prosecutors provided justifications for the 
preference for consent that were supported by 
Department and FBI policy and practice; 
• Conducted voluntary witness interviews to 
obtain testimony, including from Clinton and her 
senior aides, and did not require any witnesses 
to testify before the grand jury.  We found that 
one of the reasons for not using the grand jury 
for testimony involved concerns about exposing 
grand jurors to classified information; 
• Did not seek to obtain every device, including 
those of Clinton’s senior aides, or the contents 
of every email account through which a 
classified email may have traversed.  We found 
that the reasons for not doing so were based on 
limitations the Midyear team imposed on the 
investigation’s scope, the desire to complete the 
investigation well before the election, and the 
belief that the foregone evidence was likely of 
limited value.  We further found that those 
reasons were, in part, in tension with Comey’s 
response in October 2016 to the discovery of 
Clinton emails on the laptop of Anthony Weiner, 
the husband of Clinton’s former Deputy Chief of 
Staff and personal assistant, Huma Abedin; 
• Considered but did not seek permission from 
the Department to review certain highly 
classified materials that may have included 
information potentially relevant to the Midyear 
investigation.  The classified appendix to this 
report describes in more detail the highly 
classified information, its potential relevance to 
the Midyear investigation, the FBI’s reasons for 
not seeking access to it, and our analysis; 
• Granted letter use immunity and/or “Queen for 
a Day” immunity to three witnesses in exchange 
for their testimony after considering, as 
provided for in Department policy, the value of 
the witness’s testimony, the witness’s relative 
culpability, and the possibility of a successful 
prosecution; 
• Used consent agreements and “act of 
production” immunity to obtain the culling 
laptops used by Mills and Samuelson, in part to 
avoid the uncertainty and delays of a potential 
motion to quash any subpoenas or search 
warrants.  We found that these decisions were 
occurring at a time when Comey and the 
Midyear team had already concluded that there 
was likely no prosecutable case and believed it 
was unlikely the culling laptops would change 
the outcome of the investigation; 
• Asked Clinton what appeared to be appropriate 
questions and made use of documents to 
challenge Clinton’s testimony and assess her 
credibility during her interview.  We found that, 
by the date of her interview, the Midyear team 
and Comey had concluded that the evidence did 
not support criminal charges (absent a 
confession or false statement by Clinton during 
the interview), and that the interview had little 
effect on the outcome of the investigation; and 
• Allowed Mills and Samuelson to attend the 
Clinton interview as Clinton’s counsel, even 
though they also were fact witnesses, because 
the Midyear team determined that the only way 
to exclude them was to subpoena Clinton to 
testify before the grand jury, an option that we 
found was not seriously considered.  We found 
no persuasive evidence that Mills’s or 
Samuelson’s presence influenced Clinton’s 
interview.  Nevertheless, we found the decision 
to allow them to attend the interview was 
inconsistent with typical investigative strategy. 
For each of these decisions, we analyzed whether there 
was evidence of improper considerations, including bias, 
and also whether the justifications offered for the 
decision were a pretext for improper, but unstated, 
considerations. 
The question we considered was not whether a 
particular investigative decision was the ideal choice or 
one that could have been handled more effectively, but 
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whether the circumstances surrounding the decision 
indicated that it was based on considerations other than 
the merits of the investigation.  If a choice made by the 
investigative team was among two or more reasonable 
alternatives, we did not find that it was improper even if 
we believed that an alternative decision would have 
been more effective. 
Thus, a determination by the OIG that a decision was 
not unreasonable does not mean that the OIG has 
endorsed the decision or concluded that the decision 
was the most effective among the options considered.  
We took this approach because our role as an OIG is 
not to second-guess valid discretionary judgments 
made during the course of an investigation, and this 
approach is consistent with the OIG’s handling of such 
questions in past reviews. 
In undertaking our analysis, our task was made 
significantly more difficult because of text and instant 
messages exchanged on FBI devices and systems by 
five FBI employees involved in the Midyear 
investigation.  These messages reflected political 
opinions in support of former Secretary Clinton and 
against her then political opponent, Donald Trump.  
Some of these text messages and instant messages 
mixed political commentary with discussions about the 
Midyear investigation, and raised concerns that political 
bias may have impacted investigative decisions. 
In particular, we were concerned about text messages 
exchanged by FBI Deputy Assistant Director Peter 
Strzok and Lisa Page, Special Counsel to the Deputy 
Director, that potentially indicated or created the 
appearance that investigative decisions were impacted 
by bias or improper considerations.  As we describe in 
Chapter Twelve of our report, most of the text 
messages raising such questions pertained to the 
Russia investigation, which was not a part of this 
review.  Nonetheless, the suggestion in certain Russia-
related text messages in August 2016 that Strzok might 
be willing to take official action to impact presidential 
candidate Trump’s electoral prospects caused us to 
question the earlier Midyear investigative decisions in 
which Strzok was involved, and whether he took specific 
actions in the Midyear investigation based on his 
political views.  As we describe Chapter Five of our 
report, we found that Strzok was not the sole 
decisionmaker for any of the specific Midyear 
investigative decisions we examined in that chapter.  
We further found evidence that in some instances 
Strzok and Page advocated for more aggressive 
investigative measures in the Midyear investigation, 
such as the use of grand jury subpoenas and search 
warrants to obtain evidence. 
There were clearly tensions and disagreements in a 
number of important areas between Midyear agents and 
prosecutors.  However, we did not find documentary or 
testimonial evidence that improper considerations, 
including political bias, directly affected the specific 
investigative decisions we reviewed in Chapter Five, or 
that the justifications offered for these decisions were 
pretextual. 
Nonetheless, these messages cast a cloud over the 
FBI’s handling of the Midyear investigation and the 
investigation’s credibility.  But our review did not find 
evidence to connect the political views expressed in 
these messages to the specific investigative decisions 
that we reviewed; rather, consistent with the analytic 
approach described above, we found that these specific 
decisions were the result of discretionary judgments 
made during the course of an investigation by the 
Midyear agents and prosecutors and that these 
judgment calls were not unreasonable.  The broader 
impact of these text and instant messages, including on 
such matters as the public perception of the FBI and the 
Midyear investigation, are discussed in Chapter Twelve 
of our report. 
Comey’s Public Statement on July 5 
“Endgame” Discussions 
As we describe in Chapter Six of the report, by the 
Spring of 2016, Comey and the Midyear team had 
determined that, absent an unexpected development, 
evidence to support a criminal prosecution of Clinton 
was lacking.  Midyear team members told us that they 
based this assessment on a lack of evidence showing 
intent to place classified information on the server, or 
knowledge that the information was classified.  We 
describe the factors that the Department took into 
account in its decision to decline prosecution in Chapter 
Seven of our report and below. 
Comey told the OIG that as he began to realize the 
investigation was likely to result in a declination, he 
began to think of ways to credibly announce its closing.  
Comey engaged then DAG Yates in discussions in April 
2016 about the “endgame” for the Midyear 
investigation.  Comey said that he encouraged Yates to 
consider the most transparent options for announcing a 
declination.  Yates told the OIG that, as a result of her 
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discussions with Comey, she thought the Department 
and FBI would jointly announce any declination. 
Comey said he also told Yates that the closer they got 
to the political conventions, the more likely he would be 
to insist that a special counsel be appointed, because he 
did not believe the Department could credibly announce 
the closing of the investigation once Clinton was the 
Democratic Party nominee.  However, we did not find 
evidence that Comey ever seriously considered 
requesting a special counsel; instead, he used the 
reference to a special counsel as an effort to induce the 
Department to move more quickly to obtain the Mills 
and Samuelson culling laptops and to complete the 
investigation. 
Although Comey engaged with the Department in these 
“endgame” discussions, he told us that he was 
concerned that involvement by then AG Loretta Lynch in 
a declination announcement would result in “corrosive 
doubt” about whether the decision was objective and 
impartial because Lynch was appointed by a President 
from the same political party as Clinton.  Comey cited 
other factors to us that he said caused him to be 
concerned by early May 2016 that Lynch could not 
credibly participate in announcing a declination: 
• An alleged instruction from Lynch at a meeting 
in September 2015 to call the Midyear 
investigation a “matter” in statements to the 
media and Congress, which we describe in 
Chapter Four of our report; 
• Statements made by then President Barack 
Obama about the Midyear investigation, which 
also are discussed in Chapter Four; and 
• Concerns that certain classified information 
mentioning Lynch would leak, which we 
describe in Chapter Six and in the classified 
appendix. 
As we discuss below and in Chapter Six of our report, 
the meeting between Lynch and former President 
Clinton on June 27, 2016 also played a role in Comey’s 
decision to deliver a unilateral statement. 
Comey did not raise any of these concerns with Lynch 
or Yates.  Rather, unbeknownst to them, Comey began 
considering the possibility of an FBI-only public 
statement in late April and early May 2016.  Comey told 
the OIG that a separate public statement was 
warranted by the “500-year flood” in which the FBI 
found itself, and that he weighed the need to preserve 
the credibility and integrity of the Department and the 
FBI, and the need to protect “a sense of justice more 
broadly in the country—that things are fair not fixed, 
and they’re done independently.” 
Comey’s Draft Statement 
Comey’s initial draft statement, which he shared with 
FBI senior leadership on May 2, criticized Clinton’s 
handling of classified information as “grossly negligent,” 
but concluded that “no reasonable prosecutor” would 
bring a case based on the facts developed in the 
Midyear investigation.  Over the course of the next 2 
months, Comey’s draft statement underwent various 
language changes, including the following: 
• The description of Clinton’s handling of 
classified information was changed from 
“grossly negligent” to “extremely careless;” 
• A statement that the sheer volume of 
information classified as Secret supported an 
inference of gross negligence was removed and 
replaced with a statement that the classified 
information they discovered was “especially 
concerning because all of these emails were 
housed on servers not supported by full-time 
staff”; 
• A statement that the FBI assessed that it was 
“reasonably likely” that hostile actors gained 
access to Clinton’s private email server was 
changed to “possible.”  The statement also 
acknowledged that the FBI investigation and its 
forensic analysis did not find evidence that 
Clinton’s email server systems were 
compromised; and 
• A paragraph summarizing the factors that led 
the FBI to assess that it was possible that 
hostile actors accessed Clinton’s server was 
added, and at one point referenced Clinton’s 
use of her private email for an exchange with 
then President Obama while in the territory of a 
foreign adversary.  This reference later was 
changed to “another senior government 
official,” and ultimately was omitted. 
Each version of the statement criticized Clinton’s 
handling of classified information.  Comey told us that 
he included criticism of former Secretary Clinton’s 
uncharged conduct because “unusual transparency…was 
necessary for an unprecedented situation,” and that 
such transparency “was the best chance we had of 
having the American people have confidence that the 
justice system works[.]” 
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Other witnesses told the OIG that Comey included this 
criticism to avoid creating the appearance that the FBI 
was “letting [Clinton] off the hook,” as well as to 
“messag[e]” the decision to the FBI workforce to 
emphasize that employees would be disciplined for 
similar conduct and to distinguish the Clinton 
investigation from the cases of other public figures who 
had been prosecuted for mishandling violations. 
The Tarmac Meeting and Impact on Comey’s Statement 
On June 27, 2016, Lynch met with former President 
Clinton on Lynch’s plane, which was parked on the 
tarmac at a Phoenix airport.  This meeting was 
unplanned, and Lynch’s staff told the OIG they received 
no notice that former President Clinton planned to 
board Lynch’s plane.  Both Lynch and former President 
Clinton told the OIG that they did not discuss the 
Midyear investigation or any other Department 
investigation during their conversation.  Chapter Six of 
our report describes their testimony about the 
substance of their discussion. 
Lynch told the OIG that she became increasingly 
concerned as the meeting “went on and on,” and stated 
“that it was just too long a conversation to have had.”  
Following this meeting, Lynch obtained an ethics 
opinion from the Departmental Ethics Office that she 
was not required to recuse herself from the Midyear 
investigation, and she decided not to voluntarily recuse 
herself either.  In making this decision, Lynch told the 
OIG that stepping aside would create a misimpression 
that she and former President Clinton had discussed 
inappropriate topics, or that her role in the Midyear 
investigation somehow was greater than it was. 
On July 1, during an interview with a reporter, Lynch 
stated that she was not recusing from the Midyear 
investigation, but that she ”fully expect[ed]” to accept 
the recommendation of the career agents and 
prosecutors who conducted the investigation, “as is the 
common process.”  Then, in a follow up question, Lynch 
said “I’ll be briefed on [the findings] and I will be 
accepting their recommendations.”  Lynch’s statements 
created considerable public confusion about the status 
of her continuing involvement in the Midyear 
investigation. 
Although we found no evidence that Lynch and former 
President Clinton discussed the Midyear investigation or 
engaged in other inappropriate discussion during their 
tarmac meeting, we also found that Lynch’s failure to 
recognize the appearance problem created by former 
President Clinton’s visit and to take action to cut the 
visit short was an error in judgment.  We further 
concluded that her efforts to respond to the meeting by 
explaining what her role would be in the investigation 
going forward created public confusion and did not 
adequately address the situation. 
Comey told the OIG that he was “90 percent there, like 
highly likely” to make a separate public statement prior 
to the tarmac meeting, but that the tarmac meeting 
“tipped the scales” toward making his mind up to go 
forward with his own public statement. 
Comey’s Decision Not to Tell Department Leadership 
Comey acknowledged that he made a conscious 
decision not to tell Department leadership about his 
plans to make a separate statement because he was 
concerned that they would instruct him not to do it.  He 
also acknowledged that he made this decision when he 
first conceived of the idea to do the statement, even as 
he continued to engage the Department in discussions 
about the “endgame” for the investigation. 
Comey admitted that he concealed his intentions from 
the Department until the morning of his press 
conference on July 5, and instructed his staff to do the 
same, to make it impracticable for Department 
leadership to prevent him from delivering his 
statement.  We found that it was extraordinary and 
insubordinate for Comey to do so, and we found none of 
his reasons to be a persuasive basis for deviating from 
well-established Department policies in a way 
intentionally designed to avoid supervision by 
Department leadership over his actions. 
On the morning of July 5, 2016, Comey contacted Lynch 
and Yates about his plans to make a public statement, 
but did so only after the FBI had notified the press—in 
fact, the Department first learned about Comey’s press 
conference from a media inquiry, rather than from the 
FBI.  When Comey did call Lynch that morning, he told 
her that he was not going to inform her about the 
substance of his planned press statement. 
While Lynch asked Comey what the subject matter of 
the statement was going to be (Comey told her in 
response it would be about the Midyear investigation), 
she did not ask him to tell her what he intended to say 
about the Midyear investigation.  We found that Lynch, 
having decided not to recuse herself, retained authority 
over both the final prosecution decision and the 
Department’s management of the Midyear investigation.  
As such, we believe she should have instructed Comey 
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to tell her what he intended to say beforehand, and 
should have discussed it with Comey. 
Comey’s public statement announced that the FBI had 
completed its Midyear investigation, criticized Clinton 
and her senior aides as “extremely careless” in their 
handling of classified information, stated that the FBI 
was recommending that the Department decline 
prosecution of Clinton, and asserted that “no reasonable 
prosecutor” would prosecute Clinton based on the facts 
developed by the FBI during its investigation.  We 
determined that Comey’s decision to make this 
statement was the result of his belief that only he had 
the ability to credibly and authoritatively convey the 
rationale for the decision to not seek charges against 
Clinton, and that he needed to hold the press 
conference to protect the FBI and the Department from 
the extraordinary harm that he believed would have 
resulted had he failed to do so.  While we found no 
evidence that Comey’s statement was the result of bias 
or an effort to influence the election, we did not find his 
justifications for issuing the statement to be reasonable 
or persuasive. 
We concluded that Comey’s unilateral announcement 
was inconsistent with Department policy and violated 
long-standing Department practice and protocol by, 
among other things, criticizing Clinton’s uncharged 
conduct.  We also found that Comey usurped the 
authority of the Attorney General, and inadequately and 
incompletely described the legal position of Department 
prosecutors. 
The Department’s Declination Decision 
on July 6 
Following Comey’s public statement on July 5, the 
Midyear prosecutors finalized their recommendation 
that the Department decline prosecution of Clinton, her 
senior aides, and the senders of emails determined to 
contain classified information.  On July 6, the Midyear 
prosecutors briefed Lynch, Yates, Comey, other 
members of Department and FBI leadership, and FBI 
Midyear team members about the basis for the 
declination recommendation.  Lynch subsequently 
issued a short public statement that she met with the 
career prosecutors and agents who conducted the 
investigation and “received and accepted their 
unanimous recommendation” that the investigation be 
closed without charges. 
We found that the prosecutors considered five federal 
statutes: 
• 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e) (willful mishandling 
of documents or information relating to the 
national defense); 
• 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (removal, loss, theft, 
abstraction, or destruction of documents or 
information relating to the national defense 
through gross negligence, or failure to report 
such removal, loss, theft, abstraction, or 
destruction); 
• 18 U.S.C. § 1924 (unauthorized removal and 
retention of classified documents or material by 
government employees); and 
• 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (concealment, removal, or 
mutilation of government records). 
As described in Chapter Seven of our report, the 
prosecutors concluded that the evidence did not support 
prosecution under any of these statutes for various 
reasons, including that former Secretary Clinton and her 
senior aides lacked the intent to communicate classified 
information on unclassified systems.  Critical to their 
conclusion was that the emails in question lacked 
proper classification markings, that the senders often 
refrained from using specific classified facts or terms in 
emails and worded emails carefully in an attempt to 
“talk around” classified information, that the emails 
were sent to other government officials in furtherance 
of their official duties, and that former Secretary Clinton 
relied on the judgment of State Department employees 
to properly handle classified information, among other 
facts. 
We further found that the statute that required the 
most complex analysis by the prosecutors was Section 
793(f)(1), the “gross negligence” provision that has 
been the focus of much of the criticism of the 
declination decision.  As we describe in Chapters Two 
and Seven of our report, the prosecutors analyzed the 
legislative history of Section 793(f)(1), relevant case 
law, and the Department’s prior interpretation of the 
statute.  They concluded that Section 793(f)(1) likely 
required a state of mind that was “so gross as to almost 
suggest deliberate intention,” criminally reckless, or 
“something that falls just short of being willful,” as well 
as evidence that the individuals who sent emails 
containing classified information “knowingly” included or 
transferred such information onto unclassified systems. 
The Midyear team concluded that such proof was 
lacking.  We found that this interpretation of Section 
793(f)(1) was consistent with the Department’s 
historical approach in prior cases under different 
leadership, including in the 2008 decision not to 
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prosecute former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for 
mishandling classified documents. 
We analyzed the Department’s declination decision 
according to the same analytical standard that we 
applied to other decisions made during the 
investigation.  We did not substitute the OIG’s 
judgment for the judgments made by the Department, 
but rather sought to determine whether the decision 
was based on improper considerations, including 
political bias.  We found no evidence that the 
conclusions by the prosecutors were affected by bias or 
other improper considerations; rather, we determined 
that they were based on the prosecutors’ assessment of 
the facts, the law, and past Department practice. 
We therefore concluded that these were legal and policy 
judgments involving core prosecutorial discretion that 
were for the Department to make. 
Discovery in September 2016 of Emails 
on the Weiner Laptop 
Discovery of Emails by the FBI’s New York Field Office 
In September 2016, the FBI’s New York Field Office 
(NYO) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York (SDNY) began investigating former 
Congressman Anthony Weiner for his online relationship 
with a minor.  A federal search warrant was obtained on 
September 26, 2016, for Weiner’s iPhone, iPad, and 
laptop computer.  The FBI obtained these devices the 
same day.  The search warrant authorized the 
government to search for evidence relating to the 
following crimes:  transmitting obscene material to a 
minor, sexual exploitation of children, and activities 
related to child pornography. 
The Weiner case agent told the OIG that he began 
processing Weiner’s devices on September 26, and that 
he noticed “within hours” that there were “over 300,000 
emails on the laptop.”  He said that either that evening 
or the next morning, he saw at least one BlackBerry PIN 
message between Clinton and Abedin, as well as emails 
between them.  He said that he recalled seeing emails 
associated with “about seven domains,” such as 
yahoo.com, state.gov, clintonfoundation.org, 
clintonemail.com, and hillaryclinton.com.  The case 
agent immediately notified his NYO chain of command, 
and the information was ultimately briefed to NYO 
Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) William Sweeney on 
September 28. 
Reporting of Emails to FBI Headquarters 
As we describe in Chapter Nine of our report, Sweeney 
took the following steps to notify FBI Headquarters 
about the discovery of Midyear-related emails on the 
Weiner laptop: 
• On September 28, during a secure video 
teleconference (SVTC), Sweeney reported that 
Weiner investigation agents had discovered 
141,000 emails on Weiner’s laptop that were 
potentially relevant to the Midyear investigation.  
The OIG determined that this SVTC was led by 
then Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, and that 
approximately 39 senior FBI executives likely 
would have participated.  Comey was not 
present for the SVTC. 
• Sweeney said he spoke again with McCabe on 
the evening of September 28.  Sweeney said 
that during this call he informed McCabe that 
NYO personnel had continued processing the 
laptop and that they had now identified 347,000 
emails on the laptop. 
• Sweeney said he also called two FBI Executive 
Assistant Directors (EAD) on September 28 and 
informed them that the Weiner case team had 
discovered emails relevant to the Midyear 
investigation.  One of the EADs told the OIG 
that he then called McCabe, and that McCabe 
told the EAD that he was aware of the emails.  
The EAD told us that “[T]here was no doubt in 
my mind when we finished that conversation 
that [McCabe] understood the, the gravity of 
what the find was.” 
• Sweeney said he also spoke to FBI Assistant 
Director E.W. “Bill” Priestap on September 28 
and 29, 2016.  Emails indicate that during their 
conversation on September 29, they discussed 
the limited scope of the Weiner search warrant 
(i.e., the need to obtain additional legal process 
to review any Midyear-related email on the 
Weiner laptop). 
Initial Response of FBI Headquarters 
McCabe told the OIG that he considered the information 
provided by Sweeney to be “a big deal” and said he 
instructed Priestap to send a team to New York to 
review the emails on the Weiner laptop.  McCabe told 
the OIG that he recalled talking to Comey about the 
issue “right around the time [McCabe] found out about 
it.”  McCabe described it as a “fly-by,” where the Weiner 
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laptop was “like one in a list of things that we 
discussed.” 
Comey said that he recalled first learning about the 
additional emails on the Weiner laptop at some point in 
early October 2016, although he said it was possible 
this could have occurred in late September 2016.  
Comey told the OIG that this information “didn’t index” 
with him, which he attributed to the way the 
information was presented to him and the fact that, “I 
don’t know that I knew that [Weiner] was married to 
Huma Abedin at the time.” 
Text messages of FBI Deputy Assistant Director Peter 
Strzok indicated that he, McCabe, and Priestap 
discussed the Weiner laptop on September 28.  Strzok 
said that he had initially planned to send a team to New 
York to review the emails, but a conference call with 
NYO was scheduled instead.  The conference call took 
place on September 29, and five members of the FBI 
Midyear team participated.  Notes from the conference 
call indicate the participants discussed the presence of a 
large volume of emails (350,000) on the Weiner laptop 
and specific domain names, including clintonemail.com 
and state.gov.  The Midyear SSA said that NYO also 
mentioned seeing BlackBerry domain emails on the 
Weiner laptop. 
Additional discussions took place on October 3 and 4, 
2016.  However, after October 4, we found no evidence 
that anyone associated with the Midyear investigation, 
including the entire leadership team at FBI 
Headquarters, took any action on the Weiner laptop 
issue until the week of October 24, and then did so only 
after the Weiner case agent expressed concerns to 
SDNY, prompting SDNY to contact the Office of the 
Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) on October 21 to raise 
concerns about the lack of action. 
Reengagement of FBI Headquarters 
On Friday, October 21, SDNY Deputy U.S. Attorney Joon 
Kim contacted ODAG and was put in touch with DAAG 
George Toscas, the most senior career Department 
official involved in the Midyear investigation.  
Thereafter, at Toscas’s request, one of the Midyear 
prosecutors called Strzok.  This was the first 
conversation that the FBI had with Midyear prosecutors 
about the Weiner laptop. 
Toscas said he asked McCabe about the Weiner laptop 
on Monday, October 24, after a routine meeting 
between FBI and Department leadership.  McCabe told 
us that this interaction with Toscas caused him to follow 
up with the FBI Midyear team about the Weiner laptop 
and to call McCord about the issue.   
On October 26, NYO, SDNY, and Midyear team 
members participated in a conference call.  The FBI 
Midyear team told the OIG that they learned important 
new information on this call, specifically:  (1) that there 
was a large volume of emails on the Weiner laptop, 
particularly the potential for a large number of 
@clintonemail.com emails; and (2) that the presence of 
Blackberry data indicated that emails from Clinton’s first 
three months as Secretary of State could be present on 
the laptop.  However, as we describe above and in 
Chapter Nine of our report, these basic facts were 
known to the FBI by September 29, 2016. 
The FBI Midyear team briefed McCabe about the 
information from the conference call on the evening of 
October 26, 2016.  McCabe told us that he felt the 
situation was “absolutely urgent” and proposed that the 
FBI Midyear team meet with Comey the following day.   
On October 27 at 5:20 a.m., McCabe emailed Comey 
stating that the Midyear team “has come across some 
additional actions they believe they need to take,” and 
recommending that they meet that day to discuss the 
implications “if you have any space on your calendar.”  
Comey stated that he did not know what this email was 
about when he received it and did not initially recall that 
he had been previously notified about the Weiner 
laptop. 
We found that, by no later than September 29, FBI 
executives and the FBI Midyear team had learned 
virtually every fact that was cited by the FBI in late 
October as justification for obtaining the search warrant 
for the Weiner laptop, including that the laptop 
contained: 
• Over 340,000 emails, some of which were from 
domains associated with Clinton, including 
state.gov, clintonfoundation.org, 
clintonemail.com, and hillaryclinton.com; 
• Numerous emails between Clinton and Abedin; 
• An unknown number of Blackberry 
communications on the laptop, including one or 
more messages between Clinton and Abedin, 
indicating the possibility that the laptop 
contained communications from the early 
months of Clinton’s tenure; and 
• Emails dated beginning in 2007 and covering 
the entire period of Clinton’s tenure as 
Secretary of State. 
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As we describe in Chapter Nine of our report, the 
explanations we were given for the FBI’s failure to take 
immediate action on the Weiner laptop fell into four 
general categories: 
• The FBI Midyear team was waiting for additional 
information about the contents of the laptop 
from NYO, which was not provided until late 
October; 
• The FBI Midyear team could not review the 
emails without additional legal authority, such 
as consent or a new search warrant; 
• The FBI Midyear team and senior FBI officials 
did not believe that the information on the 
laptop was likely to be significant; and 
• Key members of the FBI Midyear team had been 
reassigned to the investigation of Russian 
interference in the U.S. election, which was a 
higher priority. 
We found these explanations to be unpersuasive 
justifications for not acting sooner, given the FBI 
leadership’s conclusion about the importance of the 
information and that the FBI Midyear team had 
sufficient information to take action in early October 
and knew at that time that it would need a new search 
warrant to review any Clinton-Abedin emails.  
Moreover, given the FBI’s extensive resources, the fact 
that Strzok and several other FBI members of the 
Midyear team had been assigned to the Russia 
investigation, which was extremely active during this 
September and October time period, was not an excuse 
for failing to take any action during this time period on 
the Weiner laptop. 
The FBI’s failure to act in late September or early 
October is even less justifiable when contrasted with 
the attention and resources that FBI management and 
some members of the Midyear team dedicated to other 
activities in connection with the Midyear investigation 
during the same period.  As detailed in Chapter Eight, 
these activities included: 
• The preparation of Comey’s speech at the FBI’s 
SAC Conference on October 12, a speech 
designed to help equip SACs to “bat down” 
misinformation about the July 5 declination 
decision; 
• The preparation and distribution of detailed 
talking points to FBI SACs in mid-October in 
order, again, “to equip people who are going to 
be talking about it anyway with the actual facts 
and [the FBI’s] actual perspective on [the 
declination]”; and 
• A briefing for retired FBI agents conducted on 
October 21 to describe the investigative 
decisions made during Midyear so as to arm 
former employees with facts so that they, too, 
might counter “falsehoods and exaggerations.” 
In assessing the decision to prioritize the Russia 
investigation over following up on the Midyear-related 
investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop, we 
were particularly concerned about text messages sent 
by Strzok and Page that potentially indicated or created 
the appearance that investigative decisions they made 
were impacted by bias or improper considerations.  
Most of the text messages raising such questions 
pertained to the Russia investigation, and the 
implication in some of these text messages, particularly 
Strzok’s August 8 text message (“we’ll stop” candidate 
Trump from being elected), was that Strzok might be 
willing to take official action to impact a presidential 
candidate’s electoral prospects.  Under these 
circumstances, we did not have confidence that Strzok’s 
decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over 
following up on the Midyear-related investigative lead 
discovered on the Weiner laptop was free from bias. 
We searched for evidence that the Weiner laptop was 
deliberately placed on the back-burner by others in the 
FBI to protect Clinton, but found no evidence in emails, 
text messages, instant messages, or documents that 
suggested an improper purpose.  We also took note of 
the fact that numerous other FBI executives—including 
the approximately 39 who participated in the 
September 28 SVTC—were briefed on the potential 
existence of Midyear-related emails on the Weiner 
laptop.  We also noted that the Russia investigation was 
under the supervision of Priestap—for whom we found 
no evidence of bias and who himself was aware of the 
Weiner laptop issue by September 29.  However, we 
also did not identify a consistent or persuasive 
explanation for the FBI’s failure to act for almost a 
month after learning of potential Midyear-related emails 
on the Weiner laptop. 
The FBI’s inaction had potentially far-reaching 
consequences.  Comey told the OIG that, had he known 
about the laptop in the beginning of October and 
thought the email review could have been completed 
before the election, it may have affected his decision to 
notify Congress.  Comey told the OIG, “I don’t know [if] 
it would have put us in a different place, but I would 
have wanted to have the opportunity.” 
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Comey’s Decision to Notify Congress on 
October 28 
Following the briefing from the FBI Midyear team on 
October 27, 2016, Comey authorized the Midyear team 
to seek a search warrant, telling the OIG that “the 
volume of emails” and the presence of BlackBerry 
emails on the Weiner laptop were “two highly significant 
facts.”  As we describe in Chapter Thirteen of our 
report, McCabe joined this meeting by phone but was 
asked not to participate, and subsequently recused 
himself from the Midyear investigation on November 1, 
2016. 
The issue of notifying Congress of the Weiner laptop 
development was first raised at the October 27 briefing 
and, over the course of the next 24 hours, numerous 
additional discussions occurred within the FBI.  As we 
describe in Chapter Ten of our report, the factors 
considered during those discussions included: 
• Comey’s belief that failure to disclose the 
existence of the emails would be an act of 
concealment; 
• The belief that Comey had an obligation to 
update Congress because the discovery was 
potentially significant and made his prior 
testimony that the investigation was closed no 
longer true; 
• An implicit assumption that Clinton would be 
elected President; 
• Fear that the information would leak if the FBI 
failed to disclose it; 
• Concern that failing to disclose would result in 
accusations that the FBI had “engineered a 
cover up” to help Clinton get elected; 
• Concerns about protecting the reputation of the 
FBI; 
• Concerns about the perceived illegitimacy of a 
Clinton presidency that would follow from a 
failure to disclose the discovery of the emails if 
they proved to be significant; 
• Concerns about the electoral impact of any 
announcement; and 
• The belief that the email review could not be 
completed before the election. 
As a result of these discussions on October 27, Comey 
decided to notify Congress about the discovery of 
Midyear-related emails on the Weiner laptop.  Comey 
told us that, although he “believe[d] very strongly that 
our rule should be, we don’t comment on pending 
investigations” and that it was a “very important norm” 
for the Department to avoid taking actions that could 
impact an imminent election, he felt he had an 
obligation to update Congress because the email 
discovery was potentially very significant and it made 
his prior testimony no longer true. 
We found no evidence that Comey’s decision to send 
the October 28 letter was influenced by political 
preferences.  Instead, we found that his decision was 
the result of several interrelated factors that were 
connected to his concern that failing to send the letter 
would harm the FBI and his ability to lead it, and his 
view that candidate Clinton was going to win the 
presidency and that she would be perceived to be an 
illegitimate president if the public first learned of the 
information after the election.  Although Comey told us 
that he “didn’t make this decision because [he] thought 
it would leak otherwise,” several FBI officials told us 
that the concern about leaks played a role in the 
decision. 
Much like with his July 5 announcement, we found that 
in making this decision, Comey engaged in ad hoc 
decisionmaking based on his personal views even if it 
meant rejecting longstanding Department policy or 
practice.  We found unpersuasive Comey’s explanation 
as to why transparency was more important than 
Department policy and practice with regard to the 
reactivated Midyear investigation while, by contrast, 
Department policy and practice were more important to 
follow with regard to the Clinton Foundation and Russia 
investigations. 
Comey’s description of his choice as being between 
“two doors,” one labeled “speak” and one labeled 
“conceal,” was a false dichotomy.  The two doors were 
actually labeled “follow policy/practice” and “depart 
from policy/practice.”  Although we acknowledge that 
Comey faced a difficult situation with unattractive 
choices, in proceeding as he did, we concluded that 
Comey made a serious error of judgment. 
Department and FBI Leadership Discussions 
On October 27, Comey instructed his Chief of Staff, 
James Rybicki, to reach out to the Department about 
his plan to notify Congress.  As we describe in Chapter 
Ten of our report, Comey told the OIG that he decided 
to ask Rybicki to inform the Department rather than to 
contact Lynch or Yates directly because he did not 
“want to jam them and I wanted to offer them the 
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opportunity to think about and decide whether they 
wanted to be engaged on it.”  Rybicki and Axelrod 
spoke on the afternoon of October 27 and had “a series 
of phone calls” the rest of the day.  Rybicki told Axelrod 
that Comey believed he had an obligation to notify 
Congress about the laptop in order to correct a 
misimpression that the Midyear investigation was 
closed. 
Lynch, Yates, Axelrod, and their staffs had several 
discussions that same day as to whether Lynch or Yates 
should call Comey directly, but said they ultimately 
decided to have Axelrod communicate “the strong view 
that neither the DAG nor [AG] felt this letter should go 
out.”  Yates told us they were concerned that direct 
contact with Comey would be perceived as “strong-
arming” him, and that based on her experience with 
Comey, he was likely to “push back hard” against input 
from Lynch or her, especially if accepting their input 
meant that he had to go back to his staff and explain 
that he was reversing his decision.  She said that she 
viewed Rybicki as the person they needed to convince if 
they wanted to change Comey’s mind.  Accordingly, 
Axelrod informed Rybicki on October 27 of the 
Department’s strong opposition to Comey’s plan to send 
a letter. 
Rybicki reported to Comey that the Department 
“recommend[ed] against” the Congressional notification 
and thought it was “a bad idea.”  Although Comey told 
us that he would not have sent the letter if Lynch or 
Yates had told him not to do so, he said he viewed their 
response as only a recommendation and interpreted 
their lack of direct engagement as saying “basically...it’s 
up to you....  I honestly thought they were taking kind 
of a cowardly way out.”  The following day, October 28, 
Comey sent a letter to Congress stating, in part, that 
“the FBI has learned of the existence of emails that 
appear to be pertinent to the [Midyear] investigation.” 
Comey, Lynch, and Yates faced difficult choices in late 
October 2016.  However, we found it extraordinary that 
Comey assessed that it was best that the FBI Director 
not speak directly with the Attorney General and 
Deputy Attorney General about how best to navigate 
this most important decision and mitigate the resulting 
harms, and that Comey’s decision resulted in the 
Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
concluding that it would be counterproductive to speak 
directly with the FBI Director.  We believe that open and 
candid communication among leaders in the 
Department and its components is essential for the 
effective functioning of the Department. 
Text and Instant Messages, Use of 
Personal Email, and Alleged Improper 
Disclosures of Non-Public Information 
Text Messages and Instant Messages 
As we describe in Chapter Twelve, during our review we 
identified text messages and instant messages sent on 
FBI mobile devices or computer systems by five FBI 
employees who were assigned to the Midyear 
investigation.  These included: 
• Text messages exchanged between Strzok and 
Page; 
• Instant messages exchanged between Agent 1, 
who was one of the four Midyear case agents, 
and Agent 5, who was a member of the filter 
team; and 
• Instant messages sent by FBI Attorney 2, who 
was assigned to the Midyear investigation. 
The text messages and instant messages sent by these 
employees included statements of hostility toward then 
candidate Trump and statements of support for 
candidate Clinton, and several appeared to mix political 
opinions with discussions about the Midyear 
investigation. 
We found that the conduct of these five FBI employees 
brought discredit to themselves, sowed doubt about the 
FBI’s handling of the Midyear investigation, and 
impacted the reputation of the FBI.  Although our 
review did not find documentary or testimonial evidence 
directly connecting the political views these employees 
expressed in their text messages and instant messages 
to the specific investigative decisions we reviewed in 
Chapter Five, the conduct by these employees cast a 
cloud over the FBI Midyear investigation and sowed 
doubt the FBI’s work on, and its handling of, the 
Midyear investigation.  Moreover, the damage caused 
by their actions extends far beyond the scope of the 
Midyear investigation and goes to the heart of the FBI’s 
reputation for neutral factfinding and political 
independence. 
We were deeply troubled by text messages exchanged 
between Strzok and Page that potentially indicated or 
created the appearance that investigative decisions 
were impacted by bias or improper considerations.  
Most of the text messages raising such questions 
pertained to the Russia investigation, which was not a 
part of this review.  Nonetheless, when one senior FBI 
official, Strzok, who was helping to lead the Russia 
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investigation at the time, conveys in a text message to 
another senior FBI official, Page, “No.  No he won’t.  
We’ll stop it” in response to her question “[Trump’s] not 
ever going to become president, right?  Right?!”, it is 
not only indicative of a biased state of mind but, even 
more seriously, implies a willingness to take official 
action to impact the presidential candidate’s electoral 
prospects.  This is antithetical to the core values of the 
FBI and the Department of Justice.  
We do not question that the FBI employees who sent 
these messages are entitled to their own political views.  
However, we believe using FBI devices to send the 
messages discussed in Chapter Twelve—particularly the 
messages that intermix work-related discussions with 
political commentary—potentially implicate provisions in 
the FBI’s Offense Code and Penalty Guidelines.  At a 
minimum, we found that the employees’ use of FBI 
systems and devices to send the identified messages 
demonstrated extremely poor judgment and a gross 
lack of professionalism.  We therefore refer this 
information to the FBI for its handling and consideration 
of whether the messages sent by the five employees 
listed above violated the FBI’s Offense Code of Conduct. 
Use of Personal Email 
As we also describe in Chapter Twelve, we learned 
during the course of our review that Comey, Strzok, 
and Page used their personal email accounts to conduct 
FBI business. 
We identified numerous instances in which Comey used 
a personal email account to conduct unclassified FBI 
business.  We found that, given the absence of exigent 
circumstances and the frequency with which the use of 
personal email occurred, Comey’s use of a personal 
email account for unclassified FBI business to be 
inconsistent with Department policy. 
We found that Strzok used his personal email accounts 
for official government business on several occasions, 
including forwarding an email from his FBI account to 
his personal email account about the proposed search 
warrant the Midyear team was seeking on the Weiner 
laptop.  This email included a draft of the search 
warrant affidavit, which contained information from the 
Weiner investigation that appears to have been under 
seal at the time in the Southern District of New York 
and information obtained pursuant to a grand jury 
subpoena issued in the Eastern District of Virginia in the 
Midyear investigation.  We refer to the FBI the issue of 
whether Strzok’s use of personal email accounts 
violated FBI and Department policies. 
Finally, when questioned, Page also told us she used 
personal email for work-related matters at times.  She 
stated that she and Strzok sometimes used these 
forums for work-related discussions due to the technical 
limitations of FBI-issued phones.  Page left the FBI on 
May 4, 2018. 
Improper Disclosure of Non-Public Information 
As we also describe in Chapter Twelve, among the 
issues we reviewed were allegations that Department 
and FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public 
information regarding the Midyear investigation.  
Although FBI policy strictly limits the employees who 
are authorized to speak to the media, we found that 
this policy appeared to be widely ignored during the 
period we reviewed. 
We identified numerous FBI employees, at all levels of 
the organization and with no official reason to be in 
contact with the media, who were nevertheless in 
frequent contact with reporters.  Attached to this report 
as Attachments E and F are two link charts that reflect 
the volume of communications that we identified 
between FBI employees and media representatives in 
April/May and October 2016.  We have profound 
concerns about the volume and extent of unauthorized 
media contacts by FBI personnel that we have 
uncovered during our review. 
In addition, we identified instances where FBI 
employees improperly received benefits from reporters, 
including tickets to sporting events, golfing outings, 
drinks and meals, and admittance to nonpublic social 
events.  We will separately report on those 
investigations as they are concluded, consistent with 
the Inspector General Act, other applicable federal 
statutes, and OIG policy. 
The harm caused by leaks, fear of potential leaks, and a 
culture of unauthorized media contacts is illustrated in 
Chapters Ten and Eleven of our report, where we detail 
the fact that these issues influenced FBI officials who 
were advising Comey on consequential investigative 
decisions in October 2016.  The FBI updated its media 
policy in November 2017, restating its strict guidelines 
concerning media contacts, and identifying who is 
required to obtain authority before engaging members 
of the media, and when and where to report media 
contact.  We do not believe the problem is with the 
FBI’s policy, which we found to be clear and 
unambiguous.  Rather, we concluded that these leaks 
highlight the need to change what appears to be a 
cultural attitude among many in the organization. 
 xiii 
Executive Summary 
A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election 
 
Recusal Issues 
Former Deputy Director Andrew McCabe:  As we 
describe in Chapter Thirteen, in 2015, McCabe’s spouse, 
Dr. Jill McCabe, ran for a Virginia State Senate seat.  
During the campaign, Dr. McCabe’s campaign 
committee received substantial monetary and in-kind 
contributions, totaling $675,288 or approximately 40 
percent of the total contributions raised by Dr. McCabe 
for her state senate campaign, from then Governor 
McAuliffe’s Political Action Committee (PAC) and from 
the Virginia Democratic Party.  In addition, on June 26, 
2015, Hillary Clinton was the featured speaker at a 
fundraiser in Virginia hosted by the Virginia Democratic 
Party and attended by Governor McAuliffe. 
At the time his wife sought to run for state senate, 
McCabe was the Assistant Director in Charge of the 
FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) and sought ethics 
advice from FBI ethics officials and attorneys.  We 
found that FBI ethics officials and attorneys did not fully 
appreciate the potential significant implications to 
McCabe and the FBI from campaign donations to Dr. 
McCabe’s campaign.  The FBI did not implement any 
review of campaign donations to assess potential 
conflicts or appearance issues that could arise from the 
donations.  On this issue, we believe McCabe did what 
he was supposed to do by notifying those responsible in 
the FBI for ethics issues and seeking their guidance. 
After McCabe became FBI Deputy Director in February 
2016, McCabe had an active role in the supervision of 
the Midyear investigation, and oversight of the Clinton 
Foundation investigation, until he recused himself from 
these investigations on November 1, 2016.  McCabe 
voluntarily recused himself on November 1, at Comey’s 
urging, as the result of an October 23 article in the Wall 
Street Journal identifying the substantial donations from 
McAuliffe’s PAC and the Virginia Democratic Party to Dr. 
McCabe. 
With respect to these investigations, we agreed with the 
FBI’s chief ethics official that McCabe was not at any 
time required to recuse under the relevant authorities.  
However, voluntary recusal is always permissible with 
the approval of a supervisor or ethics official, which is 
what McCabe did on November 1.  Had the FBI put in 
place a system for reviewing campaign donations to Dr. 
McCabe, which were public under Virginia law, the 
sizable donations from McAuliffe’s PAC and the Virginia 
Democratic Party may have triggered prior 
consideration of the very appearance concerns raised in 
the October 23 WSJ article.  Finally, we also found that 
McCabe did not fully comply with this recusal in a few 
instances related to the Clinton Foundation 
investigation. 
Former Assistant Attorney General Peter Kadzik:  
In Chapter Fourteen, we found that Kadzik 
demonstrated poor judgment by failing to recuse 
himself from Clinton-related matters under federal 
ethics regulations prior to November 2, 2016.  Kadzik 
did not recognize the appearance of a conflict that he 
created when he initiated an effort to obtain 
employment for his son with the Clinton campaign while 
participating in Department discussions and 
communications about Clinton-related matters. 
Kadzik also created an appearance of a conflict when he 
sent the Chairman of the Clinton Campaign and a 
longtime friend, John Podesta, the “Heads up” email 
that included the schedule for the release of former 
Secretary Clinton’s emails proposed to the court in a 
FOIA litigation without knowing whether the information 
had yet been filed and made public.  His willingness to 
do so raised a reasonable question about his ability to 
act impartially on Clinton-related matters in connection 
with his official duties. 
Additionally, although Department leadership 
determined that Kadzik should be recused from Clinton-
related matters upon learning of his “Heads up” email 
to Podesta, we found that Kadzik failed to strictly 
adhere to this recusal.  Lastly, because the government 
information in the “Heads up” email had in fact been 
released publically, we did not find that Kadzik released 
non-public information or misused his official position. 
FBI Records Vault Twitter 
Announcements 
As we describe in Chapter Fifteen, on November 1, 
2016, in response to multiple FOIA requests, the FBI 
Records Management Division (RMD) posted records to 
the FBI Records Vault, a page on the FBI’s public 
website, concerning the “William J. Clinton Foundation.”  
The @FBIRecordsVault Twitter account announced this 
posting later the same day.  We concluded that these 
requests were processed according to RMD’s internal 
procedures like other similarly-sized requests, and 
found no evidence that the FOIA response was 
expedited or delayed in order to impact the 2016 
presidential election.  We also found no evidence that 
improper political considerations influenced the FBI’s 
use of the Twitter account to publicize the release. 
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Recommendations 
Our report makes nine recommendations to the 
Department and the FBI to assist them in addressing 
the issues that we identified in this review: 
• We recommend that the Department and the 
FBI consider developing guidance that identifies 
the risks associated with and alternatives to 
permitting a witness to attend a voluntary 
interview of another witness (including in the 
witness’s capacity as counsel). 
• We recommend that the Department consider 
making explicit that, except in situations where 
the law requires or permits disclosure, an 
investigating agency cannot publicly announce 
its recommended charging decision prior to 
consulting with the Attorney General, Deputy 
Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or his or her 
designee, and cannot proceed without the 
approval of one of these officials. 
• We recommend that the Department and the 
FBI consider adopting a policy addressing the 
appropriateness of Department employees 
discussing the conduct of uncharged individuals 
in public statements. 
• We recommend that the Department consider 
providing guidance to agents and prosecutors 
concerning the taking of overt investigative 
steps, indictments, public announcements, or 
other actions that could impact an election. 
• We recommend that the Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General take steps to improve the 
retention and monitoring of text messages 
Department-wide. 
• We recommend that the FBI add a warning 
banner to all of the FBI’s mobile phones and 
devices in order to further notify users that they 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. 
• We recommend that the FBI consider (a) 
assessing whether it has provided adequate 
training to employees about the proper use of 
text messages and instant messages, including 
any related discovery obligations, and (b) 
providing additional guidance about the 
allowable uses of FBI devices for any non-
governmental purpose, including guidance 
about the use of FBI devices for political 
conversations. 
• We recommend that the FBI consider whether 
(a) it is appropriately educating employees 
about both its media contact policy and the 
Department’s ethics rules pertaining to the 
acceptance of gifts, and (b) its disciplinary 
provisions and penalties are sufficient to deter 
such improper conduct. 
• We recommend that Department ethics officials 
include the review of campaign donations for 
possible conflict issues when Department 
employees or their spouses run for public office. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
I. Background 
The Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) undertook this review of various actions by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Department in connection with the investigation into the 
use of a private email server by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  Clinton 
served as Secretary of State from January 21, 2009, until February 1, 2013, and 
during that time used private email servers hosting the @clintonemail.com domain 
to conduct official Department of State (State Department) business.   
In 2014, in response to a request from the State Department to Clinton for 
“copies of any Federal records in [her] possession, such as emails sent or received 
on a personal email account while serving as Secretary of State,” Clinton produced 
to the State Department 30,490 emails from her private server that her attorneys 
determined were work-related.  Clinton and her attorneys did not produce to the 
State Department approximately 31,830 emails because, they stated, they were 
personal in nature, and these emails subsequently were deleted from the laptop 
computers that the attorneys used to review them. 
In 2015, at the State Department’s request, the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) reviewed emails from Clinton’s 
private email server that she had produced to the State Department and identified 
a potential compromise of classified information.  The IC IG subsequently referred 
this information to the FBI. 
The FBI opened an investigation, known as “Midyear Exam” (MYE or 
Midyear), into the storage and transmission of classified information on Clinton’s 
unclassified private servers in July 2015.  Over the course of the next year, FBI 
agents and analysts and Department prosecutors conducted the investigation.  
Their activities included obtaining and analyzing servers and devices used by 
Clinton, contents of private email accounts for certain senior aides, and computers 
and email accounts used to back up, process, or transfer Clinton’s emails.  The 
investigative team interviewed numerous witnesses, including current and former 
State Department employees. 
On June 27, 2016, while the Midyear investigation was nearing completion, 
then Attorney General (AG) Loretta Lynch and former President Bill Clinton had an 
unscheduled meeting while their planes were parked on the tarmac at Phoenix’s 
Sky Harbor Airport.  Former President Clinton boarded Lynch’s plane, and Lynch, 
Lynch’s husband, and the former President met for approximately 20 to 30 
minutes.  Following the meeting, Lynch publicly denied having any conversation 
about the Midyear investigation or any other substantive matter pending before the 
Department.  Nevertheless, the meeting created significant controversy.  On July 1, 
2016, Lynch publicly announced that she would accept the recommendation of the 
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Midyear investigative and prosecutorial team regarding whether to charge former 
Secretary Clinton. 
The following day, Saturday, July 2, 2016, the FBI and Department 
prosecutors interviewed former Secretary Clinton at the FBI’s Headquarters 
building.  Then, on July 5, 2016, without coordinating with the Department and with 
very brief notice to it, then FBI Director James Comey publicly delivered a 
statement that criticized Clinton, characterized her and her senior aides as 
“extremely careless” in their handling of classified information, and asserted that it 
was possible hostile actors gained access to Clinton’s personal email account.  
Comey concluded, however, that the investigation should be closed because “no 
reasonable prosecutor” would prosecute Clinton or others, citing the strength of the 
evidence and the lack of precedent for bringing a case on these facts.  The following 
day, July 6, 2016, Lynch was briefed by the prosecutors and formally accepted their 
recommendation to decline prosecution. 
On October 28, 2016, 11 days before the presidential election, Comey sent a 
letter to Congress announcing the discovery of emails that “appear[ed] to be 
pertinent” to the Midyear investigation.  Comey’s letter was referring to the FBI’s 
discovery of a large quantity of emails during the search of a laptop computer 
obtained in an unrelated investigation of Anthony Weiner, the husband of Clinton’s 
former Deputy Chief of Staff and personal assistant, Huma Abedin. 
The FBI obtained a search warrant to review the emails 2 days later, on 
October 30, 2016.  Over the next 6 days, the FBI processed and reviewed a large 
volume of emails.  On November 6, 2016, 2 days before the election, Comey sent a 
second letter to Congress stating that the review of the emails on the laptop had 
not changed the FBI’s earlier conclusions with respect to Clinton.  
The OIG initiated this review on January 12, 2017, in response to requests 
from numerous Chairmen and Ranking Members of Congressional oversight 
committees, various organizations, and members of the public to investigate 
various decisions made in the Midyear investigation.  The OIG announced that it 
would review the following issues: 
 Allegations that Department or FBI policies or procedures were not 
followed in connection with, or in actions leading up to or related to, 
Comey’s public announcement on July 5, 2016, and Comey’s letters to 
Congress on October 28 and November 6, 2016, and that certain 
underlying investigative decisions were based on improper 
considerations; 
 Allegations that then FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe should have 
been recused from participating in certain investigative matters; 
 Allegations that then Assistant Attorney General for the Department’s 
Office of Legislative Affairs, Peter Kadzik, improperly disclosed non-
public information to the Clinton campaign and/or should have been 
recused from participating in certain matters; 
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 Allegations that Department and FBI employees improperly disclosed 
non-public information; and 
 Allegations that decisions regarding the timing of the FBI’s release of 
certain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents on October 30 
and November 1, 2016, and the use of a Twitter account to publicize 
the same, were influenced by improper considerations. 
The OIG announcement added that “if circumstances warrant, the OIG will 
consider including other issues that may arise during the course of the review.”  
One such issue that the OIG added to the scope of this review arose from the 
discovery of text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on 
the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers, that 
expressed statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and 
statements of support for then candidate Clinton, as well as comments about the 
handling of the Midyear investigation.  We addressed whether these 
communications evidencing a potential bias affected investigative decisions in the 
Midyear investigation. 
This review is separate from the review the OIG announced on March 28, 
2018, concerning the Department’s and FBI’s compliance with legal requirements, 
and with applicable Department and FBI policies and procedures, in applications 
filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) relating to a 
certain U.S. person.  We will issue a separate report relating to those issues when 
our investigative work is complete at a future date. 
II. Methodology 
During the course of this investigation, the OIG interviewed more than 100 
witnesses, several on more than one occasion.  These included former Director 
Comey, former AG Lynch, former Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Sally Yates, 
members of the former AG’s and DAG’s staffs, FBI agents and supervisors and 
Department attorneys and supervisors who conducted the Midyear investigation, 
personnel from the FBI’s New York Field Office (NYO) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) involved in the Anthony Weiner 
investigation, former and current members of the FBI’s senior executive leadership, 
and former President Clinton. 
All of the former Department and FBI officials we contacted to request 
interviews related to the Midyear investigation agreed to be interviewed.  However, 
two witnesses with whom we requested interviews in connection with our review of 
whether Peter Kadzik, the former Assistant Attorney General for the Department’s 
Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), should have been recused from certain matters 
declined our request for an interview or were unable to schedule an interview. 
We also reviewed significantly more than 1.2 million documents.  Among 
these were FBI documents from the Midyear investigation, including electronic 
communications (EC) and interview reports (FD-302s), agent notes from witness 
interviews, draft and final versions of the letterhead memorandum (LHM) 
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summarizing the Midyear investigation, drafts of Comey’s public statement and 
letters to Congress, and contemporaneous notes from agents and supervisors 
involved in meetings about the statement and letters to Congress.  We also 
obtained documents from prosecutors and supervisors in the Department’s National 
Security Division (NSD) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
Virginia (EDVA), as well as the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) and 
the Office of the Attorney General (OAG).  Importantly, among these documents 
were contemporaneous notes from the prosecutors and supervisors involved in the 
investigation. 
In connection with our efforts to investigate the circumstances surrounding 
the FBI’s discovery of Midyear-related emails on Anthony Weiner’s laptop computer 
and Comey’s notification to Congress on October 28, 2016, we obtained documents 
from NYO and SDNY personnel.  These documents included forensic logs from 
processing of the Weiner laptop by NYO Computer Analysis and Recovery Team 
(CART) personnel, NYO and SDNY communications about the discovery of the 
emails, and other documents. 
We obtained communications between and among agents, prosecutors, 
supervisors, and FBI and Department officials to understand what happened during 
the investigation and identify the contemporaneous factors considered in making 
investigative decisions.  In addition to a large volume of emails, we obtained and 
reviewed well in excess of 100,000 text messages and instant messages to or from 
FBI personnel who worked on the investigation. 
Our review also included the examination of highly classified information.  We 
were given broad access to relevant materials by the Department and the FBI, 
including the sensitive compartmented information (SCI) discussed in the classified 
appendix to this report and emails and instant messages from both the FBI’s Top 
Secret SCINet system and Secret FBINet system.  Several of the State Department 
emails between Secretary Clinton and her staff from the underlying Midyear 
investigation included information relevant to a tightly-held Special Access Program 
(SAP), and we did not seek or obtain the required read-ins for that program.  Based 
on our review of emails containing redacted SAP and the FBI’s explanation of the 
program, we determined that this information was not needed for us to make the 
findings in this report. 
Finally, and as discussed in more detail below, our review included 
information obtained in the Midyear investigation and the Anthony Weiner child 
exploitation investigation pursuant to grand jury subpoenas and sealed search 
warrants.  At the Inspector General’s request, the Department sought court orders 
authorizing the release of sealed information that does not otherwise affect 
individual privacy interests so that we can include relevant information in this 
report.  This information is included in the report where appropriate. 
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III. Analytical Construct 
As noted above, the OIG undertook this review to determine, among other 
things, whether “certain investigative decisions [taken in connection with the 
Midyear investigation] were based on improper considerations,” including political 
bias or concerns for personal gain.  In conducting this portion of our review, it was 
necessary to select particular investigative decisions for focused attention.  It would 
not have been possible to recreate and analyze every decision made in a year-long 
complex investigation.  We therefore identified particular case decisions or other 
incidents which were the subject of controversy.  These included the use of consent 
agreements and voluntary interviews to obtain evidence; grants of immunity to 
witnesses; and the decision to allow Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson, two of 
former Secretary Clinton’s attorneys, to attend her interview. 
During our investigation, we looked for direct evidence of improper 
considerations, such as contemporaneous statements in emails, memoranda, or 
other documents explicitly linking political or other improper considerations to 
specific investigative decisions.  We likewise questioned witnesses about whether 
they had direct evidence of improper considerations affecting decisionmaking.  As 
noted above, we reviewed significantly more than 1.2 million emails, text 
messages, and internal documents relating to the investigation, and interviewed 
more than 100 witnesses who were involved in the matter. 
We also analyzed the justifications offered for the investigative decisions we 
selected for focused review (including contemporaneous justifications and those 
offered after the fact) to determine whether they were a pretext for improper, but 
unstated, considerations.  We conducted this assessment with appreciation for the 
fact that Department and FBI officials were required to make numerous decisions 
involving complex matters daily, under the unusual pressures and challenges 
present in the Midyear investigation. 
In the January 12, 2017 memorandum announcing this review, we stated, 
“Our review will not substitute the OIG’s judgment for the judgments made by the 
FBI or the Department regarding the substantive merits of investigative or 
prosecutive decisions.”  Consistent with this statement, we do not criticize 
particular decisions or infer that they were influenced by improper considerations 
merely because we might have recommended a different investigative strategy or 
tactic based on the facts learned during our investigation.  The question we 
considered was not whether a particular investigative decision was perfect or ideal 
or one that we believed could have been handled more effectively, but whether the 
circumstances surrounding the decision indicated that it was based on 
considerations other than the merits of the investigation.  If the explanations that 
we were given for a particular decision were consistent with a rational investigative 
strategy and not unreasonable, we did not conclude that the decision was based on 
improper considerations in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  We took this 
approach because our role as an OIG is not to second-guess valid discretionary 
judgments made during the course of an investigation, and this approach is 
consistent with the OIG’s handling of such questions in past reviews.   
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We applied this same standard as we reviewed and considered the 
Department’s declination decision, the letterhead memorandum (LHM) summarizing 
the investigation, and contemporaneous emails and notes reflecting analysis and 
discussion of legal research conducted by the prosecutors. 
IV. Structure of the Report 
This report is divided into sixteen chapters.  Following this introduction, 
Chapter Two summarizes the relevant Department policies governing the release of 
information to the public and to Congress and the conduct of criminal 
investigations, as well as the relevant statutes regarding the mishandling of 
classified information that provided the legal framework for the Midyear 
investigation. 
In Chapter Three, we provide an overview of the Midyear investigation, 
including decisions about staffing and investigative strategy.  In Chapter Four, we 
discuss the decision to publicly acknowledge the Midyear investigation and former 
President Obama’s statements about the Midyear investigation.  In Chapter Five, 
we discuss the conduct of the investigation, focusing on the significant investigative 
decisions that were subject to criticism by Congress and the public after the fact.  
In Chapters Six and Seven, we describe the events leading to former Director 
Comey’s July 5 statement and the Department’s decision to decline prosecution of 
former Secretary Clinton.  Chapters Eight through Eleven provide a chronology of 
events between the FBI’s discovery of Clinton-related emails on the Weiner laptop 
in late September 2016 and Comey’s letter to Congress on October 28, 2016, and 
describe the FBI’s analysis of those emails and letter to Congress on November 6, 
2016. 
Chapter Twelve describes the text messages and instant messages 
expressing political views we obtained between certain FBI employees involved in 
the Midyear investigation and provides the employees’ explanations for those 
messages.  It also briefly discusses the use of personal email by several FBI 
employees, and provides an update on the status of the OIG’s leak investigations. 
Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen address allegations that then Deputy 
Director Andrew McCabe and then Assistant Attorney General Peter Kadzik should 
have been recused from participating in certain matters, or violated the terms of 
their recusals. 
Chapter Fifteen addresses allegations that the timing of the FBI’s release of 
FOIA documents and its use of Twitter to publicize the release were influenced by 
improper considerations or were otherwise improper. 
Chapter Sixteen includes our conclusions and recommendations. 
We also include a non-public classified appendix, which discusses highly 
classified information relevant to the Midyear investigation (Appendix One), and a 
non-public Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) appendix containing the complete, 
unmodified version of Chapter Thirteen (Appendix Two). 
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We are providing copies of our unclassified report and the classified appendix 
to Congress, and are publicly releasing our report without these appendices.  We 
also are providing copies of our unclassified report to the Office of Special Counsel 
(OSC) for its consideration.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
APPLICABLE LAWS AND DEPARTMENT POLICIES 
In this chapter, we describe the applicable laws, regulations, policies, and 
practices that govern the conduct of the Midyear investigation and are relevant to 
the analysis in the report.  We identify specific Department and FBI policies related 
to investigative steps taken during the Midyear investigation, overt investigative 
activities in advance of an election, and the disclosure of information to the media 
and to Congress.  We also describe the Department regulations governing the 
appointment of a special counsel. 
Finally, we summarize the criminal statutes relevant to the Midyear 
investigation.  These statutes provide the legal framework for our discussion of the 
investigative strategy and the FBI’s and Department’s assessment of the evidence 
in subsequent chapters. 
I. Policies and Laws Governing Criminal Investigations 
Under federal law, investigators and prosecutors are given substantial 
authority and discretion in conducting criminal investigations.  To navigate 
challenges and issues that they may face during these investigations, and to assist 
them in exercising their authority and discretion appropriately, the Department 
maintains the United States Attorneys Manual (USAM) as a “comprehensive...quick 
and ready reference for...attorneys responsible for the prosecution of violations of 
federal law.”  USAM 1-1.2000, 1-1.1000.  In reviewing investigative decisions made 
during the Midyear investigation, we identified several provisions of the USAM of 
potential relevance. 
The principles guiding the exercise of decisions related to federal 
prosecutorial discretion and those relevant to criminal prosecutions can be found 
within USAM Title 9-27.000, the Principles of Federal Prosecution.  There the 
Department lays out guidance for federal prosecutors with the intent of “ensuring 
the fair and effective exercise of prosecutorial discretion and responsibility by 
attorneys for the government, and promoting confidence on the part of the public 
and individual defendants that important prosecutorial decisions will be made 
rationally and objectively on the merits of the facts and circumstances of each 
case.”  USAM 9-27.001.  USAM Section 9-27.220 specifies grounds for commencing 
or declining prosecution, stating that an attorney for the government should 
commence or recommend federal prosecution if he or she believes that the person’s 
conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will 
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless the prosecution 
would serve no substantial federal interest, the person is subject to effective 
prosecution in another jurisdiction, or there exists an adequate non-criminal 
alternative to prosecution.  This section also states, “[B]oth as a matter of 
fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no 
prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the attorney for the 
government believes that the admissible evidence is sufficient to obtain and sustain 
a guilty verdict by an unbiased trier of fact.” 
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A. Grand Jury Subpoenas 
A federal grand jury is a group of sixteen to twenty-three eligible citizens, 
empaneled by a federal court that considers evidence in order to decide if there has 
been a violation of federal law.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(a)(1).  It is the responsibility of 
federal prosecutors “to advise the grand jury on the law and to present evidence for 
its consideration.”  USAM 9-11.010. 
Grand jury subpoenas are one tool frequently used by federal prosecutors to 
collect evidence to present to a grand jury.  USAM 9-11.120, Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.  
There are two types of grand jury subpoenas:  (1) a grand jury subpoena ad 
testificandum which compels an individual to testify before the grand jury; and (2) 
a grand jury subpoena duces tecum which compels an individual or entity, such as 
a business, to produce documents, records, tangible objects, or other physical 
evidence to the grand jury.  G.J. Manual § 5.2; Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1 
Federal prosecutors have “considerable latitude in issuing [grand jury] 
subpoenas.”  G.J. Manual § 5.4 (quoting Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985)).  Nonetheless, “the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited.”  G.J. 
Manual § 5.1 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)).  A court 
may quash a grand jury subpoena, upon motion, “if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.  In addition, a grand jury 
subpoena cannot override the invocation of a valid “constitutional, common-law, or 
statutory privilege” and cannot be used when “a federal statute requires the use of 
a search warrant or other court order.”  G.J. Manual § 5.1 (quoting Branzburg, 
408 U.S. at 688) and §§ 5.6, 5.26.  These limitations are discussed, insofar as they 
are relevant to this review, in subparts I.B., I.C., and 1.E. of this chapter. 
There are also policy limitations governing the use of grand jury subpoenas.  
For example, the USAM provides guidelines for issuing grand jury subpoenas to 
attorneys regarding their representation of clients.2  USAM 9-13.410.  These 
guidelines are discussed in subpart I.B. of this chapter.  In addition, the USAM 
generally advises prosecutors to consider alternatives to grand jury subpoenas, 
such as obtaining testimony and other evidence by consent, in light of the 
requirement that the government maintain the secrecy of any testimony or 
evidence accessed through the grand jury.  USAM 9-11.254(1). 
B. Search Warrants and 2703(d) Orders 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unlawful searches and 
seizures of their property.  Generally, the government must obtain a search warrant 
                                       
1  Federal Grand Jury Practice, Office of Legal Education (October 2008), available at 
https://dojnet.doj.gov/usao/eousa/ole/usabook/gjma/index.htm. 
2  The USAM also provides guidelines for the use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain testimony 
from targets or subjects of an investigation.  “Target” means a “person as to whom the prosecutor or 
the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in 
the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant,” while “subject” means a “person whose 
conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation.”  USAM 9-11.151. 
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before searching a person’s property in which the person retains a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).  
Courts have held that individuals retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in data 
held within electronic storage devices, such as computers and cellular telephones.  
E.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 
391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001).  To obtain a search warrant pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 (Rule 41 search warrant), the government must make a 
showing of facts under oath demonstrating probable cause to believe that the 
property to be searched contains evidence of a crime.  Thus, while the government 
may issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain an electronic device, such as a 
computer or cellular telephone, the government generally will only be able to 
search the electronic device if it can demonstrate probable cause to believe the 
device contains evidence of a crime. 
In addition, as discussed above, a grand jury subpoena cannot be used when 
“a federal statute requires the use of a search warrant or other court order.”  The 
Stored Communications Act provides that the government must obtain a search 
warrant in order to require a “provider of electronic communication service” to 
produce the contents of a subscriber’s electronic communication that have been in 
electronic storage for 180 days or less.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  For the content 
of electronic communications that have been in electronic storage for more than 
180 days, the government must usually either obtain a search warrant or provide 
prior notice to the subscriber or customer and obtain a court order or subpoena.3  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).  Thus, except for specific circumstances, in order to 
obtain the contents of an individual’s email communications that are older than 180 
days from a communications service provider such as Yahoo! or Google (Gmail) 
without notifying the subscriber in advance, the government must first obtain a 
Rule 41 search warrant upon a showing of probable cause that the stored emails in 
possession of the provider contain evidence of a crime. 
Independent of whether the government can make the requisite probable 
cause showing to warrant a Rule 41 search warrant, the government may be able 
to obtain a court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2703(d) order).  A 
2703(d) order requires a communications service provider to produce information 
related to an individual’s email account other than the content of the individual’s 
emails, such as subscriber information and email header information.  A court will 
issue a 2703(d) order if the government “offers specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that...the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
                                       
3  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(b)(ii), the court may permit delays in noticing a 
subscriber/customer for up to 90 days to avoid the adverse results listed at 18 U.S.C. § 2705.  Those 
adverse results include:  (A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from 
prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or 
(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial. 
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C. Evidence Collection Related to Attorney-Client Relationships 
The USAM contains guidelines for the use of subpoenas and search warrants 
to obtain information from attorneys related to their representation of clients. 
When a subpoena issued to an attorney may relate to information concerning 
the attorney’s representation of a client, the USAM mandates additional process.  
USAM 9-13.410.  As a preliminary matter, all reasonable attempts must be made to 
obtain the information from alternative sources (specifically including by consent) 
before issuing the subpoena to the attorney, unless such efforts would compromise 
the investigation.  The Department thereafter exercises “close control” over the 
issuance of such a subpoena.  Before seeking such a subpoena, it “must first be 
authorized by the Assistant Attorney General or a DAAG [Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General] for the Criminal Division” except in unusual circumstances.  Before the 
Department official can authorize the subpoena, several principles must be 
examined regarding the submitted draft subpoena, including: 
 All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternative 
sources shall have proved unsuccessful; 
 The information sought is reasonably needed for the successful 
completion of the investigation; 
 In a criminal investigation, there must be reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been or is being committed, and that the 
information sought is reasonably needed for the successful completion 
of the investigation or prosecution; and 
 The need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse 
effects upon the attorney-client relationship. 
USAM 9-13.410.C. 
The intent behind this additional process is to strike a “balance between an 
individual’s right to the effective assistance of counsel and the public’s interest in 
the fair administration of justice and effective law enforcement.”  USAM 9-
13.410.B. 
The Department similarly exercises “close control” when law enforcement 
seeks the issuance of a search warrant for “the premises of an attorney who is a 
subject of an investigation, and who also is or may be engaged in the practice of 
law on behalf of clients.”  USAM 9-13.420.  Such a search has the potential to 
“effect...legitimate attorney-client relationships” or uncover material “protected by 
a legitimate claim of privilege[.]”  Id.  Therefore, prosecutors “are expected to take 
the least intrusive approach consistent with vigorous and effective law enforcement 
when evidence is sought from an attorney actively engaged in the practice of law.”  
USAM 9-13.420.A.  Unless it would compromise an investigation, the USAM advises 
that consideration be given to obtaining needed information from other sources or 
through the use of consent or a subpoena, rather than issuing such a search 
warrant.  USAM 9-13.420.A.  Consultation with the Criminal Division and approval 
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from an Assistant Attorney General or U.S. Attorney are required as well.  USAM 9-
13.420.B-C. 
The use of process to recover materials from “disinterested third parties,” 
including disinterested third party attorneys, requires consideration of additional 
guidance under 28 C.F.R. § 59.1 and USAM 9-19.220.  Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 
§ 59.1(b), “It is the responsibility of federal officers and employees to...protect 
against unnecessary intrusions.  Generally, when documentary materials are held 
by a disinterested third party, a subpoena, administrative summons, or 
governmental request will be an effective alternative to the use of a search warrant 
and will be considerably less intrusive.”  Similarly, USAM 9-19.220 provides, “As 
with other disinterested third parties, a search warrant should normally not be used 
to obtain...confidential materials” from a disinterested third party attorney. 
D. Use of Classified Evidence Before A Grand Jury 
The classification of information and evidence can be another significant 
challenge for a federal prosecutor advising a grand jury.  See USAM 9-90.230.  
Because jurors lack security clearances, the disclosure of such information “may 
only be done with the approval of the agency responsible for classifying the 
information[.]”  USAM 9-90.230.  Though the Department offers measures to 
“increase the likelihood” a classifying agency will approve the use of such 
information, the Department encourages prosecutors to consider several 
alternatives to seeking such disclosures.  Id.  A significant number of limitations 
and high-level Department approvals make seeking approval from the classifying 
agency complex, and inevitably such approval takes additional time.  See USAM 
9-90.200, 210. 
E. Immunity Agreements 
When a witness invokes their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, the government must either forgo the witness’s incriminating 
testimony or offer the witness protection from prosecution resulting from such 
testimony, a protection known as “use immunity.”  28 C.F.R. § 0.175(a), Crim. 
Resource Manual 716.  The term “use immunity” encompasses several degrees of 
legal protections for a witness:  transactional immunity, formal use immunity, letter 
immunity, and “Queen for a Day” agreements.  Crim. Resource Manual 719. 
1. Transactional Immunity 
Transactional immunity offers the highest level of legal protection to a 
compelled witness, protecting the witness from actual prosecution for the offense(s) 
involved in the Grand Jury proceeding.  Crim. Resource Manual 717.  For decades 
prior to 1972, the Supreme Court only recognized transactional immunity as the 
government vehicle to compel testimony from a witness invoking their Fifth 
Amendment rights.  See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-52 (1972). 
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2. Formal Use Immunity 
In 1970, Congress created a framework for the Department to grant formal 
“use immunity” for a witness offering testimony in a federal criminal investigation.  
18 U.S.C. § 6002; Crim. Resource Manual 716.  Unlike transactional immunity, use 
immunity only protects the witness against the government’s use of the immunized 
testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the witness, except for perjury or giving a 
false statement.  Crim. Resource Manual 717.  However, the Supreme Court 
subsequently found that the statutory framework creating formal use immunity also 
prohibits the government from using immunized testimony to discover new 
evidence that is then used to prosecute the witness.  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.  
This additional protection is known as “derivative use immunity.”  Crim. Resource 
Manual 718.  Thus, the government retains the ability to prosecute a witness given 
formal use immunity, but only with evidence obtained independently of the 
witness’s immunized testimony.  Crim. Resource Manual 717-18.  In order to do so, 
the government must overcome a “heavy, albeit not insurmountable burden, by a 
preponderance of the evidence” to demonstrate wholly independent discovery of 
such evidence.  United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 92 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing 
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460). 
To obtain formal, court-ordered use immunity, a U.S. Attorney, after 
obtaining the approval of the Attorney General or her designee and the Criminal 
Division, seeks a court order to compel testimony of a witness appearing before the 
grand jury.  18 U.S.C. § 6003(b); USAM 9-23.130.  Such compelled testimony 
should be sought when the witness’s testimony, in the judgment of the U.S. 
Attorney, is necessary for the public interest and the witness is likely to invoke (or 
has invoked) their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.4  Id.  The 
decision to grant immunity by a designated Department division ultimately requires 
final approval from the Department’s Criminal Division.  Crim. Resource Manual 
720.  Once the U.S. Attorney receives Department approval, he or she submits a 
motion to the judge overseeing the grand jury requesting the order to compel 
testimony from the witness.  Id. at 723. 
3. Letter Immunity and “Queen for a Day” Agreements 
In contrast with transactional and formal use immunity, a witness receiving 
either letter immunity or a “Queen for a Day” agreement is provided legal 
protections by the prosecutor pursuant to an agreement in exchange for the 
witness’s agreement to provide testimony.  Crim. Resource Manual 719.  The legal 
                                       
4  The USAM offers a non-exhaustive list of factors that should be weighed in judging the 
public interest:  (1) the importance of the investigation or prosecution to effective enforcement of the 
criminal laws; (2) the value of the person's testimony or information to the investigation or 
prosecution; (3) the likelihood of prompt and full compliance with a compulsion order, and the 
effectiveness of available sanctions if there is no such compliance; (4) the person’s relative culpability 
in connection with the offense or offenses being investigated or prosecuted, and his or her criminal 
history; (5) the possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling his or her 
testimony; and (6) the likelihood of adverse collateral consequences to the person if he or she testifies 
under a compulsion order.  USAM 9-23.210. 
15 
protections the witness receives for voluntary testimony result from the type of 
agreement the witness makes with the prosecutor.  Id. 
Letter immunity describes an agreement between the prosecuting office and 
the witness that results in a letter from the prosecuting office to the witness 
authorizing the grant of legal protections.5  Id.  While the provisions of the 
agreement can vary, as a general matter letter immunity, like formal immunity, 
only protects the witness against the government’s use of the immunized testimony 
in a subsequent prosecution of the witness, except for perjury or giving a false 
statement.  Crim. Resource Manual 717; see United States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d 
297, 301 (2d Cir. 1990).  Depending on the provisions of the agreement, the 
government may retain the ability to prosecute the witness with evidence obtained 
independently of the witness’s immunized testimony, but as with formal use 
immunity, the government bears a considerable burden in such a prosecution.  
Crim. Resource Manual 717-18; see also Pelletier, 88 F.2d at 303. 
In a “Queen for a Day” agreement, often referred to as a “proffer” 
agreement, a witness “proffers” or informs prosecutors of what the witness would 
state under oath if called to testify and, in exchange, the federal prosecutor agrees 
to limited legal protection for the witness conditioned on the witness’s truthful 
testimony.  Crim. Resource Manual 719.  In a standard “Queen for a Day” 
agreement, the government agrees not to use any statements made by the witness 
pursuant to the proffer agreement against the witness in its case-in-chief in any 
subsequent prosecution of the witness, or in connection with the sentencing of the 
witness if the witness is subsequently prosecuted and convicted.  However, unlike 
with formal use immunity or letter use immunity, the government typically may use 
leads obtained from the witness’s statements to develop evidence against the 
witness and may use the witness’s statements to cross-examine the witness in any 
future prosecution of the witness.  United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Richard B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin, Jr., “Queen for 
a Day” or “Courtesan for a Day”:  The Sixth Amendment Limits to Proffer 
Agreements, 15 No. 9 White–Collar Crime Rep. 1 (2001). 
4. Act of Production Immunity 
Act of production or “Doe” immunity describes a distinct type of immunity 
applying to a witness’s production of records, instead of witness testimony.  USAM 
9-23.250; United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).  The production of records 
by a witness in response to a grand jury subpoena potentially implicates the right 
against self-incrimination if the fact that the witness produced the records could be 
used against the witness in a future prosecution as an admission of the existence 
and possession of the records.  USAM 9-23.250.  The Department uses the same 
procedure to grant act of production immunity as it does for formal use immunity, 
producing a formal letter authorizing the U.S. Attorney to make a motion for a 
judicial order to compel the production of specifically enumerated records in 
                                       
5  The reach of the legal protections offered in such a letter may vary, with some instances of 
letter immunity being restricted to the jurisdiction of a particular U.S. Attorney and others applying in 
multiple districts or extending nationwide, typically with the agreement of the other prosecutors. 
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exchange for not using the witness’ act of production against the witness in a 
subsequent prosecution of the witness.  Id.; Crim. Resource Manual 722.  
Alternatively, the prosecutor can enter into a letter agreement with the individuals.  
In either situation, the act of production immunity does not provide any protection 
for the witness from a future prosecution. 
II. Department Policies and Practices Governing Investigative Activities 
in Advance of an Election 
Department policies require all Department officials to “enforce the laws...in 
a neutral and impartial manner” and to remain “particularly sensitive to 
safeguarding the Department’s reputation for fairness, neutrality, and 
nonpartisanship.”6  Various policies also address investigative activities timed to 
affect an election and require that prosecutors and agents consult with the Criminal 
Division’s Public Integrity Section (PIN) before taking overt investigative steps in 
advance of a primary or general election.  No Department policy contains a specific 
prohibition on overt investigative steps within a particular period before an election.  
Nevertheless, various witnesses testified that the Department has a longstanding 
unwritten practice to avoid overt law enforcement and prosecutorial activities close 
to an election, typically within 60 or 90 days of Election Day.  We discuss relevant 
Department policies and practices below. 
A. Election Year Sensitivities Policy 
In 2008, 2012, and 2016, the then Attorney General issued a memorandum 
“to remind [all Department employees] of the Department’s existing policies with 
respect to political activities.”7  These memoranda are substantially similar.  Each 
memorandum contains two sections, one addressing the investigation and 
prosecution of election crimes and the other describing restrictions imposed on 
Department employees by the Hatch Act.8  In its election crimes section, the 2016 
memorandum requires consultation with PIN at “various stages of all criminal 
matters that focus on violations of federal and state campaign-finance laws, federal 
patronage laws and corruption of the election process.”9  However, the 
memorandum also states the following: 
Simply put, politics must play no role in the decisions of federal 
investigators or prosecutors regarding any investigations or criminal 
                                       
6  See Loretta Lynch, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for all 
Department Employees, Election Year Sensitivities, April 11, 2016, 1. 
7  Lynch, Memorandum for Department Employees, 1; Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Memorandum for all Department Employees, Election Year Sensitivities, March 
9, 2012, 1; Michael Mukasey, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for all 
Department Employees, Election Year Sensitivities, March 5, 2008, 1. 
8  The Hatch Act prohibits Department employees from engaging in partisan political activity 
while on duty, in a federal facility, or using federal property, including using the Internet at work for 
political activities.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2017). 
9  Lynch, Memorandum for Department Employees, 1. 
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charges.  Law enforcement officers and prosecutors may never select 
the timing of investigative steps or criminal charges for the purpose of 
affecting any election, or for the purpose of giving an advantage or 
disadvantage to any candidate or political party.  Such a purpose is 
inconsistent with the Department’s mission and with the Principles of 
Federal Prosecution. 
Likewise, the 2016 memorandum recommends that all Department 
employees consult with PIN whenever an employee is “faced with a question 
regarding the timing of charges or overt investigative steps near the time of a 
primary or general election,” without regard to the type or category of crime at 
issue.10  Ray Hulser, the former Section Chief of PIN who currently is a DAAG in the 
Criminal Division, told us that this policy does not impose a “mandatory consult” 
with PIN, but rather encourages prosecutors to call if they have questions about 
investigative steps or criminal charges before an election. 
B. The Unwritten 60-Day Rule 
After the FBI released its October 28, 2016 letter to Congress informing them 
that the FBI had learned of the existence of additional emails and planned to take 
investigative steps to review them, contemporaneous emails between Department 
personnel highlighted editorials authored by former Department officials discussing 
a longstanding Department practice of delaying overt investigative steps or 
disclosures that could impact an election.  These former officials cited the so-called 
“60-Day Rule,” under which prosecutors avoid public disclosure of investigative 
steps related to electoral matters or the return of indictments against a candidate 
for office within 60 days of a primary or general election.11 
The 60-Day Rule is not written or described in any Department policy or 
regulation.  Nevertheless, high-ranking Department and FBI officials acknowledged 
the existence of a general practice that informs Department decisions.  Former 
Director Comey characterized the practice during his OIG testimony as “a very 
important norm which is...we avoid taking any action in the run up to an election, if 
we can avoid it.”  Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York, told us that the Department’s most explicit policy is about crimes that 
affect the integrity of an election, such as voter fraud, but that there is generalized, 
unwritten guidance that prosecutors do not indict political candidates or use overt 
investigative methods in the weeks before an election. 
                                       
10  During late 2016, Department personnel also considered guidance in The Federal 
Prosecution of Election Offenses prohibiting overt investigative steps before an election.  U.S. 
Department of Justice, The Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, 7th edition (May 2007).  
However, this publication explicitly applies to election crimes, not to criminal investigations that 
involve candidates in an election.  See id. at 91-93. 
11  See Eric Holder, James Comey Is A Good Man, But He Made A Serious Mistake, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 30, 2016; Jamie Gorelick and Larry Thompson, James Comey is Damaging Our Democracy, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2016; Jane Chong, Pre-Election Disclosures: How Does, and Should, DOJ Analyze 
Edge Cases, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/pre-election-disclosures-how-
does-and-should-doj-analyze-edge-cases (accessed May 8, 2018). 
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Several Department officials described a general principle of avoiding 
interference in elections rather than a specific time period before an election during 
which overt investigative steps are prohibited.  Former AG Lynch told the OIG, “[I]n 
general, the practice has been not to take actions that might have an impact on an 
election, even if it’s not an election case or something like that.”  Former DAG Yates 
stated, “I look at it sort of differently than 60 days.  To me if it were 90 days off, 
and you think it has a significant chance of impacting an election, unless there’s a 
reason you need to take that action now you don’t do it.”  Former Principal 
Associate Deputy Attorney General Matt Axelrod stated, “...DOJ has policies and 
procedures on...how you’re supposed to handle this.  And remember...those 
policies and procedures apply to...every election at whatever level....  They apply, 
you know, months before....  [P]eople sometimes have a misimpression there’s a 
magic 60-day rule or 90-day rule.  There isn’t.  But...the closer you get to the 
election the more fraught it is.” 
Hulser told the OIG that there was “a sense, there still is, that there is a rule 
out there, that there is some specific place where it says 60 days or 90 days back 
from a primary or general [election], that you can’t indict or do specific 
investigative steps.”  He said that there is not any such specific rule, and there 
never has been, but that there is a general admonition that politics should play no 
role in investigative decisions, and that taking investigative steps to impact an 
election is inconsistent with the Department’s mission and violates the principles of 
federal prosecution. 
Hulser said that while working on the Election Year Sensitivities 
memorandum, they considered codifying the substance of the 60-Day Rule, but 
that they rejected that approach as unworkable, and instead included the general 
admonition described above.  Citing PIN guidance, Hulser told OIG that a 
prosecutor should look to the needs of the case and significant investigative steps 
should be taken “when the case is ready, not earlier or later.”12 
III. Public Allegations of Wrongdoing Against Uncharged Individuals and 
Disclosure of Information in a Criminal Investigation 
The USAM instructs prosecutors that “[i]n all public filings and proceedings, 
federal prosecutors should remain sensitive to the privacy and reputation interests 
of uncharged third-parties” and that there is ordinarily no legitimate governmental 
interest in the public allegation of wrongdoing by an uncharged party.  USAM 9-
27.760.  Accordingly, even where prosecutors have concluded that an uncharged 
individual committed a crime, Department policies generally prohibit the naming of 
unindicted individuals (as well as co-conspirators) because their privacy and 
reputational interests merit significant consideration and protection.  See USAM 9-
11.130, 9-16.500, 9-27.760. 
                                       
12  Hulser produced an excerpt of a publication, written by a former Deputy Chief of PIN, 
discussing the issues involved in choosing the timing for charging a public corruption case.  U.S. 
Department of Justice, Prosecution of Public Corruption Cases (February 1988), 214-15. 
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Department regulations governing interactions with the media recognize that 
“[t]he availability to news media of information in criminal and civil cases is a 
matter which has become increasingly a subject of concern in the administration of 
justice.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.2(a)(1).  Addressing this concern, the FBI issued a Media 
Relations Policy Guide for FBI personnel.  The FBI Media Relations Policy Guide 
recognizes that the regulations found at 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 lay out specific and 
controlling guidelines addressing the release of information to the media from 
Department authorities as well as from subordinate law enforcement components, 
including the FBI.  Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.1.  The FBI Media Relations Policy 
Guide also recognizes that the USAM offers further specific guidance consistent with 
federal regulations in its Media Policy section “governing the release of 
information...by all components (FBI...and DOJ divisions) and personnel of the 
Department of Justice.”  USAM 1-7.001.  The Department’s policy and regulations 
forbid the confirmation or denial and any discussion of active investigations, except 
in limited, specified circumstances.  USAM 1-7.530.  Taken together, these 
documents offer an understanding of Department operations related to the media, 
particularly publicity around FBI investigations. 
A. FBI Media Relations Policy 
In October 2015, the FBI issued the version of its Media Relations at FBI 
Headquarters (HQ) and in Field Offices Policy Guide (“FBI Media Policy Guide”) 
pertinent to this review.13  The FBI Media Policy Guide recognizes that the FBI 
Office of Public Affairs (FBI OPA) “works to enhance the public’s trust and 
confidence in the FBI by releasing and promoting information about the FBI’s 
responsibilities, operations, accomplishments, policies, and values.”  The FBI Media 
Policy Guide confirms that FBI OPA “operations are governed by DOJ-OPA’s 
instructions, located at Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 50.2, and by 
the United States Attorneys’ Manual [USAM], Title 1-7.000, ‘Media Relations.’”  As 
such, where the guidance in the FBI Media Policy Guide conflicts with the USAM or 
28 C.F.R. § 50.2, the USAM and Code of Federal Regulations control FBI media 
practices. 
In its provisions governing disclosure of information to the media from FBI 
Headquarters in Washington, the FBI Media Policy Guide states “the [FBI] Director, 
[FBI] deputy director (DD), associate deputy director (ADD), [Assistant Director] 
for [FBI] OPA, and [FBI] OPA personnel designated by the [OPA Assistant Director] 
are authorized to speak to the media.”  However “[a]ll releases of information 
by...any FBI personnel...authorized to speak to the media must conform with all 
applicable laws and regulations, as well as policies issued by DOJ,” which includes 
specific reference to the USAM, among other Department legal authorities.  The FBI 
Media Policy Guide itself constrains authorized disclosures, explaining “[d]isclosures 
                                       
13  The October 2015 FBI Media Policy Guide is available online in the FBI records vault.  See 
FBI Office of Public Affairs, Media Relations at FBIHQ and in Field Offices Policy Guide, October 13, 
2015, https://go.usa.gov/xQNXQ (accessed May 7, 2018).  On November 14, 2017, the FBI released a 
significantly revised guidance for media relations entitled Public Affairs Policy Guide: Media Relations, 
External Communications, and Personal Use of Social Media. 
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must not prejudice an adjudicative proceeding and...must not address an ongoing 
investigation” except in specified circumstances.14  The FBI Media Policy Guide 
offers limited justifications to release information regarding an ongoing 
investigation, specifying the need “to assure the public that an investigation is in 
progress[,]...to protect the public interest, welfare, or safety,...[or] to solicit 
information from the public that might be relevant to an investigation.”  Any such 
release requires “prior approval of FBIHQ entities...[and] the careful supervision of 
OPA.” 
The FBI Media Policy Guide specifies that when releasing information to the 
media via a press conference, FBI OPA personnel “must request approval...in 
advance from DOJ-OPA for any case or investigation that may result in an 
indictment.”  Further, FBI personnel “must coordinate with DOJ OPA on any 
materials, quotes, or information to be released in the press conference.” 
B. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 
In all criminal matters, federal regulations bar Department personnel from 
“furnish[ing] any statement or information...if such a statement or information may 
reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of...a future trial.”  28 C.F.R. 
§ 50.2(b)(2).  The regulation also provides that “where information relating to the 
circumstances of...an investigation would be highly prejudicial or where the release 
thereof would serve no law enforcement function, such information should not be 
made public.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3). 
The regulations permit, subject to limitations, some facts to be released 
publicly, including a defendant’s name, age, and similar background information, 
the substance of the charges at issue, specified details regarding an investigation, 
and the circumstances surrounding an arrest.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3).  But 
while permitting this limited release, the regulation specifies that the Department 
personnel making the public “disclosures should include only incontrovertible, 
factual matters, and should not include subjective observations.”  Id.  These strict 
limitations “shall apply to the release of information to news media from the time a 
person is the subject of a criminal investigation until any proceeding resulting from 
such an investigation has been terminated by trial or otherwise.”  28 C.F.R. 
§ 50.2(b)(1).  A Department official explained to the OIG that “otherwise” included 
criminal actions ended when the Department declines to prosecute. 
The regulations do provide for exceptions, acknowledging situations in which 
the regulations “limit the release of information which would not be prejudicial 
under the particular circumstances.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(9).  When a Department 
official believes that “in the interest of the fair administration of justice and the law 
enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be released, in a 
particular case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney General or the 
Deputy Attorney General to do so.”  Id. 
                                       
14  When FBI officials make a public comment, the FBI Office of General Counsel “must advise 
FBI OPA on the potential impact of public comment on...proposed and pending litigation.” 
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C. USAM Media Relations Guidance 
The Attorney General’s central role to information disclosures to the media is 
also recognized in the USAM’s Media Relations policy.15  See USAM 1-7.210.  The 
USAM makes clear that “[f]inal responsibility for all matters involving the news 
media and the [Department] is vested in the Director of the Office of Public Affairs 
(OPA)” and, without exception, the “Attorney General is to be kept fully informed of 
appropriate matters at all times.”  USAM 1-7.210. 
The USAM’s Media Relations section offers several provisions governing how 
information disclosure to the media may permissibly take place.  Overall, the USAM 
1-701(E) requires “any public communication by any...investigative agency about 
pending matters or investigations that may result in a case, or about pending cases 
or final dispositions, must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney 
General, the United States Attorney, or other designate responsible for the case.”  
Reinforcing a general principle of non-disclosure, the USAM declares “[a]t no time 
shall any component or personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any 
statement or information that he or she knows or reasonably should know will have 
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”  USAM 
1-7.500. 
In keeping with that principle, USAM 1-7.530 instructs Department personnel 
that, except in unusual circumstances, they “shall not respond to questions about 
the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment on its nature or progress, 
including such things as the issuance or serving of a subpoena, prior to the public 
filing of the document.”  Those unusual circumstances where comment may be 
appropriate included “matters that have already received substantial publicity, or 
about which the community needs to be reassured that the appropriate law 
enforcement agency is investigating the incident, or where release of information is 
necessary to protect the public interest, safety, or welfare[.]”  USAM 1-7.530.  But 
in any such circumstances, “the involved investigative agency will consult and 
obtain approval from the...Department Division handling the matter prior to 
disseminating any information to the media.”  Id. 
USAM 1-7.401 addresses specifically press conferences, emphasizing a 
preference for written press releases as the “usual method to release public 
information...by investigative agencies.”  While permissible, press conferences 
“should be held only for the most significant and newsworthy actions, or if a 
particularly important deterrent or law enforcement purpose would be served.  
Prudence and caution should be exercised in the conduct of any press 
conference[.]”  USAM 1-7.401.  Repeatedly the USAM states that before holding a 
                                       
15  The Department significantly revised the USAM Media Relations provisions in November 
2017, retitling them under “Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy.”  This report primarily 
addresses the USAM Media Relations provisions in effect at the time of the events within the scope of 
this review.  We consider the revised USAM provisions related to the media in Chapter Six of this 
report. 
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press conference “prior coordination with OPA is required” for information “of 
national significance.”  USAM 1-7.330(B), 1-7.401(B). 
IV. Release of Information to Congress 
The provision of information from the Department and the FBI to Congress is 
governed by Department policy guidance, the USAM, and FBI rules.16 
A. USAM Congressional Relations Guidance 
Under the USAM Title 1-8.000, and consistent with 28 C.F.R. § 0.27, 
communications between Congress and the Department are the responsibility of the 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA).17  As written, the 
USAM 1-8.000 generally addresses personnel within the staff of the various United 
States Attorneys’ Offices.  However, USAM 1-8.000 explicitly applies to Department 
components and several provisions of the USAM guidance regarding the 
Department’s congressional relations bind all Department personnel.18 
One such provision is USAM 1-8.030 requiring coordination of a Department 
response when Congress seeks information that is not public.  USAM 1-8.030 states 
“[a]ll Congressional requests for information (other than public information), 
meetings of any type, or assistance must immediately be referred to the...OLA[.]”  
The USAM lists the following examples of congressional requests requiring referral 
to OLA: “requests for non-public documents or information; discussion of or 
requests for briefings on cases;...[and] suggestions or comments on case 
disposition or other treatment[.]”  USAM 1-8.030.  These standards apply “in both 
open and closed cases” and the USAM highlights a specific bar on “provid[ing] 
information on (1) pending investigations;...(3) matters that involve grand jury, 
tax, or other restricted information; (4) matters that would reveal...sensitive 
investigative techniques, deliberative processes, the reasoning behind the exercise 
                                       
16  We note that the policies and rules described herein do not restrict lawful whistleblowing, 
protections for which were recognized by Attorney General Sessions in a recent memorandum 
reiterating the Department’s “commit[ment] to protecting the rights of whistleblowers (i.e., those 
employees or applicants who have made a lawfully protected disclosure to Congress).”  Jefferson B. 
Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for All Heads of Department 
Components, Communications with Congress, May 2, 2018, 2. 
17  According to the Code of Federal Regulations, “[t]he following-described matters are 
assigned to, and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Assistant Attorney General, Office 
of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs: (a) Maintaining liaison between the Department and the 
Congress.”  28 C.F.R. § 0.27. 
18  While the AAG of OLA “is responsible for communications between Congress and the 
Department under the authority of the Attorney General” per the USAM, that authority does not 
override statutory reporting requirements to Congress, such as those required for the OIG found at 5 
U.S.C. App. 4(a)(5). 
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of prosecutorial discretion, or the identity of individuals who may have been 
investigated but not indicted.”19  Id. 
B. FBI Guidance on Information Sharing with Congress 
The FBI’s status as the primary investigative agency of the federal 
government makes its sharing of information with Congress of special concern.  
Relevant guidance is provided in The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic 
FBI Operations (“AGG-Dom”) and the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations 
Guide (“DIOG”).  The AGG-Dom directs that the FBI may “disseminate information 
obtained or produced” through its domestic investigations “to congressional 
committees as authorized by the Department of Justice Office of Legislative 
Affairs.”20  AGG-Dom § VI.B.1(c).  This direction is reinforced in the DIOG’s section 
on the retention and sharing of information, which states “that the FBI may 
disseminate information obtained or produced through activities under the AGG-
Dom...[t]o Congress or to congressional committees in coordination with the FBI 
Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs.”  
DIOG § 14.3.1(D).  Notably, both the AGG-DOM and DIOG anticipate circumstances 
requiring departure from their rules.  DIOG §§ 2.6-2.7.  The DIOG spells out how 
such departures may occur, usually involving high-level FBI approval, coordination 
with the FBI Office of General Counsel, and notice and/or approval at the highest 
levels of the Department of Justice.  Id. 
C. Current Department Policy on Communication of Investigative 
Information to Congress 
While the USAM, AGG-Dom, and DIOG lay out the consistent institutional 
relationships in the Department and its components for Congressional information 
flow, the Department also uses policy memoranda and other communications to 
provide guidance on how communication should be handled with Congress in 
sensitive, investigation-related circumstances.  Among these are two memoranda 
governing Department communications with Congress and a letter addressing the 
principles of Department communications with Congress on ongoing investigations. 
                                       
19  On its face, this portion of USAM 1-8.030 addresses U.S. Attorney’s Offices specifically.  But 
the provision thereafter offers broader guidance that “[a]ll requests for these types of information 
should be referred to OLA[.]”  USAM 1-8.030.  Moreover, a Department official with long-term 
experience in OLA explained that he viewed the entirety of the USAM guidance on Congressional 
Relations as helping to understand “the playing field on which we operate in terms of a sensitivity of 
congressional contacts.” 
20  The FBI is required to coordinate with OLA before sending formal communications to 
Congress regarding substantive matters that impact the Department.  According to a Department 
official with long-term experience in OLA, the FBI can sometimes speak to Congress more informally 
by email or phone about certain types of matters like procedural matters, without first obtaining OLA 
approval. 
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1. Policy Memoranda on Department Communications with 
Congress 
On May 11, 2009, then Attorney General Holder issued a policy 
memorandum for all Department components (including the FBI) entitled 
Communications with Congress and the White House (“May 2009 Memo”).  In 
addressing pending criminal investigations and cases, the May 2009 Memo 
explained that the heads of investigative agencies, tasked with the primary duty of 
initiating and supervising cases, “must be insulated from influences that should not 
affect decisions in particular criminal...cases.”  The May 2009 Memo continues that 
for communications with Congress, consistent with “policies, laws, regulations, or 
professional ethical obligations...and consistent with the need to avoid publicity that 
may undermine a particular investigation,” congressional inquiries related to 
pending criminal investigations and cases “should be directed to the Attorney 
General or [DAG].”21 
On August 17, 2009, then Attorney General Holder issued an updated memo 
(“August 2009 Memo”) entitled Communications with Congress.  The August 2009 
Memo clarified that all inquiries from congressional officials should be directed to 
DOJ OLA.  The August 2009 Memo also spelled out that “all communications 
between the Department and Congress...should be managed by OLA to ensure that 
relevant Department interests and other Executive Branch interests are protected.”  
“[C]omponents should not communicate with members, committees, or 
congressional staff without advance coordination with OLA.”  The August 2009 
Memo concluded with direction for component heads to contact DOJ OLA for any 
questions on the policy.22 
2. The Linder Letter 
In a January 2000 letter from the Department’s AAG for OLA to then 
Congressman John Linder (“Linder letter”), the Department described in detail the 
principles that guide OLA and the Department in their decision to disclose or 
withhold information from Congress.  The letter remains a reference guide for OLA. 
The Linder letter lays out “governing principles” to foster “improved 
communications and sensitivity between the Executive and Legislative Branches 
regarding our respective institutional needs and interests.”  After discussing the 
general tension between the interests of the two branches, the Linder letter 
                                       
21  The May 2009 Memo exempts congressional hearing communications and communications 
internal to an investigation from this requirement.  The August 2009 Memo does not include any 
exemption for congressional hearing communications. 
22  On January 29 and May 2, 2018, Attorney General Sessions released memoranda also 
entitled Communications with Congress that reiterated and expanded direction to Department and 
component personnel regarding coordination with OLA “[c]onsistent with past policy and practice[.]”  
Among other changes, the May 2018 memorandum states “communications between the Department 
and Congress...will be managed or coordinated by [OLA] to ensure that relevant Department and 
Executive Branch interests are fully protected.”  In addition, the May 2018 memorandum states that 
“OLA will review prior to transmittal all Department written communications to Congress, including 
letters...and any other materials intended for submission or presentation on Capitol Hill.” 
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examines the “inherent threat to the integrity of the Department’s law enforcement 
and litigation functions” that comes from congressional inquiries during pending 
investigations.  The letter noted that this concern was “especially significant with 
respect to ongoing law enforcement investigations.”  It then described the 
Department’s longstanding policy, “dating back to the beginning of the 20th 
Century,” to decline to provide congressional committees with access to open law 
enforcement files.  One risk, according to the letter, is the possible public 
perception that such congressional inquiries amount to pressure resulting in “undue 
political and Congressional influence over law enforcement and litigation decisions.”  
Another risk is the “severe[] damage” to the reputations of those mentioned in 
disclosure of information on open matters, “even though the case might ultimately 
not warrant prosecution or other legal action.” 
Finally, even when an investigation results in a declination, the Linder letter 
explains that the disclosure of information contained in such a declination 
memorandum “would implicate significant individual privacy interests as well.”  
Such information “often contain[s] unflattering personal information as well as 
assessments of witness credibility and legal positions.  The disclosure of the 
contents of these documents could be devastating to the individuals they discuss.” 
V. Special Counsel Regulations 
Since the 1999 lapse of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, 
Department regulations govern the process of appointing a special counsel.  28 
U.S.C. §§ 591-599, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038 (1999).  According to 28 C.F.R. § 600.1, 
the Attorney General (or Acting Attorney General) may appoint a special counsel for 
the criminal investigation of a person or matter when it would be in the public 
interest and there exists a Department conflict of interest or other extraordinary 
circumstance. 
The regulations provide that the Attorney General need not appoint a special 
counsel immediately when a possible conflict emerges.  Instead, the Attorney 
General may authorize further investigation or mitigation efforts, such as recusal.  
See 28 C.F.R. § 600.2.  The special counsel must come from outside the 
government.23  See 28 C.F.R. § 600.3.  The Attorney General sets the criminal 
jurisdiction of the special counsel through a “specific factual statement of the 
matter to be investigated,” though the Attorney General may authorize the 
                                       
23  In 2003, then Deputy Attorney General James Comey, who was the Acting Attorney 
General after the recusal of then Attorney General John Ashcroft, appointed a U.S. Attorney as special 
counsel in a letter citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, which describe the delegation authority of the 
Attorney General’s office.  See United States v. Scooter Libby, 429 F.Supp. 27, 40 (D.D.C. 2006).  
This method of appointing a special counsel did not rely on Department regulations, eliminating 
restrictions on who may be appointed special counsel and removing guidance setting the Attorney 
General’s supervisory role over the office.  See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.2, 600.7. 
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additional areas of investigation.24  28 C.F.R. §§ 600.3-600.4.  Day to day, the 
special counsel is not subject to Department supervision, but the Attorney General 
maintains the ability to review and overrule special counsel decisions in certain 
circumstances.  28 C.F.R. § 600.7. 
VI. Criminal Statutes Relevant to the Midyear Investigation 
Four statutes governing the handling and retention of classified information 
are relevant to the Midyear investigation:  18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 793(e), 793(f), and 
1924.25  Section 793(f)(1), which prohibits the grossly negligent removal of 
“national defense information,” became a central focus of the investigation and of 
subsequent prosecutive decisions.  In addition to the mishandling and retention 
statutes, prosecutors also considered whether former Secretary Clinton or others 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2071, a criminal statute prohibiting the willful concealment, 
removal, or destruction of federal records, in connection with the deletion of emails.  
We discuss the Department’s analysis of these statutes in Chapter Seven. 
A. Mishandling and Retention of Classified Information 
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e) 
Sections 793(d) and (e) are felony statutes that apply to the willful 
mishandling and retention of classified information.  Section 793(d) governs the 
mishandling of classified documents or information by individuals who are 
authorized to possess it — that is, who have the appropriate security clearance and 
require access to the specific classified information to perform or assist in a lawful 
and authorized governmental function (“need to know”).26  Section 793(d) 
provides: 
Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or 
being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, 
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, 
model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, 
or information relating to the national defense which information the 
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully 
communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, 
transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the 
same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the 
                                       
24  A special counsel’s jurisdiction also covers “federal crimes committed in the course of, and 
with the intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel’s investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of 
justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.”  28 C.F.R. § 600.4. 
25  Under the USAM, the Department’s National Security Division (NSD) must expressly 
approve any prosecution involving these statutory provisions.  See USAM 9-90.020. 
26  See Exec. Order 13526 §§ 4.1(a)(1)-(3), 6.1(dd) (Dec. 29, 2009); see also United States 
v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 919 n.10 (4th Cir. 1980). 
27 
same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of 
the United States entitled to receive it...[is subject to a criminal fine or 
imprisonment]. 
Thus, to prove a violation of Section 793(d), the government must establish the 
following: 
 The individual lawfully had possession of documents or “information 
relating to the national defense;” 
 If information, he or she had reason to believe that the information 
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of 
a foreign nation; and 
 The individual willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the 
document or information to a person not entitled to receive it, or 
willfully retained the document or information and failed to deliver it to 
the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it. 
Section 793(e) addresses the possession and transmission of classified 
information by persons who are not authorized to possess it, either because they 
lacked the requisite security clearance and need to know, or because they exceeded 
the scope of their authorization by removing classified materials from a secure 
facility.27  Apart from this distinction, Sections 793(d) and 793(e) are substantially 
identical. 
Information Relating to the National Defense 
Both 793(d) and 793(e) apply to individuals who possess documents or 
“information relating to the national defense.”  This term is not defined in the 
statute.  Courts have not limited this phrase to any specific subject matter, but the 
Fourth Circuit has held that the government must establish first that the 
information is “closely held by the government,” and second, that its “disclosure 
would be potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy of the 
United States.”  United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 618, 620-21 (E.D. 
Va. 2006) (Rosen I) (citing Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941)); United 
States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1073 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Truong, 
629 F.2d 908, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 817 
(2d Cir. 1945). 
The classification level of information may be “highly probative of whether 
the information at issue is ‘information relating to the national defense’ and 
whether the person to whom they disclosed the information was ‘entitled to receive’ 
                                       
27  See, e.g., United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2013) (Navy 
linguist who printed and removed Secret documents indicted under 793(e)); United States v. Chattin, 
33 M.J. 802, 803 (1991) (Navy seaman who stuffed classified document down his pants and walked 
out of a secure facility charged under 793(e)). 
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[it].”28  However, classification level does not conclusively establish that a 
document or information is “information relating to the national defense.”  In United 
States v. Rosen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694-95 (E.D. Va. 2009) (Rosen II), the court 
stated that the term “information relating to the national defense” is not 
synonymous with classified information.  While the classification level of information 
may serve as evidence that the government intended that it be closely held, the 
defendant can rebut the conclusion by showing that the government in fact failed to 
hold it closely.  The court also stated that the classification level could not be 
introduced to show that unauthorized disclosure of the information might potentially 
damage the United States or aid an enemy of the United States.29 
Willfulness 
Sections 793(d) and (e) both require that the prohibited act be done 
“willfully.”  Courts have interpreted “willfully” to mean an act done “intentionally 
and purposely and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with the 
bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law.”30 
In Rosen I, the court held that to prove that the defendants “willfully” 
committed the conduct prohibited under Sections 793(d) and (e), the government 
is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 
[T]hat the defendants knew the information was NDI [information 
relating to the national defense], i.e., that the information was closely 
held by the United States and that disclosure of this information might 
potentially harm the United States, and that the persons to whom the 
defendants communicated the information were not entitled under the 
classification regulations to receive the information.  Further the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendants communicated the information they had received from 
their government sources with “a bad purpose either to disobey or to 
disregard the law.”  It follows, therefore, that if the defendants, or 
                                       
28  Rosen I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 623; see also Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (document 
marked “Secret” was “information relating to the national defense” because the classification level 
indicated that it would cause serious damage to the security of the United States if lost, and 
defendant’s training placed him on notice that the government considers information in classified 
documents important to national security); United States v. Kiriakou, 2012 WL 3263854, at *6 (E.D. 
Va. 2012) (unreported decision) (rejecting defendant’s argument that 793(d) is unconstitutionally 
vague because courts have relied on the classified status of information to determine whether it is 
closely held by the government and harmful to the United States); United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 
2d 44, 53 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Defendant’s vagueness challenge is particularly unpersuasive in light of the 
fact that he is charged with disclosing the contents of an intelligence report...which was marked TOP 
SECRET/SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION....”). 
29  Several weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, prosecutors moved to dismiss the 
indictment based on the “unexpectedly higher evidentiary threshold” required to prevail at trial.  See 
Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Rosen, Crim. No. 1:05CR225 (E.D. Va. filed May 1, 2009). 
30  Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 190 (1998) (cited in Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 
107-08); see also Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071; United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 918-19 (4th Cir. 
1980). 
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either of them, were truly unaware that the information they are 
alleged to have received and disclosed was classified, or if they were 
truly ignorant of the classification scheme governing who is entitled to 
receive the information, they cannot be held to have violated the 
statute.31 
Additional Burden of Proof for Disclosures of Intangible Information 
Courts have held that Sections 793(d) and (e) contain a “heightened” or 
“additional” mens rea requirement where the transmission of intangible information 
(as contrasted with the retention or transmission of classified documents) is 
involved.32  In addition to showing that an individual acted willfully, the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she possessed “reason to believe 
that the information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the 
advantage of a foreign nation.”33 
Vagueness Challenges 
The term “information relating to the national defense” in Sections 793(d) 
and (e) repeatedly has been challenged as unconstitutionally vague.  Courts have 
rejected such challenges because the statute requires the government to prove that 
an individual “willfully” committed the prohibited conduct, a requirement that 
“eliminat[es] any genuine risk of holding a person ‘criminally responsible for 
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’”34 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) 
Section 793(f)(1), known as the gross negligence provision, became a central 
focus in the controversy over the decision not to recommend prosecution of former 
Secretary Clinton or her senior aides, and former Director Comey’s public statement 
on July 5, 2016.  Below we discuss the statutory requirements under Section 
793(f), the Midyear prosecutors’ interpretation of Section 793(f)(1), and previous 
cases in which prosecution was declined under the gross negligence provision. 
a. Statutory Requirements 
Section 793(f) provides as follows: 
                                       
31  Rosen I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (internal citation omitted). 
32  See Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 105; Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909, 916-17 (D. Md.); 
see also United States v. Leung, No. 03-CR-434 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 14, 2003). 
33  See Rosen I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 643; see also Memorandum Opinion, United States v. 
Sterling, No. 1:10-CR-00485-LHB (filed Jun. 28, 2011) (government asserted that it must prove that 
the defendant acted willfully and had reason to believe the information would harm the United States 
where he is alleged to have disclosed classified information). 
34  Id. at 625; Morison, 844 F.2d at 1073; Truong, 629 F.2d at 918-19 (4th Cir. 1980); see 
also Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941) (holding that information “connected with” or “relating 
to” the national defense used in the predecessor to a related Espionage Act statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague because the statute included a scienter requirement). 
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Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control 
of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, 
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, 
appliance, note, or information, relating to the national defense, (1) 
through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its 
proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, 
or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having 
knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper 
place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, 
or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of 
such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer...[is 
subject to a criminal fine or imprisonment]. 
Section 793(f)(1) addresses the removal, delivery, loss, theft, abstraction, or 
destruction of any document or “information relating to the national defense” 
through gross negligence, while Section 793(f)(2) penalizes the failure to report the 
removal, loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction of any document or “information 
relating to the national defense,” if an individual has knowledge that it has been 
removed from its proper place of custody. 
Section 793(f), like sections 793(d) and (e), requires that the information in 
question be “information relating to the national defense.”  In United States v. 
Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit upheld jury 
instructions in a Section 793(f)(2) case that required the government to prove that 
“disclosure of information in the document would be potentially damaging to the 
national defense, or that information in the document disclosed might be useful to 
an enemy of the United States.”  
b. Prosecutors’ Interpretation of the “Gross 
Negligence” Provision in Section 793(f)(1) 
Section 793(f)(1) does not define what constitutes “gross negligence,” nor 
have any federal court decisions interpreted this specific provision of the statute.  
However, the prosecutors analyzed the legislative history of Section 793(f)(1) and 
identified statements made during the 1917 congressional debate indicating that 
the state of mind required for a violation of Section 793(f)(1) is “so gross as to 
almost suggest deliberate intention,” criminally reckless, or “something that falls 
just a little short of being willful.”  The prosecutors cited a statement by 
Congressman Andrew Volstead during the 1917 debate about the predecessor to 
Section 793(f)(1): 
I want to call attention to the fact that the information that is covered 
by this section may be, and probably would be, of the very highest 
importance to the Government....  It is not an unusual provision at all.  
It occurs in a great many criminal statutes.  Men are convicted for 
gross negligence, but it has to be so gross as almost to suggest 
deliberate intention before a jury will convict.  For instance, a person is 
killed by a man running an automobile recklessly on a crowded street.  
He may, and under the laws of most States would be, adjudged guilty 
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of manslaughter, and can be sent to State prison....  We have, as I 
have already stated, a number of statutes of that kind.  This provision 
is not revolutionary.  It is the ordinary practice to apply such statutes 
to cases where lack of care occasions the death or serious injury of 
persons.  This section should be, and probably would be, applied only 
in those cases where something of real consequence ought to be 
guarded with extreme care and caution.35 
Given the absence of a definition of “gross negligence” in Section 793(f), the 
prosecutors researched state manslaughter statutes in effect at the time of the 
1917 congressional debate, and determined that gross negligence was interpreted 
in that context to require wantonness or recklessness that was equivalent to 
criminal intent.  However, the prosecutors also identified contemporaneous state 
court decisions interpreting other criminal statutes using “gross negligence” to 
require proof that ranged from something more than civil negligence to willful, 
intentional conduct. 
The Midyear prosecutors did not find any court cases addressing the state of 
mind required for a violation of Section 793(f)(1).  However, the prosecutors 
analyzed United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1978), a Fourth 
Circuit decision interpreting Section 793(f)(2).  This case involved a civilian 
employee who completed a military vulnerability analysis and marked it “Secret,” 
then took a copy of it home to proofread.  While at home, his cousin secretly 
photographed part of the analysis with a camera provided by the Soviet Union.  
When the defendant later learned that his cousin had taken these photos, he 
accepted $1,000 as a “payment for remaining silent” rather than reporting that the 
information had been compromised.  Upholding the statute against a challenge that 
it was unconstitutionally vague, the court held that Section 793(f)(2) requires the 
government to prove that the defendant knew that the document had been illegally 
abstracted, and that this knowledge requirement was sufficient to save the statute 
from vagueness. 
In addition, the Midyear prosecutors reviewed previous prosecutions under 
Section 793(f)(1) in federal or military courts and concluded that these cases 
involved either a defendant who knowingly removed classified information from a 
secure facility, or inadvertently removed classified information from a secure facility 
and, upon learning of its removal, failed to report its “loss, theft, abstraction, or 
destruction.”36  The prosecutors concluded that based on case law and the 
                                       
35  65 Cong. Rec. H1762-63 (daily ed. May 3, 1917). 
36  See Indictment, United States v. Smith, No. 03-CR-429 (C.D. Cal filed Feb. 24, 2004); see 
also United States v. Courpalais, No. ACM 35571, 2005 WL 486145 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 
2005) (defendant removed four classified photographs and took them home); United States v. Roller, 
37 M.J. 1093 (1993) (defendant inadvertently placed two classified documents in his gym bag and 
took them home, and left the documents in his garage when he later discovered them); United States 
v. Chattin, 33 M.J. 802 (1991) (defendant stuffed classified documents down his pants and took them 
home); United States v. Gaffney, 17 M.J. 565 (1983) (defendant was supposed to destroy classified 
material but instead took it home and put it in a neighborhood dumpster); United States v. Gonzalez, 
12 M.J. 747 (1981) (defendant intermingled two classified messages with personal mail he was 
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Department’s prior interpretation of the statute, charging a violation of Section 
793(f) likely required evidence that the individuals who sent emails containing 
classified information “knowingly” included the classified information or transferred 
classified information onto unclassified systems (Section 793(f)(1)), or learned that 
classified information had been transferred to unclassified systems and failed to 
report it (Section 793(f)(2)).  Thus, the Midyear prosecutors interpreted the “gross 
negligence” provision of Section 793(f)(1) to require proof that an individual acted 
with knowledge that the information in question was classified.37 
As noted above, sections 793(d) and (e) have survived constitutional 
vagueness challenges because of the existence of a scienter requirement in the 
form of the requirement to prove “willfulness.”  Such a challenge has not yet been 
raised in a Section 793(f)(1) “gross negligence” case.  The Midyear prosecutors 
stated: 
[T]he government would likely face a colorable constitutional challenge 
to the statute if it prosecuted an individual for committing gross 
negligence who was both unaware he had removed classified 
information at the time of the removal and never became aware he 
had done so....  Moreover, in bringing a vagueness challenge, defense 
counsel would also likely point to the significant disagreement as to 
the meaning of “gross negligence.” 
c. Previous Section 793(f)(1) Declinations 
The Midyear prosecutors also reviewed at least two previous investigations 
where prosecution was declined under the gross negligence provision in Section 
793(f)(1).  The Midyear prosecutors told us that these declinations informed their 
understanding of the Department’s historical approach to Section 793(f)(1).  We 
discuss these previous declinations below. 
Gonzales Declination Decision 
One of these previous cases involved an OIG investigation into the 
mishandling of documents containing highly classified, compartmented information 
about a National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance program by former White 
House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.  In 2004, while Gonzales 
                                       
carrying to a friend in Alaska, then put the message in a desk drawer in the friend’s room and forgot 
them); cf. United States v. Oxfort, 44 M.J. 337 (1996) (defendant removed classified messages from a 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in Japan with the intention of passing them 
along to individuals who were not entitled to receive them; although the opinion states the defendant 
was charged under 793(e), prosecutors found documents referencing charges filed under Section 
793(f)(1) based on the same facts); United States v. McGuinness, 33 M.J. 781 (1991) (defendant took 
home numerous classified items from previous assignments and was charged under Section 793(e), 
but a Section 793(f)(1) conviction was set aside for statute of limitation reasons). 
37  Proof of such knowledge would also be necessary to establish a violation of Sections 793(d) 
or (e), which required proof of “willfulness.”  Accordingly, as detailed below and in subsequent 
chapters, the investigative team focused significant attention on determining whether Clinton, her 
senior aides, and senders of emails that contained classified information had actual knowledge of the 
classified status of the information. 
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was the White House Counsel, he took handwritten notes memorializing a meeting 
about the legality of the NSA program.  The notes included operational details 
about the program, including its compartmented codeword.  Although Gonzales did 
not mark the notes as classified, he said that he used two envelopes to double-
wrap the notes and may have written an abbreviation for the codeword on the inner 
envelope.  On the outer envelope, Gonzales said that he wrote “AG – EYES ONLY – 
TOP SECRET.”  He stored these notes in a safe in the West Wing of the White House 
and said that he took them with him when he became the Attorney General in 
February 2005.  Gonzales said that he did not recall where he stored the notes after 
removing them from the White House, but that he may have taken them home.  
Gonzales also stored the notes and several other documents containing TS//SCI 
classification markings in a safe in the Attorney General’s office that was not 
approved to hold such materials. 
The OIG referred investigative findings to NSD for a prosecutive decision.  
According to information reviewed by the OIG, on August 19, 2008, NSD analyzed 
Gonzales’ handling of the notes under the gross negligence provision in section 
793(f)(1).  NSD concluded that prosecutors likely could show that the documents 
were removed from their proper place of custody, but that the question was 
whether that removal constituted “gross negligence.”  After discussing the 
legislative history of Section 793(f)(1), NSD stated that the government likely 
would have to prove that Gonzales’ conduct was “criminally reckless” to establish 
that he acted with gross negligence under Section 793(f)(1).  NSD concluded that 
Gonzales’ inability to recall precisely where he stored the notes detracted from 
prosecutors’ ability to “show a state of mind approaching ‘deliberate intention’ to 
remove classified documents from a secure location.” 
AUSA Declination Decision 
The Midyear prosecutors also reviewed another 2008 case in which 
prosecution was declined under Section 793(f)(1).  This case involved an AUSA who 
sent numerous boxes of documents to his personal residence in the United States 
following an overseas tour as a legal attaché.  According to the prosecutors’ 
analysis, the boxes contained a large number of documents that were classified at 
the Secret and Confidential levels.  Many of these documents were organized 
haphazardly or were improperly marked.  The AUSA testified that he did not 
purposely ship classified documents to his house, but acknowledged that it was 
highly likely that the documents he shipped included some classified materials. 
Interpreting section 793(f)(1), NSD stated that prosecutors likely would be 
required to prove that the AUSA’s conduct was “criminally reckless.”  NSD identified 
factors suggesting that the AUSA’s conduct did not rise to the level of gross 
negligence, including that he testified that he did not purposely ship classified 
documents to his house, and thus he did not deliberately intend to remove the 
classified documents from a secure location.  In addition, the documents were not 
separated into classified and unclassified categories, and they did not contain 
proper classification markings in that the first few pages of certain documents were 
not marked but later pages in the same document contained classification 
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markings.  Based on these and other factors, NSD concluded that prosecution was 
not warranted. 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1924 
Section 1924 is a misdemeanor statute that prohibits the “knowing” removal 
of documents or materials containing classified information without authority and 
with the “intent to retain” such documents or materials at an unauthorized location. 
To establish a violation of this statute, the government must show that an 
individual knowingly removed classified materials without authority and intended to 
store these materials at an unauthorized location.  To remove “without authority” 
means that the classified materials were removed from the controlling agency’s 
premises without permission.38  Although no reported cases interpret this provision, 
the Midyear prosecutors concluded that Section 1924 requires the government to 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge that the 
location where he or she intended to store classified material was an “unauthorized” 
or “unlawful” place to retain it, citing the legislative history, the Petraeus case we 
describe below, and other previous prosecutions under this provision. 
High profile cases considered by the Midyear prosecutors and by FBI 
leadership involving plea agreements under Section 1924 include former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director David Petraeus, former National Security Advisor 
Samuel “Sandy” Berger, and former CIA Director John Deutch.  In each of these 
cases, the defendants knew the information at issue was classified or took actions 
reflecting knowledge that their handling or storage of it was improper. 
Petraeus, a retired U.S. Army General, served as the Commander of the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from July 2010 to July 2011, 
and as the Director of the CIA from September 2011 to November 2012.  While in 
Afghanistan, Petraeus kept notes in black notebooks that included information 
about the identities of covert officers, war strategy, intelligence capabilities and 
mechanisms, diplomatic discussions, quotes and deliberative discussions from high-
level National Security Council meetings, and discussions with the President.  
Petraeus retained these notebooks when he returned from Afghanistan and later 
shared them with his biographer, Paula Broadwell, admitting to her in a recorded 
conversation that the notebooks were “highly classified” and contained “code word 
stuff.”  He also stored them in an unlocked desk drawer in his home office.  During 
a subsequent investigation into his mishandling and retention of classified 
information, Petraeus falsely told the FBI that he never provided or facilitated the 
provision of classified information to Broadwell.  In March 2015, Petraeus pled 
guilty to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1924, and was sentenced to 2 years of 
probation, a $25 special assessment, and a $100,000 fine.39 
                                       
38  See Exec. Order 13526, § 4.1(d). 
39  See Plea Agreement and Factual Basis, United States v. Petraeus, Crim. No. 3:15-CR-47 
(W.D.N.C. filed Mar. 3, 2015); Information, Petraeus, 2015 WL 1884065 (W.D.N.C. filed Mar. 3, 2015) 
(charging Petraeus with knowingly removing classified documents “without authority and with the 
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Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor under former President Bill 
Clinton, visited the National Archives and Records Administration to review 
documents for production to the 9/11 Commission.  During his visits, Berger 
concealed and removed documents by folding the documents in his clothes, walking 
out of the National Archives building, and placing them under a nearby construction 
trailer for later retrieval.40  Berger removed a total of five copies of classified 
documents, stored them in his office, and later destroyed three of them by cutting 
them into small pieces and discarding them.  All of these documents were marked 
classified.  Berger also created and removed handwritten notes of classified 
material that he had reviewed, and was aware that he removed these notes from 
the National Archives without authorization.  Berger pled guilty to a criminal 
information charging one count of 18 U.S.C. § 1924.41  He was sentenced to 2 
years of probation, a $56,905.52 fine, a $25 special assessment, and 100 hours of 
community service, and was precluded from accessing classified information for 5 
years. 
Former CIA Director John Deutch was investigated for using unclassified, 
Internet-connected computer systems to create and process classified documents 
and storing classified memory cards in his personal residence.  During an 
investigation by the CIA Inspector General (CIA IG), investigators recovered files 
from a computer at Deutch’s residence that were labeled as unclassified but 
contained words indicating that the information was “Secret” or “Top Secret 
Codeword,” or was otherwise highly sensitive.  For example, recovered documents 
included reports on covert operations, communications intelligence, memoranda to 
then President Bill Clinton, and classified CIA budget information.  The CIA IG 
report states that Deutch told investigators that he “fell into the habit” of using the 
unclassified system “in an inappropriate fashion,” and admitted that he had 
intentionally created highly sensitive documents on unclassified computers.  In 
addition, witnesses testified that Deutch was considered to be an “expert” or “fairly 
advanced” computer user.  Following a criminal investigation, Deutch agreed to 
plead guilty to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1924, but was pardoned by President 
Clinton on January 19, 2001, before the plea was consummated. 
Examples of conduct prosecuted under Section 1924 include a former 
government employee who stored boxes of marked classified documents in his 
personal residence; a contractor who downloaded classified information from a 
secure network to a thumb drive, transferred the information to an unclassified 
computer, and shared it with others; and a government employee who concealed 
and removed highly classified documents from a Sensitive Compartmented 
                                       
intent to retain such documents and materials at unauthorized locations, aware that these locations 
were unauthorized for the storage and retention of such classified documents”). 
40  See National Archives, Notable Thefts from the National Archives, at 
https://www.archives.gov/research/recover/notable-thefts.html (accessed Mar. 1, 2018). 
41  See Factual Basis for Plea, United States v. Berger, Crim. No. 1:05-MJ-00175-DAR (D.D.C. 
filed Apr. 1, 2005). 
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Information Facility (SCIF) where he worked and stored the documents in his 
vehicle and house. 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 2071(a) 
Section 2071(a) is a felony statute criminalizing the concealment, removal, 
or mutilation of government records filed in any public office.  To establish a 
violation of this provision, the government must prove the following beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
 An individual concealed, removed, or destroyed a record, or attempted 
to do so, or took and carried away a record with the intent to do so: 
 The record was filed or deposited in a public office of the United 
States; and 
 The individual acted willfully and unlawfully. 
The purpose of this statute is to prohibit conduct that deprives the 
government of the use of its documents, such as by removing and altering or 
destroying them.42  The Midyear prosecutors concluded that every prosecution 
under Section 2071 has involved the removal or destruction of documents that had 
already been filed or deposited in a public office of the United States (i.e., physical 
removal of a document).  In addition, to fulfill the requirement that the individual 
acted “willfully and unlawfully,” Section 2071 requires the government to show that 
he or she acted intentionally, with knowledge that he or she was breaching the 
statute.43 
                                       
42  See United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d 108, 124 (D.D.C. 2014) (See United 
States v. Rosner, 352 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. North, 716 F.Supp. 644, 
647 (D.D.C. 1989). 
43  See United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1004 (4th Cir. 1969). 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
OVERVIEW OF THE MIDYEAR INVESTIGATION 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the Midyear investigation.  More 
specifically, we describe the referral and opening of the investigation, the staffing of 
the investigation by the Department and the FBI, and the investigative strategy. 
I. Referral and Opening of the Investigation 
A. Background 
1. Clinton’s Use of Private Email Servers 
Hillary Clinton served as Secretary of State from January 21, 2009, until 
February 1, 2013.  During that time, she used private email servers hosting the 
@clintonemail.com domain to conduct official State Department business.44  
According to FBI documents, former Secretary Clinton and her husband, former 
President Bill Clinton, had a private email server in their house in Chappaqua, N.Y., 
beginning in approximately 2008 (before Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State) for 
use by former President Clinton’s staff.  Former Secretary Clinton told the FBI that, 
in or around January 2009, she “directed aides...to create the clintonemail.com 
account,” and that this was done “as a matter of convenience.” 
According to the FBI letterhead memorandum (LHM) summarizing the 
Midyear investigation, Clinton used her clintonemail.com account and personal 
mobile devices linked to that account for both personal and official business 
throughout her tenure as Secretary of State.  The LHM states that Clinton “decided 
to use a personal device to avoid carrying multiple devices.”  Clinton never 
personally used an official State Department email account or State 
Department-issued handheld device during her tenure, although there were official 
State Department email accounts from which emails were sent on her behalf. 
2. Production of Emails from the Private Email Servers to 
the State Department and Subsequent Deletion of Emails 
by Clinton’s Staff 
On September 11 and 12, 2012, terrorists attacked the U.S. Temporary 
Mission Facility and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Annex in Benghazi, Libya, 
killing four Americans.45  On May 8, 2014, the U.S. House Select Committee on 
Benghazi (House Benghazi Committee) was established to investigate the Benghazi 
attack and, thereafter, sought documents from the State Department as part of its 
                                       
44  As described in Chapter Five, the FBI discovered three servers that for different periods 
stored work-related emails sent or received by Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State. 
45  See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. 
Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, 113th Cong, 2d sess., 2014, S. Rept. 113-134, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/113134.pdf (accessed May 7, 
2018). 
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investigation.  In the summer of 2014, State Department officials contacted Cheryl 
Mills, who had served as former Secretary Clinton’s Chief of Staff and Counselor, 
concerning the State Department’s inability to locate Clinton’s and other former 
Secretaries’ emails to respond to Congressional requests.  Mills later told the FBI 
that she suggested that the State Department officials search State Department 
systems for Clinton’s clintonemail.com email address.  In addition, Mills told the FBI 
that State Department officials requested that she produce former Secretary 
Clinton’s emails and advised her that it was Clinton’s or Mills’s “obligation to filter 
out personal emails from what was provided to State.” 
Former Secretary Clinton asked Mills and Clinton’s personal attorney, David 
Kendall, to oversee the process of providing her emails to the State Department.  
In late summer 2014, Mills contacted Paul Combetta, an employee of the company 
that administered Clinton’s private server at the time, and requested that he 
transfer copies of Clinton’s emails onto Mills’s laptop and a laptop belonging to 
Heather Samuelson, a lawyer who had served in the State Department as Secretary 
Clinton’s White House Liaison.  Mills, Samuelson, and Kendall then developed a 
methodology for Samuelson to “cull” former Secretary Clinton’s work-related emails 
from her personal emails, to produce her work-related emails to the State 
Department. 
In October and November 2014, the State Department sent letters to four 
former Secretaries of State, including Clinton, requesting that they “make available 
copies of any Federal records in their possession, such as emails sent or received 
on a personal email account while serving as Secretary of State.”46  In December 
2014, former Secretary Clinton produced to the State Department “from her 
personal email account approximately 55,000 hard-copy pages, representing 
approximately 30,000 emails that she believed related to official business.”47  After 
receiving these documents, the State Department, in addition to responding to the 
House Benghazi Committee’s document request, reviewed Clinton’s emails for 
potential public release in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. 
As described in Chapter Five, Mills, Samuelson, and Combetta told the FBI 
that in late 2014 or early 2015 Mills and Samuelson asked Combetta to remove 
former Secretary Clinton’s emails from their laptops.  Combetta then used the 
commercial software “BleachBit” to permanently remove or wipe former Secretary 
Clinton’s emails from Mills’s and Samuelson’s laptops.48  Mills told the FBI that at 
some point between November 2014 and January 2015, Clinton decided she no 
longer wished to retain on her server emails that were older than 60 days and Mills 
                                       
46  See U.S. Department of State Office of the Inspector General (State IG), Office of the 
Secretary: Evaluation of Email Records Management and Cybersecurity Requirements, ESP-16-03 
(May 2016), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/esp-16-03.pdf (accessed May 7, 2018), 3. 
47  See State IG, Office of the Secretary, 4. 
48  According to documents we reviewed, BleachBit is a “freely available software that 
advertises the ability to ‘shred’ files.  ‘Shredding’ is designed to prevent recovery of a file by 
overwriting the content.” 
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instructed Combetta to change Clinton’s email retention policy accordingly.  
Combetta, however, failed to do so until late March 2015. 
On March 3, 2015, the House Benghazi Committee sent preservation orders 
requiring former Secretary Clinton to preserve emails on her servers.49  As 
described in more detail in Chapter Five, Combetta told the FBI that later in March 
2015 he realized that he had neglected to make the change to former Secretary 
Clinton’s email retention policy earlier that year, had an “oh shit” moment, and, 
without consulting Mills, used BleachBit to permanently remove Clinton’s emails 
from her server.  These included emails that had been transferred from a prior 
server.  According to FBI documents, former Secretary Clinton’s attorneys advised 
Combetta about the congressional preservation order before he made the deletions.  
As a result of Combetta’s actions, 31,830 emails that former Secretary Clinton’s 
attorneys had deemed personal in nature were deleted from three locations on 
which they had previously been stored—Mills’s and Samuelson’s laptops and the 
Clinton server. 
B. State Department Inspector General and IC IG Review of 
Clinton’s Emails and Subsequent 811 Referral 
On March 12, 2015, three Members of Congress requested that the State 
Department Inspector General (State IG) conduct a review regarding State 
Department employees’ use of personal email for official purposes.  The Members of 
Congress requested that the State IG coordinate with the Office of the Intelligence 
Community Inspector General (IC IG) to determine whether classified information 
was transmitted or received by State Department employees over personal 
systems.  Following this request, the IC IG reviewed 296 of the 30,490 emails that 
former Secretary Clinton’s attorneys had provided to the State Department and 
determined that at least two of these emails contained classified information.  The 
296 emails, including the two determined to contain classified information, had 
already been publicly released by State Department FOIA officials. 
In a June 24, 2015 letter, Kendall told the State IG and the IC IG that a copy 
of the 30,490 emails provided by former Secretary Clinton to the State Department 
was stored on a thumb drive in his law office and that her personal server was in 
the custody of the company “Platte River Networks” (“PRN”).  Based on this 
information, the IC IG concluded that “the thumb drive and personal server contain 
classified information and are not currently in the Government’s possession.” 
On July 6, 2015, the IC IG made a referral to the FBI pursuant to Section 
811(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1995 (811 referral).  This 
provision requires Executive Branch departments and agencies to advise the FBI 
“immediately of any information, regardless of its origin, which indicates that 
                                       
49  See U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Final Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 
2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 114th Cong., 2d sess., 2016, H. Rept. 114-848, 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/114th-congress/house-report/848/1 (accessed May 7, 
2018). 
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classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in an unauthorized 
manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” and is typically used to 
refer to the FBI a loss or unauthorized disclosure of classified information.  The IC 
IG referred the matter to the FBI “for any action you deem appropriate.” 
C. FBI’s Decision to Open a Criminal Investigation 
On July 10, 2015, the FBI Counterintelligence Division opened a criminal 
investigation in response to the 811 referral from the IC IG.  Although only a small 
percentage of 811 referrals result in criminal investigations, witnesses told the OIG 
that a criminal investigation was necessary to determine the extent of classified 
information on former Secretary Clinton’s private server, who was responsible for 
introducing the information into an unclassified system, and why it was placed 
there.  The FBI gave the investigation the code name “Midyear Exam,” choosing it 
from a list of randomly generated names. 
The FBI predicated the opening of the investigation on the possible 
compromise of highly sensitive classified secure compartmented information (SCI).  
One of the Midyear case agents told us that the Midyear investigative team was 
focused at the outset on the “potential unauthorized storage of classified 
information on an unauthorized system and then where it might have gotten [sic] 
from there.”  A Department prosecutor assigned to the investigation similarly 
described the scope of the investigation as “related to the email systems used by 
Secretary Clinton, and whether on her private email server there are individuals 
who improperly retained or transmitted classified information.” 
The FBI designated the Midyear investigation as a Sensitive Investigative 
Matter (SIM).  According to the DIOG, a SIM includes “an investigative matter 
involving the activities of a domestic public official or domestic political candidate 
(involving corruption or a threat to the national security)” as well as “any other 
matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an Assessment, should be 
brought to the attention of FBI [Headquarters] and other DOJ officials.”  FBI 
witnesses told us that the SIM designation is typically given to investigations 
involving sensitive categories of persons such as attorneys, judges, clergy, 
journalists, and politicians, and that that SIM investigations are overseen more 
closely by FBI management and the FBI Office of General Counsel than other 
investigations. 
The Midyear investigation was opened with an “Unknown Subject(s) 
(UNSUB),” and at no time during the investigation was any individual identified by 
the FBI as a subject or target of the investigation, including former Secretary 
Clinton.  FBI witnesses told us that the “UNSUB” designation is common and means 
that the FBI has not identified a specific target or subject at the outset of an 
investigation.  According to FBI witnesses, this allowed the FBI to expand the focus 
of the investigation based on the evidence without being “locked into a particular 
subject.”  With respect to the Midyear investigation, witnesses told the OIG that the 
FBI did not identify anyone as a subject or target during the investigation because 
it was unclear how the classified material had been introduced to the server and 
who was responsible for improperly placing it there. 
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Despite the UNSUB designation, witnesses told us that a primary focus of the 
Midyear investigation was on former Secretary Clinton’s intent in setting up and 
using her private email server.  An FBI OGC attorney assigned to the Midyear team 
(FBI Attorney 1) told the OIG, “We certainly started looking more closely at the 
Secretary because they were her emails.”  Randall Coleman, the former Assistant 
Director of the Counterintelligence Division, stated, “I don’t know [why] that was 
the case, why it was UNSUB.  I’m really shocked that it would have stayed that way 
because certainly the investigation started really kind of getting more focused.” 
In his OIG interview, Comey described former Secretary Clinton as the 
subject of the Midyear investigation and stated that he was unaware that the 
investigation had an UNSUB designation.  Similarly, in his book, Comey referred to 
former Secretary Clinton as the subject of the Midyear investigation, stating that 
one question the investigation sought to answer was what Clinton was thinking 
“when she mishandled that classified information.”50 
D. Initial Briefing for the Department 
On July 23, 2015, Coleman and then Deputy Director Mark as’ met with 
Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Sally Yates and Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 
General (PADAG) Matt Axelrod to brief them on the opening of the Midyear 
investigation.  According to Coleman, he and Giuliano told Yates and Axelrod why 
the Midyear investigation was opened and laid out their vision of how the 
investigation would be conducted, including that the FBI planned to run the 
investigation out of headquarters. 
Yates recalled being briefed by Giuliano and Coleman at the beginning of the 
Midyear investigation, but said that she did not recall having concerns about the 
information they presented at the meeting or remembering anything significant 
about it.  Axelrod told the OIG that Giuliano and Coleman showed them a copy of 
the 811 referral that the FBI had received, and either showed them or told them 
about some of the emails that had been identified as potentially classified.  Axelrod 
stated: 
That, my recollection is that the way they explained it was that review 
of the certain emails contained on the personal server that Secretary 
Clinton had been using showed that some of those emails contained 
classified information.  And so that, and that they, one of the things 
that was sort of standard practice when there was classified 
information on non-classified systems was that a review needed to be 
done to sort of contain the, I think the word they use in the 
[intelligence] community is a spill….  The spill of classified information 
out into sort of [a] non-classified arena.  And so that they needed to, 
this was a referral so that the Bureau could help contain the spill and 
identify if there was classified information on non-classified systems so 
that that classified information could be contained and either, you 
                                       
50  JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY: TRUTH, LIES, AND LEADERSHIP at 162 (Amy Einhorn, ed., 1st ed. 
2018). 
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know, destroyed or returned to proper information handling 
mechanisms. 
Asked whether he considered the Midyear investigation to be criminal as of the date 
of this initial briefing, Axelrod replied, “Not in my view.”  According to Axelrod, “it 
was some time...before I, at least I understood that it had morphed into a criminal 
investigation.” 
The prosecutors and career Department staff assigned to the Midyear 
investigation told us that they considered it a criminal investigation from early on.  
Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) George Toscas, who was the most 
senior career Department official involved in the daily supervision of the 
investigation, told us that he approached it as a criminal investigation from the 
beginning of NSD’s involvement.  Prosecutors 1 and 2, both of whom were assigned 
to the investigation by late July 2015, understood that it was a criminal 
investigation from very early in the investigation.  Prosecutor 1 told us, “I mean, 
pretty quickly this seemed like a, a criminal investigation….  [I]t looked, looked and 
it smelled like a criminal investigation to me.” 
II. Staffing the Midyear Investigation 
A. FBI Staffing 
The Midyear investigation was conducted by the FBI’s Counterintelligence 
Division.  For the first few weeks, the investigation was staffed by FBI Headquarters 
personnel and temporary duty assignment (TDY) FBI agents.  Thereafter, FBI 
management decided to run the investigation as a “special” out of FBI 
Headquarters.  This meant that the investigation was staffed by counterintelligence 
agents and analysts from the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) who were 
temporarily located to headquarters and received support from headquarters 
personnel.  FBI management selected WFO personnel based on WFO’s geographic 
proximity to headquarters and its experience conducting sensitive 
counterintelligence investigations.  FBI witnesses told us that previous sensitive 
investigations also had been run as “specials,” and that this allowed FBI senior 
executives to exercise tighter control over the investigation. 
There were approximately 15 agents, analysts, computer specialists, and 
forensic accountants assigned on a full-time basis to the Midyear team, as well as 
other FBI staff who provided periodic support.  Four WFO agents served as the 
Midyear case agents and reported to a WFO Supervisory Special Agent (“SSA”).  
Several FBI witnesses described the SSA as an experienced and aggressive agent, 
and the SSA told us that he selected the “four strongest agents” from his WFO 
squad to be on the Midyear team. 
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The SSA reported to Peter Strzok, who was then an Assistant Special Agent 
in Charge (ASAC) at WFO.51  Comey and Coleman told us that Strzok was selected 
to lead the Midyear investigative team because he was one of the most experienced 
and highly-regarded counterintelligence investigators within the FBI. 
There were also several analysts on the Midyear team.  Some analysts 
assigned to Midyear were on the review team, which reviewed and analyzed former 
Secretary Clinton’s emails.  These analysts reported to a Supervisory Intelligence 
Analyst, who in turn reported to the Lead Analyst.  FBI witnesses, including 
Coleman, told us that the Lead Analyst was highly regarded within the FBI and very 
experienced in counterintelligence investigations.  Other analysts were on the 
investigative team, which assisted the agents with interview preparation and 
performed other investigative tasks.  These analysts reported to the SSA and 
Strzok, in addition to reporting directly to the Lead Analyst.  Several analysts were 
on both the review and investigative teams. 
Until approximately the end of 2015, the Lead Analyst and Strzok both 
reported to a Section Chief in the Counterintelligence Division, who in turn reported 
to Coleman for purposes of the Midyear investigation.52  The remainder of the 
reporting chain was as follows:  Coleman to John Giacalone, who was Executive 
Assistant Director (EAD) of the National Security Branch; Giacalone to DD Giuliano; 
and DD Giuliano to Director Comey. 
During the course of the investigation, some FBI officials involved with the 
Midyear investigation retired or changed positions.  In late 2015, Coleman became 
the EAD of the FBI Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch and was no 
longer involved in the Midyear investigation.  At the same time, E.W. (“Bill”) 
Priestap replaced Coleman as AD of the Counterintelligence Division.  EAD 
Giacalone and DD Giuliano retired from the FBI in early 2016 and were replaced by 
Michael Steinbach and Andrew McCabe, respectively. 
In addition, Lisa Page, who was Special Counsel to McCabe, became involved 
in the Midyear investigation after McCabe became the Deputy Director in February 
2016.  Page told the OIG that part of her function was to serve as a liaison between 
the Midyear team and McCabe.  Page acknowledged that her role upset senior FBI 
officials, but told the OIG that McCabe relied on her to ensure that he had the 
information he needed to make decisions, without it being filtered through multiple 
layers of management.  Several witnesses told the OIG that Page circumvented the 
official chain of command, and that Strzok communicated important Midyear case 
information to her, and thus to McCabe, without Priestap’s or Steinbach’s 
knowledge.  McCabe said that he was aware of complaints about Page, and that he 
valued her ability to “spot issues” and bring them to his attention when others did 
not do so. 
                                       
51  Strzok was promoted to a Section Chief in the Counterintelligence Division in February 
2016, and to Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) in the fall of 2016. 
52  A Deputy Assistant Director in the Counterintelligence Division was between the Section 
Chief and Coleman in the reporting chain but had limited involvement in the Midyear investigation. 
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The FBI Office of General Counsel (OGC) assigned FBI Attorney 1, who was a 
supervisory attorney in the National Security and Cyber Law Branch (NSCLB), to 
provide legal support to the Midyear team.  A second, more junior attorney (FBI 
Attorney 2) also was assigned to the Midyear team.  FBI Attorney 1 reported to 
Deputy General Counsel Trisha Anderson, who in turn reported to then General 
Counsel James Baker.53 
Figure 3.1 describes the FBI chain of command for the Midyear investigation.  
This figure does not include intervening supervisors who had limited involvement in 
the investigation. 
                                       
53  Anderson now is the Principal Deputy General Counsel. 
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B. Department Staffing 
Within the Department, the Midyear investigation was primarily handled by 
the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES) of the National Security 
Division (NSD), with support from two prosecutors in the United States Attorney’s 
Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA).  All of the prosecutors assigned to 
the Midyear team had significant experience handling national security 
investigations or white collar criminal cases. 
The lead prosecutor (Prosecutor 1) was a supervisory attorney in CES.  
Prosecutor 1 told us that he selected the “best” nonsupervisory line attorney within 
CES (Prosecutor 2) to handle the Midyear investigation with him.  The two CES 
prosecutors reported directly to the Chief of CES, David Laufman, who in turn 
reported to DAAG George Toscas.  Toscas was the highest level career Department 
employee involved in the Midyear investigation, and the prosecutors and 
supervisors below him who were involved in the Midyear investigation were also 
career employees.  As described in more detail below, Department officials above 
Toscas, including then Assistant Attorney General (AAG) John Carlin, Axelrod, 
Yates, and Lynch, received briefings about the Midyear investigation but were not 
involved in its day-to-day management. 
In August 2015, EDVA was brought into the Midyear investigation.  EDVA 
assigned two supervisory attorneys to work with the CES prosecutors:  Prosecutor 3 
and Prosecutor 4.  The role of the EDVA prosecutors initially was to facilitate the 
issuance of legal process, including grand jury subpoenas, search warrants, and 
2703(d) orders.  However, the NSD prosecutors told the OIG that ultimately they 
consulted and worked closely with the EDVA prosecutors on many issues and 
decisions throughout the course of the Midyear investigation.  Prosecutor 3 similarly 
told us that as the investigation progressed, he and Prosecutor 4 were considered 
“equal partners” with the NSD prosecutors. 
EDVA senior leadership, including then U.S. Attorney Dana Boente, received 
briefings on the Midyear investigation from the EDVA prosecutors and were 
informed of significant developments, but they were not involved in investigative 
decisions.  Axelrod told the OIG that he recalled that he spoke to Boente early in 
the Midyear investigation and “let[] them know that this was NSD’s investigation.”  
Axelrod stated: 
[S]ometimes when you have a U.S. Attorney’s office and a Main 
Justice component, you know, things have to go up two chains 
and...that’s cumbersome....  [I]n...an investigation like this we figured 
it was easier just to have everything centralized in NSD.  There’s a 
reason why NSD has the ticket on, you know, all these matters, right?  
They’re the subject matter experts[.] 
Axelrod explained that NSD has primary responsibility for counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence cases not only because it has subject matter expertise in those 
areas, but also because those cases are nationwide.  He stated that there are 
certain areas of law where it is important to ensure nationwide consistency in how 
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the law is applied, because if “one district does something really different than 
another district it can have very bad...ramifications or consequences.”  As noted 
previously, the USAM requires NSD to expressly approve in advance charges 
involving certain national security statutes, including those that were considered in 
this investigation. 
Prosecutor 2 stated that NSD’s typical role varies from case to case, and 
depends on the resources and experience of the specific U.S. Attorney’s Office.  
This prosecutor told the OIG that NSD typically “drives” counterintelligence cases, 
but that its role “runs the gamut” from taking the lead on cases to playing a 
supporting role.  Prosecutor 2 stated that EDVA has been more willing to allow NSD 
attorneys to play an active role in charged cases and is “very open to [NSD’s] 
partnership and support.” 
Prosecutor 3 similarly told the OIG that EDVA’s supporting role in the Midyear 
investigation was unusual, but he attributed this to logistics.  This prosecutor 
stated, “[Prosecutors 1 and 2] were right across the street from FBI 
Headquarters....  [I]t was pretty work intensive, more so for them because they 
would have to go over there at the drop of a hat for meetings.  You know, we were 
always kept in the loop of what was going on.  But [the] FBI kept a pretty tight hold 
of the classified documents.”  Prosecutor 3 also said that running the case out of 
NSD, supervised by Toscas, allowed the Department to keep “one central location 
of control by a career person over the investigation.” 
Several witnesses told us that the FBI was frustrated at the perceived slow 
pace of bringing a U.S. Attorney’s Office into the Midyear investigation.  However, 
Toscas told us that it is not unusual for a U.S. Attorney’s Office not to be involved in 
the beginning of an investigation, and that it took some time to determine the 
proper venue and select the most appropriate U.S. Attorney’s Office.  Prosecutor 1 
told us that although the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia also was 
considered, EDVA was selected in part based on the good historical working 
relationship between NSD and EDVA. 
Boente told the OIG that he expressed concerns that EDVA was not the 
appropriate district given that former Secretary Clinton lived in New York.  He said 
that they potentially could establish venue through an email server or victim 
agency server located in EDVA, but that it would be unusual to select venue to 
prosecute a high-profile public figure on that basis.  Boente said that while no one 
explained why the Department chose EDVA, he assumed that it was because “we 
move quicker and do things a lot quicker than some districts can.” 
III. Role of Senior FBI and Department Leadership in the Investigation 
A. FBI Leadership 
The Midyear investigation was closely supervised by FBI leadership from the 
outset.  Comey told the OIG that he received frequent briefings on the Midyear 
investigation: 
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And then once it got underway, either in July or maybe in August 
[2015], I told them I wanted to be briefed on it on a much more 
frequent basis then I would normally on a case because I was keen to 
make sure that they had the resources they need and that there was 
no—that I could both support them if they needed additional things 
and protect them in the event anybody outside of the investigative 
team tried to monkey with them in any way or exert any pressure on 
them or anything like that.  Because I could see immediately how 
significant the matter was....  So I think they got into a rhythm of 
briefing me maybe every couple of weeks. 
Comey said that briefings took place roughly every two to three weeks at the 
beginning of the investigation, and occurred on a weekly basis as the investigation 
progressed. 
Comey said that the Midyear briefings typically were attended by a core team 
of senior officials: 
 The Deputy Director (Giuliano, then McCabe); 
 Comey’s Chief of Staff, James Rybicki; 
 FBI OGC personnel including Baker, Anderson, and FBI Attorney 1; 
 The EAD of the National Security Branch (Giacalone, then Steinbach); 
 The AD of the Counterintelligence Division (Coleman, then Priestap); 
 Deputy Director McCabe’s counsel, Lisa Page (beginning in February 
2016); and 
 Strzok and the Lead Analyst. 
Other FBI officials periodically attended these briefings, including then Associate 
Deputy Director (ADD) David Bowdich after his appointment in April 2016, but 
witnesses told us that briefings were carefully controlled and limited to a select 
group of senior FBI managers. 
Comey said that the Midyear team typically produced a biweekly or weekly 
written summary of their progress in the investigation, and that briefings generally 
focused on what the team had completed and what needed to be done.  Comey 
stated, “[T]he way it tended to break down is [the Lead Analyst] would talk about 
exploitation of media and sorting through emails and things.  And Pete [Strzok] 
would focus on investigative steps, interviews, things like that.”  Comey told the 
OIG: 
[I]t would typically be here in the [Director’s] conference room at the 
table and they would give me a progress report on where they were 
and I would typically ask the questions that were rooted in my interest 
in it to begin with which is— do you have the resources you need?  
Any problems that I can help you with?  I just felt the need to stay 
close to it[.] 
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As described in more detail in Chapter Six, the same officials were involved in 
discussions about whether to do a public statement announcing the closing of the 
Midyear investigation.  Comey characterized these discussions as “great family 
conversations,” stating that he was a great believer in oppositional argument and 
encouraged people to bring up different points of view. 
In addition to the Midyear-specific meetings, Comey and the Deputy Director 
(first Giuliano, then McCabe) had daily morning and late afternoon meetings about 
significant developments or issues that were impacting the FBI.  The Midyear 
investigation was sometimes discussed immediately following these meetings in 
“sidebar” meetings involving a smaller group of participants due to the sensitivity of 
the investigation.54 
As the result of these frequent briefings, Comey and McCabe knew about and 
were involved in significant investigative decisions.  McCabe stated: 
[Comey] relied on me for kind of my advice and recommendation on 
those decisions.  But he was very involved in the decisions on 
Midyear....  Not decisions like what time is the interview with John 
Jones going to take place tomorrow, but...we think we should serve a 
subpoena on so-and-so for these records, and the Department of 
Justice is saying no, we want to try to work it out with a letter.  And 
so...as that conflict was brewing, he would learn about it and weigh in 
on it and not necessarily decide it.  But he was up-to-speed on all of 
the kind of significant things that were happening in the case. 
McCabe told the OIG that although Strzok and Priestap made the day-to-day 
investigative decisions, he and Comey were informed about any problems that 
arose during the investigation, as well as any significant information that the team 
discovered. 
As described in more detail in Chapter Five, our review found examples 
where Comey or McCabe approved or directed specific investigation decisions.  
These included directing the Midyear agents to deliver a preamble at the first 
interview of Cheryl Mills about the need to answer questions about the process used 
to cull former Secretary Clinton’s personal and work-related emails, without 
informing the prosecutors; authorizing Baker to contact Beth Wilkinson, counsel to 
Mills and Samuelson, again without telling the prosecutors; approving the consent 
and immunity agreements used to obtain the Mills and Samuelson laptops; and not 
prohibiting Mills and Samuelson from attending the interview of former Secretary 
Clinton as her counsel. 
                                       
54  Other senior FBI officials involved in the Midyear investigation received additional briefings 
as needed.  The Deputy Director, EAD, and AD met on a daily basis regarding significant matters 
affecting the Counterintelligence Division, and these meetings at times included significant 
developments in the Midyear investigation.  McCabe said he was briefed when issues arose.  In 
addition, the Lead Analyst and Strzok briefed Giacalone on the Midyear investigation on a weekly 
basis. 
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B. Department Leadership 
Unlike the FBI’s senior leadership, senior Department officials played a more 
limited role in the Midyear investigation.  Although Lynch, Yates, Axelrod, and 
Carlin described making a conscious decision to allow the career staff to handle the 
Midyear investigation with minimal involvement by political appointees, they also 
told us that their involvement was consistent with their normal role in criminal 
investigations. 
Lynch 
Lynch told the OIG that she received limited briefings on the Midyear 
investigation.  She explained that the Midyear investigation was not discussed at 
her morning meetings or staff meetings because it was a sensitive matter and 
involved potentially classified information.  Lynch said that she had a monthly 
meeting with NSD, and that although the Midyear investigation was too sensitive to 
discuss during that meeting, afterward the meeting would “skinny down” to discuss 
sensitive cases among a smaller group of people that included Yates, Axelrod, 
Carlin, Toscas, and sometimes members of her staff.  She said that the cases 
discussed among this smaller group included not only the Midyear investigation, but 
also other sensitive counterterrorism and classified cases. 
Lynch said that she understood that there were political sensitivities inherent 
in the Midyear investigation, and she wanted to protect the Midyear team from 
perceived pressure from Department leadership.  She stated: 
Because we knew that it was going to be scrutinized, we wanted to 
make sure that not only was the team supported, but they also were 
insulated from a lot of people talking about it and just discussing it in 
general throughout the office....  And so, my view was that unless you 
need me for something, you know, I don’t want to be on top of the 
team for this.  They, they should work as they always work.  They 
should know that [they have] whatever they need to have, whatever 
resources they need to get.  But the Front Office is not, you know, 
breathing down their neck on this. 
Asked whether there was ever a conscious decision by the political appointees to 
step back and allow the career employees to handle the investigation, Lynch 
replied: 
Certainly it was my view, and I can’t recall having discussions about 
that.  But that was how I viewed the setup, was that we wanted to 
make sure that this was always handled by the career people, and that 
essentially even though they would need input, and certainly toward 
the end of anything you’d have to make certain decisions.  But not to 
have, at least certainly from...the fifth floor level where I was, not to 
have that kind of input early on.  Although I typically wouldn’t have 
had input...in the inner workings of an investigation. 
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Lynch said that Toscas was the most senior career Department official involved in 
making decisions about the Midyear investigation, and that she had faith and 
confidence in his ability to handle the case. 
Lynch explained that she was not involved in the day-to-day investigative 
decisions about how to staff the investigation, what witnesses to interview, or any 
of the other “things that [she] used to do as a line [Assistant U.S. Attorney 
(AUSA)].”  Nor did she intervene in conflicts between the prosecutors and agents.  
She told the OIG that this was not unique to the Midyear investigation but rather 
represented her standard practice, stating: 
[M]y view is that...whoever is, is leading the team needs to deal with 
that initially because they’ve got to keep working with each other.  
And based on my experience as an AUSA, if you can resolve it at that 
level first, you will have a team that is, is, is more solid and can work 
together more easily.  If not, then I think the, the next level 
supervisor has got to be involved in that....  [M]y view is that the 
chain of command is set up is there for that reason. 
But I wouldn’t, if someone said to me the agents want to interview this 
person, and the prosecutors don’t, my first question before I got 
involved would be to say what do the supervisors think?  Because if, if 
I as AG, or even as U.S. Attorney immediately step in and make that 
decision, then what I’ve done is I may have solved a problem, but I’ve 
cut the knees off of every supervisor in between me and them.  And, 
and that creates bigger problems down the road. 
Lynch said her view was that problems or conflicts should not be elevated to the 
Attorney General unless the parties had exhausted all other remedies. 
Yates and Axelrod 
Yates told the OIG that although Department leadership understood the 
significance of the Midyear investigation, they agreed that it should be handled like 
any other case.  She said that the role of Department leadership in the Midyear 
investigation represented their normal approach to criminal investigations, stating: 
[L]ook, we got the sensitivity of this matter obviously even from the 
beginning.  And I remember we wanted to make certain that NSD had 
all the resources that they needed, that they were on top of it.  That 
we stayed briefed on what was going on but from the very beginning it 
was important to us for this to be handled like any other case would be 
handled.  That we wanted to make sure that the line prosecutors and 
lawyers who were doing this didn’t feel like they had the leadership 
office breathing down their neck because that’s going to put a layer of 
pressure on them that is not appropriate we felt like here.  So it was 
important to us for NSD to be handling the day to day aspects of this.  
But at the same time we wanted to make sure that they were getting 
what they needed.  And that we were staying apprised of significant 
developments in it.... 
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Not only doing it the right way but making sure that we did this, that it 
had the appearance of doing it the right way too.  And public 
confidence was going to be important.  We knew that from the very 
beginning.  And that we wanted to make sure that we had a process in 
place that was going to be the right process.  And that would be for 
NSD to handle the day to day aspects of it.  And so we had [that] 
conversation.  You know, the DAG’s office is really sort of more the 
operational one between the two leadership offices.  And so I certainly 
had conversations with the AG about how we set this up and we’re 
running it.  But again, there was no real dispute with anybody about 
this.  This seemed like the natural and right way to do things.... 
Asked whether her role in the Midyear investigation differed at all from her usual 
process, Yates replied: 
Every other case is not on the radar screen of...[the] DAG, obviously.  
But this was a significant matter for the Department that was one of 
those small handful of cases that how you do it can be defining for the 
Department of Justice....  And we were very aware of that from the 
very beginning.  So when I say we were handling it like any other case 
what I mean is that we wanted to ensure that the factors that went 
into a decision about how we should proceed in that matter and how, 
the kind of latitude that the line people were handling had to do it in 
that matter, that that should be done like any other case.  Nobody 
should get any special treatment.  Nobody should be treated more 
harshly...because of who they were.  That’s what I mean it should be 
like any other case.  But we weren’t stupid.  I mean, we recognized 
that the profile and import of this matter was such that we needed to 
make sure that things were done correctly. 
Yates explained that the DAG typically gets involved in an investigation from 
a decisionmaking standpoint if there is disagreement between one of the 
Department’s litigating components and another government agency, or between a 
Department component and a U.S. Attorney’s Office, or if there is “real uncertainty” 
about whether to take a potential investigative step.  She stated, “Normally the 
DAG’s office is not running an investigation and we weren’t running this one.” 
Yates told the OIG that she received more frequent updates on the Midyear 
investigation than she did on other cases, attributing this to the profile and time 
sensitivity of the investigation.  Yates told the OIG that it was hard to generalize 
how frequently she received updates, but that she had regular meetings with NSD 
every other week.  Although the Midyear investigation was not discussed with the 
larger group present during these meetings, afterward they would “skinny down” to 
a smaller group to discuss sensitive matters, including the Midyear investigation.  
This smaller group included Carlin, Toscas, and Mary McCord, who was at the time 
the Principal DAAG in NSD.  Yates said that she also participated in Lynch’s regular 
meetings with NSD, which would similarly “skinny down” at the end. 
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The NSD and EDVA prosecutors told the OIG that they were concerned at 
various points during the Midyear investigation that there was a disparity between 
the involvement of Department and FBI leadership in discussions about 
investigative steps.  For example, while McCabe (the second in command at the 
FBI) attended meetings at which the Midyear agents and prosecutors debated 
whether and how to obtain the Mills and Samuelson laptops, the highest ranking 
official representing the Department’s position at those meetings was Toscas.  
Asked whether she was informed of these concerns, Yates told the OIG that she 
was not.  She said that she was not aware that McCabe attended meetings with the 
Midyear prosecutors, nor did she know that Comey was closely involved in the 
investigation.  Yates stated that she spoke to McCabe regularly about various 
issues, and that she thought he was “relaxed enough” with her to tell her that she 
needed to be at any meetings.  Yates said that any disparity resulted from the 
unusually high level of involvement by FBI leadership, not a decreased role by 
Department leadership. 
Axelrod similarly told the OIG that at the outset of the Midyear investigation, 
senior Department officials “made efforts to...set up a structure that would 
maintain the integrity of this matter.”  He explained that they were aware that no 
matter how the investigation turned out, there was likely to be criticism at the end.  
As a result, he said that they considered it “extra important to make sure things 
were...done...by the book, following procedures.  Making sure that when people 
criticize[d] whatever the outcome was that we’d be able to say no, this was done 
straight down the middle on the facts and on the law.” 
Axelrod said that he met with Toscas at the outset of the investigation and 
explained that Toscas would be the primary supervisor over the investigation.  
Axelrod stated: 
[W]e were going to have sort of a lighter touch from the leadership 
offices than we might on a sort of high profile case.  In other words, 
we were there for him for whatever he needed.  But we weren’t going 
to be sort of checking in day to day or week to week for updates or 
briefings.  When...something significant happened...that we needed to 
know about he would let us know.... 
And I, when I say a lighter touch I don’t mean that folks weren’t 
engaged or paying attention.  I, not at all.  I just mean we wanted to 
give them the space they needed to do whatever they thought 
necessary in the investigation.  So that at the end...I just wanted to 
make sure that any allegation that there was some sort of political 
interference with this investigation wouldn’t hold water. 
Axelrod told the OIG that the difference between the role of Department leadership 
in the Midyear investigation and the typical high-profile investigation was “just a 
matter of degree.”  He said that he and Yates relied on Toscas to bring issues to 
their attention at “skinny down” sessions following the biweekly meetings with NSD, 
but that “it wasn’t us saying okay, and what’s the latest on the email 
investigation?” 
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Carlin 
Carlin told the OIG that NSD’s standard practice is for cases to be handled by 
the career staff, supervised by a DAAG.  He said that at the beginning of the 
Midyear investigation, he held a meeting with McCord, Toscas, and the NSD 
prosecutors in which he emphasized the need to “go more by the book” and to 
follow the normal procedure.  Carlin said that he wanted one person in the NSD 
Front Office to be in charge of the Midyear investigation, and that he chose Toscas 
based on his historical expertise with investigations involving “espionage, the 
straight-up a spy [cases], and the leak mishandling type portfolio.” 
Carlin said that he preferred having one person who was clearly accountable 
and in charge.  He stated: 
I tend to like that as former career person...I knew what it felt like 
when you’re in one of those spots.  So, in general, I prefer that type of 
structure.  In this case, I knew, as well, at the end of the day, 
whatever decision was made in the case, it was going to be a high-
profile controversial decision.  And so...you might need to explain later 
what process do we follow at the Department.  And so, I wanted to 
make that clear, internally and to our partners, that this was the 
process we were following...at the National Security Division. 
And just, seeing some other cases in my career that were, they were 
high profile.  They were handled in a way than was different than the 
norm.  More people got involved in trying to make the day-to-day 
decisions.  I didn’t think that that redounded to the benefit of the case.  
Not just for appearance purposes, but...it also just created confusion 
and frustration among the relevant teams.  And kind of, 
inconsistencies in how they were staffed, sometimes, when someone 
had a great idea later, and came in over the top, and changed the way 
they were approaching the case.  So, right from the beginning, I 
wanted to, to set it up, and structure...it that way.  I felt pretty 
strongly about it. 
Carlin said that he discussed this with Lynch and Yates and made it clear to 
them that the team had the authority to make investigative and prosecutorial 
decisions.  Carlin said that he told Lynch and Yates that “like other sensitive 
matters, we would periodically update them.”  According to Carlin, Lynch and Yates 
knew that this was how Carlin was handling the investigation and supported this 
structure.  Carlin said that he also explicitly communicated this to the FBI, 
explaining it to both Giacalone and McCabe. 
IV. Investigative Strategy 
The Midyear team sought to determine whether any individuals were 
criminally liable under the laws prohibiting the mishandling of classified information, 
which are summarized in Chapter Two.  To do so, the team employed an 
investigative strategy that included three primary lines of inquiry:  collection and 
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examination of the emails that traversed former Secretary Clinton’s servers and 
other relevant evidence, interviews of relevant witnesses, and analysis of whether 
classified information was compromised by hostile cyber intrusions.55 
A. Collection and Examination of Emails that Traversed Clinton’s 
Servers and Other Relevant Evidence 
The Midyear team sought to collect and review any emails that traversed 
Clinton’s servers during her tenure as Secretary of State, as well as other evidence 
that would be helpful to understand classified information contained in those 
emails.  This included a review of the 30,490 work-related emails and attachments 
to those emails that former Secretary Clinton’s attorneys had produced to the State 
Department. 
The team also attempted to recover or reconstruct the remaining 31,830 
emails that Clinton’s attorneys determined were personal and did not produce to 
the State Department.  As described above and in Chapter Five, before the Midyear 
investigation began, these emails had been deleted and “wiped” from former 
Secretary Clinton’s then current server.  The Midyear team also believed that some 
work-related emails could have been deleted from Clinton’s servers before her 
attorneys reviewed them for production to the State Department.   
The Midyear investigators sought to recover and review deleted emails by 
obtaining and forensically analyzing, among other things, Clinton’s servers and 
related equipment; other devices used by Clinton, such as Blackberries and cellular 
telephones; laptops and other devices that had been used to backup Clinton’s 
emails from the server; and the laptops used by Clinton’s attorneys to cull her 
personal emails from her work-related emails.  The team also obtained email 
content or other information from the official government or private email accounts 
of certain individuals who communicated with Clinton by email, originated the 
classified email chains that were ultimately forwarded to Clinton, or transferred 
Clinton’s emails to other locations. 
As described in Chapter Five, the Midyear team did not seek to obtain every 
device or the contents of every email account that it had reason to believe a 
classified email traversed.  Rather, the team focused the investigation on obtaining 
Clinton’s servers and devices.  Witnesses stated that, due to what they perceived to 
be systemic problems with handling classified information at the State Department, 
to expand the investigation beyond former Secretary Clinton’s server systems and 
devices would have prolonged the investigation for years.  They further stated that 
the State Department was the more appropriate agency to remediate classified 
spills by its own employees. 
Analysts examined both the original 30,490 emails produced by former 
Secretary Clinton to the State Department and the emails recovered through other 
                                       
55  This section does not contain an exhaustive list of investigative efforts in the Midyear 
investigation, but rather is intended to be an overview of the Midyear team’s investigative strategy.  
We discuss the specific investigative steps used during the Midyear investigation in Chapter Five. 
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means to identify potentially classified information.  Once the analysts identified 
information that they suspected to be classified, the team sought formal 
classification review from government agencies with equities in the information.  
The analysts also examined the emails for evidence of criminal intent.  For 
example, they searched for: 
 Classification markings to assess whether participants in classified 
email chains were on notice that the information contained in them 
was classified; 
 Statements by former Secretary Clinton or others indicating whether 
Clinton used private servers for the purpose of evading laws regarding 
the proper handling of federal records or classified information; 
 Statements by former Secretary Clinton or others indicating whether 
they knew that emails contained information that was classified—even 
if they were not clearly marked—when they sent or received them on 
unauthorized systems; 
 Evidence as to whether former Secretary Clinton or others forwarded 
classified information to persons without proper clearances or without 
the need to know about it; and 
 Documentation showing whether originators of classified emails had 
received classified information in properly marked documents before 
transferring the information to unclassified systems without markings. 
B. Witness Interviews 
The Midyear team told us that witness interviews covered several areas of 
investigative interest.  First, the team interviewed individuals involved with setting 
up and administering former Secretary Clinton’s servers to understand her intent in 
using private servers and to assess what measures they used to protect the servers 
from intrusion.  These witnesses also helped FBI analysts understand the server 
structures to inform subsequent analyses.  Additionally, they helped FBI 
investigators identify additional sources of evidence, such as devices containing 
backups of Clinton’s emails. 
Second, the Midyear team interviewed individuals who introduced, 
transmitted, or received information on unauthorized systems, including the 
originators of classified information, Clinton’s aides who forwarded the originators’ 
emails to her, and Clinton herself.  The originators included State Department 
employees and employees of other government agencies.  The team interviewed 
these witnesses to, among other things, assess:  (1) whether they believed the 
information contained in the emails was classified; (2) how or from where they 
originally received the classified information (and whether based on those 
circumstances they should have known that the information contained in the emails 
was classified); and (3) why they sent the information on unclassified systems. 
Third, the Midyear team interviewed individuals with knowledge of how and 
why 31,830 of former Secretary Clinton’s emails were deleted from her servers and 
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other locations.  The team sought to assess whether Clinton or her attorneys 
deleted or directed the deletion of emails for an improper purpose, such as to avoid 
FOIA or Federal Records Act (FRA) requirements. 
Fourth, the Midyear team interviewed State Department employees with 
knowledge of the State Department’s policies and practices regarding federal 
records retention.  The team sought to determine whether Clinton’s use of a private 
server was sanctioned by the State Department, as well as what measures the 
State Department put in place to protect Clinton’s private server from intrusion. 
C. Intrusion Analysis 
The FBI also conducted intrusion analyses to determine whether any 
classified information had been compromised by domestic hostile actors or foreign 
adversaries.  Agents and analysts specializing in forensics examined the servers, 
devices, and other evidence to assess whether unauthorized actors had attempted 
to log into, scan, or otherwise gain access to the email accounts on the servers and, 
if so, whether their efforts had been successful.  They also examined various FBI 
datasets to assess whether emails containing classified information had been 
compromised. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
DECISION TO PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE MIDYEAR 
INVESTIGATION AND REACTION TO WHITE HOUSE 
STATEMENTS ABOUT THE INVESTIGATION 
In this chapter, we address the decision of the FBI and the Department to 
publicly acknowledge an investigation following the public referral from IC IG, 
including the allegation that former Lynch instructed former Director Comey to refer 
to the Midyear investigation as a “matter.”  We also discuss public statements by 
former President Barack Obama about the Midyear investigation, which raised 
concerns about White House influence on the investigation. 
As we describe in Chapter Six, Comey cited the events set forth in this 
chapter as two of the factors that influenced his decision to deliver a public 
statement announcing the closing of the Midyear investigation on July 5, 2016, 
without coordinating with the Department. 
I. Public Acknowledgement of the Investigation 
A. Statements about the Investigation in Department and FBI 
Letters to Congress in August and September 2015 
Following the public referral to the FBI from the IC IG in July 2015, the 
Department and the FBI received questions from the media and Congress asking 
whether they had opened a criminal investigation of former Secretary Clinton.  
According to emails exchanged in late August 2015, there was a significant 
disagreement between ODAG and FBI officials regarding whether to acknowledge 
that a criminal investigation had been opened.  FBI officials, according to the 
emails, wanted to acknowledge “open[ing] an investigation into the matter,” while 
ODAG officials approved language “neither confirm[ing] nor deny[ing] the existence 
of any ongoing investigation,” based on longstanding Department policy.  FBI and 
Department letters sent to Congress on August 27 and September 22, 2015, and a 
letter sent by the FBI General Counsel to the State Department on September 22, 
2015, used the “neither confirm nor deny” language. 
Contemporaneous emails show that former Director Comey disagreed with 
this approach.  In an August 27, 2015 email to Deputy Director (DD) Giuliano, Chief 
of Staff James Rybicki, and FBI Office of Public Affairs (OPA) Assistant Director (AD) 
Mike Kortan, he stated, “I’m thinking it a bit silly to say we ‘can’t confirm or deny 
an investigation’ when there are public statements by former [S]ecretary Clinton 
and others about the production of materials to us.  I would rather be in a place 
where we say we ‘don’t comment on our investigations.’”  Rybicki told the OIG that 
Comey thought that the Department and FBI needed to say more about the 
investigation because the IC IG referral was made publicly, and refusing to 
acknowledge an investigation would “stretch...any credibility the Department has.” 
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B. September 28, 2015 Meeting between Attorney General Lynch 
and Director Comey 
In late September and early October 2015, Comey and Lynch each had 
upcoming media and congressional appearances.  Anticipating that they would be 
asked whether the Department and FBI had opened an investigation into former 
Secretary Clinton, Comey asked to meet with Lynch to coordinate what they would 
say.  Comey told the OIG that it was the first time the two of them would be asked 
questions about the investigation publicly, and he wanted to discuss how they 
should talk about it given that there had been news coverage of the referral and “a 
lot of public discussion about that the FBI is already looking [into] this.” 
The meeting was held on September 28, 2015, and lasted approximately 15 
minutes.  Participants in the meeting included Lynch, Axelrod, and Toscas from the 
Department, and Comey, Rybicki, and then DD Giuliano from the FBI. 
1. Comey’s Account of the Meeting 
Comey told the OIG that during this meeting AG Lynch agreed they needed 
to confirm the existence of the investigation, but she said not to use the word 
“investigation,” and instead to call it a “matter.”  Comey said that Lynch seemed 
slightly irritated at him when she said this, and that he took it as a direction.  
Comey stated: 
And I remember saying, “Well, what should I call it?”  And she said, 
“Call it a matter.”  And I said, “Why would I do that?”  And she said, “I 
just want you to do that and so I would very much appreciate it if you 
would not refer to it as an investigation.”  And the reason that gave 
me pause is, it was during a period of time which lasted, where I knew 
from the open source that the Clinton campaign was keen not to use 
the word investigation....  [A]nd so that one concerned me and I 
remember getting a lump in my stomach and deciding at that moment 
should I fight on this or not. 
Comey told the OIG that he decided not to fight this instruction from the AG, but 
that it “made [his] spider sense tingle” and caused him to “worry...that she’s 
carrying water for the [Clinton] campaign[.]”  As described in Chapter Six, Comey 
told the OIG and testified before Congress that this instruction from Lynch was one 
of the factors that influenced his unilateral decision to make a public statement on 
July 5, 2016, without coordinating with the Department.56  However, Comey also 
said to us that he had no other reason to question Lynch’s motives at that time, 
stating, “[I]n fact my experience with her has always been very good and 
independent, and she always struck me as an independent-minded person[.]” 
                                       
56  See U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing with Former FBI Director 
James Comey, 115th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2017, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-former-fbi-director-james-comey# 
(accessed May 8, 2018). 
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Comey stated that one of the reasons he remembered this meeting so well 
was that Toscas made a comment after the meeting about the “Federal Bureau of 
Matters,” indicating to Comey that Toscas “had the same reaction I did to it.”  He 
said that Toscas did not say explicitly that he shared Comey’s concerns about the 
meeting, but was “signaling” agreement to him through “body language and 
humor.” 
Rybicki and Giuliano did not specifically recall the discussion that took place 
at the meeting, other than that AG Lynch told Comey to refer to the investigation 
as a “matter.”  Giuliano stated, “I don’t remember that specific [meeting].  I do 
remember the topic.  And I do remember thinking that (A) it’s ridiculous, and (B) 
quite honestly, I didn’t care what they called it....  It wasn’t going to change what 
we did.”  He recalled discussions with the Midyear team after the meeting with 
Lynch, telling the OIG that “a lot of people got wrapped around the axle” about the 
issue and “thought that that was kind of getting into the politics of the 
investigation.”  He also stated that Comey was “definitely troubled by it.” 
However, Rybicki said that he did not recall Comey being troubled by the 
meeting or expressing concern that the instruction from Lynch was an effort to 
coordinate with the Clinton campaign.  Rybicki also said that he personally did not 
come away from the meeting with the view that Lynch was biased.  Rybicki did 
recall Toscas joking about the “Federal Bureau of Matters.” 
2. Lynch’s Recollection of the Meeting 
Lynch told the OIG that Comey expressed concern during the meeting about 
how to comply with the Department’s longstanding policy of neither confirming nor 
denying ongoing criminal investigations in the face of direct questions about the 
number of agents assigned to the case and the resources dedicated to it, because 
answering those questions implicitly would acknowledge that there was an open 
investigation.  Lynch said that providing testimony about the allocation of resources 
or the way that the Department works a case is a normal practice, but that in her 
view, they were not ready to publicly confirm an investigation. 
Lynch stated that her discussion with Comey was framed in terms of how 
they could testify about the resources dedicated to the investigation without 
breaking Department policy.  Lynch said that Comey was seeking guidance on how 
to handle those issues, particularly given that the referral was public, and that 
detailed information about the investigation had been discussed in the press. 
Lynch said that she was aware of numerous letters from Members of 
Congress requesting information about the investigation, and that her meeting with 
Comey took place around the same time as a telephone call she had with Senator 
Charles Grassley, who wanted to discuss the Department’s handling of Bryan 
Pagliano, a State Department employee who set up one of Clinton’s servers, in 
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order to inform Congress’s decision as to whether to grant him immunity to compel 
his testimony before Congress.57  Lynch told the OIG: 
Senator Grassley was asking me literally will I confirm that there is a 
criminal investigation of Secretary Clinton, who are the other targets, 
who are the subjects, has a grand jury been impaneled, has this young 
man [Pagliano] been given immunity, would I give him a copy of the 
immunity order, and all the things that, that Oversight typically asks 
for. 
So I knew, and I certainly had the view, that we had to be clear and 
open with Oversight.  You know, whether it’s me or the Director.  But 
consistent with our law enforcement obligations, there are some doors 
that we do not open.  And I did not think that we were ready to open 
that door on the Hill at that time. 
Lynch said that her concerns about opening the door to detailed questions 
about the investigation informed her view that the Department should not confirm 
that there was an investigation.  She said that she recalled stating at the meeting 
with Comey, “[T]hey don’t need us to tell them that there is an investigation.  They 
need us to confirm that there is an investigation.  And there is a difference.”  She 
explained: 
And once we confirm it publicly, either by saying yes there is an 
investigation, or by talking about it in a way that confirms it, the next 
series of questions is going to be is it criminal.  And it’s all going to be 
about is the Secretary a subject or a target.  And there were others 
involved as well.  There are other people beyond her who may or may 
not be named, but, you know, you start having these discussions.  
When will it be over?  What are you finding?  All those things that in 
fact Grassley did ask. 
The OIG asked Lynch if she instructed or told Comey, “I want you to call it a 
matter.”  Lynch said that she did not and would not have, because that was not 
how she spoke to people.  She told the OIG that she remembered saying the 
following at the meeting: 
Well I, I do remember saying, you know, we typically say we have 
enough resources to handle the matter....  I don’t know if I used other 
words like the case, you know, the inquiry, or something like that.  But 
I do remember saying that, and I think I may have been saying that 
because, again, I was always careful not to talk about an investigation.  
                                       
57  Based on notes and Department emails, the OIG determined that Lynch’s call with Senator 
Grassley was scheduled for later that same day, September 28, 2015.  According to talking points 
prepared for this call, Lynch intended to tell Senator Grassley that the Department could neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of any ongoing investigation or persons or entities under investigation, 
consistent with longstanding Department policy.  The talking points stated, “This policy, which has 
been applied across Administrations, is designed to protect the integrity of our investigations and to 
avoid any appearance of political influence.” 
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I was getting questioned about the referral...and is it going to lead to 
an investigation and, you know, we have it, we acknowledge it, we’re 
going to handle it.  And that’s all I can say kind of thing. 
And so I know that in addition to saying...yes, everyone knows there’s 
an investigation.  They don’t need us to tell them that.  They need us 
to confirm it, and we don’t do that.  And here’s why we don’t do that.  
I remember making those statements.  And I remember saying but of 
course you’ve got to...respond.  And one way to respond is just to 
say...you’ve got what you need to handle the matter. 
Lynch said that she thought that there had been agreement at the meeting 
about what to say.  Her takeaway was that they were going to take steps not to 
confirm that there was an official investigation open and would be careful not to do 
so in how they discussed it.  Lynch stated, “[I]t wasn’t a long meeting.  It was that, 
it wasn’t contentious.  Nobody seemed upset.  So it was more of a discussion.”  She 
said that she did not recall Comey or anyone else expressing disagreement, or 
Comey asking, “Why on earth would I do that?” 
Lynch said that the decision to avoid confirming an investigation was not 
made with any political motive in mind, and that she did not coordinate messaging 
with the Clinton campaign.  Lynch told the OIG that she was surprised to learn from 
Comey’s later congressional testimony that he interpreted the discussion at this 
meeting as evidence of potential political bias.  She stated: 
I was surprised.  I was disappointed, somewhat angry.  And mostly 
surprised that he had never raised it either at the time or later, that if 
it was a concern—I was surprised that if he thought that it was a 
problem, he was okay also handling things in that way.  I just had 
never viewed him as someone who was reluctant to raise issues or 
concerns, given that I had known him for, for some time [.] 
Lynch recalled Toscas making a joke about the “Federal Bureau of Matters” 
to one of the agents who was sitting beside him, and people laughing.  She said 
that she took this as a joke, as good-natured “ribbing” or “teasing,” and that the 
laughter told her that others in attendance also took it as a joke. 
Axelrod told us that the discussion about whether to acknowledge an 
“investigation” was just one small part of that meeting.  He said that Lynch 
suggested using the term “matter” as a way of “thread[ing] the needle” to avoid 
violating Department policy while also not appearing evasive.  According to Axelrod, 
no one from the FBI raised objections during the meeting, and the tone of the 
discussion was collegial.  He said that he thought that Comey and Lynch had 
reached a “mutual agreement that using the term ‘matter’ was the best way to 
thread the needle.”  Axelrod told the OIG that he was surprised to hear Comey’s 
later congressional testimony that he (Comey) felt uncomfortable with the 
discussion, which Axelrod said was not consistent with his recollection of Comey’s 
reaction in the room, and did not “square with...[his] recollection of the facts.” 
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3. Toscas’s Notes and Recollection of the Meeting 
Toscas took detailed notes at the September 28 meeting, which he provided 
to the OIG.  Toscas said that his notes were unusually lengthy for such a brief 
meeting because AAG Carlin was out of town and he was asked to attend in Carlin’s 
place, and he wanted to be able to tell Carlin what happened. 
Referencing his notes, Toscas testified to the OIG at length about what took 
place during the meeting.  According to Toscas, Comey told Lynch that he planned 
to acknowledge at a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) 
roundtable that the FBI had received the referral from the IC IG and that it was 
being properly staffed and receiving all necessary resources.  Comey stated that he 
planned to say that the FBI does not comment on its investigations per 
longstanding policy, but that all of its investigations are done professionally and 
timely.  Toscas said that Comey assured Lynch that he would not say that they had 
opened an investigation, but that this would be implicit in what he said, and there 
would be news reports afterwards saying that there was an investigation. 
According to Toscas, Lynch replied that she preferred “to discuss it in terms 
of a matter....  [T]his is the way I do it and then it avoids this issue because we 
should neither confirm nor deny.”  Toscas said that he interpreted Lynch’s 
statement as expressing her preference rather than telling Comey what he should 
do.  Toscas stated he did not recall Lynch instructing Comey to call it a matter, and 
he thought he would have remembered that if it had occurred.  He also said that he 
did not interpret Lynch’s comment as her “trying to shade [the investigation] into 
something it wasn’t for some particular reason.”  However, he acknowledged that 
he was not the FBI Director, and that Comey may have had a different perspective. 
Toscas said that after Lynch’s comment, Axelrod stated that they needed to 
coordinate what to say with a letter sent by the FBI General Counsel to the State 
Department the previous week and attached to a public filing in FOIA litigation, in 
which the FBI took “great pains to not call this an investigation, so as not to 
confirm the existence of an investigation.”  According to Toscas, the Department 
and the FBI had used the same language in other letters to Congress, and Lynch 
had a call scheduled later that day with Senator Charles Grassley in which she 
planned to tell him that it would be premature to acknowledge or share information 
about any investigation. 
Toscas said that Axelrod’s statement led to a back and forth between Comey 
and Axelrod, during which Comey proposed modifying the letters to Congress to 
acknowledge that the FBI had opened an investigation.  Toscas said that he was not 
sure if Comey was “toying with [Axelrod] at that point because I don’t think we 
would ever reissue letters that...clearly state normal positions.”  Toscas said that 
Comey then asked Axelrod directly, “Why not use the word, you know we’re trying 
to treat it like any other case and would we do that ordinarily?”  In response, 
Axelrod again mentioned the need to be consistent with the letters that were sent 
the previous week. 
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Toscas told the OIG that he mentioned at the meeting that the Department 
opens only a small fraction of the referrals it receives from the intelligence 
community as criminal investigations, and that the Department may not want to 
publicly acknowledge an investigation into former Secretary Clinton because it could 
serve as precedent for other referrals.  Toscas said he also made clear to the group 
that Midyear was a criminal investigation, and that the prosecutors had referred to 
it as an investigation in letters to counsel and in search warrant applications. 
Toscas said that Comey concluded the meeting by agreeing to call it a 
matter, stating, “OK, I think that will work.”  This statement also appeared in 
Toscas’s contemporaneous notes.  Toscas told the OIG that there was no indication 
at the time that Comey was concerned about the meeting or that the meeting had 
led him to question Lynch’s impartiality. 
Asked whether he made a comment to Comey about the “Federal Bureau of 
Matters,” Toscas said that he did not specifically recall doing so but may have.  He 
said that, if he did, he intended it as a joke rather than as a criticism of Lynch.  He 
told the OIG: 
I don’t know if I ribbed [Comey] walking out.  You know he’s a friend 
of mine....  In any event, maybe I said that, maybe I didn’t.  It 
wouldn’t faze me if I did, because it was in line with what I was saying 
to them [about “investigation” being part of the FBI’s name].  But it 
makes it appear as though I was sort of knocking the AG [Lynch] in 
the way they reported it, which is obviously why some goofball felt 
that they should talk about that to the newspapers....58 
C. October 1, 2015 Comey Meeting with Media 
In a “pen and pad” with reporters on October 1, 2015, Comey used the term 
“matter” in response to questions about whether the FBI had opened an 
investigation.  According to a transcript of the appearance, Comey told reporters 
that he recently had a closed session with HPSCI and would say publicly what he 
told the committee:  that the FBI had received a referral involving former Secretary 
Clinton’s use of a private email account and the possible exposure of classified 
information through that account, but that he was limited in what he could say 
because the FBI does not talk about its ongoing work.  Comey stated, “I am 
following this very closely and I get briefed on it regularly....  I am confident that 
we have the resources and the personnel assigned to the matter, as we do all our 
work, so we’re able to do it as we do all our work in a professional, prompt and 
independent way.”  Asked about the timeline for completing any investigation, 
Comey stated, “Again, I’m not going to talk about this particular matter....  Part of 
doing our work well is we don’t talk about it while we do it.” 
                                       
58  See Matt Apuzzo et al., In Trying to Avoid Politics, Comey Shaped an Election, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2017, at A1 (referencing two sources who reportedly heard Toscas state, “I guess you’re the 
Federal Bureau of Matters now.”). 
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Following Comey’s appearance, various news articles reported that Comey 
had acknowledged the existence of an investigation into former Secretary Clinton’s 
use of a private email server.59  Comey received an email containing news clips 
summarizing several of these articles and forwarded it to Rybicki, stating, “Will 
leave it to you to tell DOJ that I never used the word investigation.”  Rybicki 
replied, “Already covered.  I read back your statement to them and told them this 
is exactly the type of confusion we were concerned about as we were crafting.” 
II. Reaction to White House Statements about the Midyear Investigation 
On Sunday, October 11, 2015, an interview of then President Barack Obama 
was aired on the CBS show 60 Minutes.  During this interview, Obama characterized 
former Secretary Clinton’s use of a private email server as a “mistake,” but stated 
that it did not “pose[] a national security problem” and was “not a situation in 
which America’s national security was endangered.”  Obama also stated that the 
issue had been “ginned up” because of the presidential race.  Two days later, on 
October 13, 2015, Obama’s Press Secretary, Josh Earnest, was asked whether 
Obama’s comments “should be read as an attempt to steer the direction of the FBI 
investigation.”  Earnest replied that Obama made his comments based on public 
information, and they were not intended to influence an independent investigation. 
Former President Obama’s comments caused concern among FBI officials 
about the potential impact on the investigation.  Former EAD John Giacalone told 
the OIG, “[W]e open up criminal investigations.  And you have the President of the 
United States saying this is just a mistake....  That’s a problem, right?”  Former AD 
Randy Coleman expressed the same concern, stating, “[The FBI had] a group of 
guys in here, professionals, that are conducting an investigation.  And 
the...President of the United States just came out and said there’s no there there.”  
Coleman said that he would have expected someone in FBI or Department 
leadership to contact one of Obama’s national security officials, and “tell [him or 
her], hey knock it off.”  Michael Steinbach, the former EAD for the National Security 
Branch, told the OIG that the comments generated “controversy” within the FBI.  
Steinbach stated, “[Y]ou’re prejudging the results of an investigation before they 
really even have been started....  That’s...hugely problematic for us.” 
Department prosecutors also were concerned.  Responding to an email from 
Laufman about Obama’s 60 Minutes interview, Toscas stated, “Saw this.  And as 
[one of the prosecutors] and I discussed last week, of course it had no—and will 
never have any—effect whatsoever on our work and our independent judgment.”  
Prosecutor 4 told the OIG that Obama’s statement was the genesis of the FBI’s 
suspicions that the Department’s leadership was politically biased.  This prosecutor 
stated, “I know that the FBI considered those [statements] inappropriate.  And that 
it...[generated] a suspicion that there was a political bias...going on from the 
Executive Branch.” 
                                       
59  See, e.g., Pete Williams, FBI Director Acknowledges Agency Looking Into Clinton Emails, 
NBC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2015, http://nbcnews.to/1LmHuMM (accessed Jan. 18, 2018). 
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Asked about former President Obama’s statements, Lynch stated, “I never 
spoke to the President directly about it, because I never spoke to him about any 
case or investigation.  He didn’t speak to me about it either.”  She told the OIG that 
she did not think the President should have made the comment on 60 Minutes.  She 
stated, “I don’t know where it came from.  And I don’t know, I don’t know why he 
would have thought that either, to be honest with you.  Because, to me, anyone 
looking at this case would have seen a national security component to it.  So I 
don’t, I truly do not know where he got that from.” 
Former President Obama’s Press Secretary, Josh Earnest, made additional 
comments about the Midyear investigation during a press conference in early 2016.  
On January 29, 2016, in response to a question about whether the White House 
thought that former Secretary Clinton would be indicted, Earnest stated: 
That will be a decision that is made by the Department of Justice and 
prosecutors over there.  What I know that some officials over there 
have said is that she is not a target of the investigation.  So that does 
not seem to be the direction that it’s trending, but I’m certainly not 
going to weigh in on a decision or in that process in any way.  That is 
a decision to be made solely by independent prosecutors.  But, again, 
based on what we know from the Department of Justice, it does not 
seem to be headed in that direction. 
After this press conference, Melanie Newman, the Director of the Department’s 
Office of Public Affairs (OPA), received a transcript of Earnest’s statements about 
the investigation and forwarded it to Axelrod and three other Department officials.  
Newman stated in the email to these officials, “I’ve spoken to the [White House] 
and asked that they clarify this, to make clear they have no insight into this 
investigation.  And if they don’t correct it, I will.  I’m waiting to hear back.”  This 
email also was forwarded to Lynch. 
Asked about this email, Newman said that she spoke to Earnest that day.  
Newman said that Earnest told her that he had based his comments on what he had 
read in news stories, not conversations with anyone in the Department.  She said 
that no one in the White House ever reached out to her about the Midyear 
investigation, nor was she aware of White House staff reaching out to anyone else 
in the Department, noting, “They were very, very, very careful about engaging with 
us on that topic.”  Axelrod similarly told the OIG that Earnest’s comments implied 
that the White House had received a briefing on the Midyear investigation, which he 
said “never happened.” 
Lynch’s Chief of Staff stated that Department officials were “very upset” 
about Earnest’s statement, because “as far as we knew, no one at Department of 
Justice had spoken to anyone in the White House about it.”  The Chief of Staff told 
the OIG that they were particularly concerned by Earnest’s statement that former 
Secretary Clinton was not a target.  The Chief of Staff said that she spoke to 
officials in the White House Counsel’s Office to tell them that the Department did 
not know where Earnest was getting his information, and to ask them to talk to 
Earnest.  The Chief of Staff did not specifically recall Lynch’s reaction to this 
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statement, but said that she was “[p]robably very upset....  [A]nytime there was 
ever any suggestion that the White House, or that DOJ had improperly done 
something in an investigation, or discussed something of...a political nature, she 
would not be happy about it.” 
Prosecutors again were concerned by these comments.  On January 29, 
2016, Toscas sent the following email to Laufman, seeking to assure the team that 
the investigation would not be influenced by White House statements: 
As discussed, I spoke with ODAG and they are not aware of anybody 
from DOJ sharing any such information or assessment with the White 
House, as the below statements appear to suggest.  I want to reiterate 
what I’ve told you and the team throughout our work on this 
investigation—the explicit direction we received from the AG and DAG 
on multiple occasions is that they have total confidence in the team of 
prosecutors who are working on this case and they have instructed us 
to proceed with this matter as we would any other, without 
interference of any kind, and with the independence we have in all of 
our cases.  They have never wavered from that and have never said or 
done anything to send or suggest a contrary message.  With respect to 
the below statements that erroneously imply that the Department has 
shared information about, or an assessment of, this matter with the 
White House, we should not and will not allow such irresponsible 
statements to have any effect at all on our work.  We will continue to 
thoroughly and professionally investigate this matter as we would any 
other—and, as always—and as you, John [Carlin], and I have said 
repeatedly—we will follow the facts wherever they lead.  Thanks. 
Toscas emailed Laufman a second time, stating, “Please feel free to share this with 
the whole team (if you haven’t already).”  During his interview with the OIG, Toscas 
described Earnest’s statements as “goofy” and “ridiculous,” expressing frustration 
that he had to address comments by the White House when preparing Lynch to 
testify before Congress because of the perception of political bias that they created. 
Asked about Earnest’s statements, prosecutors told the OIG that the only 
interactions they had with the White House concerning the investigation were with 
the White House Counsel’s Office to obtain a classification review of documents in a 
Special Access Program (SAP) controlled by the White House and to interview a 
National Security Council staffer.  Prosecutor 1 told the OIG that he was not aware 
of contacts between Department leadership and the White House Counsel’s Office 
or White House staff.  Notes taken by Laufman indicate that on January 30, 2016, 
one of the prosecutors reached out to their point of contact in the White House 
Counsel’s Office and asked about Earnest’s comments.  According to these notes, 
this prosecutor was told that the content of the discussions between the White 
House Counsel’s Office and the Midyear team about the classification review and 
the interview of the staffer was limited to a small group of people in the White 
House Counsel’s Office, and that nothing that the prosecutors had discussed with 
the White House Counsel’s Office would be known to Earnest. 
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Lynch testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 9, 2016.  
Asked about the investigation, Lynch stated that she had never discussed the 
investigation with former President Obama or anyone in the White House.  Lynch 
stated, “[I]t’s my hope that when it comes to ongoing investigations that we all 
would stay silent. And I can assure you that neither I nor anyone from the 
Department has briefed to Mr. Earnest or anyone at the White House about this 
matter or other law enforcement matters....  I’m simply not aware of the source of 
his information.”60 
Lynch told the OIG that she recalled that Newman spoke with the White 
House Communications Office after Earnest’s comments and was clear that they 
were inappropriate and needed to be corrected.  Asked whether she perceived 
these comments as an effort to direct where the investigation was going or felt 
influenced by them, she said that she did not.  Lynch said that she also had a 
discussion with the White House Counsel after she testified, and that during this 
discussion he acknowledged that the comments should not have happened. 
However, former President Obama again made public comments about the 
Midyear investigation in an interview with FOX News Sunday on April 10, 2016.  
Obama stated that while former Secretary Clinton had been “careless” in managing 
her emails while she was Secretary of State, she would never intentionally do 
anything to endanger the security of the United States with her emails.  He also 
stated that he would not interfere in the FBI’s investigation into her private email 
server.  Obama stated, “I guarantee that there is no political influence in any 
investigation conducted by the Justice Department, or the F.B.I.—not just in this 
case, but in any case.”61 
                                       
60  U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
114th Cong., 2d sess., March 9, 2016, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/oversight-of-the-
us-department-of-justice. 
61  See Transcript, President Barack Obama on FOX News Sunday, Apr. 10, 2016, at 
http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2016/04/10/exclusive-president-barack-obama-on-fox-news-
sunday.html (accessed Mar. 22, 2018). 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
INVESTIGATIVE METHODS USED IN THE INVESTIGATION 
The Midyear team used several types of investigative methods and made 
various strategic decisions during the course of its investigation.  Some of these 
decisions have been the subject of criticism and allegations that they were based on 
improper considerations. 
In this chapter, we describe the following investigative methods and 
decisions made by the Midyear team:  efforts to identify relevant sources of 
physical evidence; efforts to understand and access Clinton’s servers; use of 
criminal process, including subpoenas, 2703(d) orders, and search warrants to 
obtain physical evidence; use of consent to obtain physical evidence; efforts to 
obtain evidence related to Clinton’s senior aides; use of voluntary interviews; 
decisions to grant certain witnesses use immunity; strategies employed to secure 
voluntary interviews and voluntary production of evidence from Cheryl Mills and 
Heather Samuelson; and investigative decisions surrounding the voluntary 
interview of Hillary Clinton.  We describe the reasons given for these decisions, 
disagreements among members of the Midyear team about them, especially 
between the FBI and the prosecutors, and the impact of these decisions on the 
investigation’s access to relevant information and the completeness of the 
investigation.  We also describe an internal file review of the Midyear investigation 
conducted by the FBI’s Inspection Division (INSD) in September and October 2017 
following our discovery of concerning text messages between Strzok and Page. 
In addition, we discuss instant messages in which Agent 1 expressed 
concerns about the quality of the Midyear investigation.  We considered these 
messages as part of our analysis of whether the Midyear team conducted a 
thorough and impartial investigation. 
In the analysis section of this chapter, we assess whether the evidence 
supports a conclusion that any of the investigative decisions we reviewed were 
based on improper considerations, consistent with the analytical construct 
described in Chapter One. 
I. FBI’s Efforts to Identify and Review Relevant Sources of Evidence 
The Midyear team began its investigation by reviewing the 30,490 emails 
that Clinton had produced to the State Department.  They reviewed them to 
identify emails that appeared to contain classified information and evidence of 
intent to mishandle classified information.62  Witnesses told us that to search for 
evidence of intent, the analysts looked for, among other things, classification 
markings on the documents, statements indicating that email participants knew 
                                       
62  The Midyear Supervisory Special Agent told us that the State Department provided these 
emails to the FBI in paper form.  According to the LHM, on August 6, 2015, Clinton’s attorneys 
voluntarily provided the FBI thumb drives containing the same emails. 
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information was classified, and statements indicating that Clinton decided to use a 
private server for an improper purpose, such as to avoid FOIA or other laws.  One 
analyst told us that there were at least six analysts consistently involved with 
reviewing these emails, and, at times, there were as many as fifteen or sixteen 
analysts doing so.  Once the team identified emails that appeared to contain 
classified information, they sent them to other agencies within the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (“USIC agencies”) with equities in them for formal classification review. 
FBI agents and Department prosecutors told us that, thereafter, a large focus 
of the investigation was locating the remaining 31,830 emails that made up the 
entire 62,320 emails that Clinton’s attorneys had reportedly reviewed before 
producing her work-related emails to the State Department.  Clinton’s attorneys did 
not produce those 31,830 emails to the State Department because, they stated, 
they were personal in nature; instead, the attorneys instructed Paul Combetta of 
Platte River Networks (“PRN”)—the company that managed Clinton’s server— to 
remove the emails from their own laptops and modify the server’s email retention 
period so that emails older than 60 days would not be retained.  In March 2015, 
Combetta removed the emails from Clinton’s server using BleachBit after realizing 
he had failed to implement the new email retention period several months earlier.  
The FBI team wanted to review these emails, if possible, to determine whether any 
were work-related or contained classified information, and to search for evidence of 
Clinton’s intent in using a private server. 
FBI agents and analysts, including the Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) 
assigned to the Midyear investigation, told us that to find the missing 31,830 
emails, the team attempted to identify and obtain access to any server or device—
“whether it was a BlackBerry, iPad, PC [or] phone”—Clinton used during her tenure, 
as well as devices used to back up her emails.  The FBI also sought email content 
or header information from the official U.S. government and private email accounts 
of certain individuals who were known to communicate directly with Clinton by 
email or who were involved in email chains that ultimately resulted in classified 
information being forwarded to Clinton.  However, as discussed in Section V.C of 
this chapter, the FBI did not seek to obtain the personal devices of State 
Department employees, besides Clinton, who sometimes used private email for 
State Department work and who used those devices to communicate with Clinton 
while she was Secretary of State. 
Based on our review, the FBI sent preservation requests to the State 
Department for nearly one-thousand official State Department email accounts.  One 
analyst told us that the State Department was unable to supply many of the email 
records the FBI requested due to, among other things, limitations in the State 
Department’s recordkeeping systems.  However, the FBI obtained records from the 
official State Department email accounts of certain employees, including the three 
senior aides with whom Clinton had the most email contact.  The FBI also made 
requests of other government agencies, including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Executive Office of the 
President (EOP), to search their official email systems for emails to or from email 
accounts on the clintonemail.com domain.  In addition, as discussed in Sections III 
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and V below, the Midyear team used compulsory process to obtain email records 
from certain private email accounts. 
The FBI also requested the State-Department-issued computers and 
handheld devices used by certain employees during their State Department tenure.  
However, with the exception of a desktop computer used by Bryan Pagliano (a 
State Department employee who set up Clinton’s second server), the State 
Department told the FBI that it either did not preserve or could not locate those 
devices.   
FBI witnesses told us that both FBI agents and analysts were involved in 
determining what devices and other evidence to obtain.  Based on our review of the 
evidence, the FBI obtained more than 30 devices; received consent to search 
Clinton-related communications on most of these devices; and identified numerous 
work-related emails that were not part of the 30,490 emails produced by Clinton’s 
attorneys to the State Department, many of which they sent to other agencies for 
classification review.  The thirty devices included two of Clinton’s servers, each of 
which consisted of multiple devices; storage devices used alongside Clinton’s 
servers; numerous devices that were used to back up Clinton’s emails during her 
tenure; some of Clinton’s handheld devices; Pagliano’s State Department desktop 
computer; several flash drives and laptop computers that contained copies of the 
30,490 emails that Clinton’s attorneys produced to the State Department; and the 
two laptops used by Clinton’s attorneys to cull her emails for production to the 
State Department.  Once the FBI received consent to review a device, staff from 
the FBI’s Operational Technology Division (OTD) generally imaged the device and 
prepared the image for a filter team to remove material that was privileged or 
otherwise not subject to search pursuant to the terms of a consent agreement.  
OTD then uploaded the emails and other data from the device for FBI analysts to 
review.  OTD also attempted to de-duplicate emails.  The analysts reviewed the 
emails recovered from each device for the same purposes as they reviewed the 
initial 30,490—to identify both suspected classified information and evidence of 
intent to mishandle classified information. 
The Midyear team also sought and obtained a wide range of other 
information relevant to the investigation, such as Clinton’s cable, telephone, and 
Internet subscriber and service information; financial information for certain 
witnesses; business records pertaining to the services provided by the companies 
that supported Clinton’s servers; records related to security services protecting 
Clinton’s servers; and information from mail carriers related to the delivery of a 
laptop that at one time stored Clinton’s archived emails.  Prosecutor 1 told us that 
the team sought records from at least three different companies in an effort to find 
the Blackberry emails from the beginning of Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of 
State.63  Analysts told us that they reviewed these materials to search for, among 
                                       
63  Based on the LHM, the 30,490 emails provided by Clinton’s attorneys to the State 
Department contained no emails sent or received by Clinton during the first two months of her tenure, 
January 21, 2009, through March 18, 2009, and the FBI investigative team was unable to locate the 
BlackBerry device she used during that time.  Witnesses, including former Director Comey, told us 
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other things, evidence of mishandling classified information and additional leads for 
information.  For example, one analyst stated that through records obtained from 
various phone companies, he was able to identify the 13 devices that were 
associated with two telephone numbers that Clinton used. 
According to the LHM, the FBI found and reviewed “approximately 17,448 
unique work-related and personal emails from Clinton’s tenure” containing her 
email address that were not part of the original 30,490 that Clinton’s lawyers had 
produced to the State Department.  Comey stated in his July 5, 2016, press 
conference that the FBI found “several thousand” work-related emails that were not 
part of the 30,490 emails.  However, one analyst told us, and documentation we 
reviewed showed, that the FBI did not conduct its review in such a way that it could 
calculate the precise amount of work-related emails discovered by the FBI that had 
not been produced to the State Department.  Instead, as described below, they 
focused on identifying the number of classified emails that both were and were not 
included in the 30,490. 
None of the emails, including those that were found to contain classified 
information, included a header or footer with classification markings.  As we discuss 
further in Chapter Seven, this absence of clear classification markings played a 
significant role in the decision by the Midyear prosecutors to recommend to 
Attorney General Lynch in July 2016 that the investigation should be closed without 
prosecution.  According to the LHM, the FBI, with the assistance of other USIC 
agencies, identified “81 email chains containing approximately 193 individual emails 
that were classified from the CONFIDENTIAL to TOP SECRET levels at the time the 
emails were drafted on UNCLASSIFIED systems and sent to or from Clinton’s 
personal server.”  In other words, the USIC agencies determined that these 81 
email chains, although not marked classified, contained information classified at the 
time the emails were sent and should have been so marked.  Twelve of the 81 
classified email chains were not among the 30,490 that Clinton’s lawyers had 
produced to the State Department, and these were all classified at the Secret or 
Confidential levels.  Seven of the 81 email chains contained information associated 
with a Special Access Program (“SAP”), which witnesses told us is considered 
particularly sensitive.  The emails containing Top Secret and SAP information were 
included in the 30,490 provided to the State Department. 
In June 2016, near the end of the investigation, investigators found three 
email chains, consisting of eight individual emails, that “contained at least one 
paragraph marked ‘(C),’ a marking ostensibly indicating the presence of information 
classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level.”  According to a June 13, 2016 text message 
exchange between Strzok and Page, the emails containing the “(C)” portion 
markings were part of the 30,490 that Clinton’s attorneys had provided to the State 
Department in 2014 but the FBI did not notice them until June 2016 after the IC IG 
discovered them.  By that point in time, as discussed in Chapter Six below, Comey 
had been drafting his statement announcing the closing of the investigation.  Strzok 
                                       
that they believed these missing emails could contain important evidence regarding Clinton’s intent in 
setting up a private email server.  
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wrote to Page that “DoJ was Very Concerned about this....  Because they’re 
worried, holy cow, if the fbi missed this, what else was missed?”  Strzok further 
wrote, “No one noticed.  And while minor, it cuts against ‘I never send or received 
anything marked classified.’”64  According to the prosecutors, Mills, Abedin, and 
Jake Sullivan were each parties to at least one email in the chains with the (C) 
markings. However, none of them were ever asked about the emails, because the 
FBI had not discovered the markings before their interviews and did not seek to 
reinterview them.65 
Witnesses told us that although the FBI found work-related emails, including 
classified emails, that were not part of the 30,490 produced to the State 
Department by Clinton’s lawyers, they were not able to determine whether these 
emails were part of the original 62,320 reviewed by Clinton’s attorneys.  This is 
because some of the emails they found through other sources could have been 
deleted from Clinton’s account or “overwritten in the ordinary course” before 
Clinton’s attorneys reviewed her emails for production to the State Department.  
Thus, they also were unable to determine how many of the 31,830 deleted emails 
were never recovered. 
The FBI also conducted “intrusion analyses” on each of the devices and other 
evidence to determine whether any classified information had been compromised.  
An FBI agent assigned to the Midyear team to conduct intrusion and other forensic 
analysis (“Forensics Agent”) described the team’s efforts in this regard as 
exhaustive.  He stated that these efforts included (1) examining the servers and 
others devices to identify suspicious logins or other activity, and (2) searching 
numerous datasets to determine whether foreign adversaries or known hostile 
domestic actors had accessed emails that the Midyear team had confirmed to 
contain classified information. 
Comey stated the following in his July 5, 2016, press conference regarding 
possible cyber intrusion of Clinton’s email servers: 
With respect to potential computer intrusion by hostile actors, we did 
not find direct evidence that Secretary Clinton's personal email 
domain, in its various configurations since 2009, was successfully 
hacked.  But, given the nature of the system and of the actors 
potentially involved, we assess that we would be unlikely to see such 
direct evidence. We do assess that hostile actors gained access to the 
private commercial email accounts of people with whom Secretary 
Clinton was in regular contact from her personal account. We also 
assess that Secretary Clinton's use of a personal email domain was 
                                       
64  Strzok told us that in this text message he was referring to the fact that “Secretary Clinton 
had always said [she] never received anything marked classified,” and that the new discovery of the 
emails with the (C) markings was inconsistent with that claim.  The emails with the (C) markings, 
Clinton’s statements about them during her FBI interview, and the Midyear team’s assessment of her 
credibility are discussed in Section IX.C of this chapter. 
65  Sullivan was Clinton’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy from January 2009 to February 2011 
and Director of Policy and Planning at the State Department from February 2011 to January 2013. 
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both known by a large number of people and readily apparent.  She 
also used her personal email extensively while outside the United 
States, including sending and receiving work-related emails in the 
territory of sophisticated adversaries. Given that combination of 
factors, we assess it is possible that hostile actors gained access to 
Secretary Clinton's personal email account. 
The LHM stated, “FBI investigation and forensic analysis did not find evidence 
confirming that Clinton’s email server systems were compromised by cyber means.”  
However, the LHM also stated that the FBI identified one successful compromise of 
an account belonging to one of former President Clinton’s staffers on a different 
domain within the same server former Secretary Clinton used during her tenure.  
The FBI was unable to identify the individual responsible for the compromise, but 
confirmed that the individual had logged in to the former staffer’s account and 
“browsed email folders and attachments.”  According to evidence we reviewed, the 
FBI also confirmed compromises to email accounts belonging to certain individuals 
who communicated with Clinton by email, such as Jake Sullivan and Sidney 
Blumenthal.66   
The LHM stated that the FBI was limited in its intrusion analysis due to the 
“FBI’s inability to recover all server equipment and the lack of complete server data 
for the relevant time period.”  According to the LHM, the FBI also identified 
vulnerabilities in Clinton’s server systems and found that there had been numerous 
unsuccessful attempts by potential malicious actors to exploit those vulnerabilities.  
Nonetheless, the FBI Forensics Agent told the OIG that, although he did not believe 
there was “any way of determining...100%” whether Clinton’s servers had been 
compromised, he felt “fairly confident that there wasn’t an intrusion.”  When asked 
whether a sophisticated foreign adversary was likely to be able to cover its tracks, 
he stated, “They could.  Yeah.  But I, I felt as if we coordinated with the right units 
at headquarters...for those specific adversaries....  And the information that was 
returned back to me was that there was no indication of a compromise.” 
II. The Midyear Team’s Efforts to Understand and Access Clinton’s 
Servers 
Prosecutor 1 told us that it took the Midyear team time to understand the 
setup and sequence of the various servers Clinton used.  This prosecutor stated 
that an understanding of the server setup was a necessary foundation for the 
Midyear team’s investigation.  According to the LHM, the FBI discovered three 
servers that for different periods stored work-related emails sent or received by 
Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State.  Collectively, we refer to these 
three servers as the “Clinton servers.” 
The first server was set up in 2008 by Justin Cooper, a former aide to former 
President Clinton, and is referred to in the LHM as the “Apple Server.”  Based on 
                                       
66  Clinton told the FBI that Blumenthal was a “longtime friend” who “frequently sent 
information he thought would be useful” to her as Secretary of State. 
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evidence we reviewed, the Apple Server was primarily set up for former President 
Clinton’s staff, but Secretary Clinton also used it for her work purposes from 
January 2009 until approximately March 18, 2009, about two months into her 
tenure.  During this time, Clinton primarily used a personally acquired BlackBerry 
device that was connected to the Apple Server. 
The LHM indicates that the second server, referred to in the LHM as the 
Pagliano Server, was used from March 2009 through June 2013.  Cooper told the 
FBI that “in or around January 2009 the decision was made to move to another 
server because the Apple Server was antiquated and users were experiencing 
problems with email delivery on their Blackberry devices.”  Cooper contacted Bryan 
Pagliano, an information technology specialist who worked on Hillary Clinton’s 
presidential campaign, to help him set up the Pagliano server.  Numerous 
individuals had email accounts on the Pagliano Server, including former President 
Clinton, former President Clinton’s staff, Huma Abedin—who was Clinton’s Deputy 
Chief of Staff at the State Department—and Clinton herself.  Clinton and Abedin 
were the only State Department employees with accounts on the 
@clintonemail.com domain on the Pagliano Server. 
The third server, which is referred to in the LHM as the “PRN server,” was 
active after Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State ended, from approximately June 
2013 through October 2015.  The LHM stated that in early 2013, staff for Clinton 
and former President Clinton discussed transitioning to a new vendor for email 
services, “due to user limitations and reliability concerns regarding the Pagliano 
Server.”  The staff chose the “Denver-based information technology firm Platte 
River Networks (PRN)” for this purpose.  According to the LHM, PRN employee Paul 
Combetta migrated the email accounts from the Pagliano Server to the PRN server.  
Following the migration, the Pagliano Server was stored in a data center in New 
Jersey, although it no longer hosted email services and Microsoft Exchange was 
uninstalled from it on December 3, 2013. 
According to the LHM, the FBI learned through witness interviews that the 
Apple Server, in use from 2007 to March 2009, was ultimately discarded and, thus, 
the FBI was never able to access it for review.  However, based on evidence we 
reviewed, the Midyear team obtained access to certain back-up data from the Apple 
Server held on Cooper’s personal laptops through consent agreements with 
Cooper’s attorney.  The Midyear team obtained both the Pagliano and PRN servers 
through consent agreements with David Kendall and Clinton’s other attorneys at 
Williams and Connolly. 
The FBI’s ability to review emails on both the Pagliano and PRN servers was 
limited.  With respect to the Pagliano Server, most of the emails that remained on 
the Pagliano server following the transition to the PRN server were in the 
“unallocated space” due to the removal of Microsoft Exchange in December 2013.  
FBI analysts told us that emails in the unallocated space were often fragmented and 
difficult to reconstruct.  With respect to the PRN server, the FBI discovered through 
forensic analysis and witness interviews that Combetta had transferred most of 
Clinton’s archived emails from her tenure as Secretary of State to the PRN server, 
but subsequently deleted and “wiped” them from the server using “BleachBit.”   
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Based on the LHM, FD-302s, and PRN documents collected by the FBI, the transfer 
of emails to the PRN server and subsequent wiping of the PRN server occurred as 
described in the paragraphs below.   
At around the time of the transition to the PRN server in the spring of 2013, 
Clinton’s former aide, Monica Hanley, created two archives of Clinton’s emails from 
the Pagliano Server, one on a thumb drive (Archive Thumb Drive) and one on a 
laptop computer (Archive Laptop).67  In early 2014, Hanley mailed the Archive 
Laptop to Combetta to transfer Clinton’s archived emails to the PRN server.  She 
further directed him to “wipe” the Archive Laptop and mail it to Clinton’s office 
assistant at the Clinton Foundation after he completed the transfer.  Combetta used 
a “dummy” email account to transfer Clinton’s archived emails into a mailbox 
entitled “HRC archive” on the PRN server.68  Combetta told the FBI that he then, 
per Hanley’s instructions, deleted the emails from the Archive Laptop and mailed 
the Archive Laptop to Clinton’s office assistant, but did not “wipe” the laptop.  Email 
records obtained by the FBI showed that Clinton’s office assistant sent emails to 
Combetta in both March and April 2014 asking when she should expect to receive 
the “wiped laptop;” however, Clinton’s office assistant told the FBI that she did not 
recall ever receiving it. 
An analyst told us and FBI records show that the team sought and obtained 
records from multiple mail carriers in an effort to locate the Archive Laptop.  Based 
on these records, the FBI was able to confirm that the laptop was delivered to Paul 
Combetta on February 24, 2014; however, the FBI found no records showing that 
Combetta mailed the Archive Laptop to Clinton’s office assistant as requested.  The 
FBI also attempted to obtain the Archive Thumb Drive from Hanley, but she stated 
she could not recall what happened to it. 
According to the LHM, FD-302s from Combetta’s, Mills’s, and Samuelson’s 
interviews, and PRN documents collected by the FBI, in the summer of 2014, 
Combetta uploaded .pst files of Clinton’s archived emails to Mills’s and Samuelson’s 
laptops to enable them to review Clinton’s emails and produce her work-related 
emails to the State Department.  In late 2014 or early 2015, after Clinton produced 
her work-related emails to the State Department, Mills and Samuelson requested 
that Combetta remove Clinton’s emails from their laptops, and he did so using 
BleachBit.  At around the same time, Mills directed Combetta to change the email 
retention policy on Clinton’s clintonemail.com account to 60 days, because Clinton 
had decided that she no longer needed access to her personal emails that were 
older than 60 days.  Combetta told the FBI that he mistakenly neglected to make 
the change at the time and realized his mistake in March 2015.  He stated that, 
despite the intervening issuance of a congressional preservation order on March 3, 
                                       
67  According to Hanley’s FD-302, she told the FBI that the archives were created because 
Clinton “did not want to lose her old emails when she changed her email address.”  She further told 
the FBI that PRN advised Clinton to change her email address after Sidney Blumenthal’s email account 
was compromised. 
68  As discussed in Section III of this chapter, the Midyear team obtained a search warrant for 
the dummy email account and recovered some of Clinton’s work-related emails from that account. 
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2015, he “had an ‘oh shit’ moment” and wiped the HRC archive mailbox from the 
PRN server using BleachBit sometime between March 25 and March 31, 2015. 
Despite the use of BleachBit, the FBI was able to recover some of Clinton’s 
archived emails from both the PRN server and the laptops used by Mills and 
Samuelson to cull Clinton’s emails.  The FBI also recovered some of Clinton’s 
archived emails from a search of the dummy email account that Combetta used to 
transfer Clinton’s emails from the Archive Laptop to the PRN server and, as 
discussed in Section I of this chapter, from various other sources. 
III. Use of Criminal Process to Obtain Documentary and Digital Evidence 
Despite the public perception that the Midyear investigation did not use a 
grand jury, and instead relied exclusively on consent, we found that agents and 
prosecutors did use grand jury subpoenas and other compulsory process to gain 
access to documentary and digital evidence.  According to documents we reviewed, 
at least 56 grand jury subpoenas were issued, five court orders were obtained 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2703(d) orders), and three search warrants were 
granted.  The Midyear team also sent numerous preservation letters to various 
entities, including Internet Service Providers, former Secretary Clinton’s attorneys, 
and U.S. government agencies.  We were told that FBI agents generally worked 
directly with the EDVA prosecutors to obtain subpoenas and 2703(d) orders, 
without seeking approval from the CES prosecutors, Laufman, Toscas, or any higher 
level Department officials.  Toscas told us that he was the highest level Department 
official that approved search warrant affidavits, and that he provided general 
information about search warrants that were being sought in briefings to Carlin, 
Yates, and Lynch. 
The FBI served 2703(d) orders on commercial email service providers, such 
as Google (Gmail) and Yahoo!, for information maintained on their servers 
associated with the private email accounts used by Huma Abedin, Paul Combetta, 
Cheryl Mills, and two other individuals.69  The FBI sought 2703(d) orders for these 
                                       
69  According to documentation we reviewed, the first individual was a senior State 
Department official who sometimes used a private email account to communicate with Clinton.  The 
FBI sought a 2703(d) order for this individual’s private email account after discovering an email sent 
from his private email account that the FBI determined was classified at the SECRET//NOFORN level.  
The abbreviation “NOFORN” means that the information may not be released to foreign governments, 
foreign nationals, foreign organizations, or non-U.S. citizens without the permission of the originator.  
According to Strzok’s and the Lead Analyst’s notes from early June 2016, the FBI received the returns 
from this 2703(d) order and determined that, as of that time, the email containing classified 
information no longer resided in this individual’s account. 
According to the 2703(d) order for the second individual’s account, an email containing 
information that the FBI determined to be classified at the SECRET//NOFORN level was originated 
from his private email account and forwarded, after traversing two other private email accounts, to 
Mills’s private Gmail account.  This individual was not a State Department employee and was not a 
witness in the FBI’s investigation.  Rather, the 2703(d) order stated that the FBI believed this 
individual resided in Japan based on his phone number and address and that “[a] search of relevant 
databases reveal[ed] no U.S. Government security clearances” for him.  According to Strzok’s and the 
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individuals after discovering from other sources that emails containing classified 
information were sent from or received by their accounts.  FBI witnesses told us 
that the purposes of obtaining the 2703(d) orders were to determine whether the 
known classified emails continued to reside in the unauthorized email accounts and 
whether they were forwarded to other unauthorized locations, thus posing risks to 
national security.  If they confirmed that the known classified emails continued to 
reside in the email accounts, they would then consider seeking search warrants for 
email content within the same accounts. 
Based on the 2703(d) results, the FBI was able to confirm that classified 
information continued to reside in just one of these five accounts—the account 
belonging to Combetta.  Thus, on June 20, 2016, the FBI sought a search warrant 
for this account.  According to the search warrant, the FBI initially sought the 
2703(d) order for Combetta’s account after observing numerous emails containing 
metadata for Combetta’s dummy email account in the original 30,490 emails 
provided to the State Department and determining that many of these emails 
contained classified information.  Combetta told the FBI that he created the dummy 
email account to transfer Clinton’s archived emails from the Archive Laptop to the 
PRN Server.  Based on the results of the 2703(d) order, the FBI determined that 
820 of Clinton’s emails, dated between October 25, 2010, and December 31, 2010, 
remained in the dummy email account.  The Midyear team obtained a search 
warrant to view the content of these emails and search for other emails relevant to 
the investigation. 
Prosecutor 2 told us that the Midyear team sought compulsory process when 
evidence could not be obtained through consent or when “the terms of the consent 
were such that additional process needed to be sought.”  For example, on August 
28, 2015, the Midyear team obtained a search warrant for the Pagliano Server even 
though Clinton’s attorneys had voluntarily produced and provided consent for the 
FBI to search it.  According to the search warrant application, upon conducting a 
preliminary examination of the Pagliano server, the FBI discovered that it contained 
three domains—two besides the clintonemail.com domain—and email accounts of 
numerous individuals unrelated to the FBI’s investigation, such as former President 
Clinton’s staff.  The FBI further discovered that Microsoft Exchange had been 
uninstalled from the Pagliano Server in December 2013.  As a result, the three 
different domains were commingled in the server’s unallocated space and the FBI 
could not segregate the accounts without “a complete forensic analysis of the 
Pagliano Server.”  Because Clinton’s attorneys were only able to provide consent to 
                                       
Lead Analyst’s notes from early June 2016, the FBI received the returns from this 2703(d) order and, 
as of that time, the email containing classified information no longer resided in his account. 
The Midyear team did not seek 2703(d) orders for information related to Clinton’s private 
email accounts.  Instead, as described later in this section and in Section IV of this chapter, the team 
reviewed the contents of Clinton’s emails on the Pagliano and PRN servers through a combination of 
consent agreements and a search warrant.  The team also sought records from three different 
companies in an effort to track down emails Clinton sent or received on her Blackberry account in 
early 2009, before she began using the clintonemail.com domain.  However, witnesses told us that 
these companies no longer maintained Clinton’s emails on their servers. 
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search Clinton’s email accounts on the server, the FBI obtained a search warrant to 
examine the unallocated space. 
IV. Use of Consent to Obtain Physical Evidence 
A. Debate over the Use of Consent 
Based on the evidence we reviewed, although the Midyear team used 
compulsory process on multiple occasions as described above, the prosecutors 
sought to obtain digital and documentary evidence by consent whenever possible.  
Witnesses told us that this caused frustration within the FBI, which preferred 
obtaining evidence with search warrants or subpoenas.  The witnesses generally 
agreed that this debate is common among prosecutors and agents and was not 
unique to Midyear.  To the extent the disagreement about the use of criminal 
process was more pronounced in Midyear, witnesses stated that they believed this 
was due to Midyear being a high-profile investigation.  The Lead Analyst explained 
that “everyone [was] under intense pressure,” which enhanced the “magnitude” of 
this disagreement. 
Numerous Department and FBI witnesses told us that the debate over how to 
obtain evidence was mostly about efficiency—the prosecutors believed they could 
obtain evidence faster through consent and the FBI believed that criminal process 
was more efficient.  The prosecutors stated that, in their view, consent is more 
efficient than process when witnesses are cooperative and, as Prosecutor 4 noted, 
when there is no concern that evidence will be destroyed to obstruct an 
investigation.  Based on the evidence we reviewed, Clinton’s attorneys contacted 
Department prosecutors numerous times to express Clinton’s willingness to 
cooperate by being interviewed and providing evidence voluntarily.  Prosecutor 4 
told us it was his view that the risk of destruction of evidence, in response to a 
voluntary production request, is less likely in cases where parties are represented 
by experienced attorneys, such as “firms like Williams and Connolly” (which 
represented Clinton), because the attorneys are aware of the risks associated with 
destroying evidence.  Prosecutor 4 stated, “I’m not saying that they’re more 
ethical.  I’m just saying they’re smarter.”  The prosecutors stated that seeking 
evidence through consent also saved time by allowing the government to avoid 
motions to quash subpoenas based on privilege or lack of probable cause. 
A few FBI witnesses told us that they believed the prosecutors in CES were 
generally more “risk averse” in their handling of cases than prosecutors in other 
parts of the Department.  Prosecutor 1 explained that there are reasons to be 
especially cautious in the types of cases CES handles, including protecting the 
sensitive and classified information involved in those cases.  This prosecutor told us 
that CES prosecutors must consider questions such as whether the intelligence 
community will permit the use of classified information in their cases, whether 
moving a “case forward” is worth the risk that the “use of information gathered by 
a human source could...identify sources and methods,” and whether “the criminal 
prosecution of someone [is] more valuable than the continued collection[.]” 
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Laufman and Prosecutor 4 told us that the use of criminal process tends to 
increase the risk of leaks and public disclosures.  Prosecutor 4 told us that leaks 
undermine investigations and that “unfair leaks” were an “added” consideration in 
the Midyear investigation.  Laufman told us that the Midyear prosecution team’s 
goal was to make sure that no stone was left unturned, while also being mindful 
that leaks “could be used by political actors in furtherance of political agendas.”  
Agent 3 told us that when he sought process from the prosecutors, they responded 
that they would try to obtain the evidence by consent because the witnesses “don’t 
want this to get in the paper.”  Comey told us that he believed the prosecutors 
were more hesitant to use criminal process in the Midyear investigation than normal 
because they wanted to keep “as low a profile as possible.” 
FBI team members told us that they believed they could have obtained 
evidence faster with process, especially after instances when, they believed, 
Clinton’s attorneys had not been forthcoming about the existence of potential 
sources of evidence.  For example, after Clinton’s attorneys voluntarily provided the 
FBI the Pagliano Server pursuant to an August 7, 2015 consent agreement, the FBI 
discovered through its own investigation that there was a successor server—the 
PRN server.  According to documentation we reviewed, the prosecutors and the FBI 
were frustrated that Clinton’s attorneys had not been forthcoming about the PRN 
server, and Prosecutor 1 wrote a letter to Kendall expressing this frustration.  The 
SSA told us that situations like this caused him to question whether consent was 
the best course.  However, Prosecutor 1 stated that resorting to compulsory 
process for the PRN server would have been complicated, because, among other 
things, the server was “running tons of people’s email accounts on it that were 
totally separate from...the former Secretary, including people working in 
the...former President’s office.”  The Midyear team ultimately secured the PRN 
server through a September 30, 2015 consent agreement with Clinton’s attorneys. 
Some witnesses told us that they were concerned about certain devices that 
the FBI was never able to locate.  For example, as described above in Section II of 
this chapter, the Midyear team was never able to locate the Archive Laptop and 
Archive Thumb Drive, both of which, according to Hanley and others, contained a 
complete copy of Clinton’s archived emails.  In addition, according to the LHM, the 
FBI’s investigation identified a total of 13 mobile devices associated with Clinton’s 
two known telephone numbers “which potentially were used to send emails using 
Clinton’s clintonemail.com email addresses.”  The Midyear team asked Clinton’s 
attorneys for these devices, but they stated they were “unable to locate” them.70  
According to the LHM and FD-302s, Cooper and Hanley told the FBI that they wiped 
or destroyed Clinton’s devices once she transitioned to new devices.  One FBI 
analyst told us that he was “frustrated” by the claim by Clinton’s attorneys that 
they could not find her 13 devices.  However, he stated that he “guess[ed]” the 
agency did not have probable cause to assert that the missing devices were in 
                                       
70  The attorneys produced two other Blackberry devices that they stated might contain 
relevant emails, but, according to the LHM, “FBI forensic analysis found no evidence to indicate either 
of the[se] devices...were connected to one of Clinton's personal servers or contained emails from her 
personal accounts during her tenure.”  The FBI also obtained three of Clinton’s iPads, one of which 
contained three emails from her tenure. 
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Clinton’s home such that a search warrant could be issued, given the testimony 
that her old devices had been destroyed before she transitioned to new devices.  He 
further stated that his frustration was with Clinton and her attorneys, not the 
prosecutors. 
We questioned whether the use of a subpoena or search warrant might have 
encouraged Clinton, her lawyers, Combetta, or others to search harder for the 
missing devices, or ensured that they were being honest that they could not find 
them.  Prosecutor 2 told us that the prosecutors believed that Clinton’s attorneys 
were dealing with them “in good faith” and had “no reason to think that they were 
lying” about their inability to find Clinton’s mobile devices.  Prosecutor 2 further 
stated that the team did not believe that Combetta still had the Archive Laptop in 
his possession, because “there would have been no reason for him to keep it.”  
Similarly, the Lead Analyst told us that he did not know of any evidence to suggest 
that Clinton’s attorneys were being dishonest about the evidence they could not 
locate, and compulsory process would not have made a difference in situations 
where Clinton’s attorneys represented that they could not find a device. 
Agents 1 and 2 told us that there were six laptops that Clinton’s attorneys 
had provided the FBI early in the investigation with consent to store, but not 
search, and that they would have liked to search these laptops.  Agent 2 stated that 
he believed that these laptops may have been used to review Clinton’s emails 
before Clinton’s attorneys produced her work-related emails to the State 
Department.  Agent 1 told us that he believed these laptops were used by Clinton’s 
Williams and Connolly attorneys to do the “QC of the 30,000 emails after they were 
culled by Mills and Samuelson.” 
Our review of the relevant FD-302s and other documents revealed the 
following regarding the six laptops:  On August 6, 2015, Katherine Turner, one of 
Clinton’s attorneys, voluntarily produced to the FBI three thumb drives and a laptop 
computer belonging to Williams and Connolly that contained identical copies of the 
30,490 emails Clinton’s attorneys had produced to the State Department, and 
signed a consent form for the FBI to search these devices.  In addition, Turner told 
the two FBI agents that Williams and Connolly had six additional laptops containing 
identical copies of the 30,490 emails, but that these laptops also contained 
unrelated privileged information.  Turner agreed to voluntarily produce the 
additional six laptops to the FBI so that the FBI could secure the classified 
information contained on them, but declined to provide consent to search the 
laptops because she “wished to ensure that privileged communications on the 
laptops would remain confidential.”  According to a FD-302 dated August 17, 2015, 
Turner told the FBI that one of the six laptops was in the custody of Mills’s and 
Samuelson’s attorneys at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison, LLP (“Paul 
Weiss”).  On August 21, 2015, FBI Attorney 1 wrote in a letter to Turner and a Paul 
Weiss attorney: 
It is the FBI’s understanding that the six laptop computers may 
contain privileged materials.  Therefore, the FBI will maintain the six 
laptop computers in a secure location separate from other materials 
that have been provided voluntarily to the FBI in conjunction with this 
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matter.  The FBI will not access any material or information on the six 
laptops without further consultation with you or obtaining appropriate 
legal process. 
Upon completion of this matter, the FBI will notify all parties and 
discuss the appropriate disposition of the material in a manner 
consistent with applicable laws and policies. 
Although the Midyear team left open the possibility of obtaining process to 
search the six laptops, the team ultimately never sought a search warrant.  
Prosecutor 2 explained that the Midyear team originally believed that the six 
laptops included the laptops that Mills and Samuelson used to cull Clinton’s emails.  
However, during a proffer session on March 19, 2016, Beth Wilkinson (attorney for 
Mills and Samuelson) told the prosecutors that the six laptops Clinton’s attorneys 
had produced to the FBI did not include the culling laptops and, in fact, the culling 
laptops were still in Mills’s and Samuelson’s possession.  Prosecutor 2 told us that, 
following the proffer, Mills and Samuelson turned the actual culling laptops over to 
Wilkinson, who agreed to disconnect the laptops from the Internet and place them 
in a safe in her office, until privilege issues could be resolved.  As described in 
Section VIII.D of this chapter, the Midyear team ultimately received consent to 
search the culling laptops through an agreement with Wilkinson.  Agent 2 told us 
that, despite his desire to search the content of the six laptops, the FBI might not 
have had sufficient probable cause to assert that the laptops contained emails that 
the FBI did not already have in its possession.  He further told us that it was 
“completely logical” that Clinton’s attorneys would not consent to the FBI’s review 
of the laptops given that the laptops contained privileged information related to the 
attorneys’ representation of other clients.  FBI Attorney 1 told us that she believed, 
based on the representations of Clinton’s counsel, that the six laptops never 
contained the full 62,320 emails and that they only contained copies of the 30,490 
emails that had been produced to the State Department.  She stated that, as a 
result, she did not believe that it was necessary to review the six laptops, especially 
given the privilege concerns. 
There were points in the investigation when the debate about the use of 
consent versus compulsory process was particularly pronounced.  Based on the 
evidence we reviewed, in or about March 2016, Page asked Strzok, on behalf of 
McCabe, to create a list of tasks that the Department had either refused to 
undertake or “asked to let them negotiate with counsel,” even if the FBI ultimately 
agreed with the outcome.  Page told us that McCabe suggested the list after she 
told him that Strzok and FBI Attorney 1 were “increasingly growing concerned 
about...the little things that are being left on the cutting room floor and...the 
deference to” the line prosecutors on how best to obtain evidence.  On March 24, 
2016, Strzok wrote to FBI Attorney 1 and the Lead Analyst describing the proposed 
list.71  In the email, Strzok provided a rough list of the items he was considering 
                                       
71  In the March 24, 2016 email, Strzok stated that he had asked the SSA to work on the list.  
Strzok blind-copied Page on this email, who responded to Strzok later that day to explain that McCabe 
wanted the list to be “done quietly” and Strzok should tell the SSA to “stand down and just say you’ll 
handle it.”  Page told us that McCabe wanted the list done quietly because it would not be “well-
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including and wrote, “Problem is it’s been death by a thousand cuts.”72  Strzok told 
us that at the time he wrote this email, he was “aggravated by the limitations” that 
the prosecutors were placing on the FBI’s ability to obtain evidence and felt that “if 
you add up this delta over a bunch of decisions, all of a sudden it becomes 
substantive.”  Strzok and Page told us that they did not believe a list was ever 
finalized. 
Despite this debate, the agents, analysts, prosecutors, and supervisors on 
the Midyear team generally told us that, aside from devices that had been 
destroyed or that could not be located, they ultimately obtained and reviewed all of 
the devices necessary to complete the investigation.  For example, Strzok stated 
that once he was able to “step back towards the end of the investigation,” he 
realized that “maybe we gave a little where we didn’t need to give, and maybe we 
actually got lucky here.  But is there anything that we ultimately are missing to 
make kind of an authoritative, accurate conclusion?  No.”  McCabe stated that the 
team “drew some red lines around things that we absolutely insisted we had to do,” 
such as obtaining the laptops Mills and Samuelson used to cull Clinton’s emails, and 
that those items ultimately were attained.  The SSA, who was described to us by 
several witnesses as an experienced and aggressive agent, stated that he “had a lot 
of hoops to jump through at times,” but “no matter what the obstacles were, we 
moved through them.”  Similarly, Anderson told us, “At various points...as the 
investigation progressed...we were very anxious to...seek aggressively different 
materials....  [B]ut at the end of the day, I do believe everybody felt that we had 
obtained everything that we needed to obtain in order to assess criminality.” 
B. Limits of Consent Agreements 
The SSA told us that the terms of the consent agreements were primarily 
created through negotiations between the two line NSD prosecutors, on one side, 
and the attorneys for Clinton and other witnesses, on the other.  For the most part, 
the consent agreements were limited such that the FBI was able to search only for 
emails sent or received by Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State and for 
evidence of intrusion.  These were generally the same limitations that were 
included in the subpoenas, search warrants, and 2703(d) orders obtained during 
the course of the investigation. 
                                       
received” by the Department.  Strzok stated that his understanding was that McCabe wanted to 
discuss the items in the list with Toscas during a “sidebar,” rather than in a “big, official meeting.” 
72  The items in the rough list were: 
1) getting process .. at the beginning (the fight about opening a case, about assigning a field 
office and a usao for process) 
2) a) media (consent vs SWs for all the servers and devices and games opposing counsel 
played), There is a ton here, from everything we have vs the stuff we didnt get ~ eg, apple 
server at Chappaqua, computer at Whitehaven, plethora of ipads, lack of blackberries, b) 
scoping and negotiating of what we've been able to search for 
3) email accounts (thinking Mills Gmail account) 
4) interviews (v FGJ compellence) and scoping of interviews. - I think that largely applies to 
PRN and the big four+Samuelson, right? Anyone else? 
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An FBI analyst told us that limiting the search time period to Clinton’s tenure 
as Secretary was not controversial.  The analyst explained, “[T]he reason it was 
scoped to the tenure is because...that is of course when she would have had access 
to the classified information.”  We questioned both Department and FBI witnesses 
as to whether emails from after Clinton’s tenure could have shed light on whether 
Clinton instructed her staff to delete emails for an improper purpose.  They told us 
that any relevant emails following Clinton’s tenure mostly would consist of 
communications with her attorneys regarding the sort process, and such 
communications would be protected by attorney-client privilege. 
The consent agreements and search warrants also were limited such that the 
FBI could not search emails sent or received by other accountholders on Clinton’s 
servers—such as Abedin and former President Clinton and his staff—unless Clinton 
was also a party to those emails.  One analyst told us that he would have liked to 
be able to look at emails to which Clinton was not a party.  For example, he told us 
that he would have liked to review emails between Abedin and Cooper regarding 
what Clinton may have said about the server.  We questioned the prosecutors as to 
why the consent agreements were not scoped such that they could search for any 
work-related or classified emails within Abedin’s clintonemail.com account, 
especially since FBI witnesses told us that Clinton’s server, not Clinton herself, was 
the subject of the investigation.  This is addressed in Section V.D of this chapter 
below. 
The consent agreements and search warrants incorporated provisions 
requiring the use of a filter team to ensure that the Midyear team did not review 
emails protected by privileges, including attorney-client, medical, and marital 
privileges.  One analyst told us that the filter process was cumbersome and that 
some interpretations of the privileges were unusual.  For example, because former 
President Clinton did not use email, one of his employees received former President 
Clinton’s emails and then printed them for him.  The privilege team considered the 
emails that Clinton sent to her husband through this employee as privileged, 
although this may not have been legally required.  The Lead Analyst told us that he, 
too, was often frustrated by the cumbersome filter process.  However, he stated 
that he agreed with the team’s “conservative” approach to interpreting what was 
privileged, because it was important for the FBI to handle its mission and the 
materials in its possession “responsibly” and to not unnecessarily be looking “into 
the lives of the Clintons.” 
There were at least two consent agreements that did not incorporate the use 
of a filter team, but instead allowed the attorney for the owner of the devices to 
delete personal information before voluntary production to the FBI.  These were the 
consent agreements that the Department negotiated with Justin Cooper’s attorney 
to obtain Cooper’s personal laptops that the team hoped contained, among other 
things, back-ups from the BlackBerry devices Clinton used during the first two 
months of her tenure.73  According to the FD-302 from Cooper’s September 2, 2015 
                                       
73  As noted in footnote 64 of this report, the 30,490 emails provided by Clinton’s attorneys to 
the State Department contained no emails sent or received by Clinton during the first two months of 
87 
interview, Cooper’s attorney told the FBI that Cooper’s laptops contained “files 
related to the upgrade of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Blackberry,” as 
well as emails Cooper exchanged with Clinton.  In a letter dated September 10, 
2015, Cooper’s attorney wrote to Prosecutor 1, “As we discussed and as the 
government has agreed, before providing Mr. Cooper’s computer hardware to the 
FBI, we will remove and securely delete Mr. Cooper’s personal and business files.”  
In a letter dated September 24, 2015, Cooper’s attorney wrote to Prosecutor 1 that 
he was voluntarily providing the FBI Cooper’s Mac Book Air laptop computer and 
further wrote, “[a]s agreed, we have securely deleted from the Mac Book Air Mr. 
Cooper’s personal and business files, and we have overwritten its unallocated space 
with zeros.” 
We asked some FBI and Department witnesses why they did not use a filter 
team instead of allowing Cooper to delete his personal files.  FBI witnesses told us 
that they were not concerned by the limitations in the consent agreements for the 
Cooper laptops, because Cooper was particularly cooperative and the materials he 
voluntarily provided to the FBI turned out to be fruitful.74  Indeed, according to the 
FD-302 from Cooper’s interview, Cooper’s attorney told the FBI about the back-ups 
on Cooper’s laptop without prompting.  In addition, FBI Attorney 1 and Agent 1 told 
us that they considered Cooper’s devices to be different from other devices they 
reviewed, because there was no evidence that Cooper was the sender or recipient 
of classified information and Cooper was more of an aide to former President 
Clinton than to former Secretary Clinton.  Strzok told us that the team was not 
certain that it could establish probable cause that there was classified information 
or other evidence of a crime on the Cooper laptops. 
Some FBI witnesses told us, consistent with text message exchanges 
between Strzok and Page, that the FBI was concerned that the line NSD 
prosecutors were intimidated by the high-powered attorneys representing Clinton 
and her senior aides and, as a result, did not negotiate aggressively with them.  
Strzok told us that Prosecutor 1, who handled most of the negotiations with 
counsel, is “extraordinarily competent,” but he believed more senior government 
officials should have been involved with deciding “how hard [to] push counsel.”  
Nevertheless, the FBI witnesses generally told us that they were satisfied that the 
limitations of the consent agreements did not impair the investigation.  Agent 2 
stated regarding the limitations in consent agreements, “I think generally...we were 
able to get what we were looking for.  It maybe was more complicated, time-
consuming, and cumbersome.”  The Lead Analyst told us that “every single consent 
arrangement constrained what we did...to some degree.”  However, he, Strzok, and 
FBI Attorney 1 all told us that they believed the team might have actually obtained 
                                       
her tenure, and Midyear officials believed these missing emails could contain important evidence 
regarding Clinton’s intent in setting up a private email server.  
74  For example, one analyst told us that within the Blackberry back-ups on the Cooper laptop, 
the FBI team found an email from former Secretary of State Colin Powell to Clinton on January 23, 
2009, in which Powell warned Clinton that if it became “public” that she used a Blackberry to “do 
business,” her emails could become “official record[s] and subject to the law.”  In the email, Powell 
further warned Clinton, “Be very careful.  I got around it all by not saying much and not using systems 
that captured the data.” 
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more through the consent agreements in some instances than they would have 
obtained through compulsory process.  Strzok explained that for some devices they 
were not certain that the team could establish sufficient probable cause to convince 
a judge to issue a search warrant or allow a search that was as broad as what was 
agreed upon through a consent agreement.  He provided as an example the Cooper 
laptops described above.  Similarly, Prosecutor 2 told us that the Midyear team was 
able to search certain items through consent agreements, despite privilege issues 
that may have caused a subpoena or search warrant to be quashed. 
In addition, based on our review, we determined that Department and FBI 
members of the Midyear team worked together to determine the scope of the 
review of the evidence and, in turn, the limitations to be included in consent 
agreements and search warrants.  For example, in a September 23, 2015 email 
exchange among a WFO Computer Analysis and Recovery Team forensic examiner 
(“CART Examiner”), Strzok, the Lead Analyst, the four line prosecutors, three FBI 
OGC attorneys, and two case agents, Prosecutor 2 wrote that she assumed the 
consent agreement for the PRN server would be scoped such that the FBI would not 
review the content of any emails in domains other than the clintonemail.com 
domain.  Strzok wrote back with a more expansive approach than that suggested 
by Prosecutor 2:  “I think we would ask to search the other domains for any emails 
to/from the @clintonemail.com domain in the event those emails were deleted from 
whichever clintonemail.com account and no longer available there.”  The final 
consent agreement followed Strzok’s more expansive approach, allowing the FBI to 
search the entire server, including the unallocated space and domains other than 
the clintonemail.com domain, for any emails to or from Clinton. 
None of the witnesses we interviewed could point to specific examples of 
anyone involved in the investigation allowing political or other improper 
considerations to impact the decisions on how best to obtain evidence. 
V. Efforts to Obtain Email Content from the Private Accounts of Clinton’s 
Senior Aides 
In this section, we address the Midyear team’s efforts to obtain email content 
from the accounts of the three senior aides that had the most email communication 
with Clinton—Jake Sullivan, Cheryl Mills, and Huma Abedin.  Sullivan was Clinton’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy from January 2009 to February 2011 and Director of 
Policy and Planning at the State Department from February 2011 to January 2013; 
Mills served as, among other things, Clinton’s Chief of Staff during Clinton’s tenure 
as Secretary; and Abedin served as Clinton’s Deputy Chief of Staff during Clinton’s 
tenure.  According to the LHM, the FBI discovered through its review of emails from 
various sources that only 13 individuals had direct email contact with Clinton, and 
that Sullivan, Abedin, and Mills “accounted for 68 percent of the emails sent directly 
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to Clinton.”75  State Department employees told the FBI that they considered 
emailing Sullivan, Mills, or Abedin the equivalent of emailing Clinton directly. 
In addition to examining emails to or from these senior aides within the 
original 30,490 emails produced to the State Department, the investigators 
obtained emails from the State Department for each of their official State classified 
and unclassified email accounts.  Based on a review of these emails and other 
evidence, the investigators determined that, in addition to their official State email 
accounts, Sullivan and Mills used personal Gmail accounts and Abedin used a 
personal Yahoo! account and her clintonemail.com account to conduct government 
business.  Sullivan, Mills, and Abedin told the FBI that they used their private email 
accounts for official business occasionally, including on occasions when the official 
State email system was not functioning properly.  Sullivan stated that he had the 
most difficulty using the official State system when he was traveling and on the 
weekends. 
The investigators further determined that all three of these senior aides 
either sent or received classified information on their private email accounts and 
forwarded emails containing classified information to Clinton, although none of the 
emails the FBI discovered contained classification markings.  The three aides 
provided the following explanations to the FBI for their conduct:  they did not 
believe the information contained in their emails was classified; they tried to talk 
around classified information in situations where there was an urgent need to 
convey information and they did not have access to classified systems; some of the 
information they were discussing had already appeared in news reports; and they 
relied on the originators of the emails to properly mark them.  These explanations 
were consistent with those provided to the FBI by both the originators of the emails 
containing classified information and Clinton.  Based in part on these explanations, 
the prosecutors determined that no one “within the scope of the investigation,” 
including the three senior aides, “committed any criminal offenses.” 
Nonetheless, the investigators considered obtaining additional information 
from or about the private email accounts of all three senior aides.  Emails sent to or 
from the private email accounts were potentially relevant to:  (1) further 
reconstructing the full collection of work-related emails and emails containing 
classified information that were sent to or from Clinton’s servers; (2) finding 
additional emails containing classified information that were transmitted and stored 
on unclassified systems other than the Clinton’s servers; (3) finding evidence of 
knowledge or intent on the part of Clinton, the senior aides, and possibly others 
regarding the transmission or storage of classified information on unclassified 
                                       
75  FBI analysts and Prosecutor 2 told us that former President Barack Obama was one of the 
13 individuals with whom Clinton had direct contact using her clintonemail.com account.  Obama, like 
other high level government officials, used a pseudonym for his username on his official government 
email account. The analysts told us that they questioned whether Obama’s email address (combined 
with salutations that revealed that the emails were being exchanged with Obama) or other information 
contained in the emails were classified and, thus, sent the emails to relevant USIC agencies for 
classification review.  However, they stated that the USIC agencies determined that none of the emails 
contained classified information. 
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systems; (4) controlling the spill of classified information in unauthorized locations; 
and (5) assessing whether there had been a compromise of classified information 
by hostile actors through intrusion analysis. 
The Midyear team obtained 2703(d) orders for noncontent information in 
Mills’s Gmail account and Abedin’s Yahoo! account and a search warrant for 
Sullivan’s personal Gmail account.  However, the Midyear team did not obtain 
search warrants to examine the content of emails in Mills’s or Abedin’s private email 
accounts and did not seek to obtain any of the senior aides’ personal devices.76 
A. Section 2703(d) Orders for Non-Content Information for Mills’s 
and Abedin’s Private Email Accounts 
On February 18, 2016, the FBI obtained a 2703(d) order for Abedin’s 
personal Yahoo! account.  According to the government’s application for the 
2703(d) order, the FBI discovered that on October 4, 2009, an email attaching a 
Word document without classification markings was forwarded from Abedin’s 
unclassified State Department email account to her Yahoo! account.  The 
application stated that the next day, “the text from this Word document, with slight 
edits and reformatted to State Department letterhead, was sent from a State 
Department employee on SIPRNet, a classified email system, to Cheryl Mills” with a 
classification marking of SECRET//NOFORN.  As a basis for the 2703(d) order, the 
application stated that a review of the 2703(d) returns would “help the FBI 
determine if the aforementioned email, containing a classified Word document, still 
resides within the Subject Account maintained by Huma Abedin and whether there 
are other records connecting email accounts associated with the improper 
transmission and storage of classified information.” 
Similarly, on May 31, 2016, the FBI sought and obtained a 2703(d) order for 
Mills’s personal Gmail account.  According to the government’s application for the 
2703(d) order, the FBI discovered that Mills sent or received at least 911 work-
related emails to or from her Gmail account during the time she was employed at 
the State Department.  The application stated that the FBI identified seven emails 
containing confirmed classified information and an additional 208 emails containing 
suspected classified information that had not yet undergone formal classification 
review.  The application provided as an example one email that was determined to 
be classified at the level of SECRET//NOFORN at the time the email was sent.  None 
of the emails contained classification markings.   
We were told by an analyst who focused on handling legal process, and the 
notes of Strzok and the Lead Analyst from late May and early June 2016 confirmed, 
that the returns from the 2703(d) orders for Mills’s and Abedin’s accounts revealed 
that neither the confirmed classified emails nor any emails to or from Clinton 
continued to reside in Mills’s or Abedin’s personal accounts as of the date Google 
and Yahoo! searched their servers.  According to Strzok’s and the Lead Analyst’s 
                                       
76  The senior aides’ personal devices were potential sources of work-related emails or 
remnants of work-related emails that the senior aides had deleted and were not preserved on the 
commercial providers’ servers. 
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notes, Abedin’s email account contained less than 100 emails from Clinton’s tenure 
as Secretary of State, while Mills’s account contained numerous emails from 
Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State.  Prosecutor 2 and one FBI analyst told us 
that these results provided no basis to conclude that Mills or Abedin had deleted 
emails to or from Clinton for an improper purpose, because there are various 
factors that could contribute to the preservation of emails in a personal email 
account.77 
B. Decisions Regarding Search Warrants for Private Email 
Accounts 
The Midyear team obtained a search warrant for Sullivan’s Gmail account, on 
September 17, 2015.  According to the search warrant, in reviewing the 30,490 
emails provided by Clinton’s attorneys to the State Department, the FBI found 
Sullivan’s electronic business card, which identified him as an employee of the State 
Department and listed his private Gmail address.  The search warrant stated that 
the FBI also had identified, among the 30,490 emails produced to the State 
Department, an unmarked email determined to contain information classified at the 
TOP SECRET level at the time it was forwarded by another State Department 
employee to Sullivan’s Gmail account.  The search warrant further stated that the 
FBI had identified an additional 496 emails from Sullivan’s personal Gmail account 
that it suspected contained classified information, but had not yet submitted for 
formal classification review.  One analyst told us that unlike the emails found on 
Clinton’s servers, which often were derived from the unallocated space, emails from 
Sullivan’s Gmail account were helpful because they clearly revealed important 
metadata, such as senders, recipients, and dates. 
Given the significant roles of Mills and Abedin, and the usefulness of the 
material from Sullivan’s personal account, we asked why the investigators did not 
seek search warrants for the private accounts of Mills or Abedin.  We learned that 
the SSA initially drafted a search warrant affidavit for Mills’s personal Gmail 
account, but it was never filed.  In an email to FBI Attorney 1 and the Lead Analyst 
dated March 25, 2016, Strzok listed “email accounts (thinking Mills Gmail account)” 
as an item that the FBI unsuccessfully sought from the prosecutors.  Strzok, the 
SSA, and Agent 3 told us that Strzok advocated in favor of applying for the search 
warrant, but that the prosecutors rejected the affidavit in favor of a 2703(d) order, 
based on insufficient probable cause and privilege concerns.  The SSA stated that 
he disagreed with the prosecutors’ position that there was insufficient probable 
cause for a search warrant, because there was evidence that Mills’s Gmail account 
was used for official business and contained classified information. 
Nevertheless, Prosecutor 2 told us that the FBI never made a follow-up 
request for a search warrant after receiving the 2703(d) returns.  As discussed 
above, according to Strzok’s and the Lead Analyst’s notes and other evidence, the 
Midyear team received the 2703(d) returns in late May and early June 2016 and 
                                       
77  According to records we reviewed, the Midyear team also served preservation orders on 
Google and Yahoo! in relation to Mills’s and Abedin’s personal email accounts. 
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learned that neither the classified emails nor any emails to or from Clinton 
continued to reside in either account.  Prosecutors 1 and 2 told us that, based on 
the facts developed at that point, there was likely no probable cause to seek a 
search warrant.  Strzok stated about the proposed search warrant for Mills’s Gmail 
account, “I remember we did not get it, and my general recollection is, if we 
thought it was important, and...we could have gotten probable cause, we would 
have done it.  I think we just couldn’t establish PC [probable cause].” 
Some FBI witnesses told us that there were reasons to promptly seek a 
search warrant for Sullivan’s Gmail account, instead of beginning with a 2703(d) 
order like they did with the private email accounts belonging to Mills and Abedin.  
They stated that unlike Sullivan, Mills and Abedin had not, based on the evidence 
they had reviewed, sent or received TS-SAP emails on their personal accounts, and 
these were the most sensitive emails discovered during the investigation.  One 
analyst stated that Clinton’s email exchanges with Sullivan were more substantive 
than her email exchanges with both Abedin and Mills.  In addition, witnesses told 
us, consistent with the FD-302s we reviewed, that Sullivan was a more regular user 
of personal email for conducting State business, in part because he traveled 
overseas more often than the others. 
Prosecutor 2 told us that Sullivan was treated differently from Mills and 
Abedin, because the information contained in the Top Secret email sent to Sullivan 
more clearly constituted classified information and NDI (“national defense 
information”) than the information contained in the emails sent or received by Mills 
and Abedin.78  Prosecutor 2 stated, “[T]here was a fundamental difference in the 
nature of information that we knew was in Jake Sullivan’s account, versus the 
information that was in Abedin’s account and Mills’s accounts.”  In addition, 
Prosecutor 2 told us that the prosecutors would have had to obtain Criminal 
Division approval to obtain a search warrant for Mills’s Gmail account, given that 
she was an attorney.  Prosecutor 2 told us that, while they would have sought the 
approval if they believed it was “appropriate,” this was among the factors they 
considered in “deciding what process to use.” 
C. Access to Personal Devices for Clinton’s Senior Aides 
Another potential means to obtain emails to or from the private accounts of 
Clinton’s senior aides would be to obtain access to their personal devices, such as 
laptops or cellular telephones, on which copies of such emails might reside.  Such 
access could possibly have been obtained by consent or via search warrant.79  As 
                                       
78  As described in Chapter Two, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 793(e), and 793(f) require the 
information that is alleged to be mishandled to be “information relating to the national defense.”  This 
is also referred to as “national defense information” or NDI, and is not synonymous with classified 
information. 
79  As noted previously, while the government could also have issued a subpoena for any 
laptops or cellular telephones, it would not have been able to search the electronic communications 
within such a device without a search warrant.  See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
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described in Section VIII.D of this chapter, the Midyear team obtained, through 
consent agreements with Beth Wilkinson, the laptops that Mills and Samuelson used 
to cull Clinton’s emails for production of her work-related emails to the State 
Department.  However, the investigators did not seek access to the private devices 
used by Sullivan, Mills, or Abedin during Clinton’s tenure at State.80 
Witnesses told us that the team’s focus was on Clinton and obtaining her 
devices, such as her servers, computers, and hand-held devices.  Prosecutor 2 
stated, “[T]he scope of the investigation really related to the email systems used by 
Secretary Clinton, and whether on her private email server there are individuals 
who improperly retained or transmitted classified information.”  According to one 
analyst, there were generally two types of devices that the team sought:  devices 
that Clinton used and devices to which her emails were transferred. 
We asked several witnesses why they did not obtain devices used by 
Sullivan, Mills, and Abedin, both as a means of searching for evidence of the 
mishandling of classified information by Clinton and her aides and to prevent a 
further compromise of classified information.  Both Strzok and Anderson told us 
that, at the outset of the investigation, former Deputy Director Giuliano generally 
advised the team that the purpose of the investigation was not to follow every 
potential lead of classified information.  Strzok stated that Giuliano told the team, 
“[T]his is not going to become some octopus....  The focus of the investigation [is] 
the appearance of classified information on [Clinton’s] personal emails and that 
server during the time she was Secretary of State.”  Strzok further stated that the 
FBI’s “purpose and mission” was not to pursue “spilled [classified] information to 
the ends of the earth” and that the task of cleaning up classified spills by State 
Department employees was referred back to the State Department.  He told us that 
the FBI’s focus was whether there was a “violation of federal law.”  Prosecutors 1 
and 2 similarly told us that the Department was not conducting a spill investigation, 
and that the State Department was the better entity for that role.  Prosecutor 1 
stated, “At a certain point, you have to decide what’s your criminal investigation, 
and what is like a spill investigation....  [W]e could spend like a decade tracking 
emails...wherever they went.”  The SSA told us that the Midyear team engaged in 
several conversations with the State Department regarding the spill of classified 
information, and the State Department officials expressed concern about the 
problem and were receptive to resolving it.  Generally the witnesses told us that 
they could not remember anyone within the team arguing that more should have 
been done to obtain the senior aides’ devices. 
We specifically questioned why the team did not attempt to obtain any 
personal devices used by Huma Abedin, given the team’s finding that numerous 
                                       
80  FBI Attorney 1 told us that she believed the personal laptop that Mills had used to cull 
Clinton’s emails was the same personal laptop she had used during her tenure at State.  As described 
in Section VIII.D of this chapter, the FBI ultimately obtained Mills’s culling laptop and the laptop did 
contain some emails from Clinton’s State Department tenure.  We were unable to determine whether 
this was in fact the personal device Mills used during her tenure at State and, if so, if she also used 
other personal devices. 
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work-related and classified email exchanges between Abedin and Clinton that the 
Midyear team found through various sources were absent from the 30,490 emails 
produced to the State Department by Clinton’s lawyers.  Witnesses told us that 
they believed there was a flaw in the culling process, which resulted in the 
exclusion of most of Abedin’s clintonemail.com emails from the State Department 
production.81  We also questioned (1) the failure to obtain Abedin’s devices despite 
that, according to Abedin’s FD-302, Abedin told the FBI that she turned both her 
personal laptop and her personal Blackberry over to her attorneys to be reviewed 
for production of work-related emails to the State Department; and (2) the 
inconsistency between the decision not to seek Abedin’s devices before the July 
declination and the decision to obtain a search warrant for email on the laptop 
belonging to her husband, Anthony Weiner, in October 2016.   
In response to the OIG’s questions regarding the Midyear team’s decision not 
to obtain the senior aides’ devices, Prosecutor 1 told us that he did not remember 
any “meaningful discussion” before October 2016 about obtaining the senior aides’ 
devices, aside from the laptops used by Mills and Samuelson to cull Clinton’s emails 
for production of her work-related emails to the State Department.  The SSA told us 
that in the beginning of the investigation, the Midyear team wanted to obtain every 
device that touched the server, but that over time the team realized that this would 
not be “fruitful.”  He stated that OTD personnel told the team that “it was not likely 
that there would be anything on the devices” themselves.  Some FBI witnesses told 
us that they asked the senior aides during their Midyear interviews about any 
personal devices they used for State Department work, and the Midyear team relied 
on their responses to determine what devices to obtain.  Agent 3 told us that the 
Midyear team asked Abedin whether she backed up her clintonemail.com emails 
and she responded that her email was “cloud-based” and she did not “know how to 
back up her archives.”  He stated that based on this testimony, the team assessed 
that finding helpful evidence on Abedin’s devices was unlikely. 
Both Strzok and Prosecutor 2 told us that the decision not to obtain the 
senior aides’ devices was a joint decision.  Prosecutors 1 and 2 and Strzok further 
told us that the team did not obtain Abedin’s personal laptop and Blackberry that 
she used during her employment at the State Department, even after she told the 
FBI that she gave those devices to her attorneys, because the State Department 
provided to the FBI Abedin’s work-related emails that her attorneys produced from 
those devices.  Strzok stated that Abedin’s attorneys told the Midyear team that 
they erred on the side of overproducing Abedin’s emails to the State Department 
and that, unlike the sort process for Clinton’s emails by Mills and Samuelson, there 
was no reason to believe Abedin’s attorneys’ sort process was flawed.  Prosecutor 2 
                                       
81  According to a report prepared by one analyst, the team had found through various sources 
1,716 work-related emails between Clinton’s and Abedin’s clintonemail.com accounts that had not 
been produced to the State Department by Clinton’s lawyers, and that 90 of these emails contained 
classified information.  The analyst who prepared the report told us that only approximately 32 email 
exchanges between Abedin and Clinton were included in the production, which was surprising to the 
FBI given Abedin’s prominent role on Clinton’s staff.  According to the written analysis he prepared, 
the problem was likely that Clinton’s attorneys only considered Clinton’s exchanges with Abedin’s 
clintonemail.com account to be work-related if they were also sent to a .gov account or contained a 
specific work-related key term. 
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told us, consistent with notes this prosecutor took at a meeting on October 27, 
2016, that the only reason the FBI later obtained the Weiner laptop was because “it 
had ended up in our laps.”  We describe this issue further in Chapters Nine, Ten, 
and Eleven. 
Several witnesses told us that tracking down Clinton’s devices alone was very 
challenging.  They stated that the investigation would have taken years if the team 
attempted to seek every possible device that might contain Clinton’s emails or 
classified material.  For example, Prosecutor 2 stated: 
I think the idea was that, that this investigation had to be somewhat 
focused, otherwise it could spin off into a million different directions.  
And this investigation could take different forms for years and years 
and years to come.  So, you know, the, the focus of the investigation 
was, was really the private email system. 
Agent 3 told us that the team focused on Clinton’s devices because they were the 
most likely to have the full tranche of missing emails from Clinton’s servers, 
whereas the devices of any one person would only have a “fraction” of them. 
Midyear team members further told us that they placed limits on their 
investigation based on practical considerations, including what they observed to be 
systemic problems with handling classified information at the State Department.  
They stated that they discovered persistent practices of State Department 
employees, including both political and career employees, discussing classified 
information on both unclassified government email accounts and personal email 
accounts, and that this culture predated Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State.  In 
addition, FBI Attorney 1 told us that the emails containing classified information 
that were forwarded to Clinton often originally copied numerous State Department 
and other government agency employees, some of whom could have forwarded 
them to other unclassified locations besides the chain that ultimately led to 
Clinton’s server.  Witnesses told us that these factors made it impractical for them 
to search every email account or device that classified emails may have traversed. 
D. Review of Abedin’s Emails on the Clinton Server 
Abedin was the only State Department employee, besides Clinton, with an 
account on the clintonemail.com domain on Clinton’s server.  Witnesses told us and 
documents we reviewed showed that the Midyear team did not review all of 
Abedin’s clintonemail.com emails on the server; rather, they limited their searches 
to her email exchanges with Clinton.  We questioned why this limitation was put in 
place, given that the purpose of the investigation was to generally assess any 
mishandling of classified information in relation to Clinton’s server.82 
                                       
82  As we discuss in Chapter Eleven, in October 2016, when the Midyear team was drafting the 
search warrant affidavit for the Weiner laptop, Baker questioned why the team was not seeking to 
review all of Abedin’s emails on Weiner’s laptop.  He wrote, “I’m still concerned we are viewing the PC 
too narrowly.  There is PC to believe that Huma used her email accounts to mishandle classified 
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Several witnesses told us that they did not seek to review all of Abedin’s 
emails because her role was administrative in nature.  While witnesses told us that 
Abedin had possibly the most contact with Clinton and sometimes forwarded or 
printed substantive work-related emails to or for Clinton, she was never an 
originator of classified materials, she did not typically use classified systems, she 
did not receive or forward the particularly sensitive information, and she did not 
comment substantively on classified information that was contained in the emails 
she forwarded.  Prosecutor 1 explained that the team was not “as concerned that 
[Abedin] was taking stuff off the classified systems and dumping it down.”  These 
factors also contributed to the decision not to obtain a search warrant for content 
from Abedin’s Yahoo! account. 
However, during a review of the Weiner laptop in October and November 
2016, the FBI discovered unmarked classified emails that Abedin had forwarded to 
Weiner.  During an FBI interview on January 6, 2017, Abedin acknowledged that 
she “occasionally” forwarded work-related emails to her husband for printing. 
E. Decision Not to Seek Access to Certain Highly Classified 
Information 
As detailed in the classified appendix to this report, the OIG learned late in 
our review that the FBI considered seeking access to certain highly classified 
materials that may have included information potentially relevant to the Midyear 
investigation, but ultimately did not do so.83  In late May 2016, FBI Attorney 1 
drafted a memorandum stating that review of the classified materials was 
necessary to complete the Midyear investigation and requesting permission to 
review them. 
The FBI never finalized the May 2016 memorandum or received access to 
these classified materials for purposes of the Midyear investigation.84  FBI witnesses 
told us that this was for various reasons, including that they believed that the 
classified materials were unlikely to include information from the beginning of 
former Secretary Clinton’s tenure, and thus would not have a material impact on 
the investigation.  However, other FBI witnesses including Strzok, the Lead Analyst, 
and the SSA told us that reviewing the materials would have been a logical 
investigative step. 
                                       
information.  I just don’t understand why that us [sic] not enough to look at all her emails.”  Baker 
told us that he believed the team had probable cause to look at all of Abedin’s clintonemail.com and 
Yahoo! emails, based on the evidence that classified information had traversed both private email 
accounts. 
83  The OIG also has not reviewed the highly classified information. 
84 As we describe in the classified appendix, the FBI sent a memorandum to the Department 
on June 1, 2018, requesting permission to review these classified materials for foreign intelligence 
purposes unrelated to the Midyear investigation. 
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The classified appendix describes in more detail the highly classified 
information, its potential relevance to the Midyear investigation, and the FBI’s 
reasons for not seeking access to it. 
VI. Voluntary Interviews 
According to documents we reviewed, the Midyear team conducted 72 
witness interviews.  The witnesses included individuals involved with setting up and 
administering Clinton’s private servers, State Department employees, and other 
individuals with suspected knowledge of Clinton’s email servers, the transmission of 
classified information on the servers, or her intent.  Based on our review, we 
determined that all witnesses were interviewed voluntarily or pursuant to immunity 
agreements and, consistent with the FBI’s normal procedures, none of the 
witnesses were placed under oath or recorded.85  No witnesses testified before the 
grand jury. 
The FBI and Department witnesses we interviewed told us that the Midyear 
team, including agents, analysts, the SSA, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, and line 
prosecutors worked together to decide whom to interview and the sequencing of 
witness interviews, without seeking approval from higher level Department or FBI 
officials.  Agent 1 stated that the initial strategizing on whom to interview generally 
occurred at the level of the SSA and below.  The SSA and most of the case agents 
told us that they did not recall any significant disputes over whom to interview and 
that they were never told by higher level managers, including Strzok, or 
Department employees, including the prosecutors, not to interview particular 
witnesses that they believed were essential to the investigation.  Similarly, the 
prosecutors told us that their chain of command did not seek to influence the 
team’s decisions on whom to interview.  Toscas told us that the prosecutors made 
him aware of upcoming important interviews and he briefed that information up the 
chain, but he and higher level Department officials were not involved in deciding 
whom to interview. 
FBI witnesses told us that the agents and analysts worked together to 
determine what questions to ask to witnesses, and that the analysts prepared 
packets of documents to use as exhibits.  The SSA and the case agents told us that 
their supervisors were involved in strategy sessions before interviews and in editing 
and suggesting potential questions, but did not dictate the process and never 
forbade them from asking particular questions.  They also told us that for more 
significant witnesses, the line prosecutors reviewed their interview outlines and 
suggested eliminating questions based on privilege, relevance, or a scope that had 
been agreed upon with the witness’s counsel.  The SSA stated that the prosecutors’ 
review of the questions did not cause “friction” and that the process was “fairly 
seamless.”  The prosecutors told us that higher level Department officials were not 
involved in deciding what questions to ask witnesses. 
                                       
85 See DIOG § 18.5.6 (recording of noncustodial interviews is optional; no requirement that 
witnesses be placed under oath during voluntary interviews).      
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Witnesses told us and the FD-302s indicated that the case agents led the 
interviews, and prosecutors and supervisors only attended when witnesses were 
represented by counsel or particularly significant.  According to documents we 
reviewed, Strzok attended the interviews of five key witnesses—Abedin, Mills, 
Samuelson, Sullivan, and Clinton.  He stated that he only attended these interviews 
because Laufman insisted on attending them, and he believed that as Laufman’s 
counterpart at the FBI he should attend them as well.  Laufman told us that he 
attended the interviews that he believed were “potentially the most consequential,” 
because of the “enormous implications” and “potential consequences” of the 
Midyear investigation and to ensure that no one involved in the investigation went 
“off in a direction that wasn’t consistent with a purely independent, investigative, 
impartial approach.”  He further told us that he wanted to be involved in key 
interviews in order to make his own assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and 
gain a full picture of the investigation, so that he could make an informed judgment 
at the end of the investigation as to whether to accept the FBI’s and prosecutors’ 
recommendations.  Prosecutor 1 told us that the Midyear agents were “very, very 
diligent and most of them were very good interpersonally,” and that the 
prosecutors only interjected occasionally during interviews. 
We were told that the decision to conduct voluntary interviews rather than 
subpoenaing witnesses before the grand jury was not controversial or unusual.  FBI 
agents and prosecutors told us that their usual practice is to interview witnesses 
voluntarily and only resort to grand jury if witnesses are uncooperative or not 
credible.  They further told us that the Midyear witnesses were mostly cooperative 
and credible and that using the grand jury would have been complicated given the 
sensitive, classified information involved.  Prosecutors 1 and 2 and Agent 1 told us 
that not calling any witnesses before the grand jury was common in mishandling 
investigations, because doing so would typically require grand jurors to learn about 
classified information.  Before introducing classified information to the grand jury, 
prosecutors must obtain approval from the USIC agency that was responsible for 
classifying the information.86  Prosecutor 1 explained that although “[y]ou can put 
classified information in front of the grand jury[,] [y]ou really would like to avoid 
that because you're basically exposing people that aren't going to be cleared to the 
information.”  Agent 1 stated that he had specialized in investigations concerning 
the loss of classified information since approximately 2008 and during that time he 
had only been involved in one or two investigations where witnesses were 
subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury.  Agent 4 told us that voluntary 
interviews are better than the grand jury for “rapport-building” and obtaining 
information. 
Prosecutor 1 told us that the prosecutors were prepared to issue grand jury 
subpoenas for any witnesses that refused to voluntarily submit to interviews, for 
situations where they believed witnesses were untruthful, or for situations where 
witnesses provided statements that would be helpful in a later prosecution and the 
team wanted to “lock them in.”  While all witnesses ultimately submitted to 
voluntary interviews, the team issued a grand jury subpoena for Paul Combetta.  As 
                                       
86  See USAM 9-90.230. 
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discussed in Section VII.B of this chapter, ultimately the Midyear team decided that 
it was unnecessary to question Combetta before the grand jury. 
VII. Use Immunity Agreements 
The Department entered into letter use or “Queen for a Day” immunity 
agreements with three witnesses in the Midyear investigation:  Bryan Pagliano, Paul 
Combetta, and John Bentel.  These immunity agreements and the specific reasons 
for them are described in Sections A through C below.  The Department also 
entered into two act-of-production immunity agreements in relation to the personal 
laptops used by Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson to cull Clinton’s emails.  These 
are discussed in Section VIII.D.3 of this Chapter.  The Department did not enter 
into any transactional immunity agreements. 
The prosecutors told us that, in deciding whether to grant use immunity to a 
witness, they considered whether the witness had criminal “exposure” (i.e., 
whether there were crimes for which the witness could be prosecuted), the 
witness’s degree of culpability, the value of the witness’s expected testimony, 
whether there were other sources of the same information, and whether the grant 
of immunity would help or hinder the investigation.  Numerous Department and FBI 
witnesses told us that they did not oppose the immunity agreements.  Some 
witnesses stated that there was nothing unusual or troubling about the nature or 
quantity of immunity agreements used in the Midyear investigation, especially since 
so many witnesses were represented by counsel.  Witnesses also told us that the 
immunity agreements were approved within the Department through the level of 
DAAG Toscas, and that higher level Department and FBI officials were not involved 
in negotiating or approving the immunity agreements.  Yates told us that she was 
briefed about immunity agreements, but, since she was not made aware of any 
disagreements related to them, she did not consider overruling them.  Lynch told 
us that she generally was not briefed or otherwise involved in immunity issues.87 
A. Pagliano 
As previously noted, Bryan Pagliano was an information technology specialist 
who worked on Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and later set up the Pagliano 
server, which was the second of the Clinton Servers.  The Midyear team entered 
into two immunity agreements with Pagliano:  a “Queen for a Day” use immunity 
agreement on December 22, 2015, and a letter use immunity agreement on 
December 28, 2015.  Based on our review, the immunity was granted in response 
to a request by Pagliano’s counsel and resulted in at least two voluntary interviews 
that helped inform the FBI’s investigation. 
Witnesses told us that Pagliano was a critical witness because he set up the 
server that Clinton used during her tenure.  According to Prosecutor 2, Pagliano 
                                       
87  As described in Chapter Four, Lynch told us that she received a memorandum regarding 
congressional immunity issues for Pagliano, but only because Senator Charles Grassley had requested 
a phone call with her regarding Pagliano. 
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was “uniquely positioned” to describe to the FBI the “setup” and “mechanics” of 
Clinton’s server, as well as to answer questions regarding possible cyber intrusion.  
On August 10, 2015, Pagliano’s counsel emailed an FBI agent that he was “not 
prepared to have Mr. Pagliano participate in an interview with the FBI- particularly 
in the absence of any explanation as to the focus or scope of your prospective 
questions.”  According to an August 27, 2015 email among the prosecutors, Strzok, 
the Lead Analyst, and the SSA, Pagliano’s attorney had spoken with Prosecutor 1 
and was “insistent on immunity for his client even though it was explained to him 
that Pagliano is a witness and not a target.”  Prosecutor 3 wrote to the Midyear 
team, in response to the request of Pagliano’s lawyer, “We’re probably going to see 
this a lot with any witness who is facing having to be interviewed or testify on the 
Hill.  We should all sit down and prioritize witnesses to be interviewed and decide 
who it’s safe to immunize.” 
According to documents we reviewed, on or about September 4, 2015, 
Pagliano’s attorneys told the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that he would exercise 
his Fifth Amendment rights in response to any questions by the Committees about 
his role in setting up Clinton’s private email server.  The next day, the Washington 
Post reported that the Clintons personally paid Pagliano to support Clinton’s private 
email server while he was employed at the State Department.88  According to 
emails we reviewed, within days of these allegations the Midyear team took steps 
to obtain financial information related to Pagliano from several sources.  In 
addition, the Midyear prosecutors contacted the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity 
Section (PIN) to consider whether Pagliano should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 
209 for receiving outside compensation for government work or for improperly 
failing to report outside income on financial disclosure paperwork.  On or about 
September 9, 2015, Pagliano pleaded his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in response to questions about the set-up of Clinton’s email server 
before the House Benghazi Committee. 
On December 11, 2015, Prosecutor 2 wrote an email to the other line 
prosecutors notifying them that PIN had declined charges against Pagliano.  Then 
PIN Chief Ray Hulser told us that PIN declined charges because the PIN prosecutors 
determined that (1) Pagliano’s outside compensation was for work for the Clintons 
(primarily former President Clinton), not for State Department work;89 and (2) 
Pagliano reported his compensation from the Clintons on federal financial disclosure 
reports before he was told by the State Department that this was not necessary.  
Hulser further told us that PIN’s decision to decline charges against Pagliano was 
                                       
88  Rosalind S. Helderman and Carol D. Leonnig, Clintons Personally Paid State Department 
Staffer to Maintain Server, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2015. 
89  According to the FD-302 of Pagliano’s subsequent interview pursuant to the immunity 
agreement, Pagliano told the FBI that at the time he built the Pagliano server he did not know Clinton 
would be Secretary of State or would have an account on the server.  Rather, he told the FBI that he 
“believed the email server he was building would be used for private email exchange with Bill Clinton 
aides.” 
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not influenced by the Midyear team’s desire to interview Pagliano and that PIN was 
never pressured by anyone within the FBI or the Department to decline charges. 
Prosecutor 1 told us that around the same time as PIN’s declination, the 
team received a proffer from Pagliano’s attorney, through which the team 
confirmed that Pagliano had important information to provide.  Thus, on December 
22, 2015, the Department entered into a “Queen for a Day” proffer letter with 
Pagliano.  The “Queen for a Day” letter provided that Pagliano would “answer all 
questions completely and truthfully, and...provide all information, documents, and 
records” within his custody or control, related to the substance of his interview.  In 
exchange, the Department agreed that any statements made during his proffer 
would not be admitted during the government’s case-in-chief or at sentencing 
during any future prosecution of Pagliano.  The Department would, though, be able 
to “make derivative use of, and pursue any leads suggested by” Pagliano; use his 
statements for appropriate cross examination and rebuttal; and prosecute Pagliano 
for statements or information that were “false, misleading, or designed to obstruct 
justice.”  The prosecutors told us that they wanted to ensure that Pagliano was a 
credible witness and that his statements would be consistent with his attorney’s 
proffer before offering him the broader letter use immunity. 
Two FBI case agents interviewed Pagliano for the proffer on December 22, 
2015, in the presence of all four prosecutors, the CART examiner, and Pagliano’s 
attorneys.  Among other things, Pagliano described the set-up of the Pagliano 
server and related equipment, as well as the transition to the PRN server, to help 
inform later OTD analysis of those devices.  In addition, Pagliano told the FBI about 
a late 2009 or early 2010 conversation with Mills in which he conveyed a concern 
raised by a State Department Information Technology Specialist that Clinton’s use 
of a private email server could violate federal records retention laws.  Pagliano told 
the FBI that Mills responded that former Secretaries of State, including Colin Powell, 
had done the same thing.  The FBI relied on this testimony in subsequent 
interviews, including a later interview of Mills.90 
The prosecutors and Agent 1 told us that they met afterwards and everyone 
agreed that Pagliano was credible and helpful.  Prosecutor 1 told us that “everyone 
assessed that [Pagliano] was scared but truthful,” and that Pagliano might have 
been even more nervous and less forthcoming had he been required to testify in 
the grand jury, outside the presence of his attorney.  They also agreed that there 
were some follow-up questions that would need to be asked.  Thus, on December 
28, 2015, the Department offered Pagliano “use immunity coextensive with that 
granted under 18 U.S.C. § 6001” in exchange for future truthful court testimony, 
grand jury testimony, or voluntary interviews related to the Midyear matter, 
pursuant to a letter use immunity agreement.  The letter provided that the 
government would not use any information directly or indirectly derived from 
Pagliano’s truthful statements or testimony against him in a future prosecution, 
                                       
90  Mills told the FBI that she did not recall the conversation with Pagliano. 
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“except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or any other offense 
that may be prosecuted consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 6001.” 
According to a FD-302 and contemporaneous agent notes, the Midyear team 
interviewed Pagliano again on June 21, 2016, and he answered questions to clarify 
answers provided during the proffer.  For example, Pagliano told the FBI that he 
decided not to “implement Transport Layer Security (TLS) between the Clinton 
email server and State server,” because at the time he “understood the Clinton 
email server to be a personal email server and did not see a reason for encryption.”  
He also told the FBI about “failed log-in attempt[s]” on the Clinton email server in 
January 2011, which Pagliano described as a “brute force attack (BFA)” that was 
not “abnormal.”  According to the LHM, “[T]he FBI’s review of available Internet 
Information Services (IIS) web logs showed scanning attempts from external IP 
addressees over the course of Pagliano’s administration of the server, though only 
one appear[ed] to have resulted in a successful compromise of an email account on 
the server.”  As described in Section I of this chapter, the one confirmed successful 
compromise was of an account belonging to one of President Clinton’s aides. 
Both Department and FBI witnesses told us that no one opposed the decision 
to grant Pagliano immunity.  The SSA told us that the FBI did not consider him a 
subject or someone they would prosecute in connection with Midyear, the FBI 
believed his testimony was very important, and providing immunity was an 
effective way to secure his testimony.  Prosecutor 4 told us that the way Pagliano 
was handled was “standard operating procedure.”  In addition, witnesses told us 
that Pagliano pleading the Fifth Amendment and refusing to testify before Congress 
gave the Department no choice but to offer Pagliano immunity. 
B. Combetta 
As previously noted, Paul Combetta was the employee of PRN who migrated 
the email accounts from the Pagliano server to the PRN server in 2013, transferred 
Clinton’s archived emails to the PRN server in 2014, and later wiped emails from 
the PRN server in March of 2015.  The Department entered into a letter use 
immunity agreement with Combetta on May 3, 2016.  Midyear team members told 
us that Combetta was an important witness for several reasons, including his 
involvement with the culling process and the deletion of emails and his interactions 
with several people that worked for Clinton.  Several Midyear team members stated 
that after conducting two voluntary interviews of Combetta, they believed that 
Combetta had not been forthcoming about, among other things, his role in deleting 
emails from the PRN server following the issuance of a Congressional preservation 
order.  The witnesses further stated that Combetta’s truthful testimony was 
essential for assessing criminal intent for Clinton and other individuals, because he 
would be able to tell them whether Clinton’s attorneys—Mills, Samuelson, or 
Kendall—had instructed him to delete emails. 
Combetta was first interviewed on September 17, 2015, by two case agents, 
in the presence of Prosecutor 2 and Combetta’s counsel.  The interview was 
voluntary and there was no immunity agreement.  According to the FD-302 and 
contemporaneous agent notes, Combetta provided information regarding the set-up 
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of the PRN server, the roles of other PRN employees in the management of the PRN 
server, his role in transferring emails from the Archive Laptop to the PRN server, 
and his role in creating .pst files of Clinton’s archived emails to be transferred to 
the laptops used by Mills and Samuelson to cull Clinton’s emails (“culling laptops”).  
However, he denied that PRN “deleted or purged” Clinton’s emails from the PRN 
server or from back-ups of the server and stated that Clinton’s staff never 
requested that PRN do so. 
On February 18, 2016, the same two agents interviewed Combetta again, 
this time in the presence of the CART examiner, the Forensics Agent, Prosecutor 2, 
and Combetta’s counsel.  Once again, the interview was voluntary and there was no 
immunity agreement.  According to the FD-302 and contemporaneous agent notes, 
Combetta continued to deny deleting the HRC Archive Mailbox from the server and 
stated that “he believed the HRC Archive mailbox should still be on the Server in 
the possession of the FBI,” despite documentation showing that the mailbox was no 
longer on the server as of January 7, 2015.  Combetta stated that only he and one 
other administrator had the ability to delete a mailbox from the server.  When the 
agents showed him documentation indicating that an administrator had manually 
deleted backup files and used BleachBit on March 31, 2015, he stated that he did 
not recall deleting backup files, he did not recall anyone asking him to delete 
backup files, any PRN employee had the ability to delete backup files, he believed 
he used BleachBit “for the removal of .pst files related to the various exports of 
Clinton’s email” to Mills’s and Samuelson’s laptops, and he used BleachBit for this 
purpose “of his own accord based on his normal practices as an engineer.”  He 
further stated that he did not recall a March 9, 2015 email in which Mills reminded 
him of his obligation to preserve emails pursuant to a preservation order.  The FD-
302 and contemporaneous notes indicate that the agents attempted to ask 
Combetta about documents related to a conference call with Kendall and Mills on 
March 25, 2015, just before the deletions and use of BleachBit, but his attorney 
advised him not to answer based on the Fifth Amendment. 
During the February 18, 2016 interview, the agents also showed Combetta 
an email dated December 11, 2014, in which he wrote to a PRN colleague, “I am 
stuck on the phone with CESC [Clinton’s staff] again....  Its [sic] all part of the 
Hilary [sic] coverup [sic] operation  I’ll have to tell you about it at the party.”  
Combetta told the agents that the reference to the “Hilary [sic] coverup [sic] 
operation” was “probably due to the recently requested change to a 60 day email 
retention policy and the comment was a joke.”91  Department and FBI witnesses 
told us that Combetta’s explanation for this email seemed credible to them, given 
                                       
91  According to the FD-302, contemporaneous notes, and exhibits, the agents also asked 
Combetta about a July 24, 2014 email to Pagliano regarding using a “text expression editor.”  
Combetta told the agents that Mills was concerned that Clinton’s then current email address would be 
“disclosed publicly” when her archived emails were provided to the State IG, because “when a user 
changes his or her email address, Outlook updates the old email address with the new email address.”  
We found that this might explain later media reports that Combetta posted on Reddit on or about July 
24, 2014, “I may be facing a very interesting situation where I need to strip out a VIP’s (VERY VIP) 
email address from a bunch of archived email....”  See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, Hillary Clinton’s IT Guy 
Asked Reddit for Help Altering Emails, A Twitter Sleuth Claims, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2016. 
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his personality and the way the email was written, and they did not discuss 
interviewing Combetta’s colleague regarding the email. 
The SSA told us that he believed Combetta should have been charged with 
false statements for lying multiple times; however, the SSA also stated that he was 
ultimately satisfied that Combetta’s later immunized testimony was truthful and 
that he was “fine” with the immunity agreement.  Prosecutor 2, Agent 2, and the 
Forensics Agent indicated that, while they believed that Combetta had not been 
forthcoming during the first two interviews, they were not certain that they had 
sufficient evidence to charge him with obstruction or false statements.  According to 
documents we reviewed, the forensic evidence showed that Clinton’s emails had 
been deleted and wiped from the server, but did not definitively link Combetta with 
those actions.  Agent 2 explained that the team “felt pretty strongly that maybe he 
had deleted information off of Secretary Clinton’s server,” but that interpreting 
computer forensics and precisely what they mean can be “kind of messy.”  
Similarly, the Forensics Agent stated that, based on the forensic evidence alone, it 
was “very difficult” to be certain that Combetta conducted the deletions; however, 
based on the Midyear team’s assessments of the credibility of Combetta and the 
other administrator, the team was more “focused on” Combetta.  Prosecutor 2 told 
us that using the forensic evidence in combination with witness testimony, the team 
“probably could have established” that Combetta conducted the deletions; however, 
Prosecutor 2 stated that there was insufficient evidence, after the first two 
interviews, to prove that Combetta understood his obligation to preserve Clinton’s 
emails and deliberately violated the Congressional preservation order. 
In addition, members of the Midyear team told us, consistent with their 
contemporaneous emails, that they believed Combetta’s failure to be forthcoming 
during the first two interviews was largely due to a lack of sophistication and poor 
legal representation, rather than an intent to hide truth.  For example, Prosecutor 2 
wrote in an email on March 29, 2016, to the other line prosecutors, “It’s really hard 
to tell whether Paul [Combetta] is trying to hide something, or we are simply 
experiencing the effects of really bad (no) attorney prep and/or an attorney that 
has counseled him to say ‘I don’t remember’ if he doesn’t have a specific 
recollection of taking a specific action on a specific date.”  Prosecutor 2 expressed 
the same sentiments during OIG interviews.  Agent 2 stated, “We just felt like we 
weren’t getting the whole story or maybe he was holding back a little.”  Prosecutor 
1 stated, “[W]e didn't assess his exposure to be terribly significant.”  However, 
Prosecutor 1 also stated: 
There were certainly discussions about whether he had, had [18 U.S.C. 
§] 1001 exposure [for making false statements]....  He was clearly not 
being forthright with us....  And I think, my, my guess is if we couldn't 
have gotten him to come in and, and he was messing around with us 
on the immunity, we probably would have had to charge him.  But, I 
think we were more interested in understanding what had happened....  
And the most expedient way to, to do that, I think we assessed, was 
just to, to immunize him and keep moving. 
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Both prosecutors and agents also told us that Combetta was not someone 
the government was interested in prosecuting given his role in the case.  Agent 1 
told us that the absence of evidence that Combetta knew anything about the 
content of the emails on Clinton’s server minimized the FBI’s interest in prosecuting 
him.  Prosecutor 4 stated: 
I was concerned that we would end up with obstruction cases against 
some poor schmuck on the down, that, that had a crappy attorney 
who didn’t really, you know, if I was his attorney, he wouldn’t have 
gone in and been, you know, hiding the ball in the first place.  And so 
at the end of the day, I was like, look, let’s immunize him.  We’ve got 
to get from Point A to Point B.  Point B is to make a prosecution 
decision about Hillary Clinton and her senior staff well before the 
election if possible.  And this guy with his dumb attorney doing some 
half-assed obstruction did not interest me.  So I was totally in favor of 
giving him immunity. 
Prosecutor 2 told us that Combetta’s counsel was “concerned” that the Midyear 
team would “want to charge somebody...to show we had done something” and “go 
after some low-level person like Combetta to make a point.”  Prosecutor 2 stated, 
“that was never our intention” and “it was in our interest to...make him and his 
counsel feel comfortable enough that they were going to give us the facts that we 
needed to figure out what happened in this case.” 
In the March 29, 2016 email exchange, the four line prosecutors weighed two 
approaches to dealing with Combetta:  (1) offering letter use immunity and only 
issuing a grand jury subpoena if Combetta did not comply or was untruthful during 
an immunized interview; versus (2) issuing a grand jury subpoena first and 
withdrawing the subpoena if Combetta was cooperative and truthful during a 
voluntary, immunized interview the morning before a scheduled grand jury 
appearance.  In support of the second approach, Prosecutor 4 sent an email stating 
that it was “common for witnesses to play games early in high profile investigations 
as they try to figure out the lay of the land” and noting that a grand jury subpoena 
was a “powerful” tool in this situation. 
On April 8, 2016, the Department subpoenaed Combetta to appear before 
the grand jury on May 3, 2016.  Along with the subpoena, Prosecutor 3 wrote an 
email to Combetta’s attorney that the FBI intended to “continue its interview of 
[Combetta] and go over any relevant documents with him” on May 3 and that “[i]n 
the event he needs to appear before the GJ, that would likely occur” the following 
morning.  The prosecutors and agents explained to us that the plan was to 
interview Combetta on May 3, and place him in the grand jury on May 4 if they 
assessed that he was still uncooperative or untruthful. 
On the evening of May 2, Prosecutor 3 wrote to the other prosecutors that 
that they would need to discuss whether to put Combetta in the grand jury on May 
4.  He further wrote, “Regardless as to how he answers the questions, I could see 
the FBI advocating that we put him in the GJ.”  Prosecutor 4 responded, “I would 
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prefer that we not put him in the GJ without a clear articulable reason for doing so, 
but we can discuss.”  Prosecutor 4 told the OIG: 
Generally, I think people overestimate the value of the grand jury to 
get people that are lying to tell the truth.  My experience, I’ve had the 
best luck with working with defense counsel or having very aggressive 
interviews with them personally, one-on-one, which I would typically 
not want to do in the grand jury.  You know, if I’m going to beat 
somebody up to get them to tell the truth, I don’t want 23 grand 
jurors sitting around while I’m yelling at somebody. 
The prosecutors told us that Combetta’s attorney had informed them in 
advance of the May 3 meeting that Combetta would plead the Fifth Amendment in 
the grand jury.  They further told us they believed they had no real choice but to 
grant Combetta immunity.92  They stated that they did not consider charging 
Combetta with a crime and then seeking his cooperation against other witnesses, 
because they did not believe he had significant criminal exposure.  In addition, 
Prosecutor 1 explained that if the Department had dropped or lowered charges 
against Combetta in exchange for his cooperation, a defense attorney would have 
used the cooperation agreement to impeach Combetta’s credibility at a subsequent 
trial. 
Accordingly, on May 3, 2016, the Department entered into a standard letter 
use immunity agreement with Combetta.  The terms of this agreement were 
identical to the terms incorporated into the Pagliano letter use immunity 
agreement.  Specifically, in exchange for Combetta providing truthful information 
during FBI interviews as well as truthful testimony during any grand jury or court 
appearances, the Department agreed that it would not use his statement or 
testimony, or any information derived from it, during a subsequent criminal 
prosecution, “except for a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or any 
other offense that may be prosecuted consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 6002.”93  Both 
the prosecutors and the FBI agents involved with Combetta’s interview told us that 
the decision to grant Combetta use immunity was not controversial and that 
everyone agreed that it was the most effective way to obtain the information they 
needed from him. 
During a speech at an FBI conference for Special Agents in Charge in October 
2016, Comey indicated that he agreed with the decision to enter into a use 
immunity agreement with Combetta in order to obtain potentially valuable 
information concerning any role that Clinton played in the deletion of emails from 
                                       
92  The Midyear team did not first conduct a Queen for a Day proffer with Combetta, as they 
did with Pagliano.  Prosecutors typically enter Queen for a Day immunity agreements before offering 
letter use immunity, because Queen for a Day agreements allow the government to assess the 
usefulness and reliability of the witness’s expected testimony before agreeing not to use leads 
obtained from the testimony to develop evidence against the witness. 
93  This language meant that Combetta could be prosecuted for lying during his May 3 
immunized interview.  However, the government could not use Combetta’s statements on May 3 to 
prosecute him for lying in the past, including during the previous two Midyear interviews. 
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her server.  Responding to the complaint that the Midyear team “handed out 
immunity like candy,” he stated: 
I hope you also notice our subject here was Hillary Clinton. We wanted 
to see[,] this very aggressive investigative team wanted to see can we 
make a case on Hillary Clinton. To make that case they worked up 
from the bottom. The guy who set up her server, the guy who 
panicked and deleted emails, he is really not our interest. Out interest 
is trying to figure out did he give us anything against her. 
Combetta was interviewed subject to the terms of the immunity agreement 
on May 3, 2016, by the same two FBI case agents, this time in the presence of the 
SSA, the CART examiner, all four line prosecutors, and Combetta’s attorneys.  
According to the FD-302 and contemporaneous notes of the two agents and the 
CART Examiner, Combetta provided the FBI additional detail regarding his removal 
of emails from the culling laptops, stating that Mills had requested that he “securely 
delete the .pst files” in November or December 2014 but had not specifically 
requested that he use “deletion software.”  He told the FBI that he was the one who 
recommended the use of “BleachBit” because he had used it for other clients.  He 
also acknowledged removing the HRC Archive mailbox from the PRN server 
between March 25, 2015, and March 31, 2015, and using BleachBit to “shred” any 
remaining copies of Clinton’s email on the server, despite his awareness of 
Congress’s preservation order and his understanding that the order meant that “he 
should not disturb Clinton’s email data on the PRN server.”  According to the FD-
302 and contemporaneous notes, Combetta told the FBI that he had an “oh shit” 
moment upon realizing that he had failed to comply with Mills’s request in late 2014 
or early 2015 to “change the retention policy for Clinton’s and Abedin’s existing and 
ongoing mail to 60 days.”  He further told the FBI that Mills had contacted him on 
or about March 8, 2015, to assess what was still on the servers, including whether 
there were any “old back up data or copies of mailboxes hanging out there on old 
equipment.”  However, he stated that he did not tell Mills that he subsequently 
realized the archived emails were still on the PRN server or that he deleted them in 
late March.  In addition, he stated that he “could not recall the content” of the 
March 25, 2015, call with Kendall and Mills.  In sum, Combetta took responsibility 
for the deletions, without implicating Clinton or her attorneys. 
We interviewed seven Midyear team members who attended Combetta’s May 
3, 2016, interview, all of whom told us that they conferred immediately following 
Combetta’s interview and agreed that Combetta’s testimony finally “made sense,” 
that he had been truthful and forthcoming, and that he did not implicate anyone in 
criminal activity such that there was a need to “lock in” his testimony in the grand 
jury.  Prosecutor 1 told us that Combetta’s testimony finally “squared with the 
forensic evidence,” and also corroborated the testimony of other witnesses, 
including Mills and Samuelson, that they were unaware of the March deletions by 
Combetta. 
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C. Bentel 
As noted previously, John Bentel worked at the State Department for 39 
years, the last four of which he served as Director of the Executive Secretariat 
Information Resource Management (S/ES-IRM), before he retired in 2012.  As 
detailed below, the investigators had received evidence that Bentel had information 
relating to the State Department’s possible sanctioning of Clinton’s use of a private 
email server. 
According to documentation we reviewed, the Department entered into a 
“Queen for a Day” agreement with Bentel on June 10, 2016.  The terms of this 
agreement were similar to those offered to Pagliano.  Prosecutor 2 told us that the 
team did not subsequently grant Bentel the broader letter use immunity granted to 
Pagliano and Combetta, nor did his counsel ask for it.  The witnesses we 
interviewed told us that the decision to enter into a Queen for a Day agreement 
with Bentel was not controversial.  Prosecutors 1 and 2 stated that Bentel’s 
attorney sought use immunity because he thought that Bentel was portrayed poorly 
in the State IG report.  They further stated that the team granted Bentel immunity 
because he was a necessary witness, who did not, to their knowledge, face any 
criminal “exposure.”  Prosecutor 2 described the Bentel interview as a “check-the-
box type interview.”  The SSA told us that he did not oppose immunity for Bentel, 
because the FBI had no intentions of seeking that Bentel be prosecuted. 
The agents asked Bentel about allegations by two S/ES-IRM staff members 
that they had raised concerns about Clinton’s use of personal email to him during 
separate meetings.  According to the State IG report, one of the staff members told 
the State IG that Bentel told the staff member that “the mission of S/ES-IRM is to 
support the Secretary” and instructed the staff member to “never speak of the 
Secretary’s personal email system again.”94  According to the FD-302 and agent 
notes, the agents showed Bentel documents that suggested that he was aware that 
Clinton had a private email server that she used for official business during their 
joint tenure.  One of the agents explained that the purpose of asking Bentel about 
his knowledge of the server was to assess whether Clinton’s use of the server was 
sanctioned by the State Department.  However, Bentel maintained that he was 
unaware that Clinton used personal email to conduct official business until it was 
reported in the news and denied that anyone had raised concerns about it to him. 
Both agents who interviewed Bentel told us that he was uncooperative and 
the interview was unproductive; however, they attributed these problems to 
nervousness and fear of being found culpable.  Agent 3 told us that he did not 
believe that immunity for Bentel was necessary and that it did not help the 
investigation because Bentel was not forthcoming during his interview.  However, 
he did not believe that Bentel had any criminal exposure and therefore the 
immunity agreement did not harm the investigation. 
                                       
94  Department of State Office of Inspector General, Office of the Secretary: Evaluation of 
Email Records Management and Cybersecurity Requirements (May 2016), Evaluations and Special 
Projects Report ES-16-03, https://oig.state.gov/system/files/esp-16-03.pdf (accessed May 7, 2018). 
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VIII. Use of Consent and Act of Production Immunity to Obtain Mills and 
Samuelson Testimony and Laptops 
In this section we examine decisions made by the FBI and the Department 
regarding whether to interview Mills and Samuelson regarding the process they 
used to cull Clinton’s emails in connection with providing emails to the State 
Department in 2014, as well as whether and how to obtain and review the personal 
laptops used by Mills and Samuelson for this culling process (“culling laptops”).  The 
investigators told us that access to these laptops was particularly important to 
ensure the completeness of the investigation.  All 62,320 emails pulled from the 
Clinton servers were stored at one time on these laptops, so access to the laptops 
offered the possibility of reconstructing a large number of the deleted emails 
through digital forensics.95  Moreover, the deletion of emails by Mills and Samuelson 
from these laptops had become a matter of great public controversy, including 
allegations that they had been deleted for improper purposes, increasing the 
importance of attempting to recover as many of them as possible.  Ultimately, both 
Mills and Samuelson submitted to voluntary interviews regarding the culling process 
and voluntarily provided the culling laptops to the FBI after receiving “act of 
production” immunity. 
In the subsections below we discuss:  privilege claims raised by Mills and 
Samuelson; the debate between the FBI and the Department; the events that led 
to the Department securing voluntary interviews of Mills and Samuelson; the steps 
that were taken to secure and search the culling laptops, including the decision to 
grant Mills and Samuelson “act of production” immunity and the consent 
agreements for the culling laptops; the involvement of senior Department and FBI 
officials; and a discussion of the motivations behind the Mills and Samuelson 
dispute. 
A. Privilege Claims Raised by Mills and Samuelson 
As noted previously, in response to a State Department request in 2014, 
Mills and Samuelson, neither of whom were still employed by the State 
Department, worked together on behalf of Clinton to produce Clinton’s State work-
related emails that were on the PRN server by crafting a process to cull what they 
believed to be Clinton’s personal emails from her work-related emails.  Samuelson, 
under Mills’s supervision, reviewed the emails that had been placed on the culling 
laptops and, following completion of this culling process, Clinton produced 30,490 
work-related emails to the State Department.  Thereafter, Mills and Samuelson 
asked Combetta to securely delete the .pst files from the culling laptops, which, as 
described above, he did using BleachBit.  Mills and Samuelson then continued to 
use the culling laptops for work related to their legal representation of other clients. 
                                       
95  By comparison, personal devices used by other persons who might have sent or received 
emails to or from addresses on the Clinton servers would only contain the emails sent or received by 
that person. 
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While the Midyear team was interested in speaking with Mills and Samuelson 
about this culling process, they also were interested in interviewing Mills concerning 
her time at the State Department with Clinton, due to evidence that Mills frequently 
communicated directly with Clinton and that she received and forwarded classified 
information on both her unclassified State email and personal Gmail accounts.96  
During Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State, Mills served as, among other things, 
Clinton’s Chief of Staff and Samuelson served as a senior advisor to Clinton and 
White House Liaison. 
According to documents we reviewed, Mills and Samuelson told the FBI and 
Wilkinson told the prosecutors that Mills and Samuelson had attorney-client 
relationships with Clinton for purposes of their work culling Clinton’s emails in 2014.  
According to internal memoranda and emails, the prosecutors began asking 
Wilkinson to provide her clients for voluntary interviews regarding the culling 
process in December 2015, but Wilkinson raised objections.  Specifically, Wilkinson 
argued that any interview questions regarding the culling process “would require 
answers revealing privileged information,” and she suggested that the Department 
obtain the information through an attorney proffer by Wilkinson instead.97  
Prosecutor 2 told us, and contemporaneous notes show, that the prosecutors also 
asked Wilkinson to voluntarily turn over the culling laptops in March 2016, after 
Wilkinson informed them that the laptops were still in her clients’ possession.  
However, Wilkinson refused to voluntarily turn over the culling laptops, arguing that 
the laptops contained privileged information related to both Clinton and Mills’s and 
Samuelson’s other clients.  Wilkinson told the prosecutors that she would instead 
take possession of the culling laptops from her clients, disconnect them from the 
Internet, and secure them in a safe in her office. 
B. Debate over Interviewing Mills and Samuelson Regarding the 
Culling Process and Obtaining the Culling Laptops 
FBI case agents and the SSA told us, and contemporaneous emails show, 
that they believed that interviewing Mills and Samuelson regarding the culling 
process and searching the culling laptops were essential investigative steps.  They 
stated that they hoped to be able to find the full 62,320 emails that were originally 
reviewed by Mills and Samuelson to determine whether any additional emails—
beyond those that Clinton’s attorneys provided to the State Department and those 
that the FBI found through other sources—contained classified information.  They 
further stated that they believed the culling process might have been flawed, 
                                       
96  Prosecutor 1 told us that the Midyear team did not have an investigative need to interview 
Samuelson concerning her time at State. 
97  Wilkinson also represented two other witnesses, a former senior State Department official 
and Jake Sullivan.  According to emails we reviewed, Wilkinson agreed to provide the former senior 
State Department official for an interview, but at first refused to provide Sullivan, although she 
acknowledged that Sullivan never had an attorney-client relationship with Clinton.  On January 14, 
2016, the prosecutors prepared a memorandum requesting authorization to notify Wilkinson that the 
Department was prepared to issue a grand jury subpoena for Sullivan’s testimony, as well as 
authorization to issue the grand jury subpoena if Wilkinson continued to object.  On January 18, 2016, 
Toscas emailed Laufman approving both requests.  Wilkinson ultimately agreed to provide Sullivan for 
a voluntary interview, which took place on February 27, 2016. 
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because their other reconstruction efforts had revealed a significant number of work 
related emails to or from Clinton that had not been included in the State 
Department production.  Strzok told us that the FBI investigators hoped that asking 
questions about the culling process and reviewing the culling laptops would help 
determine why this was the case and whether there was a nefarious purpose.  For 
example, several FBI witnesses stated that they believed that asking questions 
about the culling process might help them determine why Abedin’s emails were 
underrepresented in the State IG production. 
FBI witnesses told us that once Wilkinson refused to voluntarily provide her 
clients for interviews and the culling laptops, they believed it was appropriate and 
in the interest of efficiency to subpoena Mills and Samuelson before the grand jury 
and seek a search warrant to seize the culling laptops from Wilkinson’s office.  The 
FBI witnesses stated that even if a judge ultimately were to quash a subpoena or 
decide that there was no probable cause to issue a search warrant, it was the FBI’s 
obligation to at least try to obtain what they believed to be critical potential sources 
of evidence. 
The line prosecutors and Laufman told us, and contemporaneous emails and 
internal memoranda show, that they agreed that it would be helpful to interview 
Mills and Samuelson regarding the culling process and obtain the culling laptops.  
However, they had several concerns about using compulsory process to do so.  
First, they were concerned that at least certain questions regarding the culling 
process would seek information protected by attorney-client privilege and the 
attorney work product doctrine.  Second, they were concerned that the culling 
laptops contained privileged material relating to both Clinton and Mills’s and 
Samuelson’s other clients.  Third, they raised questions about establishing probable 
cause to search the culling laptops given evidence that they had been wiped of the 
emails relevant to the Midyear investigation.  Fourth, based on conversations with 
Wilkinson, they believed she would file a motion to quash any search warrant or 
subpoena and that this would lead to protracted litigation that would delay the 
investigation.  Finally, they stated that they were required to follow the procedures 
set forth in the Department policy for obtaining physical evidence and testimony 
from an attorney regarding the attorney’s representation of a client.  They stated 
that, at a minimum, 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 and USAM 9-19.220 and 9-13.420 did not 
permit them to execute a search warrant on Wilkinson’s office under these 
circumstances. 
The prosecutors told the OIG that the FBI did not appreciate the complexity 
involved with obtaining the culling testimony and laptops.  Prosecutor 4, whom 
several witnesses told us was known for being an experienced prosecutor with 
significant experience handling privilege issues, explained that he was frustrated 
that the FBI was “willing to litigate to the death issues that [he] thought would be 
very close calls and could delay the investigation for two years without a strong 
belief that it would actually change the results” of the investigation. 
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C. Events Leading to Voluntary Interviews of Mills and Samuelson 
Regarding the Culling Process 
1. Attorney Proffer on March 19, 2016 
On February 1, 2016, Toscas received from the NSD prosecutors their 
proposed investigative steps for Mills and Samuelson.  The prosecutors proposed 
pursuing a grand jury subpoena to question Mills concerning her State Department 
tenure (where there were no attorney-client privilege issues), but seeking attorney 
proffers before considering grand jury subpoenas for Mills’s and Samuelson’s 
testimony about the culling process.  They provided two reasons for this approach. 
First, they indicated that, pursuant to the USAM, to obtain Criminal Division 
authorization for a subpoena to an attorney regarding the attorney’s representation 
of a client they must show that the information sought is not protected by a valid 
claim of privilege and that “[a]ll reasonable attempts to obtain the information from 
alternative sources shall have proved to be unsuccessful.”  USAM 9-13.410(C).  The 
prosecutors described how they would tailor their questions about the culling 
process to avoid seeking information protected by attorney client privilege.98  
However, they indicated that they could not represent that all reasonable attempts 
had been made to obtain the information from alternative sources without first 
attempting to obtain the information through an attorney proffer. 
Second, they indicated that they were concerned that issuing subpoenas for 
testimony regarding the culling process could result in protracted litigation with an 
uncertain outcome.  They indicated that, despite extensive legal research, the team 
had been unable to find clear authority indicating that a court should allow an 
attorney to be questioned about actions taken on behalf of a client, even if 
describing those actions would not implicate confidential communications between 
the client and attorney. 
In February 2016, Wilkinson agreed to both an attorney proffer by Wilkinson 
regarding the culling process and a voluntary interview of Mills regarding her State 
Department tenure.  On February 8, 2016, the prosecutors emailed Wilkinson a 
short list of broad topics for the attorney proffer and the proffer was scheduled for 
March 19, 2016.  Separately, Mills’s interview regarding her State Department 
tenure was set for April 9, 2016. 
According to Prosecutor 2’s notes of the March 19 attorney proffer, the 
proffer was attended by all four line prosecutors, Beth Wilkinson, and two other 
attorneys from Wilkinson’s firm.  Mills’s and Samuelson’s attorneys told the 
prosecutors, consistent with a State IG Report described above, that Mills and 
Samuelson initiated the culling process after the State Department requested 
Clinton’s assistance reconstructing her work-related emails.  The attorneys further 
                                       
98  Specifically, they indicated that they intended to ask Mills and Samuelson questions falling 
into three categories:  “(1) receipt of emails from PRN; (2) general questions about the culling process 
that do not implicate the attorney-client privilege; and (3) handling of the emails, which have been 
confirmed to contain classified information.” 
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stated that the State Department had told Mills that “it was HRC’s responsibility to 
determine” what was personal and what was work-related, because this would be 
“too burdensome for State.”  The attorneys described the manner in which Mills and 
Samuelson obtained the emails from Combetta and generally how they conducted 
their review.  The attorneys told the prosecutors that Mills asked Combetta to 
remove the .pst files from Mills’s and Samuelson’s laptops after Clinton’s work-
related emails were produced to the State Department; however, the attorneys 
stated that they “never heard of BleachBit.”  According to the notes, the attorneys 
confirmed that Clinton had changed her email retention policy to 60 days in early 
2015, but would not “say reason for changing policy – either [privilege] or HRC’s 
question to answer.” 
2. Midyear Team Meeting on March 28, 2016 
After the March 19 attorney proffer, the FBI team took the position that it 
was still essential to interview Mills and Samuelson regarding the culling process.  
On March 28, 2016, the Midyear team held a meeting to decide the best way 
forward.  McCabe and Toscas were the highest level FBI and Department officials, 
respectively, at the meeting.  Witnesses told the OIG and contemporaneous emails 
show that this meeting was contentious and that the FBI insisted that the team 
either interview Mills regarding the culling process during the scheduled interview 
on April 9, 2016, or inform Wilkinson before April 9 of its intent to do so at a future 
date.  The FBI witnesses stated that they believed if they did not do this, Mills 
would only give the FBI one “bite at the apple”—that she would assert publicly that 
she cooperated with the FBI without an incentive to return for another interview.   
Based on a review of emails and text message exchanges, we determined 
that Page was one of the more outspoken FBI personnel at the March 28 meeting in 
favor of interviewing Mills and Samuelson about the culling process and countering 
the Department’s privilege concerns.  In a March 29, 2016 email exchange, Strzok 
asked Prosecutor 4, “[H]ow are you doing?  You seemed none too pleased at times 
on Monday [March 28].”  Prosecutor 4 replied with an email about Page: 
I am fine.  I don’t like “former prosecutors” [Page] giving their 
opinions from the cheap seats.  I have been known throughout my 
career by the agents I work with as the most aggressive prosecutor 
that they have ever seen.  During my last five jury trials I have forced 
no fewer than a dozen lawyers to testify against their former clients.  
It is easy for FBI attorneys to second guess our opinions when they 
haven’t ever had to actually stand before a judge and defend their 
opinion.99 
In response, Strzok defended Page and wrote, “Best I can tell is I think 
everyone in the room’s motives were (are) pure.”  Prosecutor 4 then wrote: 
                                       
99  Page told us that she had been a prosecutor in the Department’s Organized Crime and 
Racketeering Section before joining the FBI. 
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I am stuck in the middle of pushing NSD along and trying to get FBI to 
be realistic.  The investigation is degenerating into everyone trying to 
figure out what the congressional testimony looks like in the future.  
My job is to put criminals in jail, period. 
Following the March 28 meeting, Strzok drafted an email to send to the 
prosecutors to memorialize the FBI’s understanding of the decision made at the 
meeting regarding Mills and Samuelson.  The email was approved by FBI OGC, 
Steinbach, and McCabe.  Strzok sent the email on March 29, 2016, to the four line 
prosecutors and copied Toscas and several FBI employees.  In the email, Strzok 
wrote that the prosecutors had agreed to “inform Wilkinson of DOJ’s and FBI’s 
intention to interview Mills and Samuelson about the sort process.”  In addition, 
Strzok wrote that the prosecutors had agreed to contact the Department’s 
Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) regarding whether they could 
seek a waiver of attorney-client privilege from Clinton through Kendall. 
According to emails we reviewed, the line prosecutors and Laufman agreed 
with reaching out to PRAO for advice on seeking a waiver from Kendall and did so 
on March 31, 2016.  In addition, in early April, 2016, they sought guidance from 
the Criminal Division as to whether seeking the waiver was permissible under 
Department policy.  On April 12, 2016, three days after the Mills interview, a 
Criminal Division official told NSD that he was “not aware of any DOJ policy that 
would prevent [CES] from seeking the waiver.” 
As far as Strzok’s assertion that the prosecutors had agreed to notify 
Wilkinson that the FBI intended to interview her clients regarding the culling 
process, Prosecutors 1 and 2 indicated in an email exchange on March 30, 2016, 
that this was not correct.  According to the March 30 email exchange, the 
prosecutors were concerned that certain issues had not yet been resolved, including 
obtaining necessary approvals from the Criminal Division.  Also on March 30, 2016, 
Prosecutor 1 wrote to Prosecutor 2 and Laufman that he did not want to take a 
position with Wilkinson that they would be unable to “stand behind” and thus be 
accused of “dealing with her in bad faith.”  Prosecutor 1 told us, “It’s not smart to 
make demands when you don’t understand what kind of leverage you have.”  Thus, 
Prosecutor 2 told us, and documents showed, that before the April 9 interview the 
prosecutors told Wilkinson that the FBI “had not foreclosed” the possibility of 
interviewing her clients regarding the culling process, but not that the FBI insisted 
on doing so. 
3. FBI Call to Wilkinson on April 8 About Mills and 
Samuelson Interviews Without Informing Prosecutors 
On April 8, 2016, the day before the Mills interview, FBI GC Baker contacted 
Wilkinson, without notifying the line prosecutors or higher Department officials in 
advance, to convince her to consent to the FBI’s demands for the culling testimony 
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and culling laptops.100  The prosecutors learned of Baker’s call to Wilkinson the 
following day, when Wilkinson told the prosecutors at the Mills interview she had 
been contacted by a “senior FBI official” regarding interviews of her clients. 
Comey told us that he approved Baker’s call to Wilkinson and that he “must 
have known [Baker] was not going to tell DOJ.”  In addition, Laufman’s notes of a 
meeting following the Mills interview indicate that McCabe was aware of the call 
beforehand.  Baker told us that he reached out to Wilkinson because he believed 
the line prosecutors had not been sufficiently aggressive.  Laufman stated that he 
took “great offense” to Baker’s assertion that the prosecutors had not been 
aggressive with Wilkinson, “because we were accomplishing and had accomplished 
great things through creative troubleshooting of extraordinarily sensitive issues 
with counsel to obtain the media and devices whose review was the foundation of 
this investigation.”  Prosecutors 1 and 2 told us that Baker’s efforts were not 
effective, because Wilkinson continued to refuse to provide consent. 
4. FBI Surprise Statement at Outset of April 9 Mills 
Interview 
On April 9, 2016, Mills appeared with Wilkinson for a voluntary interview 
concerning Mills’s tenure at State.  According to a FBI memorandum (“Mills 
Interview Memorandum”), shortly before the interview Strzok advised the 
prosecutors and Laufman that the agent conducting the interview would be making 
a statement at the start of the interview “concerning the scope of [the] interview, 
the FBI’s view of the importance of the email sorting process, and the expectation 
of a follow-up interview once legal issues had been resolved.”  Witnesses referred 
to this statement as “the preamble.” 
Comey told the OIG that he approved of the preamble but did not suggest it, 
and McCabe stated that he “authorized” the preamble.  McCabe told us that he 
directed the FBI team not to discuss the preamble with the prosecutors before the 
day of the interview because he was “concerned that if we raised another issue with 
DOJ, we would spend another two weeks arguing over the drafting of the preamble 
to the interview, which I just was not prepared to do.” 
The prosecutors told us that they were surprised and upset because the 
preamble was inconsistent with their prior representations to Wilkinson and they 
believed it was strategically ill-advised.  The Mills Interview Memorandum states 
that the prosecutors objected to the preamble but that they were told that “the 
FBI’s position was not subject to further discussion.” 
According to the Mills Interview Memorandum, the interviewing agents 
delivered the preamble at the outset of the interview as planned.  Witnesses told us 
                                       
100  Baker told us that he had known Wilkinson for many years, and documents show that she 
had previously reached out to him in Midyear as part of a broad effort to speak with senior 
Department and FBI officials, up to and including Attorney General Lynch.  Lynch and other high level 
Department officials told us that they did not speak with Wilkinson during the course of the 
investigation. 
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that Wilkinson was visibly angered by the preamble and that she and Mills stepped 
outside the interview room after the agent delivered it.  The prosecutors stated that 
they convinced Wilkinson and Mills to return for the remainder of the scheduled 
interview concerning Mills’s tenure.  However, according to Prosecutor 1, Mills was 
“on edge the whole time.”101 
According to notes of the interview, the prosecutors told Wilkinson that they 
were “sandbagged” by the FBI and that they did not know in advance about the 
preamble.  Additionally, according to the notes, Wilkinson informed the prosecutors 
of the call the previous day from a “senior FBI official.” 
Prosecutors and FBI agents told us that the events surrounding the April 9 
Mills interview, including both the preamble and Baker phone call that were planned 
without Department coordination, caused significant strife and mistrust between the 
line prosecutors and the FBI.  AAG Carlin told us that the prosecution team asked 
him to call McCabe and “deliver a message that this is just not an acceptable way to 
run an investigation.”  Carlin told us that he delivered this message to McCabe and 
also briefed Lynch and Yates on the issues. 
Witnesses told us that the strife between the prosecutors and the FBI team 
culminated in a contentious meeting chaired by McCabe a few days later.  On the 
Department side, this meeting was attended by the line prosecutors, Laufman, and 
Toscas.  Prosecutor 2 told us that during this meeting the prosecutors explained 
that they were trying to be “careful” in their handling of complicated issues, and 
that McCabe responded that they should “be careful faster.”  Laufman stated that 
McCabe’s comment “undervalued what we had been able to accomplish to date 
investigatively through negotiating consent agreements.”  According to Laufman’s 
notes, McCabe agreed that Baker’s unilateral contacts with Wilkinson should not 
have happened, and Baker agreed not to have further contact with Wilkinson.  With 
respect to the preamble, however, the prosecutors told us that McCabe stated that 
he would “do it again.” 
5. Mills and Samuelson Agree to Voluntary Interviews 
Regarding the Culling Process 
In May 2016, Wilkinson agreed to allow Mills and Samuelson to be voluntarily 
interviewed regarding the culling process, provided the questions asked during the 
interviews did not seek information that was considered “opinion work product.”102  
                                       
101  During the interview, according to the FD-302, Mills told the FBI that she “did not learn 
Clinton was using a private server until after Clinton’s [State Department] tenure.”  The FD-302 
further states, “Mills stated she was not even sure she knew what a server was at the time.”  Abedin 
similarly told the FBI that she “did not know that Clinton had a private server until...it became public 
knowledge.”  The prosecutors told us that they found it credible that Mills and Abedin did not 
understand that Clinton had a “private server,” even though Mills and Abedin knew Clinton had an 
email account on the clintonemail.com domain.  They further stated that Mills’s and Abedin’s 
statements were consistent with what the prosecutors understood to be Mills’s and Abedin’s limited 
technical knowledge and abilities. 
102  Opinion work product is attorney work product that involves “mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories” concerning litigation and, like communications protected by 
117 
The prosecutors told us that this meant that the agents could ask questions 
regarding the “mechanics” of the culling process, including how Mills and 
Samuelson obtained and reviewed the emails for production to the State 
Department.  However, they told us that they could not put a particular email in 
front of Mills or Samuelson and ask why the call was made to consider it work-
related or personal.  The prosecutors explained that, based upon their research and 
Prosecutor 4’s experience with privilege, they believed they would not likely be 
successful convincing a judge that such questions were permissible. 
Samuelson and Mills were interviewed regarding the culling process on May 
24, 2016, and May 28, 2016, respectively, which was before the Midyear team 
obtained access to the culling laptops.  Witnesses told us and contemporaneous 
documents show that the agents prepared outlines in advance of the interviews and 
the prosecutors reviewed them to ensure they were consistent with the agreed 
upon parameters.  For example, based on witness testimony and the outline we 
reviewed, the prosecutors eliminated a question that asked for the “exact” search 
terms that were used during the culling process.  Prosecutor 2 told us that during 
                                       
the attorney-client privilege, is generally protected from discovery.  Strzok told us that the Midyear 
team considered whether questions regarding how Mills and Samuelson made decisions to exclude 
particular emails could have been asked based on the “crime-fraud” exception to the attorney-work 
product doctrine.  In the Fourth Circuit (which includes EDVA), in order to invoke the crime-fraud 
exception, the government “must make a prima facie showing that (1) the client was engaged in or 
planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme when he sought the advice of counsel to further the scheme, 
and (2) the documents containing the privileged materials bear a close relationship to the client's 
existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.”  In order to apply the crime-fraud exception to 
an attorney’s opinion work product, the government must also “make a prima facie showing that the 
attorney in question was aware of or a knowing participant in the criminal conduct.”  In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings No. 5, 401 F.3d 247, 251-52 (4th Cir. 2005). 
While we did not ask the prosecutors about the crime-fraud exception directly, it appeared, 
based on their answers to other questions, that that they did not believe that they could show that 
Mills or Samuelson were “engaged in or planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme” when they culled 
Clinton’s emails for production to the State IG.  Prosecutor 2 stated that the Midyear team had not 
uncovered evidence during the course of the investigation that Mills or Samuelson had a criminal 
“motive” when they conducted the culling process.  Prosecutor 2 explained, “[T]here was nothing that 
was different in the type of emails that were produced and the types of emails that were found 
elsewhere to indicate to us that there was any sort of...nefarious intent.”  Similarly, Prosecutor 1 
stated that the notion that Mills or Samuelson had criminal mens rea when they conducted the sort 
process was contradicted by the fact that the production to the State Department contained numerous 
classified emails.  This prosecutor stated, “[L]ots of classified stuff got turned over in FOIA, so the 
notion that they would have been deleting the classified didn't make a lot of sense to us at this point 
in the investigation, because [they] probably would have done a better job of getting rid of it.”  The 
Lead Analyst told us that “he had no evidence to suggest that” there was “some sort of willful 
arrangement to...remove and otherwise sideline material that would, you know, reflect criminal 
activity.”  He further stated, “We didn’t see anything else to suggest that there [are] these like willful 
criminal arrangements with attorneys.” 
Prosecutor 2 told us, and contemporaneous documents show, that the Midyear team also 
considered whether there was a waiver of privilege, due to either (1) the publication of certain 
information regarding the culling process on the Clinton campaign website; or (2) Mills’s testimony 
about aspects of the culling process before the House Benghazi Committee.  Prosecutor 2 stated, 
“[W]e thought we had pretty good arguments to argue waiver on fact work product but not opinion 
work product, which is kind of like...the way I differentiate it, asking about the mechanics versus 
asking about why substantive decisions were made.” 
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the interviews “there were a couple of assertions of privilege,” but overall the 
interviews went well. 
One of the case agents who led Mills’s and Samuelson’s interviews told us 
that he believed the interviews regarding the culling process were not as productive 
as he would have liked, because Mills and Samuelson were “so well-rehearsed.”  He 
attributed this to a number of factors, including that they were interviewed late in 
the investigation, Wilkinson was aware of the scope of the interview in advance 
from discussions with the prosecutors, and Mills was a “highly-trained professional” 
with an “excellent” attorney.  He further stated that the limited scope of the 
questioning “took away some of our tools that we would have had going into that 
interview.”  Other FBI witnesses, however, told us that while there was some 
debate over the scope of the interviews beforehand, the team was ultimately 
satisfied with the information that was obtained.  Prosecutor 2 told us that “nobody 
ever expressed a concern following the interviews that there was something that 
we needed that we didn’t get.” 
D. Steps Taken to Obtain and Search the Culling Laptops 
As noted above, the investigators wanted access to the laptops primarily 
because such access promised the possibility of reconstructing the emails that had 
been deleted in the culling process.  However, because Mills and Samuelson were 
both attorneys, the issue of obtaining access to the laptops implicated questions 
regarding how to protect any privileged information residing on them. 
1. Internal Strategizing and Call with Clinton’s Counsel 
Documents we reviewed reflected that the prosecutors spent significant time 
and effort conducting research, analyzing relevant legal, policy, and ethical issues, 
and strategizing how to best handle the issue of the culling laptops.  
Contemporaneous emails and text message exchanges we reviewed show that 
Strzok and Page challenged the prosecutors’ laptop privilege concerns and were two 
of the most outspoken proponents of using compulsory process to obtain the culling 
laptops.  Page explained to the OIG why she did not agree that the emails on the 
laptops were privileged: 
These are materials, these are the State Department’s records.  And if 
the Secretary in the first place had actually followed normal protocol, 
every single one of these emails, whether personal or work-related 
would have been in the State Department’s possession, and there 
would be no attorney-client discussions happening with respect to the 
sort of this material. 
In addition, Page stated that any other privileged material on the laptops could be 
handled by the Midyear team’s already established filter team. 
On May 18, 2016, Toscas, McCabe, Page, and Prosecutor 1 had a telephone 
conference with DAAG Paul O’Brien of the Department’s Criminal Division regarding 
the likelihood of Department approval for search warrants or subpoenas to obtain 
the culling laptops.  O’Brien told the OIG, and Page’s and Toscas’s 
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contemporaneous notes show, that during this call McCabe advocated in favor of a 
search warrant, but O’Brien stated that a search warrant was “a nonstarter.”  
O’Brien stated that he explained to McCabe that a search warrant for Beth 
Wilkinson’s office was inconsistent with the USAM and 28 C.F.R. § 59.1.  He further 
stated that he told McCabe that a judge was likely to question why the government 
was seeking a search warrant to seize the laptops from Wilkinson’s office, when a 
subpoena would suffice to obtain them (and a search warrant could be sought later 
to review their contents).103  O’Brien told the OIG that even with a filter team, “any 
time you issue a search warrant for an attorney’s office, you run the potential and 
the possibility that you can be inadvertently coming across protected client, 
sensitive attorney-client information.”  He further told us that he believed a 
subpoena was more appropriate, because it would be less intrusive and “there was 
no thought that Beth Wilkinson was going to destroy the evidence.”  According to 
Page’s notes, O’Brien stated on the call that he had never seen the Department 
seek a search warrant in similar circumstances.104 
On May 23, 2016, Toscas, McCabe, Page, and Prosecutor 1 spoke with 
Kendall based on the approval previously received from the Criminal Division.  
During the call, they described to Kendall the difficulty the team was having 
obtaining the culling laptops and told him that they would not interview Clinton 
before obtaining the laptops.  Prosecutor 1 stated that the team assumed Kendall 
and Wilkinson were speaking with one another and that a conversation with Kendall 
might ultimately lead to Wilkinson voluntarily providing the laptops. 
2. Approval to Subpoena the Culling Laptops 
On May 31, 2016, after hearing nothing further from Kendall, the Midyear 
team submitted applications for the approval of subpoenas for the culling laptops to 
the Criminal Division through O’Brien.  The applications were signed by EDVA U.S. 
Attorney Boente.  The team also prepared and submitted to O’Brien search warrant 
                                       
103  O’Brien told us that even if the laptops were still in the possession of Mills and Samuelson, 
“we still would have looked to determine whether we could obtain the materials with a subpoena 
rather than doing a search warrant,” as required by the USAM. 
28 C.F.R. § 59.1 and USAM 9-19.220 apply to the use of process against “distinterested third 
parties.”  Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 59.1, “It is the responsibility of federal officers and employees 
to...protect against unnecessary intrusions.  Generally, when documentary materials are held by a 
disinterested third party, a subpoena, administrative summons, or governmental request will be an 
effective alternative to the use of a search warrant and will be considerably less intrusive.”  Similarly, 
USAM 9-19.220 provides, “As with other disinterested third parties, a search warrant should normally 
not be used to obtain...confidential materials” from a disinterested third party attorney.” 
USAM 9-13.420 applies to searches of the premises of an attorney that is a “suspect, subject 
or target” of an investigation and provides:  “In order to avoid impinging on valid attorney-client 
relationships, prosecutors are expected to take the least intrusive approach consistent with vigorous 
and effective law enforcement when evidence is sought from an attorney actively engaged in the 
practice of law.” 
104  The policies set forth in the USAM are binding on both FBI and Department employees. 
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applications for reviewing the content of the culling laptops, to submit to a court 
once the laptops were obtained. 
In a letter to Toscas dated June 3, 2016, O’Brien authorized the issuance of 
the proposed subpoenas.  He further wrote that the team “had satisfied the 
requirement, pursuant to USAM 9-13.420(C), to consult the Criminal Division 
before applying for a warrant to search the laptop computers.”105  Toscas told us, 
and contemporaneous emails show, that he proposed applying to the court for an 
“anticipatory search warrant.”  An anticipatory search warrant is one that is 
approved by the court for use once a triggering event occurs, in this case the FBI 
securing the laptops by subpoena.  Toscas stated that he was in favor of the 
anticipatory search warrant because he thought it might help persuade a judge to 
side with the government when litigating a possible later motion to quash the 
subpoena.  However, he said that Boente and the prosecutors in EDVA did not 
agree because anticipatory search warrants were not typically used in that fashion 
in their jurisdiction. 
On June 4, 2016, Prosecutor 1 wrote to Wilkinson: 
I had wanted to speak to you personally today to discuss next 
steps.  Since we were unable to connect, in the interest of time, I am 
advising you that DOJ has authorized subpoenas for both laptops, 
which we intend to serve by COB Monday.  It is important that we 
speak on the phone as soon as possible tomorrow. 
The prosecutors had a series of phone calls with Wilkinson over the next two days, 
ultimately resulting in four letters dated June 10, 2016:  two from the Department 
(one for Mills and one for Samuelson) granting Wilkinson’s clients “act of 
production” immunity in exchange for voluntarily providing the culling laptops and 
two from Wilkinson (one for Mills and one for Samuelson) granting the Department 
consent to review the culling laptops, with certain restrictions.  Witnesses told us 
that McCabe and Toscas were the highest level FBI and Department officials, 
respectively, to approve these agreements. 
3. Act of Production Immunity for Mills and Samuelson 
The Department entered into “act of production” immunity agreements with 
both Mills and Samuelson on June 10, 2016.  The immunity agreements provided 
that the government would “not...use any information directly obtained from” the 
culling laptops in any prosecution of either witness “for the mishandling of classified 
information and/or the removal or destruction of records,” pursuant to “18 U.S.C. § 
793(e) and/or (f); 18 U.S.C. § 1924; and/or 18 U.S.C. § 2071.”  Therefore, 
Prosecutors 1 and 2 told us it was their view that the government would have been 
free to use in any future prosecution of Mills and Samuelson leads developed as a 
result of the FBI’s review of the information on the culling laptops, as well as 
information provided by Mills and Samuelson during their voluntary interviews. 
                                       
105  The USAM did not require Criminal Division approval for the search warrant, just 
consultation once the request for had been approved by a U.S. Attorney (here that was Boente).  
USAM 9-13.420(C) 
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FBI and Department witnesses told us that no one within the team disagreed 
with the decision to enter into these immunity agreement with Mills and Samuelson 
in exchange for obtaining the culling laptops.  We also were told by FBI and 
Department witnesses that, based on the evidence they had gathered at that point 
in the investigation, they did not expect to uncover anything on the culling laptops 
that would be incriminating to Mills or Samuelson.  The prosecutors told us that 
that Mills and Samuelson had included in the State Department production 
numerous emails containing classified information, including emails containing SAP 
information which was the most sensitive material identified during the Midyear 
investigation.  They also had included the emails with the (C) portion markings, 
which were the only emails containing classification markings that were discovered 
during the investigation.  According to Prosecutor 2, “[T]here was nothing that was 
different in the type of emails that were produced and the types of emails that were 
found elsewhere to indicate to us that there was any sort of motive” or “nefarious 
intent.” 
In addition, Prosecutor 1 stated that, even after the prosecutors had 
approval to obtain the laptops by subpoena, they believed that obtaining them 
through consent was preferable, because they expected a motion to quash and time 
lost through subsequent litigation.  Similarly, FBI agents and supervisors told us 
that they did not object to the immunity agreements because the protection offered 
by them was limited and allowed the team to obtain needed sources of potential 
evidence without inhibiting the investigation. 
Comey explained in a speech at an FBI conference for Special Agents in 
Charge in October 2016 that there were “huge concerns” about attorney-client 
privilege and attorney work product on the culling laptops that warranted entering 
into the immunity agreements with Mills and Samuelson in order to secure them.  
He stated: 
You can also imagine given that you’re experienced people the 
challenge in trying to get a lawyer to give you their laptop that you 
use for all of their legal work.  Huge concerns there about attorney-
client privilege, attorney work product.  We had a few options there.  
One was to serve them with a Grand Jury subpoena and then litigate 
the work product protection and the attorney-client protections for 
probably the next five years, or reach some agreement with them to 
voluntarily produce it and give them some sort of assurance as to how 
the information will be used on that laptop....  Department of Justice 
reached an agreement at the request of the lawyer for these two 
lawyers that for act of production of immunity is the way I understand 
it in my career that is you give this laptop, we will not use anything on 
the laptop against you personally in a prosecution for mishandling of 
classified information or anything else related to classified information. 
Reasonable to ask for a lawyer to ask to give us the laptops and 
enabled us to short circuit the months and months of litigation that 
would've come otherwise. I was actually surprised they agree[d] to 
give us the laptops. 
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4. Limitations in the Consents to Search the Culling Laptops 
In addition to the immunity agreements, which the Department entered into 
to obtain possession of the culling laptops, the Department entered into consent 
agreements with both Mills and Samuelson in order to enable the FBI to search the 
laptops with certain limitations.  The consent agreements provided that the “sole 
purposes of the search” were: 
“[T]o search for any .pst files, or .ost files, or compressed files 
containing .pst or .ost files, that were created by Platte River Networks 
("PRN") after June 1, 2014 and before February 1, 2015, in response 
to requests for former Secretary Clinton’s email from her tenure as 
Secretary of State;” 
“[T]o attempt to identify any emails from, or remnants of, the PRN 
Files that could potentially be present on the Device;” 
“[T]o identify any emails resident on the Device sent to or received 
from” Hillary Clinton’s known email accounts, “for the period of 
January 21, 2009 through February 1, 2013;” and 
“[T]o conduct a forensic analysis of the device to determine whether 
the Device was subject to intrusions or otherwise compromised.” 
The consent agreements described in detail a two-phase process the FBI would use 
to search the devices for the listed purposes.  In the first phase, OTD would search 
the allocated space of the devices for the .pst files created by Combetta.  If the 
intact .pst files were found, OTD would not move on to the second phase.  If not, 
OTD would go on to the second phase, which would entail searching both the 
allocated and unallocated space for “any emails, fragments of emails, files, or 
fragments of files” that could “clearly be identified as having been sent to or 
received by” one of Clinton’s email accounts during her tenure.106 
Witnesses told us, and contemporaneous text and instant message 
exchanges among FBI employees show, that negotiating the consent agreements 
was a difficult process and, at least at the outset, Strzok and others at the FBI 
believed that the prosecutors were giving Wilkinson too much control.107  However, 
                                       
106  The consent agreements also each provided: “As soon as the investigation is completed, 
and to the extent consistent with all FBI policies and applicable laws, including the Federal Records 
Act, the FBI will dispose of the Device and any printed or electronic materials resulting from your 
search.”  According to talking points drafted by members of the Midyear team in October 2016, the 
FBI had agreed to destroy the laptops because the laptops contained classified information and, as 
such, could not be returned to the attorneys following compliance with FOIA and Federal Records Act 
obligations.  The draft talking points stated that as of October 2016 the laptops had not been 
destroyed, because the FBI was still “under a legal obligation to preserve the laptops and other 
electronic media due to numerous pending FOIA requests.”  On June 11, 2018, the FBI informed the 
OIG that the FBI still had in its possession the culling laptops and all other evidence collected during 
the Midyear investigation.  
107  FBI employees have the ability to communicate internally via Microsoft Lync instant 
messages when logged on to their FBI workstation.  We discovered several Lync messages that were 
relevant to our review, and we discuss these in Section XI of this chapter and in Chapter Twelve. 
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when we interviewed Strzok, he told us that he no longer could remember what his 
specific concerns were at the time and, in the end, “we got what we needed to 
credibly come to the resolution that we did in the investigation.”  He further stated 
that some of the sentiments he expressed over text message to Page about the 
prosecutors’ handling of the issue reflected only the heat of the moment and his 
opinions at the time. 
Agent 1 told us that the phases outlined in the consent agreements were 
overly complicated and that he did not agree that the FBI should not have been 
able to review the unallocated space if the analysts found the .pst files in phase 1.  
Contemporaneous instant messages show that the Lead Analyst, FBI Attorney 1, 
and FBI Attorney 2 shared this concern.  However, this concern became moot when 
OTD was unable to find the .pst files in phase 1 and ultimately went on to phase 2 
and searched the unallocated space. 
FBI Attorney 1 exchanged instant messages with the Lead Analyst and FBI 
Attorney 2 in which she expressed frustration during the drafting of the consent 
agreements.  For example, on June 8, 2016, she wrote to the Lead Analyst, “The 
fact that Pete [Strzok] met with [Prosecutor 1] and hashed all this out and 
capitulated really pisses me off.”  Also on June 8, 2016, she wrote to FBI Attorney 
2, “OMG.  I’m so defeated.  Why do I bother?”  FBI Attorney 1 told us, in an 
interview before viewing these instant messages, that she had concerns with the 
filter process set forth in the consent agreements, which limited the filter team to 
“two attorneys, one FBI agent, and one FBI analyst, none of whom are members of 
the investigative team.”  The agreements stated that OTD would provide the emails 
from its search to the filter team, which would then “review those results to identify 
and remove:  (1) any privileged material; (2) any material that, upon further 
review, is determined not to be an e-mail sent to, or received by, the Relevant 
Accounts during the Relevant Period; and (3) any material that, upon further 
review, is determined not to be a work-related e-mail sent to, or received by,” 
Clinton’s relevant email account.  FBI Attorney 1 stated that she opposed this 
language because it differed from the filter process that had been used for other 
devices, wherein the filter team, with the assistance of OTD, relied more heavily on 
search terms to eliminate material that was beyond the scope of review or 
privileged.  She stated that her concern was that the filter process would be too 
time-consuming.  However, she told us that in the end the filter team was able to 
“get it done in a timely manner” and that resolved her concerns. 
In a follow up interview after viewing the instant messages, FBI Attorney 1 
told us that the June 8, 2016 instant messages were exchanged during a lengthy 
telephone conference with Prosecutors 1 and 2, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, FBI 
Attorney 2, and OTD technicians.  She stated that the frustrations expressed in her 
instant messages related to her concerns about the filter process discussed during 
her first interview.  She further stated that her complaints about Strzok had to do 
with him not including her in certain conversations with the prosecutors.  However, 
she told us that she did not believe that Strzok was failing to represent the FBI’s 
interests in those conversations.  She also reiterated that she was ultimately 
satisfied with the terms of the consent agreements.  On June 28, 2016, FBI 
Attorney 1 sent an instant message to the lead filter team attorney offering to 
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provide the filter team with additional resources to review the culling laptops.  The 
filter attorney responded, “Just got data from OTD and we seem to be in a good 
place with our current filter resources.” 
Agent 3 told us he was concerned by the requirement in Phase 2 that the 
emails be “clearly identifiable” as having been sent to or from one of Clinton’s email 
accounts during her tenure, because sometimes the metadata in the unallocated 
space was unclear.  However, he told us that he did not express this concern to the 
prosecutors at the time the consent agreements were being negotiated and that he 
was not sure that he had sufficient “technical basis” to do so.  We asked 
Prosecutors 1 and 2 about this concern and they stated that the language was 
developed with input from the investigative team and OTD to ensure that they were 
able to access what they needed to access in order to adequately review the 
laptops.  Prosecutor 2 stated, “We came to the conclusion that the procedures that 
were in this letter would allow us to look at the material that we thought was 
critical to look at, and yet protect the attorney-client privilege in a way we thought 
we were required to do.” 
Other FBI employees told us that they would have preferred to be able to 
search for emails sent or received just before or after Clinton’s tenure, in the hope 
of identifying Clinton’s intent in setting up the email server or the intent behind the 
later deletions of emails.  The Lead Analyst told us that he would have liked to have 
been able to search Mills’s and Samuelson’s own emails on the culling laptops, to 
determine what instructions were provided to Samuelson regarding how to conduct 
the culling process and to see if there was any evidence regarding why later 
deletions occurred.  He stated that this information would have helped the FBI 
determine whether Mills and Samuelson “willfully” did something “illegal or 
inappropriate” during the sort process or whether there were “serious flaws” in the 
process.  However, he stated he had “no evidence to suggest” that Clinton or her 
attorneys had a criminal purpose in the way they conducted the sort process or in 
the deletion of emails.  He further stated, “We didn’t see anything anywhere else to 
suggest that there is these like willful criminal arrangements with attorneys.  Like, 
there’s nothing to suggest that that’s the case.  It’s just, you know, it’s the curious 
part of the investigator in all of us that thinks about that.” 
The prosecutors and some of the agents told us that the consent agreements 
were date restricted, because the primary purpose of reviewing the culling laptops 
was to find the .pst files of Clinton’s emails that were transferred by Combetta, in 
order to reconstruct, to the extent possible, the deleted emails.  They further told 
us that the attorneys’ own communications following Clinton’s tenure, with either 
Clinton or other clients, would mostly consist of items protected by privilege, and 
that they had already obtained records of communications between Clinton’s 
attorneys and PRN staff from PRN.108  Similarly, the Lead Analyst acknowledged 
that he might not have been able to view such emails even with legal process due 
to privilege and probable cause concerns.  He stated, “[T]his was not a snap 
                                       
108  As noted in Section V of this chapter, the Midyear team also did not seek a search warrant 
of Mills’s personal Gmail account for email exchanges following Clinton’s tenure, when she had an 
attorney-client relationship with Clinton. 
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decision.  This decision was made, and this was the best and most effective way 
to...obtain this content.  And there’s going to be trade-offs involved in that.” 
Most of the Department and FBI witnesses we interviewed told us that they 
were ultimately satisfied with the consent agreements to search the Mills and 
Samuelson laptops and did not feel that the consent agreements unduly limited 
their investigation.  In addition, some witnesses told us that in the end they 
believed that the FBI obtained more through the consent agreements than it would 
have obtained through a subpoena or search warrant.  For example, Prosecutor 4 
stated that that he told the FBI “repeatedly in no uncertain terms that I thought 
that the probability of success on a grand jury subpoena for the laptops [because of 
a motion to quash] was, that they would get some things, but the vast majority of 
what they wanted, they would not get.”  Similarly, the Lead Analyst told us that he 
eventually learned that sometimes consent allows the FBI to obtain “a broader 
swath of material.” 
5. Review of the Laptops 
The FBI and Department witnesses told us that they ultimately did not 
identify evidence on the Mills or Samuelson laptops that changed the outcome of 
the investigation.  According to documents we reviewed, the team recovered 9,000 
emails on Mills’s laptop, which were mostly duplicates of the emails included within 
the 30,490 produced to the State Department, and they found no new classified 
emails.  The team was able to recover “approximately 112 files” from Samuelson’s 
laptop, but the analysts did not believe these files contained “work-related 
material.” 
E. Involvement of Senior Department and FBI Officials 
Witnesses told us, and documents show, that the issues surrounding the 
culling laptops and testimony was one of the few issues in the Midyear investigation 
that was briefed to high-level Department officials.  The highest level Department 
official involved in substantive decisionmaking regarding the culling testimony and 
laptops, including the decision to grant immunity, was Toscas.  Toscas told us that 
while he agreed with the prosecutors that there were complicated privilege 
concerns, he also agreed with the FBI that the culling laptops had to be reviewed 
and that the prosecutors had more leverage than they realized in negotiating with 
Wilkinson. 
Toscas told the OIG that he briefed Lynch on the negotiations with Wilkinson 
because of the potential for litigation, and because Wilkinson had stated that she 
planned to contact Department leadership.  He stated that Lynch responded that 
she knew Wilkinson and was familiar with her aggressive style.  He stated that 
Lynch told him, “[P]ursue whatever you want to do, she’s going to be that way.  
That is her reputation....  Tell the team to get what they need done.”  Based on that 
guidance, Toscas told us that he conveyed to the line prosecutors to “be civil” but 
“be just as aggressive back” to Wilkinson. 
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Lynch told us that she did not recall Toscas bringing to her attention the 
prosecutors’ difficulties negotiating with Wilkinson or conflict with the FBI.  
However, she stated that in the spring of 2016 Toscas briefed her and Yates that 
“additional laptops were found” and that “because the people who owned the 
laptops were lawyers, in addition to having had a connection with Secretary 
Clinton’s team, there were issues of privilege.”  She stated that the only reason this 
issue was brought to her attention was because it “raised the possibility of 
litigation.”  She further told us that the team was able to “resolve” the issues 
without litigation, but she did not “know the specifics.”  In addition, Lynch stated 
that she and Wilkinson had been “prosecutors together in Brooklyn” and that, based 
on that experience, she described Wilkinson’s “aggressive” style to Toscas.  Yates 
and Carlin similarly told us that they were briefed on the Mills and Samuelson 
issues, but could not remember many details.  Carlin stated that at one point he 
reached out to McCabe to discuss the issues and that he “fully agreed” with the 
recommendation of the prosecutors that “trying to do an adversarial search warrant 
on a lawyer’s office” would result in the case being “tied up in litigation for a period 
of time.” 
On the FBI side, Comey, McCabe, and Baker were all substantively involved 
with the debate with the prosecutors over whether and how to obtain the culling 
testimony and laptops.  McCabe stated, “I was very clear about this with the 
Director, that we could not conclude this investigation in a credible way until we 
had done everything humanly possible to look at those laptops, fully realizing that it 
likely, there may not be anything on them.”  He stated he also made this point 
clear to “Carlin, Toscas, and others.”  Comey told the OIG that he agreed with the 
FBI team that the culling laptops were “critically important.”  He stated: 
I believe we could not credibly complete this investigation without 
getting access to those laptops, and that I was not going to agree to 
complete this investigation until we had access to those laptops 
because...we just couldn’t credibly say we had done all we could do, if 
we didn’t do everything possible to see, is there a forensic trace of 
emails that were deleted and can we tell whether there was 
obstructive intent. 
Comey, Baker, and other FBI witnesses told us that they believed the 
prosecutors were overly cautious about obtaining the laptops, because they were 
intimidated by high-powered defense counsel like Wilkinson.  Referencing the 
prosecutors’ concerns about obtaining the laptops, Comey stated: 
And I remember a general concern that...there was a sense that [the 
prosecutors] didn’t want to do things that were too overt or too 
aggressive and I don’t know whether that extended to the use of a 
grand jury or not.... 
But there was a sense that there was a general lack of aggressiveness 
and willingness to take steps that would roil the waters.  In my 
judgment honestly, was that that wasn’t politically motivated that’s 
just the normal cowardice...this is the normal fear and conservatism 
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and the higher profile the matter, the more afraid sometimes the 
prosecutors are. 
And so I didn’t attribute that to a political motive.... 
Lynch and Yates told us that they were unaware of any complaints that the 
prosecutors were not sufficiently aggressive, or that they were believed by the FBI 
to be intimidated by high-powered defense counsel.  Lynch stated, “I don’t 
remember that being conveyed to me.  You know, agents always think that 
prosecutors aren’t aggressive enough.  But they don’t know the discussions and 
decisions that go behind the decisions as to...what steps you’re going to take[.]”  
She said that she would have viewed any such complaints as part of the normal 
dialogue that often occurs between prosecutors and agents unless someone had 
brought the complaints to her as a “catalogue” of specific decisions that were 
problematic. 
Comey told us that he addressed the laptop issue with Yates, because he was 
concerned that higher level Department officials needed to be involved.  He stated: 
I think I had the sense that there’s nobody home.  That the grownups 
aren’t home at Justice because they’ve, they’re stepping away from 
this.  And so to be fair to myself, I think the laying over this was this 
sense that, in a way Carlin and above has abdicated responsibility for 
this. 
However, despite his testimony that the prosecutors were not aggressive 
enough with Wilkinson and that higher level Department officials were not engaged, 
Comey told us that he did not discuss his concerns with the Department, ask the 
Department to assign new prosecutors, or seek the appointment of a special 
counsel.109  As discussed in Section II.A.2 of Chapter Six of this report, Comey told 
the OIG that he told Yates in April 2016 that the closer they got to the political 
conventions, the more likely he would be to insist that a special counsel be 
appointed.  Comey said that his comment to Yates was motivated in part by his 
frustration that it was taking the Midyear prosecutors too long to obtain the Mills 
and Samuelson laptops.  However, as explained in Section VII of Chapter Six, we 
did not find evidence that Comey ever seriously considered seeking the 
appointment of a special counsel.  His reasons for not seeking the appointment of a 
special counsel or even seeking the assignment of new prosecutors were that he 
had the “A-team” working on the investigation on the FBI side and it was “too late 
in the game” at that point.  In addition, Comey stated that he believed Yates “must 
have done something” in response to his discussion with her, “because the team 
perceived an adrenaline injection into the DOJ’s side that we had not seen before” 
and secured the culling testimony and laptops.  Comey indicated to the OIG that he 
was satisfied with this result, stating, “We got access, we negotiated access to the 
                                       
109  Comey also told us that he was not “troubled or struck” by the Department’s decision to 
have NSD run the investigation. 
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laptops and interviews of the lawyers, so the team got what the investigators 
thought they needed.” 
F. Motivations behind the Culling Testimony and Laptop Dispute 
Several FBI officials told us that they perceived that the prosecutors were 
reluctant to obtain the culling laptops and testimony, but they did not believe that 
such reluctance was motivated by bias or political considerations.  Comey stated, 
“There was serious concern about the reluctance to pursue the laptops...I had no 
reason to believe that was driven by an improper consideration.” 
Based on the evidence we reviewed, Comey and others at the FBI were 
primarily motivated in the debate over obtaining the culling testimony and laptops 
by a desire to credibly complete the investigation and to do so sufficiently in 
advance of the election to not be perceived as political.  Indeed, witnesses told us, 
and contemporaneous notes show, that by the time the Midyear team was debating 
how to handle Mills and Samuelson, the team generally agreed that the 
investigation was headed toward a declination and did not believe that it was likely 
that anything found on the culling laptops would change that outcome.  For 
example, according to Laufman’s notes from May 11, 2016, Strzok told Laufman 
that although he did not believe that finding something on the culling laptops that 
would change the outcome of the investigation was likely, it was nonetheless 
important to secure them from an “investigative standpoint.” 
In addition, the notes of both Department and FBI employees show that 
beginning as early as May 2016, Comey conveyed to his employees a sense of 
urgency to complete the Midyear investigation.  For example, Page wrote in her 
notes from a meeting on May 9, 2016, “Need to act with incredible urgency.”  In 
the same notes, she included a reminder to herself to “call John [Carlin]” and ask, 
“do your people know D’s urgency?”  The next day, an analyst wrote in her notes: 
[The Lead Analyst] and Pete 
Meeting with Director 
Sense of urgency 
Similarly, Laufman’s May 11, 2016 notes state: 
Director Comey... 
- Extraordinary sense of urgency... 
- As get closer to election would be more difficult to close  
- Risk of perception that won’t be credible, be seen as partisan... 
FBI desires to wrap up in weeks, not months. 
Moreover, as described in Chapter Six, Comey shared with Baker, McCabe, Rybicki, 
Priestap, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, and Page his first draft of a public statement 
recommending that no charges be pressed against Clinton in early May 2016, 
before the Midyear team interviewed Mills and Samuelson or obtained the culling 
laptops. 
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As described above, Strzok and Page were two of the strongest advocates of 
obtaining the culling testimony and laptops by compulsory process.  On May 4, 
2016, a few weeks before Mills and Samuelson were voluntarily interviewed 
regarding the culling process and a little over a month before the FBI obtained the 
culling laptops, Strzok and Page exchanged the following text messages.  The 
sender of each message is identified after the timestamp. 
8:40 p.m., Page:  “And holy shit Cruz just dropped out of the race.  
It’s going to be a Clinton Trump race.  Unbelievable.” 
8:41 p.m., Strzok:  “What?!?!??” 
8:41 p.m., Page:  “You heard that right my friend.” 
8:41 p.m., Strzok:  “I saw trump won, figured it would be a bit.” 
8:41 p.m., Strzok:  “Now the pressure really starts to finish MYE…” 
8:42 p.m., Page:  “It sure does.  We need to talk about follow up call 
tomorrow.  We still never have.” 
The same day, at 8:48 p.m., Strzok sent a similar text message to the Lead 
Analyst.  However, the Lead Analyst responded, “Did he? We need to finish it well 
and promptly, but it’s more important that we do it well. A wise man once said 
that.”  The Lead Analyst told us that the “wise man” referenced in his text message 
was Comey. 
Both Strzok and Page told us that the May 4, 2016 text message exchange 
was not an example of them allowing their political viewpoints to impact their work 
on the Midyear investigation.  Rather, they told us that Comey had expressed a 
desire complete the investigation as far in advance of the elections as possible to 
avoid impacting the political process, and the fact that the presidential race was 
down to two candidates was a milestone that enhanced that sense of urgency.  
They both told us that their desire to move quickly to finish Midyear was not 
impacted by Donald Trump, in particular, securing the nomination over the other 
Republican candidates. 
IX. Interview of Former Secretary Clinton 
The interview of Hillary Clinton took place on Saturday, July 2, 2016.  Comey 
provided a few reasons for conducting the interview on a Saturday, including to 
complete the interview as soon as possible after the team finished all other 
investigative steps, to accommodate Clinton’s schedule, and to “keep very low 
visibility.”  Comey told us that he received a briefing before the interview regarding 
general parameters, including when the interview would take place and who would 
be conducting it.  However, he stated that he was not involved in formulating the 
questions for the interview. 
We reviewed several issues related to the Clinton interview, including:  the 
decision to conduct her interview last; a debate over the number of FBI agents and 
Department employees who would attend her interview and whether there were 
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any efforts to adjust that number for political reasons; the conduct of the interview; 
the decision to allow Mills and Samuelson to attend the interview as Clinton’s 
attorneys even though they were also witnesses in the investigation; and the 
decision to conduct a voluntary interview rather than subpoena Clinton before the 
grand jury. 
A. Decision to Conduct Clinton’s Interview Last 
Witnesses told us that interviewing Clinton at the end of the investigation 
was logical.  Prosecutor 3 told us that generally if investigators want to determine 
whether someone “at the top” is culpable, they first want to see what “lower level 
people have to say.”  Prosecutor 3 told us that none of the prosecutors or agents 
disagreed with the decision to interview Clinton last. 
Witnesses told us that in the Midyear case in particular it made sense to start 
at the bottom, because lower level people generally originated the emails 
containing classified information on unclassified systems and sent them to Clinton’s 
closer aides who, in turn, forwarded them to Clinton.  Prosecutor 1 explained: 
[T]he natural thing to do was work your way up the chain.  And I say 
chain, but I also mean email chain....  And just get to the, get to the 
end.  The Secretary’s email system was obviously the sort of 
foundation of all of this and why it became an issue.  So we needed to 
understand the thinking in, in setting that up.  So we naturally wanted 
to do her last.  Also, doing interviews in that order in my experience 
allows you not to have to come back in serial fashion to the higher-
level people who it’s harder to get time with them. 
Toscas stated that the team wanted to ask the lower level employees who 
originated the emails that turned out to be classified why they wrote the emails on 
unclassified systems, before asking the same questions of Clinton’s aides and 
Clinton herself.  Comey told us that one of the strategies behind interviewing 
Clinton last was that the interviewing agents would know enough information from 
other witnesses that they could test Clinton’s credibility by asking her questions to 
which they already knew the answers. 
B. Number of People Attending (“Loaded for Bear” Text Message) 
Witnesses told us that there were disagreements within the Midyear team 
regarding who should attend the interviews of certain key players in the 
investigation.  They stated that Laufman insisted on attending certain interviews, 
including Clinton’s interview, although he normally did not attend interviews.  The 
FBI took the position that if Laufman would be at an interview, Strzok, who was 
roughly his counterpart at the FBI, should also be at the same interview. 
Strzok and Page told us, and contemporaneous emails and notes show, that 
they and other members of the Midyear team, including the line prosecutors, were 
concerned about the number of people attending Clinton’s interview and Laufman’s 
insistence on attending.  These discussions started well before Clinton’s July 2 
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interview.110  On February 24, 2016, Strzok emailed Priestap that Laufman had 
called him earlier stating that he “felt strongly about DoJ bringing four attorneys 
([Laufman] + 3), and that he was going to raise it up his chain.”  Strzok further 
wrote that he told Laufman that raising the issue up the chain would be “necessary 
because the DD had indicated the group should be 2-2,” meaning two agents and 
two prosecutors.  Strzok forwarded this email to Page and another employee, who 
was also an advisor to McCabe, two minutes later.  Strzok told us, and the email 
chain that followed shows, that Strzok agreed with McCabe that two agents and two 
prosecutors would be ideal, but he was amenable to three agents and three 
prosecutors as a compromise.  However, both McCabe and Strzok were opposed to 
allowing four prosecutors to attend the interview. 
Later that evening, Strzok and Page exchanged several text messages about 
the dilemma over how many people should attend Clinton’s interview.  Based on a 
review of this exchange, Strzok was concerned that if only two agents and two 
prosecutors attended the interview and Laufman insisted on being one of the 
prosecutors, it would be difficult for Strzok to decide whether to send two case 
agents or himself and one case agent.  The following text messages were part of 
this exchange.  The sender of each message is identified after the timestamp. 
10:32 p.m., Page:  “Do you or Bill [Priestap] fundamentally believe 
that 3 and 3 is the RIGHT thing for the case?  If the answer is no, then 
you call [McCabe’s advisor] back and say we’re good as is.  You have 
never wavered from saying 2 and 2 is best.  I don’t get what the 
hesitation is now.” 
10:52 p.m., Page:  “One more thing:  she might be our next 
president.  The last thing you need us going in there loaded for bear.  
You think she’s going to remember or care that it was more doj than 
fbi?” 
10:56 p.m., Strzok:  “Agreed.” 
Page sent a similar text message to an advisor to McCabe a few minutes 
after her text message to Strzok, and later to McCabe himself.  With McCabe’s 
advisor, she had the following exchange. 
10:56 p.m., Page:  “Hey, if you have one opportunity to discuss 
further with andy, please convey the following:  She might be our next 
president. The last thing we need is us going in there loaded for bear, 
when it is not operationally necessary. You think she’s going to 
remember or care that it was more doj than fbi? This is as much about 
reputational protection as anything.” 
11:00 p.m., Advisor:  “I’ll catch him before the morning brief to give 
him this nugget....   
                                       
110  Both FBI and Department witnesses, including Comey, told us that the Midyear team had 
originally planned to interview Clinton much earlier, but the interview was delayed because other 
tasks took longer than expected to complete. 
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The next morning, on February 25, 2016, this exchange continued as follows. 
4:10 a.m., Page:  “Hey I’ll just text andy this morning with my 
thought.” 
4:11 a.m., Advisor:  “Sounds good.” 
The text message to McCabe was on February 25, 2016, at 7:41 a.m.: 
Page:  “Hey, you’ve surely already considered this, but in my view our 
best reason to hold the line at 2 and 2 is:  She might be our next 
president. The last thing we need is us going in there loaded for bear, 
when it is not operationally necessary. You think she’s going to 
remember or care that it was more doj than fbi?  This is as much 
about reputational protection as anything.” 
The next text message exchange between McCabe and Page was in the evening on 
February 25, 2016: 
9:16 p.m., Page:  “Hey I’m sorry. It’s just wildly aggravating how 
much churn has gone on this. Have a good night.” 
9:50 p.m., McCabe:  “Agree. Strongly.” 
Page told us that the term “loaded for bear” in her mind meant “a ton of 
people,” such that the FBI was “trying to intimidate.”  She stated that the message 
she was trying to send in her text message was not that Clinton should be treated 
differently, but that she should be handled the same as any other witness the FBI 
interviews.  She further stated that as a former prosecutor her “personal 
preference” would be to not have too many people in an interview, because 
“[t]hat’s just sort of not conducive to both rapport-building and also just...what it 
looks like...just pure optics.”  In addition, she told us that she believed the 
additional interviewers were “unnecessary” and “if there is no value to be added, 
then we should do things the way we always do things, which is with a smaller, 
more discrete footprint.”  She further told us that, while “it’s irrelevant whether or 
not [Clinton]...would or would not become president...if she did become president, 
I don’t want her left with a feeling that...the FBI marched in with an army of 50 in 
order to interview me.”  In other words, Page stated that her concern had to do 
with the “reputational risk” to the FBI. 
McCabe’s advisor told us that he was not substantively involved in the 
Midyear investigation but, as an advisor to McCabe, he was sometimes present 
when Midyear was discussed at meetings and copied on emails in which Midyear 
was discussed.  He stated that he believed that he was involved in the late 
February conversations regarding how many Midyear team members should attend 
Clinton’s interview, because he was filling in for Page at one point during the 
conversations.  McCabe’s advisor told us that he did not recall the above text 
message exchange with Page, likely because he was not substantively involved with 
the issues and was distracted at the time he received it.  McCabe’s advisor stated 
that he “did not know that the fact that [Clinton] might be our next President might 
be one of those motivating factors in Pete’s or in Lisa’s mind in determining the size 
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of the interview team.”  After reviewing the text message exchange during his OIG 
interview he stated: 
My reaction to that is that that should not be a consideration in, in 
determining the right investigative step to take in the investigation, in 
determining the size of the team, the interview team.  That...should 
have no bearing on it.  What’s right for the case is right for the case, 
and that’s how we should make our decisions. 
However, Strzok told us that he did not take Page’s comment to mean that 
“we need to treat her differently because she’s the next president.”  He further told 
us, “I am certain I made no decision based on anything [Clinton] might be or 
become.”  Strzok stated that strategically, to obtain “the best answer” it is “always 
ideal” to conduct an interview with “two agents and the subject.”  He went on:  
“Now, if they want counsel, fine.  If you have a DOJ attorney, fine.  But ideally...my 
experience is the smaller the setting, the more effective the interview.”  Strzok told 
us that the only relevance of her being the next president was that “you don’t want 
the president thinking you’re a bunch of clowns.” 
Similarly, McCabe stated that the “typical” way to run an interview is with 
two agents and one attorney, and “one of the reasons for doing that is to kind of 
keep the interviewees...defenses a little bit lower and not make people so 
concerned.”  He stated that he understood Page to be saying in her text message 
that she would not want the future president to think the FBI was “a bunch 
of...brutes.”  In addition, McCabe told us that when he wrote that he “agree[d] 
strongly” with Page, he was agreeing that it was “ridiculous that we're still talking 
about who is going to what interview from which side,” not that the team should 
not go into Clinton’s interview too aggressively. 
Several other FBI and Department witnesses we interviewed corroborated 
Page’s, Strzok’s, and McCabe’s testimony that typically the FBI limits the number of 
interviewers in an interview for strategic investigative purposes, and that Laufman’s 
insistence on attending certain interviews caused frustration within the FBI.  For 
example, Agent 2 stated, “when the room gets too big...it's hard as the interviewer 
to try to build that connection with the person you're interviewing...to get a good 
interview.”  AAG Carlin told us that disputes regarding which prosecutors and 
agents will attend an interview are common.  He further told us that “to do an 
effective interview you don’t want to have 50 people in the room.”  As noted in 
Section VI of this chapter, Laufman told us that he attended the interviews of 
Clinton and other key witnesses to ensure that those interviews were handled 
properly and to ensure that he had a complete picture of the investigation before 
accepting the FBI’s and the prosecutors’ recommendations.  
Ultimately, Clinton’s interview was attended by Agents 1 and 2, Strzok, 
Laufman, and all four line prosecutors.  McCabe stated that the number of people 
that ultimately attended Clinton’s interview shows that investigative steps were not 
influenced by a desire to go easy on Clinton.  In addition, multiple witnesses told us 
that they never heard anyone discussing the need to go easy on Clinton in light of 
her candidacy for president and that any such discussions would have been 
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inappropriate.  Carlin stated that such discussions would have been “thoroughly 
unacceptable and no one on our team would have done that.” 
C. Conduct of Clinton’s Interview 
Both agents and prosecutors told us that by the time of Clinton’s interview 
they did not believe criminal charges were likely because they had conducted all 
other investigative steps and, absent a confession from Clinton, they had concluded 
that there was insufficient evidence of intent.  Comey told us that by early May 
2016 (when he circulated a first draft of a public statement recommending that the 
Midyear investigation be closed without prosecution), the team had not “found 
anything that seemed to the team or to me as a case that DOJ would prosecute” 
and he had a “reasonable confidence read at this point that barring something else, 
this looks like it’s on a path” toward declination.  However, he stated that if Clinton 
had “lied to us in a way that we thought we could prove, that would have changed 
everything.”  Prosecutor 1 stated that there were important topics the team wanted 
to cover with Clinton, including whether she was aware that classified information 
was present in her emails, her understanding of the highly classified SAP material 
contained in some of her emails, why she used a private email account on a private 
server, and security measures she took when emailing overseas. 
Agents 1 and 2 were the case agents that conducted Clinton’s interview, in 
the presence of all four prosecutors, Laufman, Strzok, and Clinton’s attorneys.  
Witnesses told us that Agent 2 focused on questioning Clinton regarding her 
involvement in emails that the FBI determined to contain classified information, 
while Agent 1 questioned her regarding her server and the production of emails to 
the State Department by her attorneys. 
As discussed in Chapter Twelve, we identified instant messages from Agent 1 
that raised concerns about potential bias.  This included an instant message 
exchange on November 8, 2016 (Election Day), between Agent 1 and Agent 5 (who 
were in a relationship at the time and are now married), in which Agent 1 
messaged, “You should know;…. that I’m…. with her.”111  (Punctuation in original).  
Additionally, we observed instant messages in which Agent 1 expressed concerns 
about the quality of the Midyear investigation, as described in Section XI of this 
chapter.  Two of the instant message exchanges we identified occurred close in 
time to the Clinton interview. 
On June 28, 2016, four days before the Clinton interview, Agent 1 sent an 
instant message complaining about the numerous people involved in preparing for 
the Clinton interview.  Agent 1 messaged, “...very aggravating making this flow 
with 20+ voices for disparate information anyway.  We have nothing – shouldn’t 
[sic] even be interviewing.  Today, someone said we really need to call out that she 
had two phones when her excuse not to have a state bb [State Department 
Blackberry] in the first place was because she didnt [sic] want to carry two 
phones.”  Agent 1 sent a series of messages that continued, “My god....  I’m 
                                       
111  “I’m with her” was one of the Clinton campaign slogans. 
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actually starting to have embarrassment sprinkled on my disappointment....  Ever 
been forced to do something you adamantly opposed.” 
We asked Agent 1 about this instant message exchange.  He told us that 
when he wrote “20+ voices” he was referring to the number of FBI and Department 
employees involved in the Clinton interview preparation.  He stated that Agent 2 
and he were “working together well,” and they “just kept saying to each other when 
are we going to actually have time to prepare for this other than prepare everyone 
else for it?”  He stated that the frustration expressed in the instant message 
exchange was related to his sense that Midyear was not the “normal” case where 
the FBI “culminate[s]” with an interview of a subject who introduced classified 
information onto an unclassified system, unlike Clinton who mostly received 
classified material from others.  We asked Agent 1 if he thought that the Clinton 
interview was unnecessary.  Agent 1 told us he thought the interview was 
necessary and stated: 
I think we needed to get statements from the Secretary about what 
she knew this information to be, she was the Secretary of State, so if 
you thought this was classified, why did you not, if you had an 
impression it was classified, why did you not stop it, or why did you 
not say to the people that were underneath you that you should 
handle this better?  What did you know about where it was?  How do 
you understand a server to, to work, and do you know that a copy 
resides there?  Those types of things, to include a couple that we 
found.  I don't, I don't want to make it sound like there was no reason 
to interview her.  That, including, including a couple of emails we 
found where there were portion markings, what we thought to be 
portion markings inside of the email.  And she had made statements 
before that...there were no emails that were marked classified. 
Agent 1 told us that he did not know what he meant by “forced to do something 
you adamantly opposed.”  Agent 1 stated that this may have been a reference to 
not being able to prevent Mills and Samuelson from attending the Clinton interview. 
On July 6, 2016, four days after Clinton’s interview, Agent 1 sent an instant 
message in which he stated that he was “done interviewing the President,” referring 
to Clinton.  We asked Agent 1 if he thought of Clinton as the next president while 
conducting the Midyear investigation.  Agent 1 stated, “I think my impression going 
into the election in that personal realm is that all of the polls were favoring Hillary 
Clinton.”  We asked Agent 1 if he treated Clinton differently because of this 
assumption.  Agent 1 stated, “Absolutely not.  I think the message they said that 
our leadership told us and our actions were to find whatever was there and 
whatever, whatever that means is what it means.” 
We interviewed all eight of the FBI and Department officials that attended 
Clinton’s interview, and none of the witnesses we interviewed expressed concerns 
about the way the case agents handled the interview.  Prosecutor 1 told us that 
Prosecutors 1 and 2 and the case agents did “most of the talking during the 
interview,” which was “led by the agents.”  Prosecutor 1 further told us that 
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generally “agents would lead [the interviews], and attorneys would interject as 
needed, and we’d pause after different, as we transitioned to make sure things 
were covered.”  In addition, Prosecutor 1 stated that, “The agents had a good 
rapport with [Clinton].”  Prosecutor 1 further stated, generally, that the agents did 
a “good job” in interviews and that he did not have concerns about the agents not 
“pushing hard enough.” 
Based on a review of the FD-302 and contemporaneous notes from Clinton’s 
interview, Clinton told the Midyear team that she chose to use a personal 
Blackberry connected to her personal email account for official communications for 
convenience, and she denied using personal email or a personal server to avoid 
FOIA or Federal Records Act requirements.  Clinton further told the FBI that during 
her tenure she received classified information through secure briefings, secure calls, 
classified hard documents, and classified faxes, and she “did not recall receiving 
any emails she thought should not be on an unclassified system.”  According to the 
FD-302, Clinton stated that she was aware that her email was supported by a 
private server, but she did not know the details of the different server systems she 
used.  The FD-302 indicated that the interviewers showed Clinton numerous 
unmarked emails she had received containing information that was determined to 
have been classified.  Clinton responded with respect to each email that she did not 
believe the information contained in the email was classified or that she relied on 
the State Department employees who worked for her to use their judgment in 
determining whether information was classified and appropriate to send on 
unclassified systems.  Agent 1 told us that the interviewers asked “probing 
questions” with respect to each of Clinton’s responses.  Prosecutor 1 told us, and 
our review of other FD-302s showed, that Clinton’s responses to these questions 
were consistent with the testimony of other witnesses on the email chains, 
including Clinton’s senior aides who forwarded classified information to her. 
The FD-302 and contemporaneous notes indicate that the interviewers asked 
Clinton about her understanding of her record keeping obligations, the culling 
process that was used to provide her work-related emails to the State Department, 
and the deletion of emails from her server.  According to the FD-302, Clinton told 
the FBI, among other things, that she did not recall being asked to turn over her 
email records upon her departure from State and that she believed her work-
related emails were “captured by her practice of sending them to state.gov email 
addresses of her staff.”  She stated that, upon receiving a request from the State 
Department in 2014, she “expected” her attorneys to turn over any emails that 
were “work-related or arguably work-related,” but she did not otherwise participate 
in developing the culling process.  Agent 1 told us, consistent with the FD-302, that 
he pressed her on her lack of involvement in the State Department production, by 
showing her a work-related email that was not produced as part of the 30,490.  
Clinton responded that she agreed that the email was work-related and did not 
know why it was not included in the State Department production.  Clinton told the 
FBI that in December 2014, after the production of her work-related emails to the 
State Department, her staff asked her what she wanted to do with her personal 
emails and she responded that she “did not need them anymore.”  The FD-302 
states that “Clinton never deleted, nor did she instruct anyone to delete, her email 
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to avoid complying with Federal Records Act, FOIA, or State or FBI requests for 
information” and that she “trusted her legal team” would comply with the March 3, 
2015 Congressional preservation request. 
In addition, the interviewers asked Clinton about an email that contained a 
parenthetical with a “(C)” at the beginning.  According to the prosecutors, Clinton 
received three email chains during her State Department tenure that contained at 
least one paragraph that began with a ‘(C),’ a classification marking used to denote 
information classified at the Confidential level.  The prosecutors stated that these 
were the only emails containing classification markings that the FBI identified 
during its investigation, the emails did not contain any markings other than the one 
or two paragraphs in each email beginning with a “(C),” and as of July 6, 2016, the 
State Department had not responded to the FBI’s request for a determination as to 
as to whether the information in these three emails was classified at the time the 
emails were sent.  The prosecutors further stated that the State Department had 
determined through the FOIA process that only one of the three emails contained 
information that was classified as of July 6, 2016, and that this email was classified 
at the Confidential level.  According to the FD-302 from Clinton’s interview, Clinton 
told the FBI that she did not know what the “(C)” meant and “speculated it was a 
reference to paragraphs ranked in alphabetical order.”  The FD-302 indicates that 
the FBI had added a classification marking of “Confidential” to the top of the 
document and that, upon noticing this marking, Clinton asked if the “(C)” meant 
Confidential.  Clinton told the interviewers that she did not agree that the 
information contained in the email was classified, because it described information 
that was already in the press.  Witnesses told us, and contemporaneous emails 
show, that the FBI and Department officials who attended Clinton’s interview found 
that her claim that she did not understand the significance of the “(C)” marking 
strained credulity.  Agent 1 stated, “I filed that in the bucket of hard to impossible 
to believe.”  Agent 1 further stated that he and the other interviewers asked Clinton 
about her understanding of the “(C)” markings four or five times, but she did not 
change her answer.  He told us, “I also don’t know at that point in the interview 
what else we could have done besides all the different ways that we asked it.” 
Comey told us that one of the purposes of interviewing Clinton was to see if 
she would be truthful.  However, he stated that the agents that conducted the 
interview found her credible and were surprised at how “technically illiterate” she 
was.  While Comey did not specifically comment on the team’s reactions to Clinton’s 
testimony regarding the “(C)” portion markings, he stated, “By her demeanor, she 
was credible and open and all that kind of stuff, but—so I can’t sit here and tell you 
I believed her.  I can only tell you, in no particular could we prove that she was 
being untruthful to us.”  The prosecutors similarly indicated that the team did not 
believe it could prove that Clinton had been dishonest during her interview or that 
she knew that the document with the “(C)” marking was classified.  The 
prosecutors stated that the “(C)” markings were somewhat ambiguous given their 
placement in the email chains and the fact that the classification marking 
‘Confidential’ was not spelled out anywhere in the email, let alone in a readily 
apparent manner.  They further stated that Clinton’s statement regarding her 
knowledge of the “(C)” marking was not one that could be affirmatively disproved. 
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D. Decision to Allow Mills and Samuelson to Attend Clinton 
Interview 
According to the FD-302 for Clinton’s interview, Mills and Samuelson 
attended the interview as Clinton’s counsel, in addition to Clinton’s three attorneys 
from the Williams and Connolly law firm.  Numerous FBI and Department witnesses 
told us that they were opposed to Mills and Samuelson attending Clinton’s 
interview, because Mills and Samuelson were also witnesses in the investigation.  
They stated that they were concerned both that Mills and Samuelson could 
influence Clinton’s testimony and that their presence would be bad from an “optics” 
standpoint. 
Prosecutor 1 told us that the prosecutors first learned that Mills and 
Samuelson planned to attend Clinton’s interview less than a week before the 
interview took place.  Witnesses told us that the prosecutors contacted Kendall to 
discuss their concerns about Mills and Samuelson attending, but that Kendall 
“pushed back.”  Several Midyear team members stated, and contemporaneous 
notes show, that after the call with Kendall the Midyear team conferred more than 
once and that everyone agreed that, although they were not comfortable with the 
situation, they could not prevent Clinton from bringing her counsel of choice to a 
voluntary interview.  Laufman stated, “We gave careful thought to whether we had 
any grounds to bar admission to Mills and Samuelson from the interview of 
Secretary Clinton.  And we determined we did not have a legal or bar rule-slash-
ethics based premise to do so.”  Several witnesses also told us that they were more 
concerned with the “optics” of Mills and Samuelson attending than them influencing 
Clinton’s testimony, because they were confident that Clinton had already been well 
prepared by her attorneys and had probably conferred with Mills and Samuelson in 
advance of the interview in any event (which the investigators could not prevent). 
Based on the evidence we reviewed, the issue of Mills’s and Samuelson’s 
attendance was raised up the chain within the FBI through former Director Comey 
and within NSD through Toscas.  According to FBI Attorney 1, the issue was 
discussed at a meeting she attended that included Comey, McCabe, Baker, Rybicki, 
Deputy General Counsel Anderson, EAD Steinbach, AD Priestap, Strzok, Page, and 
the Lead Analyst.  FBI Attorney 1 stated that the lawyers in the meeting, including 
Comey, all agreed that there was no legal basis to exclude Mills and Samuelson 
from the interview.  Comey told us that he could not remember the specifics of his 
conversations regarding Mills and Samuelson attending the Clinton interview; 
however, he stated that he believed “it was a fairly brief discussion because our 
judgment was it’s an essential interview, we’ve washed them out.  We’ve looked at 
their conduct pretty carefully and so those two things together, so we don’t really 
have a basis for excluding...either of them from the interview.” 
Lynch and Yates both told us they did not recall being briefed on Mills and 
Samuelson attending Clinton’s interview.  Carlin told us, “I don’t remember [Mills’s 
and Samuelson’s attendance] being a major issue so I’m assuming they worked 
that out without, I kind of more was just briefed that that was occurring rather than 
that there was some dispute over it.”  
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The prosecutors told us that the team put a plan in place to prevent Mills or 
Samuelson from influencing Clinton’s testimony:  if Mills or Samuelson “actively 
involved themselves in the interview” they would address the issue further at that 
time, possibly through a “side bar” with Kendall.  The prosecutors and agents that 
attended the interview all told us that ultimately Mills and Samuelson did not 
interfere or object, engage in side-bars with Clinton, or speak substantively during 
the interview.  Rather, Prosecutor 1 told us that Clinton’s Williams and Connolly 
attorneys did the “actual...lawyering, such that there was any there.” 
Prosecutor 1 stated that they did not consult PRAO regarding the ethical 
implications of Mills’s and Samuelson’s attendance.  We asked the prosecutors 
whether they spoke to Wilkinson about their concerns or suggested to Wilkinson 
that her clients’ attendance could violate their own ethical duties, given that at the 
time of the culling testimony and laptop dispute Wilkinson had indicated that her 
client’s interests were different from Clinton’s in the Midyear investigation.112  They 
told us they had not done so, and Laufman stated he did not recall considering 
those ethical concerns.  However, Laufman and FBI Attorney 1 both told us that if 
there was such a conflict, Clinton could waive it.  In addition, Prosecutor 1 stated 
that the team did not question at the time of the Clinton interview whether Mills 
and Samuelson in fact had ongoing attorney-client relationships with Clinton, 
because the prosecutors had already concluded there were ongoing attorney-client 
relationships when they sought subpoenas for the culling laptops.113 
E. Consideration of Subpoenaing Clinton before the Grand Jury 
We asked several witnesses whether they considered subpoenaing Clinton 
before the grand jury in order to avoid Mills’s and Samuelson’s presence at the 
interview.  We also asked whether they considered simply refusing to interview 
Clinton if she insisted on having Mills and Samuelson present, given the pressure on 
Clinton to cooperate with the investigation—in other words, whether the Midyear 
team underestimated its strategic position against Clinton’s attorneys. 
Some witnesses told us that use of the grand jury was the only way to legally 
prevent Mills and Samuelson from attending, but that the team did not seriously 
consider that option.  Prosecutor 4 stated: 
                                       
112  In the March 31, 2016 PRAO request seeking advice on whether the prosecutors could 
seek a waiver of attorney-client privilege from Kendall, Laufman wrote that Wilkinson had represented 
that her clients’ interests “may differ from, or conflict with” Clinton’s interests. 
113  As part of the application for the subpoenas for the laptops, the prosecutors had to answer 
whether Mills and Samuelson had ongoing attorney client relationships with Clinton and whether the 
subpoenas would have any potential adverse effects on those relationships.  The prosecutors wrote in 
the applications that Wilkinson had represented that Mills and Samuelson continued to have attorney-
client relationships with Clinton, but that “the nature and scope of that representation is unclear given 
that the former Secretary has separate counsel (David Kendall) representing her during this 
investigation.”  They further wrote, “Even if [Mills and Samuelson are] representing Clinton in 
conjunction with this matter, it is highly unlikely that issuance of the subpoena would result in Mills 
being disqualified from representing the former Secretary.” 
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I thought Mills being present was idiotic.  And I believe that 
[Prosecutor 1] and I talked about it.  And I said, well, look, we cannot 
exclude her as a legal matter unless we are willing to threaten to 
throw Hillary in the grand jury, at which point I’m fairly confident that 
they will fold.  And [Prosecutor 1] and I discussed it.  And I don't know 
if he ever raised that possibility.  But it was obvious to me that nobody 
was willing to, to threaten, to threaten Hillary in the grand jury. 
However, Prosecutor 4 stated that his concern about Mills and Samuelson 
attending Clinton’s interview was “from an optics standpoint” and that “from my 
vantage point, the cost-benefit analysis of trying to go through and get somebody 
to authorize me to threaten to throw Hillary in the grand jury was not worth getting 
the, the interview done at that point.”  Prosecutor 3 told us that if the Midyear team 
insisted that Mills and Samuelson not attend, Clinton likely would have relented 
because of her desire to say publicly that she cooperated with the investigation.  
Other FBI and Department witnesses we interviewed told us that they simply did 
not consider these options. 
The SSA told us that it would have been anomalous to subpoena Clinton 
before the grand jury given that no other witnesses had testified before the grand 
jury and Clinton, like the other witnesses, was cooperating.  Strzok told us that the 
team decided against subpoenaing Clinton to testify before the grand jury because 
“the expectation of the information we would get from her in either setting was not 
substantively different,” given that she had “extraordinary counsel” preparing her.   
Toscas told us that if Clinton had been required to testify before the grand 
jury, members of the FBI team would not have been able to participate in the 
interview.  In addition, Laufman, Prosecutor 1, and FBI Attorney 1 told us that 
admitting classified information before the grand jury would have involved an 
uncertain and lengthy process of obtaining approvals from the various government 
agencies that owned the classified information.  Prosecutor 1 stated that, even if 
the approvals could be obtained, it is better to avoid sharing classified information 
with the grand jury, if possible.   
Laufman stated that subpoenaing Clinton to testify before the grand jury 
would have been “a grossly disproportionate course of action in relation to what we 
were dealing with and [out of] step with how we had previously been conducting 
the investigation throughout its course.”  He further stated, “[W]e did not think this 
was worth blowing up the investigation, and, and creating what almost certainly 
would have become a matter of public knowledge that we had suddenly issued a 
grand jury subpoena to the Secretary at this stage of the national electoral 
process.”  He explained that throughout the investigation the team was attempting 
to avoid “extrinsic information” from the investigation being publicly disclosed and 
used for political purposes, and this was no exception. 
Witnesses told us that at the point of Clinton’s interview, they had conducted 
all other investigative steps and knew that there was insufficient evidence to 
prosecute Clinton unless she incriminated herself.  Laufman told us that because 
the prosecutors did not believe a subsequent trial was likely, they were not 
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concerned that Mills’s or Samuelson’s later testimony would be influenced by being 
privy to Clinton’s interview.  Prosecutor 4 told us that if he had the investigation to 
do over again, the one thing he would have done differently was “insist that Mills 
not attend the Hillary interview.”  However, he also stated that at that point he 
agreed with the rest of the team that there was no prosecutable case and the main 
reason to have put her in the grand jury was to avoid subjecting the investigation 
to criticism.114 
Comey told us that he did not remember discussing with anyone the 
possibility of subpoenaing Clinton before the grand jury.  However, he stated: 
At that point, I really didn’t think there was a there there, and the 
question was, is she going to lie to us?  She’d be as likely to lie to us 
in a grand jury or in an interview.  And I just suppose in the grand jury 
is you’ve got the transcript, but we’ve got a bunch of agents taking 
notes, so I don’t think it would’ve mattered much to me at that point. 
X. FBI Inspection Division Internal File Review of the Midyear 
Investigation 
In September and October 2017, the FBI assigned three SSAs (File Review 
SSAs) from the Boston Field Office to the FBI’s Inspection Division (INSD) to 
conduct a special review of the Midyear investigation (File Review).115  Baker told us 
that he proposed the File Review after being informed of the OIG’s discovery of text 
messages between Strzok and Page expressing political views.  He stated that once 
he learned of the text messages, he suggested to EAD Carl Ghattas and possibly 
other senior FBI officials that a review team be brought in to “look at the case and 
all the decisions that were made in a quiet way.”  Baker further stated that the 
purposes of the File Review were to “make sure that [Strzok, Page,] or others did 
not make decisions in the case based on improper political considerations, including 
failing to taken actions they should have,” and to “make sure that, from a 
management perspective, if other steps needed to be taken, we should find that 
out quickly and take those steps, including reopening the investigation.”  He told us 
that they decided that the File Review team would not interview witnesses, because 
they did not want to interfere with the ongoing OIG review.  Baker stated that 
Ghattas took the lead on the review. 
Two of the SSAs who conducted the File Review had experience in the FBI’s 
Criminal Investigative Division (CID) while the third SSA had experience in the 
FBI’s Counterintelligence Division (CD).  The File Review SSAs told us that Ghattas 
requested that they do the File Review, and that they met with Ghattas in FBI 
                                       
114  Prosecutor 4 stated that once he realized there was no prosecutable case, he had two 
goals in the investigation: “One was to conduct the investigation quickly to get it resolved before the 
election, as soon before the election as possible.  And the second was to do it in a way that would 
engender public trust to the maximum extent possible.” 
115  Due to fact that the OIG’s review was ongoing at the time, the FBI sought and obtained 
permission from the OIG to conduct the File Review.   
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Headquarters at the start of their review.  They stated that they were instructed not 
to discuss their review with other FBI employees.  The File Review SSAs also told us 
that they were not told about the text messages between Strzok and Page before 
the start of the review.  Baker told us he was unaware that the File Review SSAs 
were not told about the text messages before the start of the File Review.   
File Review SSAs 2 and 3 told us that they understood the purpose of the 
review to be to assess what the Midyear investigators appeared to have done well, 
what investigative steps were missed, and what lessons could be learned from the 
investigation.  File Review SSA 2 stated that the File Review was not intended to be 
a reinvestigation.  The File Review SSAs told us that their review was limited, by 
design, to the official FBI Midyear file.  They did not interview any witnesses nor did 
they review any documents that were not included in the official file, such as 
handwritten notes taken by Midyear team members during meetings, emails or text 
messages sent or received by Midyear team members, or materials maintained by 
the prosecutors or others Department officials.  They also did not review SAP 
material.  File Review SSA 2 told us that the team did not “intend [for the file 
review] necessarily to be a...final...judgment or indictment on the FBI or on WFO or 
the case agents.  It was more just...here are our observations, and here are some 
questions...should anyone else...take a look at this...take this into consideration.  
That's kind of all we intended by it.” 
The File Review SSAs told us, consistent with their File Review Report, that 
they conducted their review over the course of six days, between September 5 and 
September 8, 2017, and between October 3 and 4, 2017; however, the first day 
was mostly spent meeting with Ghattas and locating the records to review.  They 
stated that thereafter they spent approximately 12 hours per day reviewing records 
in the official file, discussing items they came across that caused them concern, and 
recording information in spreadsheets.  File Review SSAs 2 and 3 told us that each 
File Review SSA focused on a different portion of the file, and none of them 
individually reviewed the entire file.  During the course of their review, in addition 
to reviewing and discussing the records, the File Review SSAs completed a first 
draft of the File Review Report, which File Review SSA 1 finalized with minor edits 
thereafter.  The File Review SSAs told us that they all approved the final File Review 
Report. 
Under the heading “FBI Investigative Actions,” the File Review Report stated: 
The [File] Review Team’s analysis of the MIDYEAR EXAM investigation 
did not find substantial or significant areas of investigative oversight 
based on the stated goals of the investigation.  In contrast, [the File 
Review Team] assessed [that] the [Midyear] investigative team 
conducted a thorough investigation within the constraints imposed by 
DOJ.  Appropriate witnesses were interviewed, records preserved, 
information and computer devices obtained, and necessary business 
records were subpoenaed to meet the goals of the investigation.  FBI 
resources such as [Computer Analysis and Recovery Team (CART) 
personnel], Intelligence personnel, communication analysis, and Cyber 
Agents were skillfully and successfully utilized to review and fully 
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exploit substantial amounts of data in support of the investigation....  
The efforts of the case Agents and case team should be commended. 
Nonetheless, the File Review Report also contained criticisms of the Midyear 
investigation.  Generally, the File Review Report assessed that it would have been 
better to run the Midyear investigation as a traditional criminal investigation out of 
a Criminal Investigative Division (CID) field office, rather than as a 
counterintelligence investigation out of CD.  The File Review SSAs expressed 
concern that treating the investigation as a CD investigation with NSD oversight 
resulted in more limited use of compulsory process such as grand jury subpoenas 
and search warrants.  However, the File Review SSAs told the OIG that they were 
not aware of any precedent for handling a counterintelligence investigation out of 
CID.  File Review SSA 2 stated that counterintelligence investigations “are always 
run out of the Counterintelligence Division.”116   
The File Review SSAs identified specific concerns with the Midyear 
investigation, although we found that many of these concerns were the result of the 
fact that the File Review SSAs had incomplete information.  For example, the File 
Review Report states, “No immunity in exchange for testimony was observed in the 
investigation,” and “[o]ne instance of a proffer letter was observed,” referring to 
the limited use immunity agreement between the Department and John Bentel.  
The File Review SSAs told us that they were unaware that the Midyear prosecutors 
also entered into letter use immunity agreements with Combetta and Pagliano.117 
The File Review SSAs told us, consistent with the File Review Report, that 
they believed the Midyear agents relied too heavily on outlines during interviews 
and did not ask sufficient follow-up questions.  However, they stated that they 
based this assessment only on their review of the FD-302s.  The Midyear SSA and 
Agent 1 told us that the CD Division does not draft FD-302s in such a way that a 
reader would know what follow-up questions were asked of witnesses; instead, the 
FD-302s generally set forth each witness’s ultimate statements in response to 
series of questions. 
In addition, the File Review SSAs told us that they considered the DIOG, but 
did not consider any Department policies, such as the USAM, regarding guidelines 
for obtaining evidence relevant to the Midyear investigation.  For example, they 
                                       
116  The File Review Report also described a concern that the Midyear Team was “directly 
supervised by CD-4 personnel [in FBIHQ] as opposed to an SSA and ASAC as found during field office 
investigations.”  In fact, at the time the Midyear investigation began, Strzok was an ASAC in the FBI’s 
Washington Field Office (WFO) and the Midyear SSA was an SSA in WFO.  
117  Additionally, the File Review Report expressed a concern regarding the timing of the 
Pagliano declination letter, but we found that this concern was based on incomplete information.  The 
report stated, “It was unclear to the [file] review team the need for such an expedited prosecution 
declination.”  However, the File Review SSAs told us they were unaware that the declination 
concerned only Pagliano’s compensation from the Clintons (for which PIN ultimately determined he 
faced no criminal exposure), and not the mishandling of classified information or destruction of federal 
records. 
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stated they did not consult the USAM provisions regarding obtaining evidence from 
attorneys concerning their representation of clients. 
Based on these findings, the report concluded: 
INSD assessed the FBI Midyear Exam investigation successfully 
determined classified information was improperly stored and 
transmitted on Clinton’s email server, and classified information was 
compromised by unauthorized individuals, to include foreign 
government’s or intelligence services, via cyber intrusion or other 
means [referring to compromises of email accounts associated with 
certain individuals who communicated with Clinton’s server, such as 
Blumenthal].  However, the structure of the investigation and 
prosecution team, as prescribed in the CD PG, and treatment of the 
investigation as a traditional espionage matter rather than a criminal 
investigation significantly hindered the ability of the investigative team 
to obtain full, accurate and timely information. 
XI. Instant Messages Relating to the Conduct of the Midyear 
Investigation 
FBI employees have the ability to communicate internally via Microsoft Lync 
instant messages when logged on to their FBI workstation.  As part of our review, 
the OIG identified contemporaneous instant messages in which Agent 1 expressed 
concerns about the quality of the Midyear investigation.  These messages were sent 
to numerous FBI employees, including an agent assigned to the Midyear filter team 
(Agent 5).  Agent 1 and Agent 5, who are now married, were in a relationship for 
the entirety of the Midyear investigation.  We identified additional instant messages 
sent by Agent 1 and Agent 5 that raised concerns about potential bias.  We discuss 
these messages and others in Chapter Twelve. 
The Midyear filter team was responsible for conducting an initial review of 
evidence obtained during the investigation and ensuring that nothing that was 
either beyond the scope of the FBI’s authority to review or protected by a valid 
privilege was provided to the investigative team.  We found that Agent 1 and Agent 
5 exchanged numerous instant messages about the Midyear investigation.  
However, we identified no instances where Agent 5 provided Midyear-related 
information to Agent 1 that should have been withheld from the investigative team.  
Agent 1 and Agent 5 told us that their Midyear supervisors were aware of their 
relationship by the end of 2015 at the latest and it was never identified as a 
concern. 
We asked Agent 1 generally about his use of instant messaging on his FBI 
workstation.  Agent 1 told us that he believed that instant messages were not 
retained by the FBI and therefore used less caution with those communications 
than he would have with other types of communications, such as email or text 
messages.  Agent 1 also repeatedly emphasized that the instant messages served 
as a type of emotional release for him.  Agent 1 stated: 
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I took that [instant messaging] as an informal, akin to a conversation 
almost, almost, you know, water cooler style.  I think in there....  
There is personal and emotional communications between my then 
girlfriend, now wife.  There is some jocularity there.  There is, you 
know, I think, I think some outlet, stress outlet.... 
You know, guys, I just, I think this was primarily used as a personal 
conversation venting mode for me.  I’m embarrassed for it.  I don’t 
think that it affected my actions. 
Agent 1 told us that the nature of his workspace also contributed to his use of 
instant messaging.  Agent 1 explained that for the Midyear investigation he was 
relocated to FBI Headquarters and placed inside a SCIF with others on the Midyear 
team.  Due to this, he was effectively unable to use his personal electronic devices 
at work and was also in a small space with his coworkers and supervisors, thereby 
preventing phone communication.  Agent 1 emphasized that these were not 
excuses for the substance of his instant messages, but explanations for why he 
used them as an outlet for “stress relief” about frustrations he encountered at work.  
Agent 1 described his instant messages with Agent 5 as personal communications 
with his significant other that they used for mutual support and complaints.  
Similarly, Agent 1 stated his instant messages with FBI personnel not assigned to 
the Midyear investigations were typically communications with friends.  He also 
noted that many of these communications were initiated by FBI personnel seeking 
information on the Midyear investigation.  Agent 5 echoed many of Agent 1’s 
explanations, stating that she considered instant messaging to be a private channel 
to communicate with Agent 1.  Agent 5 told us that Agent 1 was her outlet at work 
for “emotional outbursts” and “relief of stress.” 
Agent 1 sent instant messages in the initial months of the Midyear 
investigation commenting on the investigation.  Some of these messages are listed 
below, along with the date sent and the recipient. 
September 2, 2015, to Agent 5:  “Have a really bad feeling about 
this...this case...situation....  No control and horrible decisions and 
chaos on the most meaningless thing I’ve ever done with people acting 
like fucking 9/11.” 
September 25, 2015, to an FBI employee:  “...I dont care about it.  I 
think its continued waste of resources and time and focus....” 
October 26, 2015, to Agent 5:  “Its just so obvious how pointless this 
exercise is.  And everyone is so into it....” 
We asked Agent 1 about these messages.  Agent 1 told us that prior to Midyear he 
had worked on other high-profile cases and part of the sentiment he expressed in 
these messages was a reluctance to be involved in another high-profile 
investigation.  Agent 1 stated that he knew from prior experience that decisions in 
such investigation were typically made at higher levels.  Agent 1 described the 
comment about the investigation being “meaningless” as “a little exaggerated” and 
explained that “maybe the intense scrutiny didn’t seem commensurate to what we 
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had to do.”  Agent 1 explained, “The FBI absolutely needs to investigate why 
classified information is in a place where it should not be.  I just, it would, this is 
more probably an emotional comment on how scrutinized and how focused and how 
continued, there’s a continued focus on it to this day.” 
Agent 1 also sent numerous messages that referenced “political” 
considerations in the context of the Midyear investigation.  We list examples of 
these messages below with the date sent and the content of the message along 
with context where necessary.  Unless otherwise identified, the recipients of the 
messages are FBI employees not involved in the Midyear investigation. 
January 15, 2016:  Responding to a question of when the investigation 
would be finished, Agent 1 stated, “[M]y guess is March.  Doesnt 
matter what we have, political winds will want to beat the Primarys.” 
January 28, 2016:  “...The case is the same is all of them.  Alot of 
work and bullshit for a political exercise.” 
February 1, 2016:  “...Its primary season – so we’re being dictated to 
now....” 
February 1, 2016:  “This is the biggest political shit show of them all.  
No substance.  Up at dawn – pride swallowing seige.  No headset and 
hermetically sealed in SIOC.” 
February 2, 2016:  Responding to a question about how the 
investigation was going, “Going well....  Busy, and sometimes I feel for 
naught (political exercise), but I feel good....” 
May 6, 2016, to Agent 5:  “pretty bad news today...someone has 
breathed some political urgency into this....  Everyday DD brief and 
once a week D brief from now on.” 
We asked Agent 1 about these messages.  Agent 1 stated that he hoped these 
messages “would just directly reflect upon me and not anybody else that worked 
the case.”  He explained that these messages simply reflect the fact that he wanted 
to work on something besides Midyear.  We asked Agent 1 whether these messages 
indicated that the Midyear investigation was simply an exercise in “going through 
the motions.”  Agent 1 responded, “No.  I think this investigation needed to be 
worked.”  He later continued, “I think if classified information is found in a place 
that it shouldn’t be, there should be an investigation.”  Agent 1 added that he felt 
the scrutiny and attention that Midyear received was not “commensurate” with the 
nature of the violation the team was investigating.  As to the messages about 
timing, Agent 1 told us that at some point in the investigation the “pace” increased 
and, although the team was never given a “finish by” date, there was “a sense that 
things were picking up.” 
On February 9, 2016, Agent 5 sent Agent 1 an instant message complaining 
about a meeting the filter team had with a Department attorney and the frustrating 
review task she was assigned.  Agent 1 responded: 
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Yeah, I hear you.  You guys have a shitty task, in a shitty 
environment.  To look for something conjured in a place where you 
cant find it, for a case that doesnt matter and is predestined.  All you 
ask for is acknowledgment of that and clear guidance.  But no.  DOJ 
comes in there every once in awhile and takes a wishy-washy, 
political, cowardice stance.  Salt meets wound.  That is the 
environment love.  Can’t sugar coat it.  Now, what?  What can you do?  
What can you control?  Work hard, do the best you can, and try to 
keep others motivated. 
After reading this message during his OIG interview, Agent 1 stated: 
I have no information that it was a pre-determined outcome by 
anyone.  I had, I had no statement from anyone that I can tell you 
that I worked with that said this is where we’re going....  I think even 
the leadership that stopped by in the, in the, in our space always said 
that as well.  Whatever you find, you know, is what it is.  You know, 
just, just find what it was, and, you know, don’t worry about anything 
else, the outside noise. 
All I can tell you is this is probably, I mean, it’s a little overwhelming 
to see all [these messages] at once, as probably somebody who was, 
who wanted to do something else, I think. 
Agent 1 stated that he could not recall anything specific to add to this exchange. 
In another exchange on February 4, 2016, Agent 1 and an FBI employee who 
was not assigned to the Midyear investigation discussed Agent 1’s interview with a 
witness who assisted the Clintons at their Chappaqua residence.  Part of this 
exchange follows. 
FBI Employee:  “boom...how did the [witness] go” 
Agent 1:  “Awesome.  Lied his ass off.  Went from never inside the scif 
[sensitive compartmented information facility] at res, to looked in 
when it was being constructed, to removed the trash twice, to 
troubleshot the secure fax with HRC a couple times, to everytime there 
was a secure fax i did it with HRC.  Ridic,” 
FBI Employee:  “would be funny if he was the only guy charged n this 
deal” 
Agent 1:  “I know.  For 1001.  Even if he said the truth and didnt have 
a clearance when handling the secure fax – aint noone gonna do shit” 
We asked Agent 1 about the implication in this message that no one would be 
charged irrespective of what the team found.  Agent 1 stated: 
Yeah, I, I don’t think I can say there’s a specific person that I worked 
with in this case that wouldn’t charge him for that.  I think it’s a 
general complaint of, you know, of FBI agents that are kind of, kind of 
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being emotional and, and complaining that no one is going to do 
something about, about something....  But there’s nothing specific that 
I, that I can tell you. 
Agent 1 told us he did not recall any discussion about whether this witness should 
be charged with a crime.       
In a January 19, 2016 message to Agent 4, Agent 1 stated, “What we want 
to do and what we’re going to be allowed to do are two different things.”  Agent 1 
told us that he did not remember this exchange and did not know what he was 
referring to in this message.  However, he stated that he appears “to be venting a 
little bit” to Agent 4. 
XII. Analysis of Investigative Decisions 
In this part, we provide our analysis of whether the investigative decisions 
taken in connection with the Midyear investigation that we reviewed were based on 
improper considerations, including political bias.  As described in the Analytical 
Construct set forth in Chapter One of this report, we selected for examination 
particular case decisions that were the subject of public or internal controversy.  For 
each decision, we analyzed whether there was evidence of improper considerations 
or evidence that the justifications offered for the decision were a pretext for 
improper, but unstated, considerations.  If a choice made by the investigative team 
was among two or more reasonable alternatives, we did not find that it was 
improper even if we believed an alternative decision would have been more 
effective.  Thus, a determination by the OIG that a decision was not unreasonable 
does not mean that the OIG has endorsed the decision or concluded that the 
decision was the most effective among the options considered.  We took this 
analytical approach because our role as an OIG is not to second-guess valid 
discretionary judgments made during the course of an investigation, and this 
approach is consistent with the OIG’s handling of such questions in past reviews.   
In undertaking this analysis, our task was made significantly more difficult 
because of the text messages we discovered between Strzok and Page, given the 
critical roles they played in most of the decisions made by the FBI; the instant 
messages of Agent 1, who was one of four Midyear case agents; and the instant 
messages of FBI Attorney 2, who was one of the FBI attorneys assigned to the 
investigation.118  That these employees used an FBI system or device to express 
political views about individuals affected by ongoing investigations for which they 
were responsible was particularly disappointing in comparison to their colleagues on 
the Midyear investigative team who, based on the emails, notes, memoranda, and 
                                       
118  As we describe in this chapter and in Chapter Twelve, many of those messages reflected 
hostility toward then candidate Trump and statements of support for candidate Clinton, and some of 
them mixed political commentary with discussions regarding the Midyear investigation. 
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other materials we reviewed, conducted themselves with professionalism during a 
difficult and high-pressure investigation.119 
We were cognizant of and considered these messages in reaching the 
conclusions regarding the specific investigative decisions discussed below.  In 
particular, we were concerned about text messages exchanged by Strzok and Page 
that potentially indicated or created the appearance that investigative decisions 
were impacted by bias or improper considerations.  As we describe in Chapter 
Twelve, most of the text messages raising such questions pertained to the Russia 
investigation.  Nonetheless, the implication in certain Russia-related text messages 
that Strzok might be willing to take official action to impact presidential candidate 
Trump’s electoral prospects—for example, the August 8, 2016 text exchange in 
which Page asked Strzok “[Trump’s] not ever going to become president, right?  
Right?!” and Strzok replied “No.  No he won’t.  We’ll stop it”—caused us to question 
the earlier Midyear investigative decisions in which he was involved, and whether 
he took specific actions in the Midyear investigation based on his political views.120  
As we describe in this chapter, we found that Strzok was not the sole 
decisionmaker for any of the specific investigative decisions examined in this 
chapter.  We further found evidence that in some instances Strzok and Page 
advocated for more aggressive investigative measures than did others on the 
Midyear team, such as the use of grand jury subpoenas and search warrants to 
obtain evidence. 
There were clearly tensions and disagreements in a number of important 
areas between Midyear agents and prosecutors.  However, we did not find 
documentary or testimonial evidence that improper considerations, including 
political bias, directly affected the specific investigative decisions discussed below, 
or that the justifications offered for these decisions were pretextual.  We recognize 
that these text and instant messages cast a cloud over the FBI’s handling of the 
Midyear investigation and the investigation’s credibility.  But our review did not find 
documentary or testimonial evidence that these political views directly affected the 
specific investigative decisions that we reviewed in this chapter.  The broader 
impact of these text and instant messages, including on such matters as the public 
perception of the FBI and the Midyear investigation, are discussed in Chapter 
Twelve. 
                                       
119  As discussed in Section X of this chapter, FBI INSD conducted a File Review of the Midyear 
investigation.  We found that the File Review’s ability to assess the Midyear investigation was limited 
based on the narrow scope of the review and the limited information available to them.  We also found 
that, as a result of the limited information available to the File Review SSAs, a number of the factual 
statements in the File Review report were inaccurate.  Accordingly, the assessments and 
recommendations of the File Review did not significantly influence the analysis of the OIG, which had 
a far more developed record, including extensive interviews, as discussed in our report. 
120  As we describe in Chapter Nine, these text messages also caused us to assess Strzok’s 
decision in October 2016 to prioritize the Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related 
investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop.  We concluded that we did not have confidence 
that this decision by Strzok was free from bias. 
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A. Preference for Consent Rather than Compulsory Process to 
Obtain Evidence 
At the outset we note that, contrary to public perception, the Midyear team 
used compulsory process in the Midyear investigation.  This included grand jury 
subpoenas, search warrants, and 2703(d) orders.  Nonetheless, the Midyear 
prosecutors told us that they obtained evidence through consent whenever 
possible.  We found no evidence that the use of consent to obtain evidence in the 
Midyear investigation was based on improper considerations.  The decisions 
regarding how to obtain particular pieces of evidence were primarily made by the 
career prosecutors, for whom we identified no evidence of political or other bias, 
and we found that the reasons they provided for those decisions were not 
unreasonable. 
The FBI investigators, attorneys, and supervisors involved with the Midyear 
investigation—including individuals for whom we identified electronic messages 
expressing political opinions—advocated for greater use of compulsory process and 
for more aggressive investigative methods, including the use of search warrants.  
However, the prosecutors told us that they often chose consent over compulsory 
process or court orders based on the following considerations:  (1) avoiding delay 
that could result from motions to quash subpoenas or search warrants; (2) 
complying with Department policies; (3) protecting classified and other sensitive 
information; (4) avoiding media leaks and public disclosures that could harm the 
investigation; (5) the perceived obstacles to establishing probable cause; and (6) 
the risk of improperly accessing privileged information.  We found these 
explanations to be supported by Department and FBI policy and practice, and that 
the disputes between the agents and the prosecutors about how aggressively to 
pursue certain evidence were good faith disagreements. 
It was not unreasonable for Department prosecutors to consider the delay 
that could result from motions to quash subpoenas and search warrants.  Both 
Department and FBI witnesses told us that they hoped to complete the 
investigation well in advance of the election, if possible, to avoid influencing the 
political process.  Indeed, Comey pressed in early May for the prompt completion of 
the investigation.  However, in seeking to avoid delay, prosecutors were required to 
balance the need for timely completion of an investigation against the need to 
ensure a thorough and complete investigation.  We did not identify bias or improper 
considerations affecting that judgment call by the prosecutors. 
Both Department and FBI policies generally support the use of consent 
agreements to obtain evidence.  The USAM advises prosecutors to consider 
alternatives to grand jury subpoenas when practicable, such as obtaining testimony 
and other evidence by consent, in light of the requirement that the government 
maintain the secrecy of any testimony or evidence accessed through the grand 
jury.  USAM 9-11.254(1).  Had the prosecutors not used consent agreements to 
obtain most of the evidence in the Midyear investigation, the FBI likely would not 
have been able to be as transparent as it was in response to FOIA and 
Congressional requests following the conclusion of the investigation. 
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The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Operations (AGG-Dom) and 
the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) require the FBI, 
when choosing among two or more operationally sound and effective methods for 
obtaining evidence or intelligence, to strongly consider using the one that is “least 
intrusive” with respect to “such factors as the effect on the privacy and civil liberties 
of individuals and potential damage to reputation.”  AGG-Dom § I.C.2; DIOG 
§§ 4.1.1, 4.4, 5.3, 18.2. The DIOG specifically identifies search warrants as a 
method that is “very intrusive.” DIOG § 4.4.3  The DIOG’s guidance regarding 
choosing the least intrusive method is emphasized in relation to Sensitive 
Investigative Matters (SIMs), such as the Midyear investigation.  The DIOG states, 
“In the context of a SIM, particular care should be taken when considering whether 
the planned course of action is the least intrusive method if reasonable based upon 
the circumstances of the investigation.” DIOG § 10.1.3.  Assessing which 
investigative options to use, and whether various options are operationally sound 
and effective, are judgment calls.  Accordingly, the Midyear team’s use of consent 
agreements, after their evaluation of the circumstances, was an approach to 
gathering evidence that complied with Department policies.  Likewise, had the 
prosecutors and agents agreed to pursue a more aggressive course after evaluating 
the circumstances and determining that it would have been a more effective 
method, it also would have been a rational approach to gathering evidence. 
Under FBI policy, it also was appropriate for the Midyear team to consider 
how the use of compulsory process or more intrusive evidence collection methods 
might result in the public disclosure of information about the investigation—
particularly public disclosure that had the potential to negatively impact the 
investigation.  The DIOG states that in deciding the least intrusive method 
necessary for effectively obtaining information, the FBI should consider the “risk of 
public exposure” and the potential that public exposure will be used to an 
individual’s “detriment and/or embarrassment.”  DIOG §§ 4.4.3(E), 5.3. Witnesses 
told us that there is a need to be particularly cautious with respect to the use of 
process in national security cases, due to the risk of classified information being 
leaked. 
It was, of course, proper for the prosecutors to consider whether they could 
demonstrate probable cause before using criminal process.  The Fourth Amendment 
protects individuals from unlawful searches and seizures of their property, and 
courts have held that individuals have privacy interests in their electronic 
communications.  See Ross, 456 U.S. at 822-23; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; Trulock, 
275 F.3d at 403.  Generally, the government must obtain a search warrant before 
searching data contained in an individual’s electronic storage devices, such as 
computers and cellular telephones.  Id.; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.  To obtain such a 
search warrant, the government must make a showing of facts under oath 
demonstrating probable cause to believe that a device to be searched contains 
evidence of a crime.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.  Both Department and FBI witnesses 
told us that, in some circumstances, they were not certain they could make such a 
showing. 
It was also proper for the prosecutors to consider privilege issues.  By law, 
prosecutors cannot use compulsory process to override privileges, such as 
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attorney-client or marital privilege.  G.J. Manual § 5.1 (quoting Branzburg, 
408 U.S. at 688); G.J. Manual §§ 5.6, 5.26.  While a filter team may be used to cull 
privileged material from seized evidence before an investigative team reviews that 
evidence, there are also Department policies that apply to seizing evidence that 
may contain privileged information.  For example, under USAM 9-13.410, 
prosecutors can only issue a subpoena to an attorney for information or evidence 
related to the representation of clients if the prosecutors first obtain approval from 
the AAG or DAAG of the Criminal Division.  The AAG or DAAG will only provide such 
approval if the prosecutors make reasonable efforts to first obtain the evidence 
through alternative sources, including consent, unless such efforts would 
compromise the investigation.  USAM 9-13.410.  Similarly, the DIOG provides that, 
“It is less intrusive to obtain information from existing government sources...or 
from publicly-available data in commercial data bases, than to obtain the same 
information from a third party (usually through legal process) that has a 
confidential relationship with the subject.” DIOG § 4.4.3(D). 
We questioned why the Midyear team did not serve subpoenas on or seek to 
obtain search warrants related to the last known persons to possess devices that 
the team was never able to locate.  These included Combetta for the missing 
Archive Laptop and Clinton or her attorneys for Clinton’s handheld devices.  Both 
FBI and Department witnesses told us that they believed Combetta and Clinton’s 
attorneys were being truthful that they could not locate these devices and therefore 
subpoenas would not have made a difference in these situations.  This was a 
judgment call made by the prosecutors and agents, and we did not identify 
evidence that it was infected by bias or improper considerations. 
We also found no evidence that the particular limitations contained in the 
consent agreements were based on improper considerations or bias.  For example, 
the prosecutors told us that the scope of consent was often limited to the time 
period of Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State, because that is when she had 
access to classified information.  Although email communications among Clinton, 
her attorneys, and PRN staff following Clinton’s tenure may have been relevant to 
Clinton’s production of work-related emails to the State Department and the 
subsequent deletions of emails her attorneys deemed personal, the prosecutors told 
us that (1) most of these communications would have been protected by attorney-
client privilege; and (2) the FBI obtained communications between Clinton’s staff, 
including her attorneys, and PRN staff from PRN.  In determining that these and 
other limitations in the consent agreements were not unreasonable, we considered 
the Department and FBI policies cited above. 
B. Decisions Not to Obtain or Seek to Review Certain Evidence 
The Midyear team did not obtain or review some evidence that we found 
might have been useful to the investigation.  The team’s reasons for not doing so 
appear to have been based on limitations they imposed on the scope of their 
investigation, the desire to complete the investigation well before the election, and 
their belief that the foregone evidence was likely of limited value.  Those reasons 
were, in part, in tension with Comey’s reaction and response in October 2016 to the 
discovery of emails between Clinton and Abedin on the Weiner laptop.  However, 
153 
we found no evidence that the decisions not to obtain this evidence were based on 
improper considerations or bias.  We concluded that these were judgment calls 
made by the prosecutors and agents. 
We asked members of the Midyear team why they did not seek to obtain the 
personal devices that Clinton’s senior aides used during their tenure at the State 
Department, given that these devices were both (1) potential sources of Clinton’s 
work-related or classified emails; and (2) unauthorized locations where classified 
emails were potentially being stored.  In addition, we inquired about the decision 
not to obtain Huma Abedin’s personal devices given (1) that she stated during her 
interview that she had given them to her attorneys for production of her work-
related emails to the State Department; and (2) the decision to seek a search 
warrant in October 2016 in order to search the Weiner laptop.  Witnesses also told 
us they believed there was a flaw in the culling process that resulted in the 
exclusion of most of Abedin’s clintonemail.com emails from the State Department 
production. 
We found that the FBI team and the prosecutors decided together to 
generally limit the devices they sought to those that either belonged to Clinton or 
were used to back-up or cull Clinton’s emails.  The team provided, among others, 
the following reasons for placing this limitation on the scope of the investigation:  
(1) the culture of mishandling classified information at the State Department which 
made the quantity of potential sources of evidence particularly vast; (2) the belief 
that Clinton’s own devices and the laptops used to cull her emails were the most 
likely places to find the complete collection of her emails from her tenure as 
Secretary of State; and (3) the belief that the State Department was the better 
entity to conduct a “spill investigation.”  With respect to the first rationale, we note 
that it fails to acknowledge that the team was not required to take an all-or-nothing 
approach.  For example, a middle ground existed where those devices belonging to 
Clinton’s three top aides—which the team determined accounted for approximately 
68 percent of Clinton’s email exchanges—would have been reviewed, but devices 
belonging to other State Department employees would not. 
Regarding Abedin’s devices, witnesses told us that Abedin played largely an 
administrative role on Clinton’s staff and, as such, they did not believe her emails 
were likely to be significant to the investigation.  Yet, as referenced above, this 
view was in tension with Comey’s approach in late October 2016, discussed in detail 
in Chapters Nine and Ten.  Comey described the discovery on the Weiner laptop in 
October as being the potentially “golden emails” based on what we concluded was 
very little information about the possible contents of the emails—a stark contrast to 
the Midyear team’s assessment that the potential emails on Abedin’s devices, 
including exchanges with Clinton, were unlikely to be significant.  The team 
distinguished their approach with the Weiner laptop based mostly on the fact that it 
happened to be in the government’s possession. 
We recognize that reasonable minds differ on investigative approaches.  We 
concluded that, in deciding not to seek the devices of Clinton’s top aides, the 
Midyear team members weighed what they believed to be the limited evidentiary 
value of the senior aides’ devices against their concerns about how pursuing them 
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would add time to and increase the scope of the investigation.  Ultimately, 
Department prosecutors have discretion with respect to “when, whom, how and 
even whether to prosecute for apparent violations of federal criminal law,” provided 
that discretion is exercised without reliance on improper considerations, such as 
political bias or concerns for personal gain, and otherwise consistent with their oath 
of office and Department policy.  See USAM 9-27.110 (comment) (citing U.S. 
Const. Art. II § 3; United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); Nader v. 
Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 
(1962); United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 
2016); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. 
Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (oath of office).  We 
did not find evidence that the decisions not to obtain the senior aides’ devices were 
based on improper considerations, nor did we find that the reasons provided were a 
pretext for improper considerations.  We also did not find that the decisions 
regarding the scoping of the investigation were inconsistent with any Department 
polices.  Accordingly, these were judgment calls that were within the discretion of 
the Midyear agents and prosecutors to make. 
In addition, as we describe in the classified appendix to this report, the OIG 
learned near the end of our review that the FBI had considered obtaining 
permission from the Department to review certain classified materials that may 
have included information potentially relevant to the Midyear investigation.  
Although the Midyear team drafted a memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General 
in late May 2016 stating that review of the highly classified materials was necessary 
to complete the investigation and requesting permission to access them, the FBI 
never sent this request to the Department.  FBI witnesses told us that they did not 
seek access to these classified materials for various reasons, including that they 
believed this information would not materially impact the conclusion.  The classified 
appendix describes in more detail the highly classified information, its potential 
relevance to the Midyear investigation, the FBI’s reasons for not seeking access to 
it, and our analysis.   
C. Voluntary Interviews 
The Midyear investigation did not use the grand jury for the purpose of 
collecting testimony from witnesses.  FBI and Department witnesses told us that 
through voluntary interviews they were able to establish better rapport with 
witnesses and avoid risks associated with exposing grand jurors to classified 
information.  We found no evidence that the use of voluntary interviews instead of 
grand jury testimony was based on improper considerations or influenced by bias.  
Rather, we concluded that these were judgment calls made by the prosecutors and 
agents. 
As with the use of consent to obtain documentary and physical evidence, the 
use of voluntary interviews instead of grand jury testimony was consistent with the 
DIOG’s preference for the “least intrusive” method.  In addition, due to grand jury 
secrecy the use of voluntary interviews contributed to the FBI’s ability to be 
transparent in response to FOIA requests and Congressional inquiries.  The 
preference for voluntary interviews also was consistent with Department policy 
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regarding the use of classified information before the grand jury.  Before classified 
information can be utilized before the grand jury, the USAM requires prosecutors to 
seek approval from the agency responsible for classifying the information.  USAM 9-
90.230.  Witnesses told us that this can be a lengthy process.  In addition, the 
USAM cautions that questioning grand jury witnesses regarding classified 
information poses a risk that the witness will disclose more classified information 
than expected or permitted.  Id.  Even if the Midyear team could have obtained the 
necessary approvals to use classified information in the grand jury, the prosecutors 
told us that there are concerns with exposing grand jurors to classified 
information—the more individuals that are exposed to classified information, the 
greater the risk of compromise. 
The Midyear prosecutors told us they kept open the possibility of 
subpoenaing witnesses before the grand jury, especially witnesses like Paul 
Combetta, whose testimony would not likely require the disclosure of classified 
information.  The Midyear team subpoenaed Combetta to appear before the grand 
jury.  However, Department prosecutors and FBI agents ultimately decided that 
questioning him before the grand jury was unnecessary because (1) they perceived 
him to be credible during his third interview; and (2) he did not implicate anyone 
else in criminal conduct such that it would have been helpful to “lock in” his 
testimony for a future trial.  We did not find evidence that this decision was 
motivated by an improper consideration. 
D. Use Immunity Agreements 
Prosecutors have wide latitude in deciding to whom to give immunity, and 
the Department entered into “letter use” or “Queen for a Day” immunity 
agreements with three witnesses in the Midyear investigation:  Pagliano, Combetta, 
and Bentel.  We found no evidence that the decisions to enter into these immunity 
agreements were based on improper considerations.  The factors that the Midyear 
prosecutors told us they considered in deciding to grant immunity were consistent 
with the factors Department policy required them to consider, including: 
 “The value of the person’s testimony or information to the 
investigation or prosecution;” 
 “The person’s relative culpability in connection with the offense or 
offenses being investigated or prosecuted;” and 
 “The possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to 
compelling his or her testimony.” 
See USAM 9-23.210. 
With respect to Pagliano, the prosecutors told us that they entered into a 
letter use immunity agreement because they believed the information he could 
provide regarding the set-up and maintenance of Clinton’s servers was critical to 
the Midyear investigation and they determined that he faced no criminal exposure.  
Based on a review of his FD-302s (as described in Section VII.A of this chapter) and 
the fact that PIN considered and declined criminal charges against Pagliano, we 
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found that the prosecutors’ assessments regarding Pagliano were not unreasonable 
or motivated by improper considerations or bias. 
With respect to Bentel, the only immunity agreement was a Queen for a Day 
proffer agreement.  This agreement prevented the Department from using any 
statements made by Bentel pursuant to the agreement against him in its case-in-
chief in any subsequent prosecution, but did not prevent the Department from 
using leads obtained from Bentel’s statements or using Bentel’s statements to 
cross-examine him in any future prosecution.  See Chapter Two, Section I.E.3.  The 
prosecutors assessed that interviewing Bentel was a necessary investigative step, 
and that he faced no criminal exposure.  Based on our review of Bentel’s FD-302 
and the limited nature of the Queen for a Day immunity agreement, we found that 
the prosecutors’ decision to grant Bentel immunity was not unreasonable or based 
on improper considerations or bias. 
With respect to Combetta, we found his actions in deleting Clinton’s emails in 
violation of a Congressional subpoena and preservation order and then lying about 
it to the FBI to be particularly serious.  We asked the prosecutors why they chose 
to grant him immunity instead of charging him with obstruction of justice, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505, or making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001. 
Department policy provides that, when considering whether to pursue 
criminal charges against an individual: 
The attorney for the government should commence or recommend 
federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct 
constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will 
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the 
prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person 
is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there 
exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. 
USAM 9-27.220.  In determining whether the prosecution would serve a federal 
interest, the Department should “weigh all relevant considerations,” including: 
 “The nature and seriousness of the offense;” 
 “The person’s culpability in connection with the offense;” and 
 “The person’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or 
prosecution of others.” 
USAM 9-27.230. 
We received mixed testimony from Department and FBI witnesses regarding 
the strength of the evidence that Combetta committed obstruction or made false 
statements following his first two interviews.  The prosecutors and agents we 
interviewed indicated that, even assuming that “the admissible evidence [was] 
probably...sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction” after Combetta’s first two 
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interviews—an assumption the prosecutors indicated was not necessarily true—they 
believed prosecuting Combetta would not “serve a federal interest.”  The reasons 
they provided to us for reaching this conclusion included:  (1) relevant to the 
nature and seriousness of the offense, there was no evidence that Combetta knew 
anything about the content of the emails on Clinton’s server or that they were 
classified when he deleted them; (2) relevant to Combetta’s culpability, they 
believed Combetta’s failure to be forthcoming had been primarily due to poor 
representation rather than a motive to mislead the investigators; and (3) relevant 
to his willingness to cooperate, Combetta was willing to cooperate with immunity.  
Prosecutor 1 told us that the team would have considered pursuing charges against 
Combetta if he refused to cooperate with immunity, but that granting immunity was 
“the most expedient way” to obtain truthful information from him. 
The prosecutors told us they believed granting Combetta use immunity was 
the best available option.  They told us that they could not forgo Combetta’s 
testimony, because they believed his truthful testimony regarding his role and the 
roles of others in the March deletions was essential to the investigation.  Moreover, 
they said they had no means other than immunity to gain his testimony, because 
he had stated that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  The prosecutors told us they did not charge Combetta and then 
pursue his cooperation in exchange for a guilty plea to reduced charges or a 
sentencing reduction because of, as discussed above, concerns about the strength 
of the admissible evidence and because they did not believe criminal charges were 
in the federal interest given his willingness to cooperate with immunity.  The 
decision to choose a use immunity agreement over a non-prosecution agreement is 
supported by the USAM, which provides that immunity is (1) appropriate when “the 
testimony or other information that is expected to be obtained from the witness 
may be necessary to the public interest;” and (2) preferable to a nonprosecution 
agreement in exchange for cooperation because immunity “at least leave[s] open 
the possibility of prosecuting [the witness] on the basis of independently obtained 
evidence.”  USAM 9-23.210; 9-27.600 (comment). 
We did not find evidence that the judgments made by the prosecutors in 
entering into these immunity agreements were inconsistent with Department policy, 
or based on improper considerations or bias.  Ultimately, assessing the strength of 
the evidence and applying the provisions of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual in 
determining whether to pursue federal criminal charges is a matter within the 
discretion and judgment of the prosecutors. 
E. Mills and Samuelson 
The issues surrounding obtaining Mills’s and Samuelson’s testimony 
regarding the culling process and searching the culling laptops consumed a 
significant amount of the Midyear team’s time and attention and caused significant 
strife between the FBI and Department prosecutors.  Several members of the FBI 
Midyear team, including Comey, expressed concerns that the prosecutors had not 
been sufficiently aggressive.  Ultimately, Mills and Samuelson submitted to 
voluntary interviews—albeit with limitations that prevented the investigators from 
soliciting privileged information—and the laptops were secured through consent 
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agreements and act-of-production immunity.  Both the prosecutors and the FBI told 
us that the team obtained what it needed from Mills and Samuelson to conduct a 
thorough investigation.  Comey himself, during a speech at an October 2016 FBI 
conference for Special Agents in Charge, which we describe below in Chapter Eight, 
acknowledged the complex issues involved with obtaining the culling laptops from 
Mills and Samuelson.  He further stated that the decision to obtain the culling 
laptops by consent was “reasonable...to short circuit the months and months of 
litigation that would've come otherwise” and that he was “actually surprised they 
agree[d] to give us the laptops.” 
We noted that these decisions concerning the laptops were occurring at a 
time when Comey and the Midyear team had already concluded that there was 
likely no prosecutable case and believed it was unlikely the culling laptops would 
change the outcome of the investigation.  Moreover, as we describe in Chapter Six, 
at the time of the deliberations regarding the Mills and Samuelson issues, Comey 
was motivated by a desire to “credibly” complete the investigation sufficiently in 
advance of the election to not be perceived as political.  Consistent with this 
motivation, Comey told us that one of the reasons he raised the possibility of a 
Special Counsel with Yates in April 2016 was to push the Department to move more 
quickly to obtain the culling laptops.  Comey also pressed the Midyear investigators 
in early May for the prompt completion of the investigation. 
The Mills and Samuelson issues were somewhat complicated.  Not only were 
Mills and Samuelson both fact witnesses, Mills had numerous classified emails pass 
through her unclassified government and personal email addresses while working at 
the State Department under Secretary Clinton; both Mills and Samuelson acted as 
attorneys for Clinton after they departed from the State Department; and both 
were represented by their own (and the same) counsel, Beth Wilkinson, while 
former Secretary Clinton was represented by separate counsel, David Kendall, in 
connection with the Midyear investigation.  These different layers of conduct and 
representation made obtaining evidence from Mills and Samuelson complex, 
whether the prosecutors sought to obtain the evidence by consent or compulsory 
process.  In seeking evidence by consent, they had to consider whose consent was 
necessary—Wilkinsons’s on behalf of Mills and Samuelson, Kendall’s on behalf of 
Clinton, or both.  They had to be cognizant of attorney-client privilege and 
attorney-work product with respect to Mills’s and Samuelson’s relationship to 
Clinton, Kendall’s relationship to Clinton, Wilkinson’s relationship to Mills and 
Samuelson, and information on the laptops related to Mills’s and Samuelson’s 
representation of other clients.  They had to consider the implications of the fact 
that Wilkinson represented both Mills and Samuelson, as well as two other 
witnesses in the Midyear investigation.  They also had to consider the policy 
restrictions set forth in the USAM, ethical issues, strategic issues (such as whether 
issuing criminal process might jeopardize the testimony that Mills consented to 
provide regarding her tenure at the State Department), and the concern that using 
criminal process could delay the investigation.  Based on the evidence we reviewed, 
the Department prosecutors extensively considered all of these issues, analyzed the 
relevant law and policy, and ultimately made judgment calls with respect to Mills 
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and Samuelson that were within their exercise of prosecutorial discretion and we 
found were not unreasonable. 
We likewise found no evidence that bias impacted the decision to obtain 
testimony and evidence from Mills and Samuelson by consent agreement and with 
act-of-production immunity.  Indeed, individuals for whom we had concerns about 
potential bias due to the content of their electronic messages advocated for the use 
of aggressive investigative measures with respect to Mills and Samuelson.  For 
example, Strzok and Page both urged the Department to issue grand jury 
subpoenas for Mills’s and Samuelson’s testimony regarding the culling process and 
to seek a search warrant to seize the culling laptops from Wilkinson’s office. 
The prosecutors told us that they followed the procedures set forth in 
Department policy for obtaining testimony and evidence from attorneys related to 
their representation of clients.  Based on our review of the relevant Department 
policy and privilege law, we found that the prosecutors’ interpretations of the 
relevant Department policy were not unreasonable and we found no evidence that 
they were motivated by improper considerations.  In accordance with 28 C.F.R. 
§ 59.4, USAM 9-19.220, and USAM 9-13.420, the prosecutors correctly determined 
that, in the absence of evidence that such efforts would compromise the 
investigation, they could not seek a search warrant to seize the culling laptops from 
Wilkinson’s office without first attempting to obtain the culling laptops through 
consent and, if that was unsuccessful, a grand jury subpoena.  Under the 
circumstances, and in accordance with USAM 9-13.410, they determined that they 
could not issue a subpoena for the culling laptops without first taking several 
preliminary steps, including:  (1) assessing whether the laptops were reasonably 
needed for the successful completion of the investigation, (2) attempting to first 
obtain the laptops by consent, and (3) seeking approval from the AAG or DAAG of 
the Criminal Division.  Also in accordance with USAM 9-13.410, they determined 
that they could not issue subpoenas for Mills’s and Samuelson’s testimony 
regarding the culling process without first seeking their testimony by consent and 
tailoring their questions such that they did not seek information that was “protected 
by a valid claim of privilege.” 
In accordance with these policies, the prosecutors conducted voluntary 
interviews with Mills and Samuelson, obtained Criminal Division approval to issue 
subpoenas for the culling laptops, and ultimately obtained the culling laptops 
through consent agreements and act-of-production immunity agreements rather 
than subpoena.  They told us that, even with the approval for subpoenas, they 
believed securing the laptops through consent was preferable to avoid the 
uncertainty and delays of a potential motion to quash the subpoenas.  The act-of-
production immunity agreements prevented the Department from using information 
obtained from the laptops in a criminal prosecution against Mills or Samuelson for 
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e) and (f) (felony mishandling of classified 
information), 18 U.S.C. § 1924 (misdemeanor mishandling of classified 
information), and 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (destruction of federal records).  The immunity 
agreements did not prevent the Department from:  (1) using information obtained 
from the laptops to prosecute Mills or Samuelson for other crimes, such as 
obstructing a Congressional or FBI investigation or lying to federal investigators; 
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(2) using evidence obtained from other sources, including their voluntary 
interviews, to prosecute Mills and Samuelson for mishandling classified information, 
destroying federal records, or any other offenses; (3) using information obtained 
from the laptops to prosecute other individuals, including Clinton, for mishandling 
classified information, destroying federal records, or any other offenses; or (4) 
using leads developed as a result of the FBI’s review of the information on the 
culling laptops. 
Ultimately, these decisions were judgment calls made by, and within the 
discretion of, the prosecutors, much like the decisions discussed above regarding 
use immunity agreements.  We found no evidence that these decisions were the 
result of improper considerations or were influenced by bias. 
F. Handling of Clinton’s Interview 
By the time of Clinton’s interview on July 2, we found that the Midyear 
agents and prosecutors, along with Comey, had decided that absent a confession or 
false statements by Clinton, the investigation would be closed without charges.  We 
further found that this conclusion was based on the prosecutors’ view that there 
was insufficient evidence of Clinton’s knowledge and intent to support criminal 
charges, which we discuss in detail in Chapter Seven. 
We did not find evidence that decisions regarding the timing or scoping of 
Clinton’s interview were based on improper considerations or influenced by bias.  In 
addition, based on our review of the FD-302 and contemporaneous notes, the 
investigators appeared to ask appropriate questions of Clinton and made use of 
documents to challenge Clinton’s testimony and assess her credibility during the 
interview.121  However, we had three primary concerns related to the Clinton 
interview:  (1) text messages sent by Page to Strzok, McCabe, and another FBI 
employee that appeared to suggest that the team limit the number of attendees at 
Clinton’s interview because she might be the next President and it could leave her 
upset at the FBI; (2) certain instant messages sent by Agent 1, who was one of the 
case agents that handled Clinton’s interview; and (3) the presence of Mills and 
Samuelson at Clinton’s interview, despite that they were also witnesses in the 
investigation. 
With regard to the number of attendees, Page sent the following text 
message in support of fewer agents and prosecutors attending Clinton’s interview:  
“[S]he might be our next president.  The last thing you need us going in there 
loaded for bear.  You think she’s going to remember or care that it was more doj 
                                       
121  For example, based on the FD-302 from Clinton’s interview, Clinton told the interviewing 
agents that she “expected her team to provide any work-related or arguably work-related emails to 
State.”  The interviewing agents then challenged this statement by showing Clinton a work-related 
email that was not produced to the State Department.  Clinton acknowledged that the email was 
work-related and stated that she did not know why her team did not produce it. 
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than fbi?”122  The text messages and contemporaneous emails reflect that Page was 
particularly concerned with the Department’s request that four prosecutors attend 
the interview.  Ultimately, eight people attended Clinton’s interview from the 
Department and FBI, including five prosecutors.  Therefore, we concluded that 
Page’s suggestion of limiting the number of attendees to four or six did not in fact 
occur.  Moreover, based on witness testimony, we found that the approach Page 
was advocating—keeping the number of interviewers down to a lower number—was 
consistent with legitimate investigative strategy. 
Nevertheless, we found that Page’s statement, on its face, consisted of a 
recommendation that the Midyear team consider how Clinton would treat the FBI if 
she were to become President in deciding how to handle Clinton’s interview.  
Suggesting that investigative decisions be based on this consideration was 
inappropriate and created an appearance of bias. 
We also were concerned that Agent 1 was one of the two agents who 
questioned Clinton during the interview given certain instant messages that we 
identified from Agent 1, including some that expressed support for Clinton and 
hostility toward Trump.  We interviewed each of the seven other FBI and 
Department attendees at Clinton’s interview, and none of them expressed concerns 
regarding the conduct of the interview.  We also did not find, based on our review 
of the interview outline prepared in advance of the interview as well as the FD-302 
and contemporaneous notes of the interview, evidence that bias or improper 
considerations influenced the conduct of the interview.  We took note of the fact 
that, because the Midyear team and Comey had concluded prior to the interview 
that the evidence did not support criminal charges (absent a confession or false 
statement by Clinton during the interview), the interview had little effect on the 
outcome of the investigation.  Nonetheless, as discussed above, we found Agent 1’s 
messages to be troubling and in Chapter Twelve, we discuss the impact of these 
instant messages on such matters as the public perception of the handling of the 
Midyear investigation and the FBI. 
Finally, we questioned why the Department and FBI allowed Mills and 
Samuelson, two percipient witnesses (one of whom, Mills, herself had classified 
information transit through her unclassified personal email account) attend Clinton’s 
interview, even if they had also both served as lawyers for Clinton after they left 
the State Department.  The FBI and Department employees we interviewed all 
agreed that the attendance of Mills and Samuelson at Clinton’s interview posed 
potential evidentiary problems, was unusual, and was unhelpful from an “optics” 
perspective.  Witnesses also told us that the only way they could have excluded 
Mills and Samuelson was by subpoenaing Clinton before the grand jury, but that 
the team did not seriously consider that option.  If the team had issued a grand 
jury subpoena, Clinton either would have been required to testify before the grand 
jury without her attorneys in the room or she might have agreed to a voluntary 
interview outside the presence of Mills and Samuelson to avoid having to appear 
                                       
122  From the context of this message in the series of text messages that day, we determined 
that the text message was focused on the number of Midyear team members attending and not on the 
nature of the questioning. 
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before the grand jury, given that a grand jury appearance would have delayed the 
investigation. 
We did not find evidence that bias played a role in the decision to proceed 
with the Clinton interview with Mills and Samuelson in attendance.  Rather, we 
concluded that it was largely based on four factors.  First, the Midyear prosecutors 
were concerned about interviewing Clinton before the grand jury because of the 
challenges of presenting classified information before the grand jury.  Second, the 
Midyear team had decided by the time of Clinton’s interview that the case was 
headed toward a declination absent a confession or false statement by Clinton. 
Third, had Clinton been required to testify before the grand jury, the FBI would not 
have been able to participate in the interview.  Fourth, the team planned to pause 
the interview and conduct a sidebar with Kendall if Mills or Samuelson interfered 
during the interview. 
Ultimately, witnesses told us that Mills and Samuelson did not interfere, 
object, or speak substantively during the interview.  Moreover, Clinton’s interview 
did not result in any change in the conclusion of the Midyear team and Comey that 
a declination decision was warranted.  Accordingly, we found no persuasive 
evidence that Mills’s or Samuelson’s presence influenced Clinton’s interview, or that 
the outcome of the investigation would have been different had Clinton been 
subpoenaed before the grand jury. 
Nevertheless, we found the decision to allow the Clinton interview to proceed 
in the presence of two fact witnesses, who also were serving as Clinton’s counsel, 
was inconsistent with typical investigative strategy and gave rise to accusations of 
bias and preferential treatment.123  Moreover, there are serious potential 
ramifications when one witness attends another witness’s interview.  The Midyear 
team could have developed information during the Clinton interview that led the 
team to reconsider its conclusion that the investigation was headed towards a 
declination, or led the team to believe that Clinton made a false statement during 
the interview.  In either case, the presence of two fact witnesses at the interview 
could have negatively impacted subsequent FBI investigative efforts or a 
subsequent trial.  We believe that it would have been useful for the Midyear team 
to have had guidance to consider in this situation.  Thus, we recommend that the 
Department and the FBI consider developing guidance consider developing practice 
guidance that would assist investigators and prosecutors in identifying the general 
risks with and alternatives to permitting a witness to attend a voluntary interview of 
another witness, in particular when the witness is serving as counsel for the other 
witness. 
                                       
123  We recognize that, as a general matter, a witness is free to consult with counsel of the 
witness’s choice.  However, the government is not required to agree to conduct an interview of a 
witness in the presence of counsel who is also a witness. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
“ENDGAME” DISCUSSIONS AND FORMER DIRECTOR COMEY’S 
PUBLIC STATEMENT 
Our review found that the Midyear team concluded beginning in early 2016 
that evidence supporting a prosecution of former Secretary Clinton or her senior 
aides was likely lacking.  This conclusion was based on the fact that the Midyear 
team had not found evidence that former Secretary Clinton or her senior aides 
knowingly transmitted classified information on unclassified systems because (1) 
classified information exchanged in unclassified emails was not clearly or properly 
marked, and (2) State Department staff introducing classified information into 
emails made an effort to “talk around” it.  Although the Midyear team continued its 
investigation, taking the investigative steps described in Chapter Five and looking 
for evidence that could change their assessment, they also began discussing what 
witnesses referred to as the “endgame” for the investigation—ways for the 
Department and FBI to credibly announce the closing of the investigation. 
In this chapter, we discuss the factors that led the Midyear team to conclude 
that the investigation likely would result in a declination.  We then describe the 
discussions among Comey, Rybicki, Yates, and Axelrod beginning in April 2016 
about how to announce the closing of the Midyear investigation, including Comey’s 
mention of a special counsel and Lynch’s knowledge of these discussions.  We also 
describe the origins of Comey’s decision to hold a press conference without 
coordinating with or informing the Department in advance, the various drafts of his 
public statement, and the Department’s reactions to the statement after he 
delivered it on July 5, 2016.  In addition, we describe the tarmac meeting between 
Lynch and former President Bill Clinton on June 27, 2016, and its impact on the 
Midyear investigation.  Finally, we describe Comey’s congressional testimony about 
the reasons for his public statement. 
I. Evidence that the Case Was Headed toward a Declination 
As described above, both Department and FBI witnesses said that the central 
question in the Midyear investigation was whether there was evidence that former 
Secretary Clinton and her aides acted with knowledge that the information 
transmitted was classified or transmitted with criminal intent.  Various witnesses 
told the OIG that the investigation focused on identifying what classified 
information transited former Secretary Clinton’s server, who introduced it, and why.  
The investigative team looked for evidence that individuals who sent emails 
containing classified information did so with knowledge that the information was 
classified—for example, took information from documents that were marked with 
classification headers and stripped off the header information—or that former 
Secretary Clinton’s private server was set up to circumvent classification 
requirements. 
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From early in the investigation, the investigative team said they knew that 
proving intent would be a challenge.124  Prosecutor 1 told the OIG: 
[T]his whole case turned on mens rea [guilty state of mind]....  I’ve 
run a lot of mishandling cases.  The issue is usually that people are 
taking things home or they’re communicating them to someone for, to 
set up a business outside or to do something that’s like, what we don’t 
tend to prosecute criminally anyway are people who are 
communicating things for work purposes....  Usually to people who are 
already cleared.  So, those are the kinds of things that when we’re 
talking about mens rea, were sort of instructive for us.... 
This prosecutor explained that Secretary Clinton and her staff did not display any of 
the counterintelligence indicators that prosecutors typically see in mishandling 
cases, such as unreported foreign contacts or “weird” meetings with foreigners.  
This prosecutor said that evidence of intent was lacking for other reasons as well, 
including that numerous witnesses testified that the State Department had terrible 
information technology (IT) systems and that its remote email system did not work 
when employees were traveling and sending emails in different time zones.  As a 
result, the investigative team said they could not infer bad intent from the use of 
personal email accounts as they might in other cases. 
Prosecutor 2 similarly stated that mishandling cases generally involve 
“people who have an intent to give classified information to others, people who 
have an intent to...take documents home and...do nefarious things with them, or 
sometimes hoarders of classified information.”  This prosecutor told the OIG that, 
unlike the typical mishandling case, the State Department employees who 
introduced classified information into the unclassified system were trying to “talk 
around” it in the course of doing their jobs.  This prosecutor stated, “And looking in 
terms of some of the times when the classified information appeared on 
[un]classified systems in this case, we see, we see problems, you know, late at 
night, weekends, the time between Christmas and New Year’s when no one is in the 
office.” 
FBI officials agreed with the prosecutors that the need to prove intent was 
problematic from the outset.  In his recent book, Comey stated: 
...Hillary Clinton’s case, at least as far as we knew at the start, did not 
appear to come anywhere near General Petraeus’s in the volume and 
classification level of the information mishandled.  Although she 
seemed to be using an unclassified system for some classified topics, 
                                       
124  The legal framework for the Midyear investigation and the basis for the decision not to 
recommend or pursue prosecution of former Secretary Clinton or her staff are described in Chapters 
Two and Seven, respectively.  Even though Section 793(f)(1) does not require intent, prosecutors told 
us that the Department has interpreted the provision to require that the person accused of having 
removed or delivered classified information in violation of this provision possess knowledge that the 
information is classified.  In addition, based on the legislative history of Section 793(f)(1), the 
prosecutors determined that conduct must be “so gross as to almost suggest deliberate intention,” be 
“criminally reckless,” or fall “just a little short of willful” to meet the “gross negligence” standard. 
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everyone she emailed appeared to have both the appropriate 
clearance and a legitimate need to know the information.  So although 
we were not going to prejudge the result, we started the Clinton 
investigation aware that it was unlikely to be a case that career 
prosecutors at the Department of Justice would prosecute.  That might 
change, of course, if we could find a smoking-gun email where 
someone in government told Secretary Clinton not to do what she was 
doing, or if we could prove she obstructed justice, or if she, like 
Petraeus, lied to us in an interview.  It would all turn on what we could 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt[.]125 
As described in more detail below, Comey said that by early May 2016, when he 
wrote the first draft of his public statement, the Midyear team was aware that 
evidence of intent was lacking. 
Others on the Midyear team agreed.  FBI Attorney 1 stated, “I have cases 
where there [are] people with thousands of classified documents in their home and 
we don’t prosecute them....  [T]his is not something we prosecute lightly or we do 
regularly.  There needs to be, usually, some either nefarious intent or some...actual 
harm that has happened because of it.”  Agent 2 told the OIG: 
[F]rom like my level looking at it...you were hard-pressed to find the 
intent of anyone to put classified information on that server.  And 
again, sloppy security practices, for sure.  Right?  But, and, and 
preventable?  Yes.  But somebody intentionally putting classified on it, 
we just never found clear-cut evidence of somebody intending to do 
that. 
As early as September 2015, FBI and Department officials realized that they 
were unlikely to find evidence of intent.  Prosecutor 2 stated that within a month of 
first obtaining criminal process, they had seen no evidence of intent.  This 
prosecutor told the OIG that the team realized that the case likely would lead to a 
declination after they had reviewed the classified information in former Secretary 
Clinton’s emails and heard the explanations for including that information in 
unclassified emails.  Prosecutor 2 said that there were a number of other 
investigative steps they needed to take to complete their due diligence, but that by 
September 2015 they knew that they would need a “game changer” to be able to 
prove intent. 
Notes obtained by the OIG from a meeting between Toscas and then EAD 
John Giacalone on December 4, 2015, confirm that the lack of intent was the 
subject of ongoing discussions.  According to the notes, Giacalone asked the team, 
“Still [do not] have much on the intent side, right?”  The notes show that the team 
members present at the meeting agreed with him.  Giacalone, who retired from the 
FBI in February 2016, said that there were “no smoking guns” showing intent when 
he left. 
                                       
125  COMEY, supra, at 164-65. 
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Similarly, other notes show that prosecutors met with NSD supervisors on 
January 29, 2016, to discuss the lack of evidence supporting prosecution.  The 
notes state: 
Don’t see prosecutable case at this point. 
A lot of stuff done from Ops Center [lower level State Department 
staff] —> up.  HRC is receiving. 
Want to insulate DOJ from criticism about how we did this work. 
No daylight [between] FBI management and investigative team agents 
re:  view of criminal liability. 
Asked what led the team to conclude by January 2016 that there would not be a 
prosecutable case, Laufman said that there was not a fixed point in time or 
organized discussion that produced this realization.  He said that every time the 
team concluded “another consequential investigative step, and no additional 
information emerged that...pointed in the direction of potential criminal liability, 
then the…foundation of facts emerged that was not likely to support a 
recommendation to charge.” 
Asked whether there was a particular piece of evidence or an interview that 
led to the realization that the case would result in a declination, Prosecutor 3 stated 
that it became apparent once the team had interviewed all of former Secretary 
Clinton’s senior staff members, including Jake Sullivan and Cheryl Mills, and heard 
the same explanation for what they believed to be an innocuous transmission of 
emails containing classified information.  Other witnesses described the team’s 
realization that the investigation would not result in a prosecutable case as 
“iterative” or “emerging over time” based on the cumulative lack of intent evidence 
over the course of the entire investigation.  In any event, various witnesses agreed 
that the team had come to the conclusion that there likely was not a prosecutable 
case by the Spring of 2016. 
Baker told the OIG that he thought that the conduct of former Secretary 
Clinton and her senior aides was “appalling with respect to how they handled the 
classified information...[and] arrogant in terms of their knowledge and 
understanding of these matters.”  He stated that he was concerned about former 
Secretary Clinton’s level of knowledge and intent, and thought that she should have 
recognized the sensitivity of information in the emails sent to her.  Baker said that 
he “debated and argued” with Comey and the Midyear team about former Secretary 
Clinton’s criminal liability, but ultimately came to the conclusion that declining 
prosecution was the correct decision after reviewing a binder of her emails.  Baker 
said that he recognized there was a lack of evidence establishing knowledge or 
criminal intent, and that based on “the volume of...communications coming at 
[Clinton] at all times, day and night, given the heavy responsibilities that a 
Secretary of State has, isn’t she entitled to rely on [the classification determinations 
by] her folks?”  Baker stated that he “did not like it....  I eventually agreed with it, 
but I did not like it.” 
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Yates told the OIG that she had been getting updates regularly from Carlin 
and Toscas about where the investigation was going.  In Spring 2016, Carlin or 
Toscas told her that if the investigation continued in the same direction it was 
going, they expected that the prosecutors and the agents would be recommending 
a declination.  Yates told us that this assessment of the case was based on 
evidence indicating that the people transmitting classified information did not have 
a “bad purpose.”  She pointed to a variety of factors, including that emails were 
sent by State Department employees to other State Department employees, and 
usually contained time-sensitive logistical information that former Secretary Clinton 
needed to receive.  She said that the information was not marked classified, with 
the exception of three paragraphs that were portion marked as “Confidential,” and 
that there were even disputes within the originating agencies as to whether the 
information should be classified at all. 
Yates said that Department leadership began talking internally in the Spring 
of 2016 about how to convey a declination decision because they knew that it 
would be controversial, and that they were all of the view that it needed to be clear 
that the decision was supported by both the FBI and the Department.  Yates said 
that these discussions always proceeded with the “great big caveat” that former 
Secretary Clinton could lie during her interview, but that they could not wait until 
after the interview to begin preparing for a declination due, in part, to the proximity 
of the election.  Discussions between the FBI and the Department about the 
“endgame” for concluding the Midyear investigation began around this same time, 
and are described in more detail below. 
II. Discussions between FBI and Department Leadership about How to 
Credibly Announce a Declination (Spring 2016) 
As noted above, Comey said that the Midyear team was aware from the 
outset that the investigation was unlikely to result in a prosecutable case, absent a 
“smoking-gun” email.  Comey told the OIG that he realized sometime in March or 
April 2016 that the evidence obtained in the Midyear investigation likely would not 
support a prosecution.  Asked what led him to that conclusion at that time, Comey 
stated: 
[T]he picture that was fairly clear at that point, [was] that Hillary 
Clinton had used a private email...to conduct her State Department 
business.  And in the course of conduct [of] her State Department 
business, she discussed classified topics on eight occasions TS, dozens 
of occasions SECRET, and there was no indication that we had found 
that she knew that was improper, unlawful, that someone had said 
don’t do that, that will violate 18 U.S.C. [the federal criminal code], 
but that there was no evidence of intent and it’s looking, despite the 
fact of the prominence of it, like an unusual, but in a way fairly typical 
spill and that there was no fricking way that the Department of Justice 
in a million years was going to prosecute that. 
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And because Counterintelligence Division of the FBI was involved in all 
the other spill cases and it collected for me the history of them, no 
way, there’s no way, unless we find something else in May and June or 
we get [18 U.S.C. §] 1001 [false statements] handed to us during her 
interview. 
Comey said that, as he came to this realization, he became concerned that 
the Department would be unable to announce the closing of the investigation in a 
way that the public would find credible and objective.  Comey said he was 
concerned that having the Department’s political leadership announce a declination 
would expose it to a “corrosive doubt about whether you did [the investigation] in a 
credible way.”  He said that this concern “dominated [his] thinking...for most of 
2016, but especially from the spring on.”  According to Comey, his concern was 
based on the appearance or perception created by the Department’s leadership 
declining prosecution of the presumptive Democratic nominee, because they were 
political appointees; it was not based on evidence that Lynch or Yates were 
interfering in the investigation or were politically biased. 
A. Initial Discussion between Comey and Yates in April 2016 
1. Options Discussed at the Meeting 
Comey said that beginning in March or April 2016, he began to think of ways 
to announce a declination.  Comey said that during this time he had a meeting with 
Rybicki, Yates, and Axelrod to discuss how the FBI and Department could credibly 
close the investigation.  Based on Yates’s description of the circumstances of the 
meeting (described below) and FBI emails, we determined that this meeting likely 
took place on Tuesday, April 12, 2016. 
According to Comey, he told Yates and Axelrod during the meeting that they 
needed to begin thinking about the how to announce the end of the investigation.  
Comey said that he told Yates, “[M]y sense of this, and I’m not done, but my sense 
of this is this is heading for a declination and how do you credibly decline this?  And 
what can you say to people to support the credibility of the work that’s been done?” 
Comey said that he urged Yates and Axelrod to consider the most 
transparent options available for announcing a declination.  Comey told the OIG: 
[M]y view was, still is, that the more information you are able to 
supply, the higher the credibility of the investigation and the 
conclusion.  And that especially in a poisonous political atmosphere, 
where all kinds of nonsense is said, the more you can fill that space 
with actual facts, the more reliable, believable, credible the conclusion 
is. 
He stated, “People are still going to disagree.  They are still going to fight, but at 
least there will be facts in the public square that show...[we] did this in a good way, 
thought about it in a good way and here is our reasoning as to why we think there 
is no there there.” 
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Comey told the OIG that they did not discuss or consider specific options, but 
that he simply said to Yates, “[Y]ou need to get smart people working on what are 
the range of possibilities...what is possible under the law, I remember mentioning 
the Privacy Act, what is possible and what are the vehicles for transparency, what 
are the outer boundaries....  I think I just teed up the issue and said, hope you will 
get smart people thinking about this.”  Asked whether he was ever involved in 
discussions about a joint appearance with Attorney General Lynch, Comey said that 
he did not recall any discussions about that option. 
Yates recalled this discussion with Comey differently.  Yates said that she had 
a regular monthly meeting with Comey, and that the day before one of these 
meetings, Axelrod received a call from Rybicki suggesting that they meet to discuss 
how to conclude the case.  She did not recall precisely when this meeting took 
place or what had happened in the investigation leading up to it, but she described 
the investigation at that time as “wrapping up.” 
Yates said that the meeting took place in her office.  She said that they 
talked about the investigation and agreed that public confidence in its resolution 
was important.  She said that everyone was of the same view that there was not a 
criminal case based on the evidence to date, and that it was not going to be 
sufficient to announce the conclusion by saying, “We looked at it...case closed.”  
She said that the four of them agreed that people needed to have confidence that 
there had been a thorough look at the facts, and that a declination was the right 
decision. 
Yates told the OIG that any discussion about how to announce a declination 
always proceeded with “great big caveat on it” that former Secretary Clinton could 
lie during her interview.  Yates stated, “This is if things continue to go that way.  
Because you don’t want to be like planning the declination that you don’t really 
know is a declination yet.  Because I mean, if she lied for example.  There’s about, 
that could change things entirely if she wasn’t truthful in the interview.” 
According to Yates, one of the options they considered was a written 
memorandum released to the public, which would give some level of facts about 
the investigation.  Yates stated that they all agreed that if they released a written 
memorandum, they also would need to hold a press conference to allow them to 
“look the [American] people in the eye” and say that there was not a criminal case, 
rather than “hiding behind a behind a [press] release or a writing that...would not 
be sufficient to convey the earnestness of that decision.”  She said that no one 
committed to a decision at this meeting, but rather they were “thinking out loud.” 
We asked Axelrod about these discussions between Yates and Comey.  He 
said they focused on whether the FBI would be part of any announcement at the 
conclusion of the investigation.  Axelrod said that they discussed preparing a 
letterhead memorandum (LHM) that could at least be provided to Congress, along 
with some form of a public announcement. 
Axelrod said that one of the options they discussed was a joint 
announcement involving Lynch and Comey.  Axelrod told the OIG that “the view 
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from the Department was it would be important for the Bureau to be part of that.”  
He stated, “[Comey] hadn’t committed to it but was...comfortable with it being 
some sort of joint thing.”  Asked why he thought it was important to have Comey 
participate in an announcement, Axelrod said that it was important for the 
Department and the FBI to display a “unified front...having both organizations 
together saying the truth, which was this was done by the book and this was the 
result.” 
Axelrod said that they never discussed the idea of Comey being the one to 
announce a declination because it was never raised, but that he was “not sure that 
would have been rejected out of hand.”  He stated, “[T]here would have been some 
advantages to that having been coordinated and planned that way.  And some 
disadvantages, too....  [T]he thing...that I knew that the Department felt strongly 
about was that Bureau had to be part of that [announcement].” 
Rybicki said that he did not recall any specific discussions, stating, “I just 
remember all ideas sort of being, you know, people talking about, you know, press 
conferences and, and, and ways of closing and things like that.  I don’t remember 
specific conversations.” 
2. Comey Mentions a Special Counsel at April Meeting with 
Yates 
Comey’s Testimony 
Comey told the OIG that during the April meeting with Yates and Axelrod, he 
told Yates that the closer they got to the political conventions, the more likely he 
would be to insist that a special counsel be appointed, because there was no way 
the Department could credibly finish the investigation once former Secretary Clinton 
was the Democratic Party nominee.  Comey said that his comment to Yates was 
motivated in part by his frustration that it was taking the Midyear prosecutors too 
long to obtain the Mills and Samuelson laptops (discussed above in Chapter Five).  
He said that he emphasized to Yates that the team needed to obtain the laptops to 
be able to finish the investigation.  According to Comey, Yates reacted to his 
comment about the possible need for a special counsel with concern, and that he 
responded, “[L]ook I’m not saying we have to do it, but the deeper we get into this 
summer, the more likely it’s going to be that I’ll feel that way.  And I was saying it 
in part to get them to just move—to move, to get us this thing [the laptops].” 
As part of this discussion, Comey said he recounted his experience when he 
was the DAG appointing then U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald as the special counsel 
to investigate the leak of the name of a covert CIA operative, Valerie Plame.126  He 
said he explained to Yates that the investigation focused in part on whether Karl 
                                       
126  Comey served as the DAG from December 9, 2003, to August 15, 2005, under President 
George W. Bush.  On July 14, 2003, the Washington Post published Plame’s name, sourced to 
unidentified senior administration officials.  On December 30, 2003, then Attorney General Ashcroft 
recused himself from the investigation.  Comey became the Acting Attorney General for purposes of 
the investigation and appointed Fitzgerald to oversee it. 
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Rove, then President George W. Bush’s senior political advisor, had leaked the 
information, and that he (Comey) was concerned about the appearance of a conflict 
of interest between Rove and then Attorney General John Ashcroft because Rove 
had managed one of Ashcroft’s Senate campaigns.  He told the OIG that he 
mentioned this to Yates because he saw similarities between the Plame leak case 
and the Midyear investigation:  namely, that in the Plame case there was no basis 
to prosecute Rove, and he did not think the Bush Administration could have 
announced a declination in a way that assured the public the investigation was 
done objectively. 
Comey said that his comment to Yates about appointing a special counsel 
also was motivated by concerns about the appearance of political bias in the 
Department.  He said that these concerns were based on the overall political 
environment—given then President Obama’s comments about the investigation, he 
did not think the Department leadership could credibly complete the investigation 
without charges.127 
Comey said that he also was concerned about an issue specific to Lynch.  As 
discussed in more detail in the classified appendix to this report, Comey told the 
OIG that the FBI had obtained highly classified information in March 2016 that 
included allegations of partisan bias or attempts to impede the Midyear 
investigation by Lynch.  Numerous witnesses we interviewed—including Comey—
said that the FBI assessed that these allegations were not credible based on various 
factors, including that some of the information was objectively false.  For example, 
the information also suggested that Comey was attempting to influence the 
investigation by extending it to help Republicans win the election, which witnesses 
said the FBI knew was not true.  By mid-June 2016, the FBI had obtained no 
information corroborating the Lynch-related allegations. 
When asked about this information, Comey stated that he knew it was not 
credible on its face because it was not consistent with his personal experience with 
Lynch.  Comey stated, “I saw no, I’ll say this again, I saw no reality of Loretta 
Lynch interfering in this investigation.”  However, Comey said that he became 
concerned that the information about Lynch would taint the public’s perception of 
the Midyear investigation if it leaked, particularly after DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 
began releasing hacked emails in mid-June 2016. 
Despite these concerns, Comey told the OIG that it did not occur to him to 
request a special counsel in late 2015, after Lynch’s instruction to use the term 
“matter” or former President Obama’s public comments about the investigation 
(discussed in Chapter Four), because Comey was satisfied with the nature and the 
quality of the investigation being conducted by the FBI.  Comey emphasized that 
                                       
127  As discussed in Chapter Four, former President Obama made comments about the 
investigation in October 2015 and April 2016, while White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest made 
statements in January 2016 suggesting that the Midyear investigation was not headed toward an 
indictment. 
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the FBI had its “A team” working on the investigation, and that he was closely 
involved to ensure that the team was protected from political or other influence. 
As we describe in more detail in the classified appendix, Yates and Axelrod 
told us that the FBI mentioned this information to them sometime in the Spring of 
2016 and provided a defensive briefing on it on July 12, 2016.128  Yates said that 
the FBI told her that the information was not deemed credible and did not show her 
the relevant documents.  After being shown the documents in her OIG interview, 
Yates expressed frustration and said that, had she been informed that the FBI had 
concerns about the information, she would have engaged Comey in discussions 
about the impact on the Midyear investigation.  The FBI also did not provide Lynch 
with a defensive briefing about the information until August 2016, more than a 
month after investigative activity in Midyear was concluded, and she also was told 
that the information was not credible.  Lynch said that until Comey’s public 
testimony in 2017, she was never told that the information played a role in his 
unilateral decision to make a public statement about the Midyear investigation or 
concerns about whether a special counsel was necessary. 
However, Comey said that he became increasingly concerned and began 
thinking about the possible need for a special counsel when he realized in March or 
April 2016 that the case likely would result in a declination, and that the declination 
might not happen until after the political conventions.  He explained that the 
Department’s leadership could not credibly announce a declination around or after 
the nominating convention, because “the confluence of a decision on a case and a 
key political event” would cause “grievous” damage to the Department’s and the 
FBI’s reputation.129 
Yates’s and Axelrod’s Testimony 
Yates told us that she recalled Comey raising the possibility of a special 
counsel at the April meeting.  She told the OIG that Comey commented that they 
may need a special counsel to announce the closing of the Midyear investigation if 
the investigation ran past the convention and former Secretary Clinton was formally 
the Democratic Party’s nominee.130  According to Yates, Comey added that there 
was no reason to request a special counsel because the investigation would be 
                                       
128  A defensive briefing is intended to warn government officials of specific security concerns 
or risks.  As we describe in the classified appendix to this report, the Department discussed this 
information with career Department officials in March 2016, and later provided defensive briefings to 
Yates and Lynch on July 12, 2016 and August 10, 2016, respectively. 
129  In Section VI.C below, we describe Comey’s testimony before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence on June 8, 2017.  During that testimony, Comey was asked whether Lynch 
had an appearance of a conflict of interest in the Midyear investigation.  Comey replied, “I think that’s 
fair.  I didn’t believe she could credibly decline that investigation—at least, not without grievous 
damage to the Department of Justice and to the FBI.” 
130  The Democratic National Convention was held from July 25 to 28, 2016.  Clinton was 
formally nominated to be the Democratic Party’s Presidential nominee on July 26, and accepted the 
nomination on July 28, 2016.  However, she secured a majority of delegates and became the 
presumptive nominee several weeks earlier, on June 6, 2016. 
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completed before the convention.  She said that she did not interpret Comey’s 
comment as a line drawn in the sand, but more of a “musing.” 
Yates characterized Comey’s suggestion as a “weird thing” that he raised 
“out of the blue,” and said that she did not understand why the convention was a 
bright line for him.  She stated, “Because if you were concerned about an 
appearance that [Clinton is] the Democratic nominee and you have a Democratic 
Attorney General, well, you got that before the convention.  You’ve kind of had that 
for quite some time now.”  Yates said that she may have mentioned to Comey that 
Clinton had been the presumptive Democratic Party nominee for some time and 
that using the convention as a dividing line seemed “really artificial.” 
Yates also said that she was taken aback by Comey’s comments, because the 
investigation had been going on for some time and he had never mentioned the 
need for a special counsel.  She said that his concern was based on the perception 
created by a Democratic-appointed Attorney General announcing that the 
Democratic Party’s Presidential nominee would not be prosecuted.  Yates said that 
she understood that this was “all for appearance reasons.”  She stated, “Jim 
[Comey] never, ever, raised any concern about Attorney General Lynch having any 
kind of actual conflict or even an appearance of a conflict before we got to the 
tarmac.  Never, ever.  Nor did anyone else at the FBI ever raise any concern about 
that that I’m aware of.” 
Asked whether Comey at any time raised concerns about the involvement of 
Lynch in either the investigation or the announcement, Yates stated: 
No...I mean, this is where, and when I am so emphatic about that it’s 
because I read articles and testimony later that frankly, shocked me.  
Because I thought, this was not the only discussion that I had with 
former Director Comey about how we would roll it out.  And I 
thought...I read and I have no way of knowing if this is true, but I 
think Director Comey’s testimony indicated that he had been thinking 
for quite some time that he felt like he needed to go in alone in 
making the announcement.  And not only did I never hear that, I’m 
not aware of anybody, I mean, maybe somebody else at DOJ had 
heard that and it never made its way to me.  But I’m not aware of 
anybody else at DOJ hearing that. 
In fact, that’s just the opposite of what our discussions were.  I would 
have thought when...we’re talking about a joint press conference, et 
cetera, that if he harbored either (A), any reservations about whether 
Attorney General Lynch had a conflict or appeared to have a conflict he 
would have said something.  I don’t know how you have a discussion 
about that and have those feelings and not say anything about it.  And 
then (B), if he was actually planning on doing it on his own I don’t 
know how he didn’t tell me that. 
Yates said that she would have expected Comey to discuss any concerns he had 
about Lynch or the Department with her, and said that Comey had not been shy or 
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hesitant to give his opinion in discussions with her.  However, she said that Comey 
“kept FBI’s information very tight,” and that she “sometimes...felt like [she] had to 
pry information out of him.” 
Axelrod gave a similar account of Comey’s mention of a special counsel.  He 
said that Comey was concerned with the dates of the national political conventions, 
particularly the Democratic National Convention, because he thought that it would 
not be tenable for the Department’s leadership to continue to oversee the 
investigation or announce a declination once former Secretary Clinton was the 
Democratic Party’s nominee.  Axelrod said that he perceived Comey’s concern as 
“purely calendar-driven.”  He told the OIG that he did not know if Comey 
appreciated the way that the appointment of a special counsel would be perceived 
by the outside world, or whether it was “some sort of gambit to sort of say hey, if 
you guys don’t pick up the pace, right, this is going to get really ugly.”  Axelrod said 
that at the time he interpreted the suggestion as Comey thinking through how to 
“navigate this in such a way that it gets accepted by, again, not by everyone but at 
least by some chunk of the public, the reasonable center, as having been done on 
the level.” 
Rybicki told the OIG that he did not recall any discussions between Comey 
and Yates about the need to appoint a special counsel. 
3. Lynch’s Knowledge of the April Meeting 
Asked about her knowledge of the meeting between Yates and Comey, Lynch 
said that Yates told her that she met with Comey, and that Comey indicated that he 
was not sure there was a “there there” with respect to the Midyear investigation.  
According to Lynch, Yates said that Comey mentioned that he should be the one to 
make any announcement about the resolution of the case, because this would be 
best for the independence of the Department.  Lynch said that Yates and she both 
thought that any discussion about an announcement was “very premature.” 
Lynch said that she did not think about the option to have Comey make any 
eventual announcement in terms of a “decision tree” because it was so premature. 
She stated that she was not aware of any other options that Comey and Yates 
discussed, but that she did not see a basis for the Department to “have the 
investigative arm announce a prosecutive decision.”  Asked whether there was 
anything about the case that in her view would warrant deviating from the standard 
practice of having prosecutors announcing a prosecutorial decision, Lynch 
responded that there was not. 
Lynch told the OIG that she understood from Yates that Comey wanted to 
complete the investigation before the political conventions.  However, she said she 
did not recall being told that Comey had mentioned the possibility of requesting a 
special counsel if the investigation continued beyond that point.  She said that, 
other than letters from Members of Congress requesting a special counsel to handle 
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the investigation, no one ever mentioned that a special counsel might be necessary 
or might be requested if the investigation took too long.131 
Lynch said that she had looked at the special counsel regulation at one point 
because that is “a decision that the AG has to make,” but had not taken steps to 
have anyone look into it or research it.  She said that she was convinced that the 
team handling the investigation could come to a conclusion.  She stated, “I was 
convinced that if, for example, they thought that someone should be charged, they 
were not going to hesitate to recommend that.” 
As we discuss in Section IV.B below, Lynch received an ethics opinion 
following the tarmac meeting with former President Bill Clinton on June 27, 2016, 
that she was not required to recuse herself from the Midyear investigation.  She 
decided not to voluntarily recuse herself for a variety of reasons, including that she 
did not have a personal relationship with either former President Clinton or former 
Secretary Clinton. 
B. Subsequent Discussions Between Comey and Yates 
Yates said that sometime after her initial meeting with Comey, she received 
a phone call from him in which he said that he had been talking to “his people,” and 
they had decided that the FBI would not make a recommendation at all.  Yates said 
that Comey told her that the FBI instead would “just give DOJ the facts and DOJ 
would make the decision and [the FBI] wouldn’t make a recommendation.”  
According to Yates, Comey described this as the way the FBI and the Department 
“normally do it.” 
Yates said that she asked Comey what he was talking about, because the FBI 
always makes recommendations about charging decisions.  According to Yates, she 
recalled saying the following to Comey: 
Jim, I thought we had talked about it the last meeting....  That we 
were all going to hold hands and jump off the bridge together.  
Because that’s kind of how I viewed this was that this was going to be 
a tough thing here.  That a lot of people were not going to like our 
decision but that’s our job.  And that we were going to, you know, we 
were all going to stand there together.  We were going to announce it 
together. 
Yates said that Comey was non-committal after she made this statement. 
                                       
131  On October 28, 2015, 44 Members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to Lynch 
requesting the appointment of a special counsel in the Midyear investigation, citing former President 
Obama’s comments about the investigation on 60 Minutes as evidence that he had prejudged the 
investigation.  The letter stated that a special counsel was warranted to ensure that the investigation 
was conducted free of undue bias from the White House.  In addition, Senator Charles Grassley sent a 
letter to former Director Comey on May 17, 2016, asking various questions, including whether Comey 
believed that a special counsel was necessary. 
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Yates said that she remembered sitting at her desk after this call and 
thinking, “What?”  She said that she spoke to Axelrod and Carlin after hanging up 
the phone, saying, “Holy cow.  I mean, what is this business of now they’re not 
even going to make a recommendation?” 
Yates said that when she thought back to every major announcement she 
had done throughout her career, the lead investigative agency was always involved.  
She said that by that point it was “really clear that from the line agents all the way 
up they were all of the view that this shouldn’t be a criminal prosecution.”  She said 
that given that agents and prosecutors agreed there was no basis to prosecute 
former Secretary Clinton, it was important to present a unified view of the 
investigation. 
Comey told the OIG that he did not recall discussions about the end of the 
investigation with the Department other than his initial April meeting with Yates and 
Axelrod, and he did not recall any discussions with them about a joint Director-
Attorney General announcement.  Rybicki also said he did not recall any discussions 
about the end of the investigation. 
Axelrod said he recalled that the FBI “went back and forth on whether...they 
wanted to be, whether they were willing or the Director was going to be willing to 
be part of...sort of some sort of joint roll out.”  Lynch also told the OIG that she 
recalled Yates mentioning that at some point that she had had another discussion 
with Comey, and that Comey was no longer sure that he should be the person 
making the announcement. 
Yates said that after this call with Comey, there were other discussions with 
him where they were “back on track” and “all holding hands and jumping off the 
bridge together.”  Yates said she did not recall whether these subsequent 
discussions took place face-to-face or on the phone, or whether anyone else from 
the FBI was there.  She said that they never made a final decision about how they 
would announce the declination, but that it was likely to be with a press conference 
where they laid out the facts supporting a conclusion that there was not a crime to 
be prosecuted.  Yates said she had anticipated that Lynch would speak, but that 
they had not determined whether there would be other speakers.  She said that 
they also planned to release a written document. 
Yates told the OIG that she did not recall identifying a target date for making 
the announcement, but that they understood it would be a “matter of days” after 
the interview of former Secretary Clinton on Saturday, July 2, 2016.  Yates stated, 
“And we were trying to be careful not to plan this too much, again, because we 
hadn’t made the final decision yet.  This is where we thought it was going to go but 
you don’t know until that interview is concluded.”  Axelrod also told us that plans 
for an announcement were not “solidified because we weren’t quite at the end.” 
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C. Other Discussions within the FBI and Department 
1. Discussions between McCabe and Carlin 
Axelrod said that the discussions between Yates and Comey about the 
conclusion of the case were not the only ones that took place between the 
Department and the FBI.  He said that during the Spring of 2016, Toscas, Carlin, 
Rybicki, and McCabe also were involved in discussions about how to credibly 
conclude and announce the conclusion of the investigation. 
We asked various witnesses about these discussions but were unable to 
develop a precise timeline for them or a specific recollection of what was discussed.  
Carlin told the OIG that he may have talked about how to credibly announce a 
declination with McCabe “once or twice.”  He said that they discussed the 
“incredible scrutiny” that the case would receive and the need to memorialize in 
writing any disagreements between the team.  He said they also discussed the need 
for a written description recounting the steps that were taken in the investigation.  
Carlin stated: 
And then what made this a little unusual for me anyway was that it 
came over as an IG, an 811 referral matter.  And so one thing we had 
discussed was doing some closeout [summary of] facts to the IG....  If 
there were no criminal charges that doesn’t mean there’s not more to 
be done for the IG and lessons that they can learn from what we did in 
terms of the steps that they apparently felt they couldn’t take...for 
things that were outside Government servers.  And so I’d always 
thought at the end that some version of just the facts, not our thinking 
as to whether or not you bring a criminal charge, should go back to 
the IG in a closeout form.  So then they could continue with whatever 
they were going to do, either administratively because there may be 
bad practices, or the set.  Substantively it was clear to me from the 
investigation that there could be improvements made in terms of how 
the State Department was giving guidance and handling potentially 
classified information. 
Carlin said that he did not know if Comey ever approved the idea of a referral back 
to IC IG, “But at the Deputy [McCabe] level I thought there was some agreement 
by a meeting of the minds that that was the likely way we were going to proceed.”  
He said that he did not want to overstate it or give the impression that everyone 
had “signed off on” the idea, but that when he “raised that as a potential course it 
seemed like people thought that was reasonable.”  Carlin said that he did not recall 
discussing a joint press appearance by Lynch and Comey. 
McCabe told the OIG that he recalled talking to Carlin about how to credibly 
conclude the investigation during lunch together in May or June 2016.  McCabe said 
that neither of them had a “very well-formed idea” about what the end of the 
investigation looked like at that point, but that Carlin felt strongly that Comey 
should have a “very active and prominent role” in any public announcement.  
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McCabe said that they discussed various options, including a written memorandum 
or a joint press conference. 
Asked about his involvement in discussions with the FBI about how to 
announce the conclusion of the case, Toscas said that he did not have a specific 
recollection of any such discussions.  He stated: 
I very much wanted the Bureau [to be] part of the discussion and I 
know that there was some discussion of making sure that—or to try to 
have a joint AG/FBI Director statement, whether in front of cameras or 
an issued written statement, and I remember thinking, and I may 
have even talked to our team you know specifically about this, like we 
want—like we want the FBI Director talking about this, right.  We want 
there to be—the American public to know that DOJ and FBI are 
together on this and that we've run it down and we've concluded the 
investigation. 
Toscas also said that he thought that Department leadership separately was 
involved in discussions with the FBI about how to announce a declination, and that 
he vaguely recalled a discussion the week before the interview of former Secretary 
Clinton about what a joint appearance or statement would look like. 
2. Discussions among Prosecutors and NSD Supervisors 
On March 30, 2016, Prosecutor 1 sent an email to Prosecutor 2 stating, 
“Read the Ruth Marcus column in the [Washington] Post if you haven’t yet.”132  The 
column referenced in the email discussed the public skepticism that would result 
from a decision not to indict former Secretary Clinton and recommended that the 
Department consider releasing a detailed investigative summary.  It included a 
hyperlink to a public report released by the Department in 2010 that summarized 
the investigation into the 2001 anthrax letter attacks.  The column also highlighted 
the need for a credible government official to provide the public with information 
about the investigation, noting, “Senior Justice officials will be mistrusted whatever 
they say, but what about FBI Director James B. Comey, who served in the Justice 
Department under George W. Bush?”  Apparently after reading this column, 
Prosecutor 2 replied, “It is not dissimilar from some of the thoughts running 
through my head in the middle of the night...or what I tried expressing at that 
disastrous meeting we called with Toscas a couple months ago.” 
Prosecutor 2 told the OIG that they had a meeting with Toscas in or around 
February 2016 focused on what the end of the investigation should look like.  
According to Prosecutor 2, Toscas said at this meeting that the prosecutors would 
provide their legal analysis and conclusions to Carlin, through Toscas, and that 
there was some “vague idea” that Comey or McCabe would release a statement.  
This prosecutor told the OIG that the Department’s involvement in any FBI 
statement was uncertain, and it was unclear at that point whether the statement 
would be written or oral.  This prosecutor described this meeting as “contentious,” 
                                       
132  See Ruth Marcus, What If Clinton Isn’t Indicted?, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2016, A17. 
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and said that NSD supervisors seemed to wonder what the line prosecutors wanted 
from them.  This prosecutor said they brought up the issue of how to announce the 
end of the investigation because they were searching for assurances from their 
management that high-level Department officials would be involved.  Prosecutor 2 
stated: 
[I]f the statement is made, who is making that statement?  Is it 
Comey?  Will DOJ be standing by his side?  If DOJ is standing by his 
side, is that going to be the Attorney General, or is that going to be 
[Prosecutor 1] and [Prosecutor 2]?  Because [Prosecutor 1] and 
[Prosecutor 2] are driving this investigation for DOJ. 
Prosecutor 1 did not recall when the meeting with Toscas took place, but 
estimated that it was sometime in early 2016.  Prosecutor 1 stated that the plan 
discussed at that meeting was for them to finalize their legal analysis and 
conclusions and provide it to the NSD chain of command.  Prosecutor 1 said that he 
also expected that there would be a public announcement of some sort given the 
high-profile nature of the investigation.  As described in Section II.C.4 below, 
Prosecutor 1 said that as the investigation moved toward completion, he 
understood that Comey likely would be the official publicly announcing a 
declination. 
Prosecutors 3 and 4 said that the team thought that the FBI would be 
involved in announcing the conclusion of the investigation, but they did not know 
what the plans were.  Prosecutor 3 stated, “We speculated...that it would be some 
FBI report, like maybe a classified report of findings, and then a public 
report...because it was a high-profile investigation....  And no one really knew 
what, what the FBI was going to do.”  Prosecutor 4 told the OIG that he did not 
care how announcing a declination was handled, other than he wanted Comey to 
participate in it.  This prosecutor stated: 
And from my vantage point, I didn’t care other than the fact that I 
wanted Comey up there on a podium.  I didn’t care whether the AG 
was sitting next to, standing next to him or not.  But I wanted Comey 
to make the announcement that, that the investigation was closed and 
that in FBI’s viewpoint that there was not a prosecutable case.... 
Because Comey was a Republican, or [had] a Republican background.  
He’d been a Republican-appointed U.S. Attorney.  He had been a 
Republican-appointed DAG.  I know Comey from his EDVA days.  I 
think, thought he was widely respected on both sides of the aisle, 
before this case especially.  And I thought that he had the gravitas, 
that no matter what he did, it was going to be questioned, but that it 
would be, that there would be an air of legitimacy to what I thought 
was a legitimate investigation if he made the announcement, and 
especially after the tarmac meeting. 
This prosecutor told the OIG that Laufman had tried on several occasions to 
raise the issue of planning for a joint announcement at meetings with the FBI, and 
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that Strzok was “always really squirrely about that.”  He said that Strzok would say 
that they should wait to see how everything worked out, or that the decision was 
“above [his] pay grade.” 
3. Additional Special Counsel Discussions 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that the FBI Midyear team discussed whether they 
needed a special counsel at the beginning of the investigation in 2015.  She said 
that at that time they had a legal intern research the statute, which expired and 
was replaced by regulations requiring appointment by the Attorney General.133  She 
said that the discussion among the FBI Midyear team was, “[D]o we need one?  
When would we need one?  How does this work sort of questions....  Was it 
necessary?  And I, and I think we kind of thought we could handle this without the 
special counsel.” 
FBI Attorney 1 stated that the idea of a special counsel came up again at 
various points during the investigation, but that “[t]here was not any really 
significant discussion about it.”  She said that the team thought that they could 
complete the investigation, and they saw no signs of a conflict of interest on the 
part of the NSD lawyers. 
Discussions about requesting a special counsel resurfaced within the Midyear 
team in mid-March 2016, following the discovery of the highly classified 
information, and occurred at various points through at least mid-May 2016.  Text 
messages between Page and Strzok on March 18, 2016, indicate that the two of 
them discussed requesting a special counsel to oversee the investigation: 
7:31 a.m., Strzok:  “Thought of the perfect person D[irector Comey] 
can bounce this off of.” 
7:31 a.m., Page:  “Who?” 
7:37 a.m., Strzok:  “Pat [Fitzgerald].  You gotta give me credit if we 
go with him.  And delay briefing him on until I can get back and do it.  
Late next week or later.” 
7:38 a.m., Page:  “We talked about him last night, not for this, but 
how great he is.  He’s in private practice though, right?  Suppose you 
could still bring him back.  And yes, I’ll hold.” 
7:57 a.m., Strzok:  “Yes, he’s at Skadden in Chicago.  I haven’t talked 
to him for a year or two.  Don’t forget that D[AG] Comey appointed 
                                       
133  As discussed in Chapter Two, Department regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 provide that 
the Attorney General, or in cases in which the Attorney General is recused, the Acting Attorney 
General, will appoint a Special Counsel when he or she determines that criminal investigation of a 
person or matter is warranted and (a) that investigation or prosecution of that person or matter by a 
United States Attorney’s Office or litigating Division of the Department of Justice would present a 
conflict of interest for the Department or other extraordinary circumstances; and (b) that under the 
circumstances, it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume 
responsibility for the matter. 
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him as special counsel in the Plame matter, and that he was there for 
Comey’s investiture.” 
7:58 a.m., Strzok:  “I could work with him again.  And damn we’d get 
sh*t DONE.” 
7:58 a.m., Page:  “I know.  Like I said, we discussed boss and him 
yesterday.” 
Based on the date of this exchange, Page told the OIG that the discovery of 
classified information relating to Lynch likely prompted her discussion with Strzok, 
but that she did not recall the idea of appointing Fitzgerald to be the special counsel 
for the Midyear investigation being discussed with FBI leadership.  After reviewing a 
draft of the report, Page stated that she and Strzok had discussed consulting 
Fitzgerald about the classified information relating to Lynch, not about serving as a 
special counsel.  Strzok said that he did not recall what led to this discussion, but 
he speculated that it may have been motivated by concerns about the information 
discussed in the classified appendix to this report.  Strzok told the OIG that 
discussions about a special counsel reflected a genuine concern about the 
Department’s ability to credibly close the investigation, denying that the idea was 
intended to get the Department to move more quickly on the Mills and Samuelson 
laptops. 
Although witnesses denied that there was a specific deadline for completing 
the Midyear investigation, witnesses told us that Comey and other senior FBI 
officials strongly encouraged the team to finish the investigation as quickly as 
possible to avoid impacting the 2016 election.  Notes reviewed by the OIG reflect 
that Comey increasingly was concerned by the timetable for completing the 
investigation as the debate about obtaining the laptops continued into May 2016.  
According to these notes, on May 9, 2016, Comey met with the FBI’s Midyear team 
and told them that there “will come a point when DOJ can’t credibly close this, and 
will need a special prosecutor.”  On May 11, 2016, other notes indicate that Comey 
told agents and prosecutors at a Midyear briefing that there was an “extraordinary 
sense of urgency” to complete the investigation, and that there was the risk that a 
declination would be perceived as partisan the closer they got to the election. 
The next day, May 12, 2016, Strzok raised the possibility of a special counsel 
during a meeting with Laufman.  Notes indicate that there was a lengthy discussion 
about Comey’s timetable for completing the investigation and the need to obtain 
the Mills and Samuelson laptops, and that Strzok mentioned the possibility of 
requesting a special counsel if they got closer to the election.  Laufman said that he 
viewed Strzok’s comment as a “veiled threat” to make it clear that the FBI was 
dissatisfied with how NSD was handling the laptop issue and would proceed how it 
wanted.  Laufman said he did not recall other instances where anyone from the FBI 
mentioned the possibility of requesting a special counsel. 
4. NSD Notes Reflecting Plans for an Announcement 
As the team progressed toward the end of the investigation, information 
obtained by the OIG indicates that prosecutors and NSD supervisors were aware 
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that Comey was planning to participate in an announcement.  On May 16, 2016, 
Priestap sent an email to Toscas stating: 
I wanted you to be aware that Director Comey would like to see a list 
of all cases charged in the last 20 years where the gravam[e]n of the 
charge was mishandling classified information.  He requested the 
information in chart form with:  (1) case name, (2) a short summary 
for context (3) charges brought, and (4) charge of conviction. 
Toscas forwarded the email to Laufman, who replied, “What is the meaning 
of this request?  Have no problem sharing data we have amassed, but am 
concerned that it signifies an expectation by Bureau to play a larger role in DOJ 
charging decision than usual.”  Toscas replied, “We will all continue to work 
together with the Bu[reau] on all aspects of this, including with respect to any such 
decisions, so we should plan for and expect that our usual close collaboration with 
the Bureau will continue all the way through to the conclusion, including any such 
decisions.” 
Toscas also asked Laufman to call him.  Notes memorializing a telephone call 
that day indicate that Toscas told Laufman, “Bureau may simply close this....  Don’t 
think this is an insane request.  Thinks Comey wants to see cases because he wants 
to be able to say why outcome not [out] of line.  Everyone knows where we are 
going to end up.” 
NSD prosecutors prepared a chart of cases indicted since 2000 under various 
provisions prohibiting the mishandling and improper retention of classified 
information.  Toscas emailed McCabe and Rybicki about the chart on May 23, 2016, 
and hand-delivered a copy to them at his routine morning meeting.  The email sent 
by Toscas included the following caveats distinguishing the charged cases from the 
Midyear investigation: 
While it is not noted specifically in the chart, the vast majority of the 
listed cases involved documents or electronic files with classification 
markings on them.  The few examples of charged cases where no 
markings were present involved photographs taken by the defendant 
(e.g., a case involving photos inside sensitive areas of a nuclear 
submarine) or handwritten notes where there were clear indications of 
knowledge of the sensitive nature of the materials (e.g., a case in 
which there was a recording of the defendant speaking about the 
classified nature of information in his hand-written notebooks). 
The “charging/plea information” column should make it clear, but the 
mishandling noted in the chart often occurred in conjunction with other 
criminal activity, including espionage, export control violations, and 
false statements, among others. 
The chart did not include any examples of cases charged under Section 793(f). 
Asked whether he thought Comey’s request signaled a plan for greater 
involvement by the FBI, Laufman told the OIG that he viewed it as part of Comey’s 
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desire to make as knowledgeable a decision as possible about whether to charge 
Secretary Clinton or her senior aides.  He stated, “And that’s a conversation 
prosecutors always have with the agent, right?...  So, I didn’t have any problem 
arming him with the legal precedents that we thought informed our judgment, 
which we expected to be somewhat controversial, especially on the gross 
negligence statute.” 
Notes reviewed by the OIG indicate that Laufman had, or was told about by 
Toscas, discussions with the FBI regarding plans to announce a declination as the 
interview of former Secretary Clinton approached.  In early June, the FBI and NSD 
began working jointly on an LHM outlining the facts developed in the investigation.  
The prosecutors began developing the legal framework for their analysis around the 
same time, but did not finalize any charging recommendations until after the 
interview. 
On June 19, 2016, Laufman had a telephone conversation with Strzok about 
Comey’s plans to make a statement about the investigation.  Laufman’s notes from 
this conversation listed the following topics for discussion: 
(1) July 2 -----> Director’s statement. 
     Q:  How many days later? 
     Q:  Content? 
     E.g., is he planning on saying anything about DOJ’s conclusions? 
(2) Do you foresee any investigative activity after July 2? 
The notes do not indicate what Strzok’s responses were about Comey’s plans for a 
statement.  However, according to the notes, Strzok told Laufman that Comey 
wanted the investigation to be completed as soon as feasible, and thought it could 
be “largely done” other than classification reviews that were “unlikely to change 
[our] view” by July 2. 
Laufman’s notes from a telephone call with Toscas on June 24, 2016 indicate 
that the two of them discussed plans for a coordinated statement with Comey.  The 
notes state: 
“Good news/bad news” 
Sounds like greater sense of “ownership” than expected – coming to 
realization that better if Dir[ector] is person who announces it; and 
seems like Dir[ector] will be up front explaining thoroughness, 
conclusion, not proceeding with any case.  Voice of joint investigation. 
But don’t know what form this will take. 
Bureau’s exploitation of computers:  by July 2 completed ---> goal. 
Soon after interview, all will be put into motion. 
Director will be champing at bit to make announcement.... 
Want team to sit down w[ith] DAG and AG, before Dir[ector] speaks. 
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On June 27, 2016, Laufman provided this information to Prosecutor 1 and another 
NSD supervisor.  Laufman’s notes from this date state, “Director will want to wrap 
up and make announcement quickly after interview....  Will be withering pressure 
after interview...expect to be very little that occurs at interview pertinent to mens 
rea determinations.”  These notes discuss the need to complete the joint LHM and 
the prosecutors’ legal analysis and conclusions as quickly as possible. 
Other notes obtained by the OIG indicate that prosecutors expected an 
announcement by Comey by Friday, July 8, 2016.  On June 30, 2016, Laufman was 
told by another NSD supervisor, “Expect that FBI wants to announce by next 
Friday....  Wed or Thurs:  briefing for DOJ leadership.”  On July 1, 2016, Laufman 
received a telephone call from Toscas stating that Toscas had spoken to McCabe 
and was told they were “still on track for Friday and FBI statement that day.”  
Laufman met with Prosecutors 1 and 2 later that day and told them, “No change in 
known timetable for next week ---> Friday, July 8 announcement by Bureau.  
Details not known yet.  Expect briefing of DAG + AG before (Thursday?)”  The notes 
indicate that the team proposed staying at the FBI after the Clinton interview to 
“hash out differences” and finalize the closing LHM. 
Asked whether these notes reflected advance knowledge by NSD supervisors 
and prosecutors about former Director Comey’s plans for a public statement, 
Laufman said they did not.  He told the OIG that discussions about how to 
announce the closing of the case intensified as the interview of former Secretary 
Clinton approached.  He said that they understood that Comey was going to make 
some kind of a statement, but that anything he was going to say would be closely 
coordinated with the Department.  He said he had no knowledge of and was not 
privy to discussions about plans for a joint statement by Comey and Lynch.  Asked 
what he thought would happen as of July 1, 2016, he stated: 
I expected that we would complete the Clinton interview.  The Bureau 
would complete its LHM.  We would complete our [legal analysis].  
Discussions would take place within DOJ, between DOJ and the 
Bureau, there would be a closely-coordinated endgame, like there is in 
the disposition of many matters in the Department where a bunch of 
people stand up...in front of a bunch of flags and carefully 
orchestrated, well thought through set of statements about a 
matter....  And we were going to be briefing the AG and the DAG 
before that. 
Laufman also recalled Toscas telling him on several occasions that there was value 
in having Comey out front on the investigation, given the accusations by “political 
actors” that the Department could not be trusted to conduct a fair and balanced or 
complete investigation. 
Strzok told the OIG that he participated in discussions with prosecutors about 
how to announce the closing of the investigation, including some discussions with 
Toscas.  Strzok said they discussed whether there would be a press conference, 
who would participate in a press conference, and what level of detail any statement 
would provide, but he characterized these discussions as “preliminary.”  Anderson 
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similarly told the OIG, “So, I think at some point, DOJ began pressing us to start 
talking about the end game.  But we, within the Bureau, were already pretty far 
along in terms of our own thinking about what we thought the end game should be, 
such that we didn’t really engage that meaningfully with DOJ on the issue at the 
line level.” 
However, notes indicate that FBI agents, lawyers, and senior officials were 
aware that the Department expected to make a joint announcement with the FBI at 
the end of the investigation.  According to FBI Attorney 1’s notes from a Midyear 
update meeting with Comey on June 27, 2016, the FBI discussed this expectation, 
stating, “Laufman saying pros memo + joint statement one week after HRC 
interview.”  Page’s notes from the June 27 meeting indicate that FBI leadership told 
the Midyear team what to say to NSD about an announcement:  “[Clinton] 
Interview Sat[urday]; LHM Tues[day], and our leadership will be talking to yours, & 
what you expect a final announcement will look like.” 
The next day, June 28, 2016, Laufman’s notes reflect that an attorney in 
NSD’s Front Office asked him to call Strzok and find out when the FBI planned to 
close the investigation.  The notes read, “If not w/in short order after July 2 – if not 
by next week – Why not?!  What’s the plan…?”  The notes indicate that Laufman 
spoke to Strzok, and Strzok told him that the FBI would finalize the LHM by the 
following Tuesday.  The notes indicate that Laufman asked what Comey’s goal was 
for announcing the closing of the investigation, and Strzok told Laufman he was not 
sure how soon it would be.  That same day, Strzok and Page exchanged the 
following text messages: 
12:43 p.m., Strzok:  "God I am getting GRILLED by Laufman right 
now.” 
12:46 p.m., Page:  “You’ve got your answer to give him....” 
12:52 p.m., Strzok:  “I do...Still going....” 
III. Drafting of Former Director Comey’s Public Statement 
A. Original Draft Statement 
Former Director Comey told the OIG that after his initial meeting with Yates 
and Axelrod in April 2016, he began thinking about the “outer boundaries” for 
announcing the conclusion of the investigation.  He explained that a one-line press 
release by the Department stating that the case was closed was one outer 
boundary, and an FBI-only press conference providing a detailed statement about 
the investigation was the other.  Comey said that the team from Strzok and the 
Lead Analyst on up discussed every option in between these two “outer 
boundaries.”  Comey told the OIG that he considered what options would be best 
calculated to minimize the reputational damage to the Department that might result 
from a declination decision given the partisan political environment in the country 
at that time. 
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Comey said that the possibility of the FBI doing a statement separate from 
the Department occurred to him around that time.  He stated: 
I mean to my mind it was a crazy idea, but we were in a [500]-year 
flood, as you all have now investigated enough and lived enough to 
know, that this is a circumstance that has never happened before.  
We’re criminally investigating one of the candidates for president of 
the United States....  [P]resident [Obama’]s comments obviously 
weighed on me as well.  You’ve got the President who has already said 
there’s no there there....  And so all of that creates a situation where 
how do we get out of this without grievous damage to the institution? 
Comey told us that, in addition to preserving the credibility and integrity of the 
Department and the FBI, his concern was protecting “a sense of justice more 
broadly in the country—that things are fair not fixed, and they’re done 
independently.” 
McCabe told the OIG that he recalled that Comey first mentioned the idea of 
doing an independent statement as “an aside, at either the beginning or the end of 
a meeting that we had...in his conference room.”  McCabe said that Baker and 
Rybicki also were present, and that the group had been discussing where the 
investigation was going and what the end would look like “if we end up with 
nothing.”  He said that Comey asked them, “[W]hat do you think about the 
prospect of just like me doing something solo?”  McCabe stated: 
And I remember when he said it kind of looking at Rybicki.  And the 
both of us are just kind of like, oh my God, you know?  And I, I mean 
honestly I, I, at first blush I was like, whew, wow, that’s, that could go 
really wrong....  Because for, you know, for the obvious reason.  It’s 
just so not what we do.  And we thought...that would be a huge break 
with...protocol...and everything else. 
McCabe said that he may have told Comey that he was concerned that an 
independent statement would be a “complete departure” from Department protocol 
and could set a “potentially dangerous precedent” for the FBI.  McCabe said that 
Comey was “very aware” that there were many reasons he should not do a 
statement on his own, and that “conventional wisdom might mitigate against it.”  
He said that in late April and early May 2016, Comey was “not anywhere close to 
having decided to do it that way.” 
Comey told the OIG that he sat down one weekend and typed out a draft 
statement.  He told the OIG that he did so from memory, explaining that it helps 
him to write when he is struggling with an idea.  Comey described the draft 
statement as a “straw person,” and told the OIG that he did this with the intention 
of giving the draft to the team and asking, “What do you think?” 
On May 2, 2016, Comey sent an email to McCabe, Baker, and Rybicki 
including the text of the draft “straw person.”  He stated at the beginning of the 
email: 
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I’ve been trying to imagine what it would look like if I decided to do an 
FBI only press event to close out our work and hand the matter to 
DOJ.  To help shape our discussions of whether that, or something 
different, makes sense, I have spent some time crafting what I would 
say, which follows.  In my imagination, I don’t see me taking any 
questions.  Here is what it might look like. 
Comey sent a four-page draft statement outlining what the Midyear team did and 
found by email, which we have provided as Attachment C to this report.  The May 2 
draft was substantially similar to Comey’s final version, but with several notable 
exceptions.  In particular, the May 2 draft statement used the statutory language 
from Section 793(f)(1), describing former Secretary Clinton’s handling of classified 
information as “grossly negligent.”  It also concluded that there was evidence of 
potential violations of this provision and the misdemeanor removal statute, Section 
1924.  The draft stated: 
There is evidence to support a conclusion that Secretary Clinton, and 
others, used the private email server in a manner that was grossly 
negligent with respect to the handling of classified information....  
There is evidence to support a conclusion that any reasonable person 
in Secretary Clinton’s position, or in the position of those government 
employees with whom she was corresponding about these matters, 
should have known that an unclassified system was no place for such 
an email conversation.  Although we did not find clear evidence that 
Secretary Clinton or her colleagues intended to violate laws governing 
the handling of classified information, there is evidence that they were 
extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified 
information. 
Similarly, the sheer volume of information that was properly classified 
as Secret at the time it was discussed on email (that is, excluding the 
“up classified” emails) supports an inference that the participants were 
grossly negligent in their handling of that information.... 
Finally, with respect to our recommendation to the Department of 
Justice.  In our system, the prosecutors make the decisions about 
whether charges are appropriate based on evidence the FBI has helped 
collect.  Although we don’t normally make public our recommendations 
to the prosecutors, we frequently make recommendations and engage 
in productive conversations with prosecutors about what resolution 
may be appropriate, given the evidence.  In this case, given the 
importance of the matter, I think unusual transparency is in order. 
Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statute 
proscribing gross negligence in the handling of classified information 
and of the statute proscribing misdemeanor mishandling, my judgment 
is that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.  At the 
outset, we are not aware of a case where anyone has been charged 
solely based on the gross negligence prohibition in the statute.  All 
charged cases of which we are aware have involved the accusation 
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that a government employee intentionally mishandled classified 
information.  In looking back at our investigations in similar 
circumstances, we cannot find a case that would support bringing 
criminal charges on these facts.  All the cases prosecuted involved 
some combination of:  (1) clearly intentional misconduct; (2) vast 
quantities of materials exposed in such a way as to support an 
inference of intentional misconduct; (3) indications of disloyalty to the 
United States; or (4) efforts to obstruct justice.  We see none of that 
here. 
As described in more detail below, the language characterizing former Secretary 
Clinton’s conduct as “grossly negligent,” the inference of gross negligence from the 
volume of classified email, and the reference to the misdemeanor mishandling 
statute were omitted from the final version delivered by Comey on July 5, 2016. 
We asked Comey about the date of this initial draft and whether it indicated 
that he had predecided the outcome of the investigation even before the interview 
of former Secretary Clinton.  Comey stated: 
[I]f you were in my position after nine months you’re incompetent if 
you don’t know where this is going.  Now the notion that I committed 
perjury by saying the decision wasn’t made by then.  The decision was 
not made by then.  But it was a high probability...this was going to 
end in a certain way that would be really, really hard, which is the 
declination, so we better get to work thinking about that.  Now if we 
find something else, great, or if...Hillary Clinton either gives us 
[18 U.S.C. §] 1001 [false statements] during the interview or the team 
says you know what, we’ve got to dig into some more stuff because 
she might have lied to us, wants to pursue additional investigative 
steps, you either recommend the 1001 or you say you know what, 
we’ve got more work to do here....  But in May, unless those things 
happen, I can see where this is headed and we’ve got to start to think 
carefully because you cannot be thinking about this on the weekend 
before the case ends.  That’s my reaction. 
Comey also told the OIG that when he wrote the May 2 draft, he thought the 
investigation would be completed by June.  As described in more detail below, 
Comey said he did not recall that his original draft used the term “gross 
negligence,” and did not recall discussions about that issue. 
On May 6, 2016, Comey emailed Rybicki and McCabe, stating, “Think maybe 
you should share my straw person announcement with Priestap, [Strzok], and [the 
Lead Analyst].  Close hold to the three of them but might be good to get them 
thinking.”  That afternoon, McCabe forwarded the draft statement to Priestap, 
Strzok, and the Lead Analyst, as well as Page.  In the email, McCabe stated: 
The Director composed the below straw man in an effort to compose 
what a “final” statement might look like in the context of a press 
conference.  This was really more of an exercise for him to get his 
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thoughts on the matter in order, and not any kind of decision about 
venue, strategy, product, etc. 
The Director asked me to share this with you four, but not any further.  
The only additional people who have seen this draft are Jim Rybicki 
and Jim Baker.  Please do not disseminate or discuss any further.  
(Emphasis in original). 
McCabe’s email noted that Comey might want to discuss the draft at the update 
meeting the following Monday, May 9, 2016.  Strzok replied, “Understood and will 
do.”  McCabe then replied to Comey, “Spoke to Bill [Priestap] and passed the email 
on the red side to Bill, Pete and [the Lead Analyst].  Also took the liberty of 
including Lisa [Page] – I hope that was ok.” 
On May 6, 2016, shortly after receiving the draft, Priestap sent McCabe his 
initial comments.  Priestap stated, “The piece is superb,” and made several 
suggestions for minor changes.  Priestap also noted that the draft contained 
information indicating that former Secretary Clinton did not comply with federal 
record requirements, suggesting that Comey have someone study the impact such 
a statement could have on administrative inquiries related to federal record 
obligations.  McCabe sent these comments to Comey the following week. 
On May 16, 2016, Rybicki sent the original draft to a larger group of people 
that included Anderson, FBI Attorney 1, and Bowdich, stating, “Please send me any 
comments on this statement so we may roll into a master doc for discussion with 
the Director at a future date.”  The draft statement also was discussed at a meeting 
that day that was attended by Comey, Rybicki, Bowdich, Steinbach, Priestap, 
Strzok, the Lead Analyst, Baker, Anderson, FBI Attorney 1, and Page.  According to 
notes from this meeting, one of the items discussed was, “Do we agree w[ith] gross 
negligence assessment??” 
Later that same day, the Lead Analyst provided comments to Strzok for 
incorporation into a “team response.”  The Lead Analyst characterized his 
comments as technical corrections, including one in which he recommended 
highlighting that some of the emails were found to contain classified information 
when sent, not just after the fact.  The Lead Analyst stated, “All of this to 
emphasize that it is not true that this is all a matter of classification after-the-fact 
and that the people sending these emails should have known better.” 
Strzok included these comments and added his and Page’s to an email that 
he sent to Rybicki, McCabe, and Priestap on behalf of the team on May 17, 2016.  
This email provided “overarching observations” about the draft, stating that they 
would provide additional comments and fact checking as Comey narrowed down 
what he wanted to say.  Among the specific recommendations provided were 
suggestions that the statement include the number of emails containing information 
that was determined to be classified at the time they were sent to “more directly 
counter the continuous characterization by Hillary Clinton describing the emails 
involved in this investigation as having been classified after the fact.” 
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The May 17 comments also noted the need to distinguish between prior high-
profile mishandling prosecutions and the Midyear investigation.  Strzok stated: 
We’d draw the distinction in noting that we have no evidence classified 
information was ever shared with an unauthorized party, i.e., 
notwithstanding the server set up, we have not seen classified 
information shared with a member of the media, an agent of a foreign 
power, a lover, etc.  Additionally, it’s important to note that had these 
same emails been sent on a state.gov system rather than a private 
one, it’s not clear that the FBI would currently have an open 
investigation. 
The May 17 email also commented on language in the initial draft that it was 
“reasonably likely that hostile actors gained access to Secretary Clinton’s private 
email account.”  Strzok stated: 
It is more accurate to say we know foreign actors obtained access to 
some of her emails (including at least one Secret one) via 
compromises of the private email accounts of some of her staffers.  
It’s also accurate to say that a sophisticated foreign actor would likely 
have known about her private email domain, and would be competent 
enough not to leave a trace if they gained access.  But we have seen 
no direct evidence they did. 
Finally, the May 17 comments listed “whether her conduct rises to the legal 
definition of gross negligence” as a topic for further discussion. 
Responding to Strzok’s email, Priestap provided additional comments on the 
draft the following day, May 18, 2016.  Priestap suggested that the statement 
should more fully describe the FBI’s role in recommending or not recommending 
that charges be brought in criminal cases, and why Comey was recommending that 
charges not be brought against former Secretary Clinton, stating: 
I believe it’s equally important for the Director to more fully explain 
why the FBI can, in good faith, recommend to DOJ that they not 
charge someone who has committed a crime (as defined by the letter 
of the law).  It’s important the Director explain our recommendation 
from the FBI perspective and not from the DOJ/prosecutorial 
perspective.  The FBI is recommending that charges not be brought in 
this instance, not only because “no reasonable prosecutor would bring 
such a case,” but because the FBI believes it’s the right thing to do 
based on....  (Emphasis and ellipses in original). 
Priestap also suggested that Comey had the option of not making a charging 
recommendation at all, but that this would undermine the FBI’s position with the 
Department in future cases.  He suggested that Comey could emphasize privately 
to the Department that it should take the FBI’s charging recommendations 
seriously, stating, “DOJ can’t just stand with us when it’s easy for them to do so.”  
Priestap’s comments also stated, “While I was initially wary of having the Director 
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provide an investigative update, I’m beginning to warm to the idea...if we don’t 
soon shape the narrative with the facts, the narrative will be shaped by others, 
potentially harming the FBI.” 
According to a meeting log prepared by FBI OGC, on May 24, 2016, Comey 
met with Page, Strzok, Baker, Anderson, FBI Attorney 1, and others to discuss the 
statement.  Page’s notes from the meeting indicate that the group discussed adding 
language highlighting how well the Midyear investigation was done and that there 
had been no political interference.  The notes also state that they planned to “have 
another conversation about the strategy at all [sic].” 
B. The Decision to Omit “Gross Negligence” 
Comey again met with Rybicki, Bowdich, Steinbach, Priestap, Strzok, the 
Lead Analyst, Baker, Anderson, FBI Attorney 1, and Page to discuss the statement 
on May 31, 2016.  Notes from this meeting indicate that the discussion included 
“Lisa [Page]/[FBI Attorney 1] legal thinking.”  According to Page, she raised 
concerns about the use of “grossly negligent” in the draft statement at one of the 
meetings with Comey (likely the May 31 meeting) before making edits to the 
statement.  Page told us: 
I believe that I raised with [Comey] the concern...with the use of gross 
negligence in particular because I was concerned that it would be 
confusing if we used a...term that has a legal definition...if we say 
she’s grossly negligent, that despite the fact that we, we and the 
Department had a good reason to not charge her with gross 
negligence, given the fact that they thought it was unconstitutionally 
vague, and it had never been done, and, you know, sort of all of the 
concomitant defenses that would also follow from, from her conduct, 
that it would just be overly confusing. 
Page further stated, “If the purpose of this is sort of clarity, and the purpose 
of this is to sort of try to explain to the American populace what happened and 
what we think about it, that to use a term that had an actual legal definition would 
be confusing.”  She said that the team discussed the need to find some other way 
to characterize former Secretary Clinton’s conduct. 
FBI Attorney 1 told the OIG that she remembered sitting down with Rybicki, 
Strzok, the Lead Analyst, and Page to discuss the language of the statute and 
whether to use “grossly negligent” wording in the draft statement.  Based on a 
meeting log prepared by FBI OGC, we determined that this meeting took place on 
June 6, 2016.  Rybicki said that he did not recall the substance of discussions about 
removing “grossly negligent” from the draft, but that there was “a lot of discussion” 
among the FBI OGC lawyers about the statute.”  He said he primarily input changes 
made by others and described his role in revising the statement as “scribe detail.” 
After this meeting, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, Page, and FBI Attorney 1 met to 
edit the statement.  Page told the OIG that the four of them edited the document 
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together at Strzok’s computer.  Metadata from a version of the statement indicates 
that Strzok modified the draft on June 6, 2016.134 
The next day, June 7, 2016, Strzok emailed an electronic copy of the revised 
draft to Page, and Page sent it to Rybicki, stating in the email, “Our thoughts, for 
the Director’s consideration.”  The revised draft attached to Page’s email was 
entitled “MYE thoughts 06-07-16” and included a number of changes from Comey’s 
original draft.  Among the changes in the revised draft was the removal of the 
conclusion that there was evidence that former Secretary Clinton and her staff were 
“grossly negligent” in their handling of classified information.  Instead, the June 7 
draft moved language from the end of the same paragraph in Comey’s original 
version to the beginning of that paragraph, stating: 
Although we did not find evidence that Secretary Clinton or her 
colleagues intended to violate laws governing the handling of classified 
information, there is evidence that they were extremely careless in 
their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information....  There 
is evidence to support a conclusion that any reasonable person in 
Secretary Clinton’s position, or in the position of those government 
employees with whom she was corresponding about these matters, 
should have known that an unclassified system was no place for such 
an email conversation. 
Page told us that FBI Attorney 1 was the one who moved “extremely careless” to 
the beginning of the paragraph.  FBI Attorney 1 agreed that she likely was the one 
who suggested this edit given that she had the most familiarity with the statute.  
This change was included in the final version of the statement. 
The draft also removed a reference to evidence of potential violations of the 
misdemeanor mishandling statute.135  The draft instead concluded that there was 
evidence of potential violations of statutes regarding the handling of classified 
information, and used the language from Comey’s original draft that no reasonable 
prosecutor would bring such a case. 
The June 7 draft included two other significant changes.  It removed the 
statement that the sheer volume of information classified as Secret supported an 
inference of gross negligence, replacing it with a statement that the Secret 
information they discovered was “especially concerning because all of these emails 
                                       
134  Separately, on June 6, 2016, Priestap sent an email to McCabe and other providing input 
on the draft statement.  In this email, he stated, “In my opinion, due to the election, this matter 
warrants the Director providing the American public an update.  Ideally, this update would be provided 
as many weeks in advance of the National Conventions as is possible.”  When asked about this email, 
Priestap told the OIG that in his view the investigation had been politicized, and that former Secretary 
Clinton engendered strong feelings of support or dislike in some.  He explained that he viewed it as 
the FBI’s obligation to “let people know what was and was not found.” 
135  As set forth in Chapter Two, 18 U.S.C. § 1924 prohibits the knowing removal of 
documents or materials containing classified information without authority and with the intent to 
retain such documents or materials at an unauthorized location. 
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were housed on servers not supported by full-time staff.”  The draft also stated that 
it was “possible,” rather than “reasonably likely,” that hostile actors gained access 
to former Secretary Clinton’s server.136 
Comey told the OIG that he did not recall that his initial draft used “grossly 
negligent,” and did not specifically recall what discussions led to this change.  He 
said that the group that met to discuss the drafts of his statement—which included 
Rybicki, Bowdich, Steinbach, Priestap, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, Baker, Anderson, 
FBI Attorney 1, and Page—struggled to figure out what term to use to describe 
former Secretary Clinton’s conduct, because “it was more than your ordinary 
somebody left a document in a unprotected place or had a single conversation.”  
According to Comey, they tried to capture the sense that her use of the private 
server was “really sloppy, but it doesn’t rise to the level of prosecution.”  He 
speculated during his OIG interview that the team advised him that it was unwise 
to track the statutory language because the “grossly negligent” conduct required by 
Section 793(f) is something just short of willful or reckless. 
Comey told the OIG that nothing the FBI learned between May 2 and July 5 
changed their view of whether former Secretary Clinton’s conduct met the definition 
of “gross negligence.”  Comey said that it was his understanding based on the 
statute’s legislative history that Congress intended for there to be some level of 
willfulness present even to prove a “gross negligence” violation.  When asked 
whether he believed at any time in the process that former Secretary Clinton was 
grossly negligent within the meaning of Section 793(f), Comey said, “No.”  Comey 
explained: 
There was no evidence to establish anything close to willfulness which 
I take as a conscious disregard of a non-legal duty and that the closest 
to there to me was, it’s just really sloppy.  A reasonable person in her 
position should have known, but what I understood 793(f) to be about 
is something closer to actual knowledge, but I think that it was this is 
obviously wildly distorted, but I think that’s what we were grappling 
with.... 
I’m trying to find a way to credibly describe what we think she did and 
our sense was, frankly mere negligence didn’t get it because it was not 
just ordinary sloppiness, it was sloppiness across a multiyear period 
and so there was, I had in my head some sense that to be credible, we 
have to capture that and what words do we use to capture it—and 
                                       
136  As described in Chapter Five, the LHM summarizing the Midyear investigation stated, “FBI 
investigation and forensic analysis did not find evidence confirming that Clinton’s email server systems 
were compromised by cyber means.”  The LHM noted that the FBI identified one successful 
compromise of an account belonging to one of former President Clinton’s staffers on a different 
domain within the same server that former Secretary Clinton used during her tenure, as well as 
compromises to email accounts belonging to certain people who communicated with Clinton by email, 
such as Jake Sullivan and Sidney Blumenthal.  The FBI Forensics Agent who conducted the intrusion 
analysis told the OIG that, although he did not believe there was “any way of determining...100%” 
whether Clinton’s servers had been compromised, he felt “fairly confident that there wasn’t an 
intrusion.” 
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that’s where we found the formulation extremely careless.  Now if I 
had to do it over again, I might have tried to find another term 
because this, we sort of walked into this entire side show about 793(f), 
but I haven’t thought of another term since then. 
Comey said that he thought that the June 7 edits “track[ed] [his] formulation” by 
moving the “extremely careless” language from the end of the paragraph in his 
original draft to the beginning. 
After reviewing a draft of the report, Anderson told the OIG that she raised 
concerns about the use of the phrase “extremely careless” to describe former 
Secretary Clinton’s conduct, as being unnecessary to the statement and also likely 
to raise questions as to why the conduct did not constitute gross negligence.  
Anderson said that she recalled that others voiced the same concern, but that she 
did not recall precisely who raised this issue or what was said.  She said that she 
recalled that Comey felt strongly that former Secretary Clinton’s behavior was 
“extremely careless,” and thought that this was the most accurate phrase to 
describe Clinton’s conduct notwithstanding concerns about criticizing her uncharged 
conduct or the potential for confusion. 
C. Comey’s Edits to the Statement 
On June 10, 2016, Rybicki emailed a revised draft of the statement to 
Comey.  Two days later, on June 12, 2016, Comey emailed additional revisions to 
Rybicki.  Comey stated in his email, “Here is my near final [draft]. Please have the 
team review it. I have saved as PDF so the team reads it fresh and not as a track-
change.” 
Comey’s June 12 draft incorporated the “extremely careless” language from 
the previous revisions: 
Although we did not find clear evidence that Secretary Clinton or her 
colleagues intended to violate laws governing the handling of classified 
information, there is evidence that they were extremely careless in 
their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information. 
For example, seven email chains concern matters that were classified 
at the Top Secret/Special Access Program level when they were sent 
and received. These chains involved Secretary Clinton both sending 
emails about those matters and receiving emails from others about the 
same matters. There is evidence to support a conclusion that any 
reasonable person in Secretary Clinton’s position, or in the position of 
those government employees with whom she was corresponding about 
these matters, should have known that an unclassified system was no 
place for that conversation. In addition to this highly sensitive 
information, we also found information that was properly classified as 
Secret by the U.S. Intelligence Community at the time it was discussed 
on email (that is, excluding the later “upclassified” emails). 
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Comey’s June 12 draft added new language that stated, “Separately, it is 
important to point out that even if information is not marked ‘classified’ in an email, 
participants who know or should know that the subject matter is classified are still 
obligated to protect it.”  This language was included in a revised form in the final 
statement delivered by Comey. 
The revisions by Comey and Rybicki included new language about the factors 
that a “reasonable prosecutor” would consider in declining to prosecute a case.  
Comey’s June 12 draft stated: 
Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statutes 
regarding the handling of classified information, our judgment is that 
no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.  Prosecutors 
necessarily weigh a number of factors before bringing charges.  There 
are obvious considerations, like the strength of the evidence, 
especially about intent.  Responsible decisions also consider the 
context of a person’s actions, and how similar situations have been 
handled in the past. 
In looking back at our investigations into mishandling or removal of 
classified information, we cannot find a case that would support 
bringing criminal charges on these facts.  All the cases prosecuted 
involved some combination of:  clearly intentional and willful 
mishandling of classified information; or vast quantities of materials 
exposed in such a way as to support an inference of intentional 
misconduct; or indications of disloyalty to the United States; or efforts 
to obstruct justice. We do not see those things here. 
To be clear, this is not to suggest that in similar circumstances, a 
person who engaged in this activity would face no consequences.  To 
the contrary, those individuals are often subject to security or 
administrative sanctions. But that is not what we are deciding now. 
Following these revisions, discussions about the draft statement continued.  
Meetings took place on June 13, 14, and 15 to discuss various issues related to the 
draft.  Documents provide little information about the substance of these meetings, 
and witnesses did not have a specific recollection of them. 
Comey and Rybicki also continued to refine the draft statement, exchanging 
revised versions on June 25, 26, and 30, and July 1, 2, and 4.  Two significant 
changes appeared in the statement during this time period. 
A June 25 draft added a sentence to a paragraph that summarized the 
factors that led the FBI to conclude that it was possible that hostile actors accessed 
former Secretary Clinton’s private server.  This new sentence stated, “She also 
used her personal email extensively while outside the United States, including from 
the territory of sophisticated adversaries.  That use included an email exchange 
with the President while Secretary Clinton was on [sic] the territory of such an 
adversary.”  On June 30, Rybicki circulated another version that changed the 
second sentence to remove the reference to the President, replacing it with 
196 
“another senior government official.”137  The final version of the statement omitted 
this reference altogether and instead read, “She also used her personal email 
extensively while outside the United States, including sending and receiving work-
related emails in the territory of sophisticated adversaries.”  FBI emails indicate 
that the decision to remove this sentence was based on concerns about litigation 
risk under the Privacy Act. 
In addition, on the morning of June 30, Comey added the following 
paragraph to the statement introduction: 
This will be an unusual statement in at least a couple ways.  First, I 
am going to include more detail than I ordinarily would, because I 
think the American people deserve those details in a case of intense 
public interest.  Second, I have not coordinated or reviewed this 
statement in any way with the Department of Justice or any other part 
of the government. They do not know what I am about to say. 
This paragraph was included in the final version of the statement that Comey 
publicly delivered on July 5, 2016.  While we did not ask Comey if he added this 
paragraph in response to the tarmac meeting between Lynch and former President 
Clinton, as described below in Section IV.D, Comey told us that this meeting 
“tipped the scales” in terms of his decision to deliver his statement “separate and 
apart” from the Department.138 
                                       
137  After reviewing a draft of this report, Rybicki explained that, although he circulated the 
new version of the draft statement, he did not suggest or make this specific edit. 
138  Text messages between Page and Strzok on July 1, 2016, the day Lynch announced she 
would accept the recommendations of career prosecutors and agents, speculated that the tarmac 
meeting was the reason for inserting the “no coordination” language: 
5:34 p.m., Strzok:  “Holy cow...nyt breaking Apuzzo, Lync[h] will accept whatever rec D and 
career prosecutors make. No political appointee input.” 
5:41 p.m., Strzok:  “Lynch. Timing not great, but whatever. Wonder if that’s why the no 
coordination language added[.]” 
7:29 p.m., Strzok:  “Timing looks like hell. Will appear choreographed. All major news 
networks literally leading with ‘AG to accept FBI D’s recommendation.’” 
7:30 p.m., Page:  “Yeah, that is awful timing. Nothing we can do about it.” 
7:31 p.m., Strzok:  “What I meant was, did DOJ tell us yesterday they were doing this, so D 
added that language[?]” 
7:31 p.m., Strzok:  “Yep. I told Bill the same thing. Delaying just makes it worse.” 
7:35 p.m., Page:  “And yes. I think we had some warning of it. I know they sent some 
statement to rybicki, bc he called andy.” 
7:35 p.m., Page:  “And yeah, it’s a real profile in courag[e], since she knows no charges will 
be brought.” 
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D. FBI Analysis of Legal and Policy Issues Implicated by the Draft 
Statement 
Comey told the OIG that he included criticism of former Secretary Clinton’s 
uncharged conduct because “unusual transparency…was necessary for an 
unprecedented situation,” and that such transparency “was the best chance we had 
of having the American people have confidence that the justice system works[.]”  
He said that that he asked Baker and FBI OGC to “scrub” his draft statement and 
“think about it through all possible policy, legal lenses.”  He said that his 
recollection was that “the only [issue] they thought that was worthy of discussion 
was the Privacy Act, and they had their Privacy Act czar d[o] a memo for me laying 
out how—why they thought it was fine under the Privacy Act.”139  Comey said that 
Baker’s advice to him was that “there w[ere] no policy or legal issues created by 
you doing this.”  Baker told the OIG that he and other FBI OGC attorneys did see 
numerous legal and policy issues associated with the statement, but that they could 
not find a clear legal prohibition that would have prevented Comey from issuing the 
statement.  
Comey cited as precedent for his statement the press conference he gave in 
June 2004, when he was the Deputy Attorney General, summarizing the evidence 
against José Padilla, a U.S. citizen who had been designated as an enemy 
combatant due to his support for al Qaeda.140  He stated: 
I mean it wasn’t a case, but I actually remember when I was DAG 
providing extraordinary transparency to the public around José Padilla 
which was a subject of great concern and controversy at the time and 
I remember commissioning the drafting of a very transparent 
statement about everything we knew about him and then pushing to 
get it declassified, get it reviewed for Privacy Act compliance which we 
                                       
139  The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, prohibits an agency from disclosing a record 
about an individual to a person, or to another government agency, from a “system of records” absent 
the written consent of the individual, unless the disclosure is pursuant to a statutory exception.  A 
system of records is a group of records under the control of an agency from which information is 
retrieved by the name of the individual or some other personal identifier assigned to the individual.  
Relevant information about an individual may be disclosed without consent under 12 statutory 
exceptions set forth in the Privacy Act, including one permitting “routine use” by the agency.  See 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).  One of the “routine uses” adopted by the FBI permits disclosure to “members of 
the general public in furtherance of a legitimate law enforcement or public safety function as 
determined by the FBI,” for example, “to provide notification of arrests...or to keep the public 
appropriately informed of other law enforcement or FBI matters or other matters of legitimate public 
interest where disclosure could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”  This includes the disclosure of information under 28 C.F.R. § 50.2, which governs 
the release of information about criminal and civil proceedings by Department personnel (including the 
FBI). 
140  See Transcript, Press Conference of James Comey, CNN, June 1, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla.transcript (accessed May 1, 2018).  Padilla was 
initially arrested on a material witness warrant in May 2002 but was then declared an enemy 
combatant by President Bush in June 2002 and transferred to military custody.  Padilla was 
subsequently prosecuted by the Department in the civilian court system and in August 2007 a federal 
jury found him guilty of conspiring to commit murder and fund terrorism. 
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also did here and then getting that out, so I remembered that pretty 
well. 
Comey also cited the Department’s letter to Congress summarizing the results of 
the criminal investigation into Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials, including 
Lois Lerner.141  Comey said that the Lerner letter, which criticized IRS officials for 
“mismanagement, poor judgment, and institutional inertia” that did not amount to 
criminal conduct, supported his decision to criticize former Secretary Clinton’s 
handling of classified information even in the absence of sufficient evidence to 
establish her criminal liability.142 
Witnesses told us that the Privacy Act concerns stemmed largely from 
Comey’s criticism of former Secretary Clinton’s conduct in his draft statement, but 
that they believed including such criticism served a legitimate law enforcement 
function (and thus was permitted).  According to FBI Attorney 1, the high public 
interest in the case, the particular individual involved, and the need to deter others 
provided justifications for including the information: 
So it wasn’t just that we weren’t prosecuting her, but you didn’t want 
to leave the impression with...the rest of the community that she’s 
getting away with something or...that this is okay to do this.  And so I 
think there was that, that balance.  And that’s why I don’t think I 
thought so hard about the, the fact that we were talking about 
uncharged conduct of her.  I was thinking more in terms of well we 
need to kind of balance this so that people understand that we’re not 
                                       
141  On October 23, 2015, the Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) sent a letter to 
Congress summarizing the results of a criminal investigation conducted by the Criminal and Civil 
Rights Divisions, in conjunction with the FBI and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, into whether any IRS official targeted tax-exempt organizations for scrutiny based on 
their ideological views.  The letter stated that the investigation uncovered “substantial evidence of 
mismanagement, poor judgment, and institutional inertia,” but “no evidence that any IRS official acted 
based on political, discriminatory, corrupt, or other inappropriate motives that would support a 
criminal prosecution.”  Regarding Lois Lerner, the former Director of the IRS Exempt Organizations 
Division, the letter stated that the investigation had focused on her criminal culpability given her 
oversight role and emails discovered in which she “expressed her personal political views and, in one 
case, hostility toward conservative radio personalities.”  The letter concluded that Lerner “exercised 
poor judgment in using her IRS email account to exchange personal messages that reflected her 
political views,” but that prosecutors could not “show that these messages related to her official duties 
and actions[.]”  Peter Kadzik, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, letter to The 
Honorable Bob Goodlatte and John Conyers, Jr., October 23, 2015, at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IRS1023.pdf. 
142  Comey told the OIG that “a friend of [his who] is a law professor” had a law student 
compile a chart showing cases in which the Department made a public statement announcing the 
closing of an investigation.  The chart was created in January 2017, and included 31 cases since 
February 2010 in which such statements were made by Department leadership or a U.S. Attorney’s 
Office.  Although the chart noted one case in which an FBI agent spoke at a press conference with the 
U.S. Attorney, every case listed in the chart involved a public statement coordinated with or made by 
the prosecutors.  The OIG determined that the “law professor” referenced by Comey was Dan 
Richman, a professor at Columbia Law School who was also a special government employee (SGE) for 
the FBI from June 2015 to February 2017. 
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giving her a clean bill of health, you know, and that people can do this 
kind of activity. 
Anderson told the OIG that she expressed concerns about criticizing uncharged 
conduct during discussions with Comey in June 2016.  She said that the decision to 
include such criticism “was a signal that...we weren’t just letting her off the hook....  
[O]ur conclusions were going to be viewed as less assailable...at the end of the day 
if this kind of content was included.” 
Baker told the OIG that “there were multiple audiences” for the criticism of 
former Secretary Clinton in Comey’s statement.  He recounted hearing that FBI 
employees not involved in the Midyear investigation hated former Secretary Clinton 
and had made comments such as, “[Y]ou guys are finally going to get that bitch,” 
and, “[W]e’re rooting for you.”  Baker stated, “And if we’re not going to get her on 
these facts and circumstances, then we’d better explain that now.”  Related to this 
idea, notes taken by Strzok at a May 12, 2016 meeting involving the Midyear team 
state, “Messaging thoughts:  Workforce Qs:  (1) If I did this, I’d be prosecuted; (2) 
Petraeus, Berger, etc. were charged; (3) Overwhelming conservative outlook.” 
FBI Attorney 1 told the OIG that she also considered whether the July 5 
statement would violate the Department’s Election Year Sensitivities Policy.  As 
described in Chapter Two, that policy requires approval from the Public Integrity 
Section of the Criminal Division before filing charges or taking overt investigative 
steps near the time of a primary or general election.  However, the policy applies 
only to election crimes cases.  FBI Attorney 1 told us, “Someone mentioned [the 
policy] at that time.  And I looked into it, and...it’s not specific to this kind of case.  
And that’s kind of the problem, I think, with the policy.” 
Baker told the OIG that the FBI took into account and complied with the 
requirement that Department personnel obtain the approval of the Attorney General 
or the Deputy Attorney General for the public release of certain information.143  
Baker said that Comey’s call to Lynch and Yates on the morning of his July 5 press 
conference (described below) telling them that he planned to hold a press 
conference later that morning, and their failure to instruct him not to do so, 
constituted “permission” under Department regulations.  Baker said that this was so 
even though Comey called Lynch and Yates only after calling the press and he had 
refused to tell Lynch and Yates what he planned to say.  When pressed by the OIG 
about this interpretation of the regulation, Baker acknowledged that it was 
“aggressive.”  In comments to the draft report, Baker further explained that 
because Comey did call Yates and Lynch on July 5:  
They could have demanded to know what he was going to say, and/or 
could have told him not to do it without a full discussion with them.  
They did not.  One is the AG, the other the DAG.  They had an 
                                       
143  Under 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(9), the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy 
Attorney General is required “if a representative of the Department believes that in the interest of the 
fair administration of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines 
should be released.” 
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opportunity to say “no” or “stop” to the FBI Director.  For whatever 
reasons, they did not.  That is on them. 
E. Concerns about a Public Statement 
Numerous witnesses told the OIG that, while they did not recall any 
significant disagreement within the FBI about whether Comey should do a public 
statement, there was concern about whether he should do one on his own, without 
advance notification to or coordination with the Department.  McCabe’s initial 
reaction to the idea was that it would breach Department protocol and create 
“dangerous precedent” for the FBI, among “a million other possible things” that 
could go wrong.  However, McCabe told the OIG, “[U]ltimately I was convinced 
that, that he was doing what he thought was right and that what was right for the 
case.” 
Baker told the OIG that he raised similar concerns in various one-on-one 
discussions with Comey over an extended time period.  Baker said he did so 
because he “viewed it as my obligation to push back aggressively with respect to 
whatever [Comey] said if I thought it was wrong,” to make sure that all legal, 
policy, and ethical issues were fully evaluated, and to “think about how others 
would think about things” from different perspectives and at different times.  Baker 
said that he and Comey discussed a range of options for announcing a declination 
and thought through the benefits and drawbacks of each, “tr[ying] to find some 
door other than the doors that led to hell.” 
Comey also sought input from his former FBI Chief of Staff, Chuck 
Rosenberg, who at the time was the Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.  Comey told the OIG that in May and June 2016 he spoke to 
Rosenberg and “sounded him out” about the possibility of doing an FBI-only 
press announcement to close the investigation.  According to Comey, Rosenberg 
was concerned that doing a statement would be unprecedented, expose Comey to 
“extraordinary fire,” and create an irreparable breach with the Department.  Comey 
said that Rosenberg thought that doing the statement was a “close call, but on 
balance, it’s the right call.” 
Rosenberg told the OIG that he spoke to Comey three times about the draft 
statement.  He said that Comey first reached out to him in late April or early May 
2016, before there was a draft statement and well before the tarmac meeting 
between Lynch and former President Clinton.  Rosenberg said that Comey was 
seeking guidance on whether he should make a public statement to announce the 
FBI was closing the Midyear investigation, or should do a referral to the 
Department.  Rosenberg described Comey as “wrestling” with the decision and 
trying to figure out the right thing to do. 
Rosenberg said that Comey showed him a hard copy of the May 2 draft 
statement, and told him that he planned to do the statement on his own, without 
coordinating with the Department.  Rosenberg said that Comey thought he could 
more credibly announce a declination without the Department because of the 
“politics” of having an Attorney General appointed by a Democratic President close 
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an investigation into the Democratic presidential nominee without charges.  Asked 
whether Comey discussed concerns about Lynch based on her instruction to him to 
call the investigation a “matter” or classified issues reflecting potential bias by her, 
Rosenberg said that he did not recall Comey mentioning those to him. 
Rosenberg said that he had two competing reactions to the statement.  He 
said that on one hand, it was “outside the norm” and inconsistent with the 
Department’s practice, and that had the FBI publicly announced a recommendation 
when he was a U.S. Attorney instead of giving it to him privately, he would not 
have been happy.  On the other hand, he thought that Comey was a “compelling 
and credible public servant,” and he said he understood why Comey thought he 
could “do this and do it well.”  Rosenberg said that he did not tell Comey that it was 
a good or bad idea, but instead raised questions about what other options were 
available and the potential ramifications of an FBI Director giving a public 
declination.  Rosenberg said that he recalled telling Comey it was a “52-48 call,” 
but that he went back and forth on whether the “52” weighed in favor of or against 
doing the statement. 
F. Comey’s Decision Not to Inform the Department 
As described above, documents and testimony indicate that Comey planned 
to do the statement independently without advance notice to the Department even 
before the tarmac meeting between Lynch and former President Bill Clinton.  
Comey acknowledged that he made a conscious decision not to tell Department 
leadership about his plans to independently announce a declination because he was 
concerned that they would instruct him not to do it, and that he made this decision 
when he first conceived of the idea to do the statement.  He stated: 
The, come May, and I’m trying to figure out how the endgame should 
work, to preserve the option that I ended up concluding was best 
suited to protect the institutions, I couldn’t tell them that I was 
considering that.  Because if I told them that one of the—in my mind I 
drew this spectrum—at one end of the spectrum is I’m going to 
announce separate from you what the FBI thinks about this and very 
practical about it they, I remember thinking this, if I surface that with 
them, they might well say, I order you not to do that and then I would 
abide that, I wouldn’t do that. 
And so I remember saying to the Midyear team when I circulated in 
May my first draft I said what would the most, one end of the 
spectrum, what would that option look like?  I said keep this close 
hold, I mean you can have conversations with the Department of 
Justice about the endgame, but don’t tell them I’m considering this 
because then that option is going from us.  Because if I were the DAG, 
maybe they wouldn’t have, but what I was thinking was, if I’m the 
DAG I say, just to be clear, I order you not to make any statements on 
this case without coordinating it with us.  And so to be honest, I would 
lose that option. 
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Asked whether he owed it to Department leadership to inform them of what he was 
thinking so that they could make a decision on behalf of the Department, Comey 
stated, “In a normal circumstance, sure.”  He explained that the Midyear 
investigation was not a normal circumstance: 
[T]o my mind, the peril to the Department, including the FBI, was so 
extraordinary, the potential for damage to the institution, that I 
needed to preserve that option....  And so look I, everything about this 
is unprecedented and God willing no Director will ever face this 
circumstance, but I thought that to protect the institution I care about 
so much, I have to preserve that option.  Of course, in a normal 
circumstance it’s the right of the Attorney General and Deputy 
Attorney General to make those decisions and the FBI Director should 
tell them, but this was not the normal circumstance. 
Comey told the OIG that he did not credibly think that Lynch and Yates were going 
to stop him when he informed them about his plans on the morning of his press 
conference, and that he wrestled with whether to tell them at all. 
IV. June 27, 2016 Tarmac Meeting and Aftermath 
A. Meeting between Lynch and Former President Clinton 
1. How the Meeting Came About 
On June 27, 2016, Lynch flew to Phoenix as the first stop in a week-long 
community policing tour.144  Traveling with her were her husband, her Deputy Chief 
of Staff, a senior counselor to the AG (Senior Counselor), a supervisor in the 
Department’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA Supervisor), and another Department 
official.  Lynch told the OIG that her plane landed several hours late, and they 
arrived in Phoenix around 7 p.m. local time.  According to Department witnesses, 
Lynch’s staff left the plane first and boarded the staff van.  Lynch remained on the 
plane with her husband and the head of her security detail, and waited to get off 
the plane until her motorcade was ready.  The OPA Supervisor explained that this 
practice is standard FBI protocol and is intended to leave the Attorney General “out 
in the open for the least amount of time.” 
Approximately 20 to 30 yards from Lynch’s plane was a private plane with 
former President Bill Clinton on it.  Former President Clinton had been in Phoenix 
for several campaign events, including a roundtable discussion with Latino leaders 
and a campaign fundraiser, and his plane was preparing to depart.  Former 
President Clinton said that he did not know in advance that Lynch was in Phoenix 
and was not aware that her plane was close to his until his staff told him.  Asked 
                                       
144  The Attorney General is required to travel on government aircraft for communications and 
security reasons, and used FBI and Department aircraft to do so. 
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about news reports that he purposely delayed his takeoff to speak to Lynch, former 
President Clinton stated: 
It’s absolutely not true.  I literally didn’t know she was there until 
somebody told me she was there.  And we looked out the window and 
it was really close and all of her staff was unloading, so I thought she’s 
about to get off and I’ll just go shake hands with her when she gets 
off.  I don’t want her to think I’m afraid to shake hands with her 
because she’s the Attorney General. 
He said that he discussed with his Chief of Staff whether he should say hello to 
Lynch, and that they debated whether he should do it because of “all the hoopla” in 
the campaign.  He stated, “I just wanted to say hello to her and I thought it would 
look really crazy if we were living in [a] world [where] I couldn’t shake hands with 
the Attorney General you know when she was right there.” 
Former President Clinton said that he did not consider that meeting with 
Lynch might impact the investigation into his wife’s use of a private email server.  
He stated, “Well what I didn’t want to do is to look like I was having some big 
huddle-up session with her you know....  [B]ecause it was a paranoid time, but...I 
knew what I believed to be the truth of that whole thing.  It was after all my server 
and the FBI knew it was there and the Secret Service approved it coming in and 
she just used what was mine.”  As a result, he said that he never thought the 
investigation “amounted to much frankly so I didn’t probably take it as seriously as 
maybe I might have in this unusual period[.]” 
Former President Clinton said that he recalled walking toward Lynch’s plane 
with his Chief of Staff, and that Lynch and her staff were “getting off the airplane.”  
He said that he greeted Lynch, who was on the plane, and Lynch stated, “[L]ook it’s 
a 100 degrees out there, come up and we’ll talk about our grandkids.” 
The Senior Counselor told the OIG that she was waiting in the van with the 
three other Department employees on the trip, and she saw two people walking 
toward Lynch’s plane.  She said that as the two people went up the stairs to the 
plane, she realized that one of them was former President Clinton.  The Senior 
Counselor said that she saw the head of Lynch’s security detail turn away the 
second person at the door and allow former President Clinton to board the plane.  
Other witnesses recalled that former President Clinton had additional staff members 
with him, and that these people did not board the plane. 
The Deputy Chief of Staff said that she had “zero knowledge” that former 
President Clinton was there before she saw him approach the plane.  She stated, 
“And if I had knowledge, I would not have been in that van.  I would’ve...stayed on 
the plane and got everybody off....  No heads up or anything.”  The Senior 
Counselor said she asked everyone in the van if they knew that former President 
Clinton was going to be there, and they all said no.  The OPA Supervisor said that 
he later learned that former President Clinton’s Secret Service detail had contacted 
Lynch’s FBI security detail and let them know that the former President wanted to 
meet with Lynch.  Although Lynch’s staff was supposed to receive notice of such 
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requests, witnesses told us that they were not informed of the request from former 
President Clinton.145 
Lynch said that she was on the plane with her husband and the head of her 
security detail, and that they were preparing to leave when she learned that former 
President Clinton had asked to speak to her.  She stated: 
[W]e were walking toward the front door, and then...the head of my 
detail stopped and spoke to someone outside the plane, turned around 
and said former President Clinton is here, and he wants to say hello to 
you.  And I think my initial reaction was the profound statement, 
what?  Something like that.  And he repeated that.  And he spoke 
again to someone outside the plane.  And we were, we were about to 
walk off the plane.  We were going to go down the stairs and get into 
the motorcade and go on, and...the head of my detail said...can he 
come on and say hello to you?  And I said, yes, he can come on the 
plane and say hello.  And he was literally there.  So I don’t know if he 
was talking to President Clinton or somebody else.  I don’t know who 
was on the steps. 
Lynch said that former President Clinton boarded the plane in a matter of seconds, 
suggesting that he was in the stairwell near the door to the plane.  Lynch said that 
she was very surprised that he wanted to meet with her because they did not have 
a social relationship, and she was also surprised to see him “right there in the 
doorway so quickly.” 
Lynch said that she had “never really had a conversation” with former 
President Clinton before this meeting, or with former Secretary Clinton at any time.  
She said that “years ago” when she was the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 
New York, she saw former Secretary Clinton at a 9/11 event and said hello.146  She 
said that she also saw both of them at the funeral for former Vice President Joe 
Biden’s son, Beau Biden, which was held on June 6, 2015.  She said that she 
recalled that during that conversation former President Clinton congratulated her on 
the FIFA corruption case.  Lynch told the OIG that she did not have a social 
                                       
145  On July 2, 2016, the head of Lynch’s security detail sent an email to another agent in the 
FBI Security Division, stating, “I will explain the details later, but you know, we [are] not the final 
word as to who comes in or out of the AG’s space.  Her staff dropped the ball in a big way, and we 
were the easy scapegoats!  I’m pretty pissed about the way things went down and how they were 
handled afterwards, needless to say I will be making some changes as to how much interaction we will 
have with this staff going forward.”  The OIG considered but decided not to interview the head of 
Lynch’s FBI security detail because of concerns that requiring a member of the Attorney General’s 
security detail to testify about what he observed in the course of conducting his official duties could 
impair the protective relationship and because the security concerns raised by the head of the security 
detail in his email were not a focus of this review.  Further, we believed it was unlikely that the head 
of the security detail would have been in a position to be able to overhear the conversation between 
Lynch and former President Clinton. 
146  Lynch was nominated by former President Clinton to be the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern 
District of New York, and served from June 2, 1999 to May 2, 2001.  Lynch served in the same 
position from May 8, 2010 to April 27, 2015. 
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relationship or socialize with either former President Clinton or former Secretary 
Clinton. 
However, Lynch said that public officials often stopped her to say hello when 
she traveled, and that as a result she was not initially concerned when former 
President Clinton wanted to say hello.  For example, Lynch told us that Ohio 
Governor John Kasich, who was a candidate in the 2016 Republican presidential 
primary, stopped her one time to say hello in an airport, and they had a 10-minute 
conversation even though they had never met before.  The OPA Supervisor told the 
OIG, “It wouldn’t be uncommon for [Lynch] to...match courtesy with courtesy 
regardless of [whether the person was] Republican, Democrat, whatever.” 
2. Discussion between Former President Clinton and Lynch 
During our review, we found no contemporaneous evidence, such as notes, 
documenting the substance of the discussion between Lynch and former President 
Clinton.  The only documentary evidence we identified that summarized the 
meeting were “talking points” created by Lynch’s staff after the meeting became a 
subject of controversy, as discussed in Section IV.B. 
Former President Clinton and Lynch denied that they discussed the Midyear 
investigation, the upcoming interview of former Secretary Clinton, any other 
Department investigation, or plans for Lynch to serve in some capacity in a Hillary 
Clinton administration.  We summarize below what they told us about their 
discussion. 
Former President Clinton’s Testimony 
Former President Clinton told us that he congratulated Lynch on being named 
Attorney General and mentioned several things that she had done that he thought 
were good policy, such as continuing with criminal justice reforms that were 
implemented by former Attorney General Eric Holder.  He said that they then talked 
about their grandchildren, his recent visit to see former Attorney General Janet 
Reno, and his golf game. 
We asked former President Clinton if he had discussed Brexit or West Virginia 
coal policy with Lynch.  He said he did not recall Brexit coming up, but 
acknowledged that he probably did discuss it with her because he was very worried 
that it would disrupt the Irish peace process.147  When asked whether his comments 
included the potential implications of the Brexit vote and the rise of populism for 
the U.S. election, he stated that he did not remember discussing that, but that one 
of his “automatic responses” during the campaign was to describe how the press 
had underestimated the reaction to globalization and the resulting identity crisis, 
and how Brexit was simply a manifestation of that.  As a result, he said he could 
not rule out that he said something similar to Lynch.  Former President Clinton also 
said that he did not recall mentioning West Virginia coal policy to Lynch, but that he 
                                       
147  On June 23, 2016, voters in the United Kingdom approved a referendum to leave the 
European Union, a decision known as Brexit. 
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would not be shocked if he had done so because he thought a lot about it, and he 
frequently talked about the issue. 
Former President Clinton said he did not recall telling Lynch that she was 
doing a great job, but told us he probably did so because “the Justice 
Department...when President Obama was there, I thought they did a lot of good 
things that needed doing, especially in criminal justice.”  However, he denied that 
his comments were motivated by an intent to influence the investigation.  He told 
us that he did not recall telling Lynch that she was his favorite cabinet member, 
and he did not think it was likely that he would have made such a comment.  He 
stated, “I like her, but I’m very close to Tom Vilsack and was very close to a couple 
of the others, so I couldn’t have said that, but I do like her a lot.” 
Former President Clinton said he only mentioned former Secretary Clinton 
once during the discussion, and that concerned how happy she was to be a 
grandmother.  He said he told Lynch: 
[T]hat she was a happy grandmother and an ardent one and that we 
were very lucky because our daughter and her husband and our 
grandchildren live in New York, so they are about an hour from us in a 
decent traffic day.  And I told her that before the campaign was 
underway Hillary and I tried to see our grandkids every week and in 
the best weeks, she would see them once when she was down there.  
Then I would see them once and then we’d see them once together 
and I was down, and I remember talking about every now and then we 
got them up in Chappaqua where we live and it was quite bracing 
trying to keep up with them and how much fun it was and that’s really 
what we talked about. 
I do remember saying that grandparents typically say it’s better than 
being a parent because it’s all the fun and none of the responsibilities, 
and I told Chelsea once after [her daughter] was born that she would 
never hear me say that, that I still thought being her father was the 
best gig I ever had. 
When asked whether they discussed former Secretary Clinton’s upcoming interview 
with the FBI, Clinton replied, “Absolutely not....  [I]t wouldn’t have been 
appropriate for me to talk to her about any of that and I didn’t.”  He said that they 
also did not discuss the Midyear investigation, the Clinton Foundation matter, any 
other Department investigation, the Benghazi hearings held by Congress, or then 
FBI Director Comey. 
We asked former President Clinton whether he discussed the possibility of 
Lynch serving as Attorney General or in another position in a future Hillary Clinton 
administration, or a possible judicial nomination.  He stated: 
No.  Not even with anybody else.  Not with Hillary.  Not with 
anybody....  We didn’t discuss that because...I’m very superstitious.  I 
never discuss anything like that.  I want everybody to focus on the 
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matter at hand and I thought the environment was much more volatile 
than a lot of people did. 
Former President Clinton also said that he was a little surprised by the criticism 
after his tarmac meeting with Lynch.  He stated: 
[T]he mainstream media wasn’t as bad on that as they were on a lot 
of things, I thought, I think the ones that were criticizing me, I 
thought you know, I don’t know whether I’m more offended that they 
think I’m crooked or that they think I’m stupid.  I’ve got an idea, I’ll do 
all these things they accuse me of doing in broad daylight in an airport 
in Phoenix when the whole world can see it in front of an Air Force One 
crew and I believe one of her security guards.  It was an interesting 
proposition, but no we did not. 
Lynch’s Testimony 
As described above, Lynch said the head of her security detail told her that 
former President Clinton wanted to speak to her, and she said that he could come 
on the plane and say hello.  Lynch told the OIG that she thought that she and 
former President Clinton would briefly exchange greetings, and then she would get 
off the plane.  She described what happened after he boarded the plane: 
Well first we’re...standing in the...the cabin of the plane because, 
again, he’s saying he wanted to say hello.  I introduce him to my 
husband.  We were standing up, because I thought we were going to 
stand up, say hello, and then keep walking.  There were two members 
of the flight crew in the back section of the plane.  So, President 
Clinton shook hands with the head of my detail, with my husband, with 
me.  He went back and spoke to the two members of the flight crew, 
and he stayed back there for a few minutes, like five minutes maybe, 
because he spoke individually to each of them for a few minutes....  
And they were very excited, you know....  [H]e was very gracious to 
them. 
Lynch said that former President Clinton then returned to the front of the plane 
where she and her husband were standing and began talking to her husband.  She 
said they had a brief discussion about Lynch’s trip to Phoenix, Clinton’s new 
grandchild, and various family issues including how to deal with sibling rivalry.  She 
said they were still standing during this discussion, but that former President 
Clinton sat down after a few minutes: 
At some point, after two or three minutes, President Clinton turned 
around.  I had my tote bags on the bench seat of the plane, because I 
had put them there when he came on board.  I had been holding 
them.  I put them down.  He picked up my tote bags and moved them, 
and then he sat down.  So he sat down, and my husband and I were 
still standing in front of him having the discussion.  And...he sort of sat 
heavily, and...I didn’t know...how he felt, so I can’t say one way or the 
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other.  But he sat down and started talking about, you know, the 
grandkids and how they introduced them to each other.  And so, and 
ultimately, because this went on for a little but, my husband and I sat 
down also, and, you know, had that discussion about his family and 
the kids[.] 
She said that after this, the discussion continued, with former President Clinton 
doing most of the talking.  She stated: 
Well, after he was sharing with us his story about how...they 
introduced the two grandchildren to each other, which involved a 
toy...and that was green, and just, again, the family issues, he said 
what brings you to Phoenix.  And I said I’m here on a police tour, and 
I’m doing a lot about the law enforcement community relations.  And I 
said, you know, how did you find Phoenix?  And he mentioned that he 
had been there for several meetings, he had played golf.  I made a 
reference to the heat, because it was still incredibly hot while we 
landed, which was why we were still on the plane. 
And he made a comment about playing golf, and you can manage the 
heat.  Just, he was talking a lot about the golfing issue was well, but 
nothing of substance about that.  And he asked about my travels, and 
I said that I had been recently traveling to China.  I had to come back 
for the Pulse Nightclub [shooting].  I had been to Alaska and met with 
Native youth.  I then said...you know, that was an issue of great 
importance to [former Attorney General Janet] Reno.  Have you talked 
with her lately and do you know about her health?  And he said, yes, 
I’ve seen her.  I visited her along with Donna Shalala, I visited her, 
and he told me when.  And I said because she’s not doing well.  We 
talked about that for a few minutes. 
And I remember at that point saying, well, you know, thank you very 
much kind of thing, and he sort of continued chatting and, and said, 
and made a comment about his travels he was headed on.  And I said, 
well, we’ve got to get going to the hotel.  And I said I’m sure you’ve 
got somewhere to, to go.  And he said yes.  And I forget where he told 
me he was going.  He was flying somewhere, but...I’ve forgotten 
where.  He said I’m going to wherever I’m off to.  And then he made 
some comment about West Virginia.  And I do not know if he was 
headed to West Virginia.  I just don’t know...if that was the reference 
to it.  And he made a...comment about West Virginia and coal issues 
and how their problems really stem from policies that were set forth in 
1932.  And he talked about those policies for a while.  And, and I said, 
okay, well. 
According to Lynch, Clinton discussed West Virginia coal policy as an historical 
issue, not in connection with the campaign.  She said that he discussed Brexit in a 
similar context, talking about the cultural issues that led to the decision and 
whether “people in the UK viewed themselves as citizens of the world or the 
country or whatever.” 
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In response to specific questions asked by the OIG, Lynch said that she and 
former President Clinton did not discuss the Midyear investigation or any other 
Department investigation, James Comey, Donald Trump, or the upcoming 
Presidential election.  She said that they also did not discuss possible positions for 
her in a future Hillary Clinton administration, a potential nomination to the Supreme 
Court, or her future plans after President Obama left office. 
Lynch said that Clinton told her that she was “doing a great job as a cabinet 
member or...words to that effect.”  She said that she thought that he was flattering 
her and “would have said that to every cabinet member at that time.  No, I, I 
viewed it as...him being jovial, honestly, and being genial.” 
Lynch estimated that she talked to former President Clinton for 
approximately 20 minutes before a member of her staff came back onto the plane, 
as we describe below.  She said that she became increasingly concerned as the 
meeting “went on and on.”  Lynch said that when she thought about it later that 
evening and discussed it with her staff about in the context of the case, she 
concluded “that it was just too long a conversation to have had.  It...went beyond 
hi, how are you, shake hands, move on sort of thing.  It went beyond the 
discussions I’ve had with other people in public life, even in political life, it went 
beyond that [in terms of length].” 
3. Intervention by Lynch’s Staff 
While former President Clinton was on the plane, Lynch’s staff were waiting 
in the staff van.  The Deputy Chief of Staff said that they quickly realized that the 
meeting was problematic, because Clinton was not just the former President but 
was also the husband of someone who was under investigation.  The Deputy Chief 
of Staff said that she felt “shocked,” and that they all “just felt 
completely...blindsided.”  The Senior Counselor said that they immediately were 
aware that the meeting was ill-advised and that the “optics were not great.” 
The OPA Supervisor said that he waited approximately 5 minutes, and then 
he left the van.  He said he went over to one of the other agents on Lynch’s 
security detail, who was waiting in the vehicle that was going to carry Lynch.  The 
OPA Supervisor said that he asked the agent what was going on, whether there had 
been any notice that former President Clinton wanted to say hello, and how long he 
was supposed to be on the plane.  The OPA Supervisor said that the agent did not 
know.  According to the OPA Supervisor, he asked the agent to tell the head of 
Lynch’s security detail that Lynch needed to end the meeting.  The OPA Supervisor 
stated, “And I don’t know that [the head of Lynch’s security detail] thought it was 
appropriate to [ask her to] wrap it up because I guess that’s his boss too.” 
The OPA Supervisor said that there was a photographer outside, and he 
recalled telling the photographer that Lynch would not be taking pictures.  The OPA 
Supervisor said that he remembered telling the photographer that he (the 
photographer) needed to go back in his car.  The OPA Supervisor stated, “I’m going 
back in my car.  Like, no one is hanging out.  I like President Clinton, too.  I’m not 
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hanging out for a photo.”  The OPA Supervisor said that he then got back in the 
staff van.148 
By this time, former President Clinton had been on the plane for 
approximately 10 to 15 minutes.  The Deputy Chief of Staff said that they were 
discussing the need for someone to go back on the plane when the Senior 
Counselor, who led the Phoenix portion of the trip and therefore was seated in the 
front of the van closest to the door, told the group that she was going to go and 
jumped out of the van.  The Deputy Chief of Staff said, “And then [the Senior 
Counselor] was just running upstairs.  And so, that’s how—that’s when we 
decided...to do something.”  The Senior Counselor described her thinking at the 
time:  “And I don’t know what’s going on up there, but I should at least go up to 
intervene or help her if she needs help....  I think...it was part uncertainty and part 
kind of like this is a bad idea.” 
The Senior Counselor said that when she tried to go back on the plane, she 
was stopped by the head of Lynch’s security detail, who was at the door of the 
plane.  The Senior Counselor said that she told him that Lynch’s meeting with 
former President Clinton was not a good idea, and that she needed to get back on 
the plane, but he still would not let her on.  The Senior Counselor said that she then 
asked him to convey to Lynch that she was advising that the meeting was a bad 
idea.  According to the Senior Counselor, he told her, “All right, why don’t you tell 
her yourself,” and finally allowed her to board. 
The Senior Counselor said that when she got on the plane, she saw Lynch, 
Lynch’s husband, and former President Clinton sitting down and “chatting...in a 
casual way.”  The Senior Counselor said that she walked up to the three of them 
and stood there hoping that her presence would break up the meeting.  She said 
that Lynch saw her and introduced her to former President Clinton, and she shook 
his hand.  The Senior Counselor said that she hoped this would get everyone 
moving, but then former President Clinton sat back down.  The Senior Counselor 
stated, “So then...I kind of didn’t know what to do because...it was a little bit 
unusual to be in a room with...a former president and say...you need to leave....  
So...I think I stared at them for a little bit longer, and then went back to where [the 
head of Lynch’s security detail] was standing.”  The Senior Counselor said that she 
considered whether she should go get someone else or go back over to Lynch and 
tell her, “Look, ma’am, we have to go.”  She said she then went and stood in front 
of the group again. 
The Senior Counselor said that her presence prompted Lynch to tell former 
President Clinton that the reason she (the Senior Counselor) was standing there 
was that she was too polite to tell Lynch that they had to go.  The Senior Counselor 
said that Lynch told former President Clinton, “And we do have to go.  You 
know...we have a pretty busy schedule.”  The Senior Counselor said that she could 
not recall what Lynch and former President Clinton were discussing, but that her 
                                       
148  We asked Lynch about news reports that her security detail did not allow photos to be 
taken of the meeting.  Lynch said that she did not recall any such discussions, but that it was her 
standard practice not to take photos with anyone involved in a campaign around an election. 
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impression was that Lynch was “uncomfortable and wanted the meeting to be 
done.” 
Lynch said that after the Senior Counselor got back on the plane, former 
President Clinton commented, “Oh, she’s mad at me, because I’d been on the plane 
too long.  And she’s come to get you.”  Lynch said that she replied to him, “[W]ell, 
we do have to go.  And then he kept talking about something else.”  She said that 
he kept talking for “a good 5 minutes” after the Senior Counselor got back on the 
plane.  Lynch said that she finally stood up and said, “[Y]ou know, it was very nice 
of you to come.  Thank you so much.  And just...thank you again for stopping by.”  
She said that they said goodbye several times, and her husband shook former 
President Clinton’s hand again.  Former President Clinton then left the plane. 
The Senior Counselor said she went to talk to Lynch after former President 
Clinton left.  She stated, “And I kind of looked at her and...I think I 
said...something like that was not great, or...something like that.  And she’s like, 
yeah.”  She described Lynch as “look[ing] kind of...gray and, you know, not 
pleased.”  The Senior Counselor said that after they left the plane, she got into the 
staff van, Lynch got into her vehicle, and they went to the hotel.  She said that they 
did not talk to Lynch about what happened until the next day. 
The Deputy Chief of Staff told the OIG that they did not attempt to get 
information from the head of Lynch’s security detail about the conversation that 
took place on the plane.  She explained: 
And my only conversation with [the head of Lynch’s security detail] 
was a rare, fairly admonishing one...just saying, this is not okay, this 
shouldn’t be the protocol; you didn’t contact me; you could’ve radioed 
your FBI guy in the van to say, send someone up.  So...my 
conversation was not a very pleasant one by the time I talked to [the 
head of Lynch’s security detail].  So I didn’t ask questions like, oh, 
what did you hear.  I was just like, we need to figure this out, and this 
never needs to happen again. 
The Deputy Chief of Staff said that the security protocol was changed almost 
immediately as the result of what happened.  Under the revised protocol, the senior 
counselor (i.e., the staff member in charge of the trip) was required to remain on 
the plane with Lynch and the head of her security detail, and to escort her at other 
times. 
B. Responding to Media Questions about the Tarmac Meeting 
Melanie Newman, the Director of OPA, said that the OPA Supervisor called 
her from the van and “sounded the alarm,” telling her that he just saw former 
President Clinton board Lynch’s plane.  According to Newman, she asked the OPA 
Supervisor a number of questions, including why former President Clinton was there 
and whether he had a press pool with them, which he could not answer.  Newman 
said that she asked the OPA Supervisor to get out of the van and figure out what 
was going on.  Newman said that she was not just concerned that there was a 
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press event going on that they did not know about, but that the potential 
implications for the investigation were obvious to everyone “except apparently the 
FBI agents on the Attorney General’s detail.” 
Newman said that the OPA Supervisor called her back approximately 30 
minutes later, after the Senior Counselor had returned to the van.  According to 
Newman, the OPA Supervisor told her that there was no press pool, but that former 
President Clinton had his own photographer there.  Newman said that the OPA 
Supervisor told her that former President Clinton had asked Lynch’s FBI detail if he 
could go on Lynch’s plane, and no one had communicated this to her staff.  
Newman stated, “No one talks to the AG without staff saying they can talk to the 
AG.  But they didn’t do this because he’s a former President.”149   
Newman said she spoke to Lynch and the staff traveling with her by phone 
the next day, June 28, 2016.  According to Newman, during this call Lynch 
described how the meeting with former President Clinton happened, what they 
discussed, and how she had tried to end the discussion.  Newman characterized 
Lynch as “devastated” about the tarmac meeting.  She stated: 
[Lynch] doesn’t take mistakes lightly, and she felt like she had 
made...an incredible...mistake in judgment by saying yes instead of 
no, that he could come on the plane.  But also, she’s like the most 
polite, Southern person alive.  I, I don’t know in what circumstances 
she would have said no, or what would have happened if she had said 
no....  I would have much preferred a story that the Attorney General 
turned a former President of the United States away on the tarmac, 
but...she doesn’t make mistakes, and she was not pleased with herself 
for making this kind of high-stakes mistake. 
Newman said that they discussed the best way to respond to any press questions 
about the meeting.  She said that Lynch had a press conference scheduled in 
Phoenix, so she (Newman) wanted to have talking points prepared in case someone 
asked about the meeting with former President Clinton. 
At approximately 1:15 p.m. EDT, Newman received an email from an ABC 
News reporter asking about the meeting between Lynch and former President 
Clinton, based on information from its Phoenix affiliate.  Newman said that this 
inquiry confirmed that the meeting would come up at Lynch’s press conference, and 
she sped up the process to develop talking points.  Newman forwarded the inquiry 
to the OPA Supervisor and Lynch’s Acting Chief of Staff stating, “We need to talk.” 
The Acting Chief of Staff arranged a conference call, and added Matt Axelrod, 
the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Senior Counselor to the list of invitees.  However, 
the OPA Supervisor and the Senior Counselor were waiting for an event in Phoenix 
to begin and could not join the call.  Following the call, Newman emailed a short 
                                       
149  After reviewing draft of the OIG’s report, Newman clarified that “typically” no one talks to 
the AG without staff approval, and that she “assumed” that this typical practice was not followed 
because Clinton was a former president.   
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draft statement to the Senior Counselor and the Deputy Chief of Staff, copying 
Axelrod, the Acting Chief of Staff, the OPA Supervisor, and Peter Kadzik, the AAG 
for the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA).  A number of additional emails and phone 
calls followed as the draft statement was expanded and edited to include talking 
points about the topics Lynch and former President Clinton discussed.  Newman 
then emailed the statement to Lynch and her staff. 
During Lynch’s Phoenix press conference, a local reporter asked Lynch about 
her meeting with former President Clinton and whether Benghazi was discussed.  
She answered the question based on the talking points and draft statement: 
No.  Actually, while I was landing at the airport, I did see President 
Clinton at the Phoenix airport as I was leaving, and he spoke to myself 
and my husband on the plane.  Our conversation was a great deal 
about his grandchildren.  It was primarily social and about our travels.  
He mentioned the golf he played in Phoenix, and he mentioned travels 
he’d had in West Virginia.  We talked about former Attorney General 
Janet Reno, for example, whom we both know, but there was no 
discussion of any matter pending before the Department or any matter 
pending before any other body.  There was no discussion of Benghazi, 
no discussion of the State Department emails, by way of example.  I 
would say the current news of the day was the Brexit decision, and 
what that might mean.  And again, the Department’s not involved in 
that or implicated in that. 
Lynch did not receive any follow up questions from either the reporter who asked 
the question or from the other reporters in attendance. 
Based on the lack of follow up questions, Newman decided not to release a 
statement about Lynch’s meeting with former President Clinton.  However, by the 
following afternoon, several media organizations had begun picking up coverage of 
the meeting. 
On June 29, 2016, Newman emailed Lynch’s statement at her Phoenix press 
conference and the Department’s talking points to two officials in the FBI’s Office of 
Public Affairs (OPA), stating, “I want to flag a story that is gaining some traction 
tonight...about a casual, unscheduled meeting between former [P]resident Bill 
Clinton and the AG.”  The FBI OPA officials forwarded the talking points to McCabe, 
Rybicki, and Comey.  We discuss the impact of the tarmac meeting on Comey’s 
decision not to tell the Department about his decision to do a public statement in 
Section IV.E below. 
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C. Discussions about Possible Recusal 
1. Departmental Ethics Opinion 
Lynch told the OIG that she began discussing whether she needed to recuse 
herself from the Midyear investigation on June 28, 2016, the morning after the 
tarmac incident.  Lynch said that she called her Acting Chief of Staff, who was back 
in Washington, D.C., and asked her to contact the Departmental Ethics Office to 
find out if the ethics regulations required recusal.  Lynch said (and the Acting Chief 
of Staff confirmed) that she obtained an oral ethics opinion that there was no legal 
requirement to recuse herself. 
Janice Rodgers, the former Director of the Departmental Ethics Office, said 
that she remembered receiving a call from someone on Lynch’s staff, although she 
did not remember who it was.  Rodgers said that she spoke to Lynch’s staff 
member over the phone, and after hearing what happened, concluded that the 
ethics regulations did not require recusal.  Rodgers explained her understanding of 
the facts: 
[T]he fact that the subject’s spouse had, I don’t know what the right 
word is.  You know, sort of created, engineered a, you know, contact 
with the AG, which was apparently, you know, completely non-
substantive, and in my view.  And also in circumstances that made it 
very difficult for the AG to decline or avoid contact. 
Rodgers said that the question was “more of...a capital-P political issue...meaning 
people were going to make hay of it,” and that Department leadership would have 
to weigh the amount of heat they were willing to take versus the importance of 
Lynch’s participation in the matter.  She stated, “There was nothing about that that 
required recusal....  [W]hether the AG chose to recuse based on sort of the 
more...global considerations was...out of my bailiwick.” 
2. Discussions about Voluntary Recusal 
Lynch said that she then considered whether she should recuse voluntarily 
based on appearance concerns—i.e., concerns that the meeting created the 
appearance that former President Clinton was influencing the Midyear investigation 
through her, or that she was influencing it by having a connection to him.  Lynch 
said she wanted to be able to make a statement about her plans for remaining 
involved in the Midyear investigation during an interview with a Washington Post 
reporter at the Aspen Ideas Festival, which was scheduled for the last day of her 
trip, July 1, 2016. 
Lynch said she held a number of calls that involved Yates, Axelrod, Newman, 
the Acting Chief of Staff, and other Department officials, and that these calls likely 
took place on the Wednesday or Thursday of that week.  She said she also 
discussed the issue with the staff members who were traveling with her.  Lynch 
said that she did not recall anyone expressing the view that she should recuse 
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herself; she said that her staff raised issues and concerns for discussion, but no one 
presented her with a conclusion that she should recuse. 
Discussions Involving Yates, Axelrod, and Other Department Officials 
Yates told the OIG that the group participating in these calls quickly 
dismissed the idea of recusal because they knew that the Department was going to 
announce what they expected to be a declination “in a matter of days.”  She stated: 
And the fear [was] that this is going to look really artificial...if you’ve 
spent over a year with [Lynch] at the helm of this investigating it, and 
then this tarmac thing happens and she recuses....  That’s going to 
look really artificial then if all of a sudden somebody else is announcing 
it and we’re saying oh, there’s no problem with the tarmac because 
she’s recused.  When really that decision had been all but made...while 
she was AG. 
Axelrod expressed a similar opinion, and stated that other factors weighed against 
recusal as well.  In particular, he said that he understood that Lynch had not 
discussed anything improper with former President Clinton, and for her to recuse 
would have made it look like she had.  He said he also thought that the people 
calling for her recusal would not be satisfied by it: 
I thought that for folks who had already, again, for...political reasons 
been calling for a special counsel I wasn’t sure that a recusal...would 
be sufficient.  That it would end there with...the AG stepping aside and 
the DAG taking over.  I thought calls would increase for Department 
leadership to step out altogether.  Which again, I didn’t think was good 
for the integrity of the investigation.  And that was my goal was to 
protect the integrity of the investigation. 
Axelrod told the OIG that he did not specifically recall having a discussion with 
Rybicki or McCabe about the tarmac incident, but said that he was “sure [he] did 
have conversations....  [T]his would be a big thing not to have a conversation 
about[.]”  Rybicki told us that Axelrod called him early in the week to tell him that 
the tarmac meeting had happened.  McCabe said that he also spoke to Axelrod a 
day or two after the tarmac meeting, and that Axelrod told him that Lynch likely 
would not recuse herself from the Midyear investigation. 
Toscas said he was on vacation the week of the tarmac meeting, and Axelrod 
contacted him by phone to tell him about it.  Toscas said that he contacted 
Laufman, and that both he and Laufman thought that recusal was unwise.  Toscas 
stated, “I thought that a recusal would make it look like, oh this person who is 
doing inappropriate things has been overseeing this thing for a long time now, so 
that means the whole thing is tainted by it....  [T]hat would actually probably be 
more harmful to our investigation and the appearance to the public of our 
investigation.” 
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Lynch’s Decision Not to Recuse 
Lynch said that she decided not to recuse herself from the Midyear 
investigation.  In making this decision, Lynch said she considered whether her 
meeting with former President Clinton would cause people not to have faith in the 
judgment or decisions of the Department.  She said she weighed this against the 
concern that stepping aside would create a misimpression that she and former 
President Clinton had discussed inappropriate topics, or that her role in the case 
somehow was greater than it was. 
She explained that other considerations informed her decision: 
And I, and I also had the view that, you know, when you create a 
situation, as I felt I did by sitting down with, with the President, it’s, 
yes, it can be almost a relief in some ways to say, you know what?  
I’m going to recuse myself and get out of it and not take, not take the 
hits.  And then you’re just asking someone else to step up and endure 
all the hits the Department will take for the case for the result, 
whatever it is. 
And, you know, I thought about it from that, that angle as well.  
You’re just asking someone else to step up and do your job for you.  
And if I did not think it rose to the level of recusal, then I did not want 
to do something out of a desire to protect myself sort of personally 
from embarrassment also because that’s not the way to make 
somebody else take on that responsibility. 
Lynch said that she took into account that NSD did not think recusal was 
necessary.  She said she conveyed her regrets to the Midyear prosecutors for 
putting them in the position of having people outside the Department look at their 
work and think that it would be influenced by anything improper.  
Planning for the Aspen Interview 
Axelrod told the OIG that the “game plan” that emerged from these 
discussions was for Lynch to explain publicly how the Midyear investigation had 
been handled all along: 
 It was handled by career agents and prosecutors; 
 The career agents and prosecutors had been the ones doing the work 
for more than a year; 
 When the career agents and prosecutors finished their work, they 
would make a recommendation to Department leadership; and 
 When Lynch received that recommendation, she fully expected to 
accept it, but she ultimately was the decider. 
Axelrod said it was “definitely not the game plan” for Lynch to convey that she 
would accept the recommendation of the career staff no matter what they brought 
her, or that she would take herself out of the decisionmaking process but not 
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formally recuse herself.  However, he acknowledged that the different ways she 
described this process in her interview with the Washington Post reporter 
(discussed below) led to some confusion. 
Carlin spoke at the Aspen Ideas Festival before Lynch arrived and said he 
was scheduled to return to Washington, D.C., with her.  Carlin said that he met 
with Lynch, her husband, and her staff in person before her interview with the 
Washington Post reporter, and Carlin conveyed to her that NSD was not making a 
request that she recuse herself.  Carlin said they also discussed what Lynch planned 
to say in her interview.  Like Axelrod, Carlin told us that Lynch intended to provide 
more insight than she normally would into the investigative process, not to 
communicate that something had changed because of the tarmac incident. 
Melanie Newman told the OIG that she made it known that she disagreed 
with this approach from a messaging perspective.  Newman said that she thought 
recusal was appropriate because public statements and actions “need to be 
clear-cut.”  Newman stated: 
[W]e tried to have it both ways....  [W]e said that she would accept 
the recommendation of the senior career prosecutors and investigators 
on the case.  Well, usually that is what the Attorney General does 
anyway.  That means literally nothing.... 
This is the Attorney General, I mean, I’m not aware of, there may be 
disputes [in other cases] between the [FBI and the prosecutors] that 
the Attorney General is sort of the deciding vote.  But generally 
speaking, in charging decisions, the Attorney General accepts the 
recommendation of those people who know the evidence most 
intimately.  I think in the rare instance that there are disagreements, 
the Attorney General may, may accept the recommendation of one 
over the other, for example.  But that’s, that’s sort of what they do. 
Newman said that Lynch was doing the same thing that she usually does, except 
that “she was saying before the conclusion of the investigation that this was how 
she was going to handle it.  That was the difference.” 
D. Lynch’s July 1 Aspen Institute Statement 
During the interview with the Washington Post reporter, Lynch acknowledged 
that her meeting with former President Clinton raised questions about her role in 
the Midyear investigation.  Addressing how that investigation would be resolved, 
Lynch stated: 
But I think the issue is, again, what is my role in how that matter is 
going to be resolved?  And so let me be clear on how that is going to 
be resolved.  I’ve gotten that question a lot also over time and we 
usually don’t go into those deliberations, but I do think it’s important 
that people see what that process is like. 
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As I have always indicated, the matter is being handled by career 
agents and investigators with the Department of Justice.  They’ve had 
it since the beginning.  They are independent....  It predates my 
tenure as Attorney General.  It is the same team and they are acting 
independently.  They follow the law, they follow the facts.  That team 
will make findings.  That is to say they will come up with a chronology 
of what happened, the factual scenario.  They will make 
recommendations as to how to resolve what those facts lead to. 
Those—the recommendations will be reviewed by career supervisors in 
the Department of Justice and in the FBI and by the FBI Director.  And 
then, as is the common process, they present it to me and I fully 
expect to accept their recommendations. 
Lynch then responded to a question about a news article that morning 
reporting that she planned to recuse herself from the Midyear investigation.  She 
stated, “Well, a recusal would mean that I wouldn’t even be briefed on what the 
findings were or what the actions going forward would be.  And while I don’t have a 
role in those findings and coming up with those findings or making those 
recommendations as to how to go forward, I’ll be briefed on it and I will be 
accepting their recommendations.” 
As the discussion continued, Lynch responded to additional questions about 
her continued role in Midyear.  Asked about a news report that she had made the 
decision in April 2016 to accept the recommendations of the career staff, Lynch 
replied: 
Yes, I had already determined that that would be the process....  And 
as I’ve said on occasions as to why we don’t talk about ongoing 
investigations in terms of what’s being discussed and who’s being 
interviewed, is to preserve the integrity of that investigation.  We also 
typically don’t talk about the process by which we make decisions, and 
I have provided that response too. 
But in this situation, you know, because I did have that meeting, it has 
raised concerns, I feel, and I feel that while I can certainly say this 
matter’s going to be handled like any other, as it has always been, it’s 
going to be resolved like any other, as it was always going to be. I 
think people need the information about exactly how that resolution 
will come about in order to know what that means and really accept 
that and have faith in the ultimate decision of the Department of 
Justice. 
Lynch’s comments about the status of her continuing involvement in the 
Midyear investigation created considerable confusion.  After her appearance, 
various new articles reported that she had decided to defer to the recommendations 
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of the FBI or had effected a “non-recusal recusal.”150  Lynch said she participated in 
a follow-up interview with the Washington Post reporter during which she 
attempted to clarify her statement.  The resulting article quoted her as follows: 
I can certainly say this matter is going to be handled like any other as 
it has always been.  It’s going to be resolved like any other, as it was 
always going to be....  I’ve always said that this matter will be handled 
by the career people who are independent.  They live from 
administration to administration.  Their role is to follow the facts and 
follow the law and make a determination as to what happened and 
what those next steps should be....  This team is dedicated and 
professional.  So I can’t imagine a circumstance in which I would not 
be accepting their recommendations.151 
Lynch told us that her role in oversight of the Midyear investigation did not 
change.  She stated: 
[A]s I said to, to the reporter at the time, that the team is going to 
continue and, and do what they needed to do in terms of interviews, 
forensics, all the investigative steps that they would take that were not 
influenced by me.  They would look at all the facts, all the evidence, 
and come up with a recommendation that was going to be vetted 
through supervisors on both sides of the house, the legal side of the 
house, the investigative side of the house, and they would make a 
recommendation to me. 
Lynch continued: 
[T]hey are going to present me with a recommendation, that I expect 
to accept, which I always expected that I would accept given the 
people involved in the process, then there is really no need for me to 
step aside from this because I’m, I’m listening to their 
recommendation.  I’m doing what I’m supposed to do in terms of 
discharging my duties in running the Department, in, in managing the 
Department in what is an important case and a sensitive case.  And, 
and essentially, there won’t be a change. 
E. Impact of the Tarmac Meeting on Comey’s Decision to Make a 
Public Statement 
As described above, Comey began drafting a public statement announcing 
the conclusion of the Midyear investigation in early May 2016, well before the 
tarmac meeting, and told the OIG that he planned not to inform the Department.  
Comey told us that he had struggled with the decision, and that “in a way the 
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tarmac thing made it easy for me” and “tipped the scales” towards making his mind 
up to go forward with an independent announcement.  He stated, “I think I was 
nearly there.  That I have to do this separate and apart....  And so I would say I 
was 90 percent there, like highly likely going to do it anyway, and [the tarmac 
meeting] capped it.” 
Comey said that Lynch’s decision not to recuse herself and to defer to his 
recommendation impacted his decision.  He stated: 
[I]f you believe the nature, the circumstance, 500-year flood, if you 
believe that it’s officially unusual that you can’t participate 
meaningfully in one of the most important investigations in here, in 
your organization, then I think your obligation is to find another way to 
discharge leadership responsibilities.  Either appoint someone within 
the organization to be in charge of the case to make sure there is 
leadership to engage across the street with us, not to be this neither 
fish nor fowl, I’m still the Attorney General and really in an odd way, 
what she said explicitly was sort of the culture of the case before the 
tarmac thing [in that she was not closely involved in the investigation], 
which was I’m the Attorney General and that’s not really my thing and 
then she made it explicit by saying, I’m still the Attorney General, but 
I’m going to accept what Jim Comey and the prosecutors say. 
Comey also stated: 
Had Loretta said, I’m stepping out of this [after the tarmac meeting].  
I’m making Sally Yates the acting Attorney General and had I gone 
and sat down with Sally and heard her vision for it, maybe we would 
have ended up in a different place.  I don’t know.  It’s possible we’d 
end up in the same place, but it’s hard to relive different, imaginary 
lives. 
As described in more detail in Chapter Eight, on October 13, 2016, Comey 
gave a speech at the SAC Conference in which he spoke at length about the 
Midyear investigation.  Comey stated the following regarding the tarmac meeting in 
explaining his decision to deliver a unilateral public statement: 
At the end of [the investigation], [the team’s] view of it was there isn’t 
anything that anybody could prosecute.  My view was the same.  
Everybody between me and the people who worked this case felt the 
same way about it.  It was not a prosecutable case....  The decision 
there was not a prosecutable case here was not a hard one.  The hard 
one, as I’ve told you, was how do we communicate about it.  I decided 
to do something unprecedented that I was very nervous about at the 
time, and I’ve asked myself a thousand times since was it the right 
decision.  I still believe it was. 
Here was the thinking.  Especially after the Attorney General met with 
former President Clinton on that airplane the week before we 
[interviewed] Hillary Clinton....  The hard part in the wake of the 
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Attorney General’s meeting was what would happen to the FBI if we 
did the normal thing?  The normal thing would be send over an LHM 
even if we didn’t write it.  Go talk to them.  Tell them what we think, 
tell them whether we think there’s something here or whether we 
think a declination makes sense, but all of that would be done 
privately. 
What I said to myself at the time, we talked about it as a leadership 
team a lot and all believed that this was the right course, try to 
imagine what will happen to the FBI if we do the normal thing.  Then 
what will happen to us is the Department of Justice will screw around 
it for Lord knows how long, issue probably a one sentence declination, 
and then the world will catch on fire, and then the cry in the public will 
be where on the earth is the FBI, how could the FBI be part of some 
corrupt political bargain like this, there’s no transparency whatsoever, 
where is the FBI, where is the FBI.  Then, after a period of many 
weeks where a corrosive doubt about us leaks into the public’s square, 
then I’d have to testify in exactly the way I did before.  Our view of it 
would be dragged out in that way, in a way I think would’ve hugely 
damaging to us, and frankly, to the Justice Department more broadly 
and for the sense of justice in the country more broadly. 
V. July 5, 2016 Press Conference 
A. Notifications to Department Leadership 
On July 1, 2016, Comey emailed Rybicki a script containing what he planned 
to say to Lynch and Yates on the morning of July 5.  Entitled “What I will say 
Tuesday on phone,” the script stated: 
I wanted to let you know that I am doing a press conference this 
morning announcing the completion of our Midyear investigation and 
referral of the matter to DOJ.  I’m not going to tell you anything about 
what I will say, for reasons I hope you understand.  I think it is very 
important that I not have coordinated my statement outside the FBI.  
I’m not going to take questions at the press conference.  When it is 
over, my staff will be available to work with your team. 
Rybicki told the OIG that Comey wanted to be “very careful” about what he said on 
the phone to avoid substantive discussion before the actual press conference, and 
that was why he wrote out what he planned to say.  Rybicki said that Comey did 
not deliver this script verbatim during his calls to Lynch and Yates, but that it was 
close to what he actually said. 
Comey and Rybicki also developed a timeline for notifying the media, the 
Department, and Congress about the press conference.  After notifying the press 
pool and sending out a media advisory by 8:00 a.m., Comey planned to call Yates 
at 8:30 a.m. and Lynch at 8:35 a.m.  After those calls took place, McCabe, Rybicki, 
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and, Strzok were assigned to call Toscas, Axelrod, and Laufman, respectively, 
beginning at 8:30 a.m.  The timeline is set forth below in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 6.1:  FBI Timeline for Notifications on July 5, 2016 
 
Emails indicate that the Department first learned about Comey’s press 
conference as the result of the media notifications on the morning of July 5, not 
from Comey or Rybicki.  At 8:08 a.m., Melanie Newman sent an email to Lynch’s 
Acting Chief of Staff, Axelrod, and Lynch’s Deputy Chief of Staff entitled “FBI 
presser at 11 a.m.”  This email stated, “Just heard that the Director is having a 
press briefing today at 11 a.m.  I have not heard anything but have asked for 
guidance.”  Axelrod replied at 8:15 a.m., “I’ll call Rybicki.”  At 8:16 a.m., 
apparently after talking to the FBI Office of Public Affairs (OPA), Newman stated, 
“[The FBI OPA Section Chief] says the Director has called the DAG.”  Axelrod 
replied at 8:18 a.m., “Nope.”  At 8:31 a.m., Axelrod replied again and stated, “They 
just spoke.  He’s going to call the AG too.” 
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Newman emailed Axelrod and Lynch’s Acting Chief of Staff with additional 
information at 8:33 and 8:43 a.m.  She stated in the first email, “For the record, 
these notifications [to Lynch and Yates] are happening AFTER they notified press.  I 
learned from a reporter that they were requesting pool coverage—which means 
they want live TV.”  In the second email she stated, “They are also doing an off the 
record call this morning.” 
Newman told the OIG that in the weeks leading up to July 5, she had been 
“clamoring” for information from Axelrod about the conclusion of the investigation 
so that she could get some sense of the timeline.  She said she had been “hearing 
from reporters that [the investigation] was, it was coming to an end and the FBI 
was likely to announce something.”  She said that Axelrod assured her that the FBI 
would not announce a conclusion without the Department, that they were not at the 
point where they were ready to announce anything, and that he would tell her 
when they were.  Newman told the OIG that she did not doubt that Axelrod 
“believed this to be true.” 
Newman said that on the morning of July 5, after she found out from a 
reporter that the FBI would hold a press conference that day, she called the FBI 
OPA Section Chief to inquire about it and was told, “I can’t tell you what this is 
about...but I’m sure you can guess.”  According to Newman, the Department’s OPA 
had longstanding problems getting information from FBI OPA, but this was 
“unprecedented” and “absolutely ridiculous.” 
1. Call to Yates 
Comey said that when he spoke with Yates, he told her he was about to 
make a public press statement about the email investigation, including that the FBI 
had finished it and was sending it to the Department with its recommendation.  
Comey told the OIG that Yates did not say anything except “thanks for letting me 
know.”  According to contemporaneous emails, both Yates and Axelrod were 
notified by the FBI by 8:28 a.m. 
Yates told us that she remembered Comey saying that he was going to hold 
a press conference that morning.  She said that she did not recall if Comey said 
that it would be about the Clinton investigation, but that she knew it would be.  She 
stated, “And I remember thinking sort of, what the heck is this?  And hanging up 
immediately and calling Matt [Axelrod] to find out more of what he knew, because 
if there’s ever anybody who’s going to know what’s going on it’s going to be Matt.”  
She said that Comey’s tone during the call was “very emphatic, I’m not going to tell 
you what it is,” and that made her determined to find some other way to find out 
what Comey planned to say. 
Yates said that she and Axelrod assumed that Comey would deliver a very 
brief statement that the FBI had concluded the Clinton investigation and had 
reached a determination, and possibly would state what the FBI’s recommendation 
to the Department was going to be.  She said that based on her knowledge of the 
investigation, they expected that if Comey announced a recommendation it would 
be a declination.  She stated, “But [we] certainly didn’t expect what then 
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happened.”  She said that she viewed Comey’s decision to do a press statement 
without coordinating with the Department as problematic, particularly the failure to 
coordinate on the content of the statement.  We discuss Yates’s reaction to the 
content of Comey’s statement in more detail below. 
Axelrod said that he was surprised that Comey had chosen to do an 
independent press statement.  He said he thought that the statement should have 
been “coordinated and planned and discussed” with the Department.  However, at 
the time, he did not view the fact that Comey was the one delivering the declination 
as the primary problem.  He stated: 
I think it’s important to think about Comey’s press conference in two 
ways.  One was the decision to do it.  And then two was...what he 
said.  I just, one was the decision to do it at all.  And on the decision 
to do it at all, I mean, we’re surprised.  We were like completely taken 
aback.  But you know, again, we had already wanted the FBI to at 
least be, even before the tarmac, be part of the public face of this....  
Comey was...about to be the entire public face of it.  You know, there 
were some upsides and downsides to that.  But you know, it wasn’t all 
bad. 
As described in more detail below, Axelrod thought that the content of Comey’s 
statement was misleading, and that the way Comey executed the press conference 
hurt the perception of the integrity of the investigation in a significant way. 
Axelrod said that he and Yates did not discuss ordering Comey not to make 
the statement.  Axelrod stated, “I don’t recall that being discussed.  Because I don’t 
think that would have been tenable, right.  The press was already coming.  
And...ordering the Director not to do something can be very fraught.  And so I don’t 
recall that being a discussion.” 
2. Call to Lynch 
At 8:24 a.m., Lynch’s Acting Chief of Staff, after being told by Newman about 
the notice of the FBI press conference, sent an email to Axelrod, asking, “[P]lease 
call my cell when you are done with Rybicki.”  At 8:39 a.m., the Acting Chief of 
Staff sent the following email to Lynch:  “AG:  [Y]ou are about to receive a call from 
the director.  Please give me a call on my cell, and I can fill you in as to what it’s 
about.  Alternatively I will be in the office in about 5 to 10 minutes and will stop 
by.” 
Comey said that he called Lynch that morning and told her that he was going 
to make a public press statement about the email investigation, and that the FBI 
had completed the investigation and was sending it to the Department with its 
recommendation.  Comey stated that Lynch asked him, “Can you tell me what your 
recommendation is going to be?”  He said that he replied, “I can’t and I hope 
someday you’ll understand why, but I can’t answer any of your questions—I can’t 
answer any questions.  I’m not going to tell you what I’m going to say.”  Rybicki 
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told us that Comey called from his (Rybicki’s) office because of the “snafus” with 
connecting the calls and provided us with a similar account of what Comey said. 
Lynch told the OIG that she was in her office when Comey called her.  She 
said that he told her he was going to make a public statement “very soon,” and that 
it would be about the email investigation.  She described this call as follows: 
And I said, when are you proposing to do this?  And he said, very 
soon, within a few moments.  I don’t recall if he said 10:00, but 
certainly it was a short time period.  And then he said, and I am not 
going to discuss the contents with you because I think it’s best if we 
say, if we, if we are able to say that we did not coordinate the 
statement.  Then I said something, I had another question....  I don’t 
recall whether I said, what is it about?  I just don’t recall my other 
question.  And he said, it’s about, it’s going to be about the email 
investigation. 
Lynch said that he gave her no further indication about the substance of his 
statement.  She said that Comey told her he was not going to go over the 
statement with her so they both could say that it was not coordinated.  Asked 
whether this language raised a red flag indicating that she should find out more or 
tell him to stop, Lynch said it did not because it did not occur to her that Comey 
would talk about the end of the investigation or the FBI’s recommendation.  She 
stated, “And certainly I did not, at that time...on that day, even though [I] knew 
that they had interviewed the Secretary, I don’t think I had a view that [the 
investigation] was done at that point.” 
Lynch told the OIG that, had she known what Comey was going to do, she 
would have told him to stop.  She said she also would have asked him, “Why would 
you want to do this?”  She stated, “Ultimately, announcing the end of a matter, 
whether it’s going to be...how will we resolve it, would not be something that I 
would ever think that the, that the investigative side would do, which is why that 
was not what I thought he was going to do.” 
3. Notifications to NSD 
At 8:28 a.m., McCabe and Strzok received notice that Axelrod and Yates had 
been notified, which served as the “green light” for them to contact Toscas and 
Laufman, respectively.  At 8:33 a.m., McCabe sent an email to Toscas, stating: 
The Director just informed the DAG that at 1100 this morning he has 
convened a press conference to announce the completion of our 
investigation and the referral to DOJ.  He will not tell her what he is 
going to say.  It is important that he not coordinate his statement in 
any way.  He will not take questions at the conference.  His next call is 
to the AG. 
I wanted you to hear this from me.  I understand that this will be 
troubling to the team and I very much regret that.  I want to talk to 
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you after the [Principals Committee] and am happy to bring my folks 
over to DOJ this afternoon to discuss next steps. 
McCabe said that he called Toscas, but Toscas was traveling, so he instead sent 
Toscas an email.  At 8:53 a.m., Toscas sent an email to Carlin, Laufman, and Mary 
McCord, stating: 
I’m on hold to talk to the DD now.  I received a message from him a 
few minutes ago saying that this morning the Director informed the 
DAG that he will have a press conference at 11am today to announce 
the completion of the FBI’s investigation and the referral to DOJ.  He 
will not take questions at the conference, but he is not coordinating his 
statement with us.  I’ll call when I get off the phone. 
According to Laufman’s notes, Toscas then held a conference call with McCord, 
Laufman, and Prosecutors 1 and 2.  According to these notes, Toscas told the group 
that he had spoken with McCabe and learned that Comey planned to hold a press 
conference at 11:00 a.m. to announce the conclusion of the investigation and the 
FBI’s recommendation to the Department.  The notes stated, “Director has told AG 
+ DAG.  McCabe refused to convey substance.  Director doesn’t want statement to 
appear coordinated with DOJ.” 
Laufman’s notes also stated that, even though McCabe said that he would 
not share the content of Comey’s planned statement, McCabe told Toscas that 
Comey planned to talk for 10 to 15 minutes and would say what the FBI had done, 
what the FBI had found, and what the FBI’s recommendation to the Attorney 
General and the Department would be.  Finally, the notes indicate that Toscas 
spoke to Carlin, and Carlin “said not to discuss w/ OAG or ODAG in advance.” 
Other notes obtained by the OIG indicate that Laufman separately spoke to 
Strzok at 8:35 a.m. that morning.  According to these notes, Strzok called Laufman 
and said that he was “told to call [him] and say” that Comey would hold a press 
conference at 11:00 a.m. that morning.  These notes indicate that Laufman asked, 
“What exactly will he say,” and that Strzok replied, “Midyear.”  The notes also 
indicate that the “7th floor has told AG/DAG.” 
B. Reactions to the Statement 
Comey held his press conference at 11:00 a.m. on July 5, 2016.  He 
delivered the final version of his statement verbatim (provided as Attachment D to 
this report) and did not take any questions.  In this section we describe reactions to 
his statement within the Department. 
1. Department and NSD Leadership 
Lynch told the OIG that she watched Comey’s statement on the television in 
her office.  She described her thoughts as she watched Comey speak: 
[D]iscussing findings in something that was technically not closed was, 
I was a little stunned, actually....  I had no way to stop him at that 
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point, I mean, short of, you know, dashing across the street and 
unplugging something.... 
But, so, as he went further into the analysis of not only what they 
found but what they recommended, I just thought this was, this was 
done to protect the image of the FBI because of the perception that 
somehow the FBI was not going to be allowed to have their views 
known or their views expressed or their views respected within the 
process.  Because that had, that in fact had been, for those of us who 
were inside the Department at the time, and I don’t know how the FBI 
was taking it at the time, but certainly if you looked at criticism aimed 
at the Department, people said, oh yeah, you know, the AG was 
appointed by Bill Clinton to be U.S. Attorney. 
But that was never the real, the real stated concern.  It was that there 
was going to be, you know, these strong investigators who wanted to 
bring charges who would be somehow silenced or stepped on by the 
legal side of the house, whether it was the political side or the career 
side, they never really made much of a differentiation.  Easy to attach 
it to the political side if you’re talking to the AG.  But that was really 
something that was, that was thrown around a lot in, in debate outside 
of the Department. 
So I viewed it as him trying to make his recommendation clear so that, 
and from, and when he made the recommendation clear and said this 
is our recommendation, I remember wondering does the, does the 
team know that this is happening, you know, that the literal 
investigative team, both sides of it?  Did George [Toscas] know this 
was going to happen?  Who knew that this was going to occur?  And 
why didn’t we know in advance?...  Meaning the fifth floor, myself, the 
DAG.  Why weren’t we informed in advance of this?  So those are my 
thoughts during the, during, watching of the, of that particular press 
conference. 
Lynch said that she thought that the strongest public concern about the Midyear 
investigation was not that she as the Attorney General was going to “kill it,” but 
that the investigative side would want to charge somebody, and the legal side 
would say no for political reasons.  She said that she viewed Comey’s public 
statement as “basically saying...look...we’re independent.  We...aren’t influenced by 
anybody.  And now...no one is also silencing us.”  Lynch stated that she did not 
ascribe malicious intent to Comey, but that she thought that his statement was a 
“huge mistake.” 
Lynch told the OIG that she did not think that the FBI’s recommendation 
should have been made public “because we don’t make those things public.  That’s 
part of the discussion that we [agents and prosecutors] have.  That’s part of, you 
know, we can talk about it.  We can argue about it.  We can go back and forth 
about it.” 
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Yates told the OIG that she had concerns about the substance of Comey’s 
statement as she watched the press conference.  She stated: 
And while I can’t point to specific facts in Jim [Comey]’s description, 
you know, narrative description there that I would say were 
inaccurate, I also remember at the time thinking the facts as those are 
being laid out with much more censure than the facts as I understood 
them to be and how I had been briefed on this matter.  Sort of by way 
of example, I don’t recall Jim going through and explaining that there 
were no classification markings on the vast, vast, vast majority.  We 
got three email chains with a, you know, the small C [indicating that 
the information was Confidential].  Not the Top Secret or anything on 
there.  That it was all to people within the State Department.... 
That were really, to me gave the most accurate picture of what the 
facts actually were there.  And so I was stunned A, at the level of 
detail that he went into.  B, that he then made judgments and said 
things like extremely careless and should have known that this 
material was.  And every, anyone should know you shouldn’t have it 
on a private server.  That he gave the impression that, you know, the 
private server could have been hacked.  We don’t really know for 
sure....  That, you know, I thought wasn’t really a balanced description 
of what the facts were here. 
And so, you know, there are a number of things that are concerning 
about that.  One, that he sort of put that slant on it, that it was done 
without any consultation with folks at Main Justice.  That it impugned 
someone we weren’t charging.  We don’t trash people we’re not 
charging.  And we don’t get to just make value or moral judgments 
about their conduct.  And there were things in there that I thought 
were unnecessary from a factual, those, they were opinion as opposed 
to laying out, even if he were going to do this, what was a fair, 
evenhanded recitation of what the facts were.  And I thought that was 
way out of order. 
Asked what her reaction was when she looked back on the statement, Yates said 
that she was “even more stunned.”  She stated: 
At the time all of this is happening it’s such a swirl.  You know, the 
tarmac happens and trying to figure out what to happen.  I mean, all 
of this is happening so quickly and in such a charged environment it’s 
hard to fully, for it all to fully sink in like it does when you look at it 
then in the calm of day in, you know, in retrospect on that.  And look, 
it was a difficult situation with the tarmac.  But that’s not something I 
think that was appropriate for the FBI Director to unilaterally then 
decide how he was going to handle that.  I think that was a factor that 
we should consider in how we were going to publicly convey the 
results of the investigation.  And certainly if he had views about how 
that ought to happen I think he should speak up and should convey 
those views.  But to make the unilateral decision to do it is one thing.  
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And then to put out that level of detail without coordinating that with 
DOJ or, you know, DOJ agreeing with that, and then for it to be with a 
slant that I didn’t think was accurate—and I’m not saying he did that 
intentionally.  I don’t know.  I certainly wouldn’t accuse anybody of 
that.  But the way it was conveyed I didn’t think gave the most 
accurate description.  And then, as I said, impugning someone that we 
weren’t charging with sort of personal judgments.... 
Yates said that she did agree with Comey’s statement that no reasonable 
prosecutor would bring a case based on the facts developed in the investigation, 
but that she did not think that it was “the place of the FBI Director to be out telling 
the public what a prosecutor would do there.” 
Axelrod stated that he and Yates watched the press conference in her office.  
He said that he was “pretty confident” in what Comey was going to conclude based 
on what they had been led to believe about the investigation and did not fully 
process the content of the statement while Comey was delivering it.  He said that 
he reacted more negatively to the statement after attending the briefing by 
prosecutors the next day: 
I didn’t know all the facts because we were giving George [Toscas] the 
space to tell us what we thought we needed to know.  We were not in 
the weeds.  And the next day when we got the briefing o[n] some of 
the stuff in the weeds there were important facts that the NSD guys 
briefed the AG on that were absent from Comey’s statement.  And so 
that was when I started to have a much more strongly negative 
reaction to what Comey had said. 
Asked what facts were missing that he thought were important, Axelrod identified 
the following: 
A couple.  One, that according to the NSD guys and what I recall from 
their briefing is that if you look at the spectrum of cases that the 
Department has brought in the past historically in this area the 
Department has never brought a case where the classified information 
was shared between people who work for the Government.  It was 
always someone sharing classified information with someone outside 
of the Government.  That’s a pretty important fact.  That if you are 
laying out your reasons or reasons for recommending declining 
prosecution that’s a, you know, to me a pretty important one.  The 
other one I recall was that the NSD guys said that most of the emails 
were, I think whether it was all or most, the majority of the emails 
that turned out to be classified had been sent late at night or on the 
weekends.  Which, you know, to me means it’s people sort of trying 
to, you know, were not at their desks, right, where they have access 
to classified systems trying to talk about, you know, talk around or 
talk about issues.  So I thought that was a really important fact.  And 
again, just when you’re talking about intent, right, that’s an important 
thing that bears on intent. 
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Axelrod contrasted Comey’s statement with the briefing by the prosecutors the 
following day, which he characterized as a “much more complete picture.”  He 
stated, “[W]hen [the prosecutors] were done talking the reaction was like oh, this is 
clearly a declination.  When Comey was done talking, as I think you saw from the 
public reaction,...it was much more of a mixed bag.” 
Axelrod told the OIG that the way the press conference was executed hurt 
the perception of the integrity of the investigation in a significant way.  He stated: 
Because if the goal, to do what he did the goal would need to be, and I 
would imagine his goal was that by the time he’s done talking that 
even if people don’t agree with the outcome they can see why, you 
know, understand his thinking and see like why he got to the place he 
got.  And that it would sort of be like a closing argument or something, 
right.  It would be, right, here’s the rationale and I’ve [seen] the facts 
and here’s why I’m coming out the way I’m coming out.  And people 
again, on the, and for the partisans and people with political agendas, 
they’re not going to be convinced.  But that reasonable center would 
say like okay, yeah, we get it. 
That was not the reaction to the statement.  Which I think just by its 
own terms means the execution failed.  Because it raised a lot of 
questions.  It, just it wasn’t, it was much more of a, like I said, the 
difference in tone and emphasis between what he said and then what 
we heard in the AG’s office the next morning was striking—to me.  And 
I think if he had, you know, if the folks who gave the briefing the next 
[day] were the ones who, I mean, obviously not but that those words 
had been said at the press conference I think it would have been 
received quite differently. 
Toscas told the OIG that his initial reaction to Comey’s statement was, 
“[H]oly cow, like they [Axelrod and the FBI] were talking about doing a joint 
appearance or statement of some sort and he’s just doing it all on his own.”  Toscas 
said that he had concerns about Comey’s statement, both the substance of it and 
the fact that it deviated from Department practice.  He stated: 
We don’t say we’re closing something, but let me tell you some bad 
stuff that we saw along the way, but it doesn’t rise to the level of 
bringing a case.  We just don’t do it....  I don’t know whether you can 
point back to a document some place, but after doing this for almost 
24 years, somehow it’s ingrained in me and it appears to be ingrained 
in everyone around me and everyone who does this whether they’re 
new or veterans, it’s just something you don’t do, you do not. 
It’s the same reason why, if you, for example, and we have these 
discussions in some cases, if you go get a search warrant and it’s 
under seal and in the search warrant you’re seeing Tom—there’s 
probable cause that Tom committed, fill in the blank, whatever 
horrible crime you want or a lesser crime.  You go do your search.  
There’s no case.  There’s no prosecution.  It never comes.  You know it 
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never leads to a prosecutable case.  You don’t unseal that warrant and 
tell the public, hey, there’s probable cause that Tom is, you know 
engages in child pornography or we suspect him of a bank robbery, 
you just don’t do it. 
And so it’s the same type of principle.  When you decide you’re not 
proceeding, you say nothing more.  I get that in some instances 
there’s going to be a lot of public knowledge of the facts.  A shooting, 
for example, where the public has seen what happened, so they 
already know of actual conduct whether it’s criminal or not is different, 
so you could say, we’re not bringing a charge, but still comment on 
what everyone has seen. 
But that’s not what this was and people could have tried to guess or 
you know surmise what the actual exchanges were in some instances 
or what the particular parts of the classified information were, but I 
just didn’t see it as something that—it did not square with the way we 
would ordinarily operate. 
Toscas said that Comey’s decision to do the statement seemed “beyond strange” 
and “incredibly dangerous” considering the ongoing campaign and the proximity to 
the election. 
Asked whether “extremely careless” was too similar to “gross negligence,” 
Toscas said that it was.  Toscas said that once Comey was getting “grilled 
about...gross negligence,” it must have become obvious that they chose words that 
were so similar to the statutory language that they “created friction in being able to 
explain [his] ultimate decision.”  He told the OIG that he did not know how Comey’s 
lawyers missed this issue, and that the statement would have benefitted from legal 
review by the prosecutors. 
Toscas did not have a problem with Comey’s statement that no “reasonable 
prosecutor” would bring a case.  He stated: 
[T]hat didn’t bother me at all.  This is a man who was the Deputy 
Attorney General of our country.  He ran this Department.  He was a 
lifelong prosecutor.  I had no problem with that.  I know other people 
do because they say, oh he’s usurping authority and things like that, 
but I think he is a—he is perfectly qualified, and regardless of his 
position, even in private practice or as a citizen, a private citizen, he 
could say that and I think it has credibility. 
However, Toscas expressed concerns about the downstream effects of Comey’s 
deviation from Department practice in making a public statement in July, which he 
said then impacted Comey’s decisions in October.  We discuss those concerns in 
Chapter Ten. 
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2. Prosecutors 
As described above, Prosecutors 1 and 2 learned about Comey’s plan to hold 
a press conference as the result of McCabe’s call to Toscas and Strzok’s call to 
Laufman.  Strzok also spoke directly to Prosecutor 1 that morning.  Prosecutor 1 
said that he was “extremely angry” on the phone and pressed Strzok to tell him 
what Comey planned to say, but that Strzok flatly refused and said that he was not 
allowed to tell him.  Following this call, Prosecutor 1 contacted Prosecutors 3 and 4 
and informed them that Comey planned to hold a press conference that morning. 
The prosecutors had varying reactions to the substance of Comey’s 
statement.  Prosecutor 4 told the OIG that he was surprised at how strong Comey’s 
“no reasonable prosecutor” language was and by the inclusion of negative 
commentary about former Secretary Clinton’s conduct, but that he did not recall 
hearing anything factually inaccurate in the statement. 
Prosecutors 1, 2, and 3 identified substantive concerns with Comey’s 
statement.  Prosecutor 1 highlighted Comey’s negative comments about former 
Secretary Clinton, characterizing them as “declining to prosecute someone and then 
sort of dirtying them up with facts that you develop along the way.”  Prosecutor 1 
also said that the use of “extremely careless” to describe her conduct “begs 
questions about gross negligence” that could have been avoided if the statement 
were more carefully crafted.  Prosecutor 2 thought that the statement was “totally 
unfair on many levels,” particularly the discussion of uncharged conduct, and that 
the characterization of the evidence in the statement was “very skewed.” 
Prosecutors 3 and 4 said they had concerns about Comey’s use of “extremely 
careless” to describe former Secretary Clinton’s conduct in the statement.  On July 
6, 2016, Prosecutor 3 sent the following email to Prosecutors 1, 2, and 4: 
It’s unfortunate that Comey didn’t differentiate the standard of proof 
between 793(f) and the other statutes.  He glossed over all with 
mention of the absence of intent and made no mention of the 
necessity of proving knowledge of classified [information] with regard 
to 793(f) and why that proof was deficient.  By using the phrase 
“extremely careless” he lit up the talking heads last night, many of 
whom opined that such verbiage warranted a gross negligence charge 
and that Comey was giving Clinton an unwarranted pass.  Even the so-
called legal experts didn’t seem to understand the elements of that 
statute and why it did not apply to the facts. 
In his OIG interview, Prosecutor 3 said that he thought that Comey’s remarks had a 
good assessment of the investigation, but that he should have better articulated the 
gross negligence provision “because that seemed to draw a lot of fire from the 
public.”  Prosecutor 3 said that Comey’s statement did not explain well enough that 
under the gross negligence provision “you have to know...you’re being careless with 
what is in fact classified information.” 
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On August 2, 2016, Laufman sent an email to FBI Attorney 1 in connection 
with draft FBI responses to Congressional inquiries that had been made to Comey, 
and copied Toscas and the NSD prosecutors and supervisors on the email.  Laufman 
stated the following about Comey’s July 5 statement: 
We appreciate the Bureau sending us its draft response to the inquiries 
Director Comey received from Congress.  We assume you have already 
considered and rejected simply responding to the letters (which were 
sent before the Director’s congressional testimony) by referring the 
Committees to the Director’s lengthy [congressional] testimony.  As 
the Director has publicly stated, the Bureau did not coordinate the 
Director’s public statements about this case (many of which are 
repeated in the Bureau’s draft response) with the Justice Department, 
and we therefore did not have an opportunity to express our views 
about those statements in advance.  As I’m sure you understand, 
some of the Director’s statements went beyond the types of 
statements that we, as prosecutors, would typically make in a case 
where no charges were brought (e.g., characterizing uncharged 
conduct of individuals within the scope of the investigation).  While we 
understand and respect the Director’s reasons for departing from 
normal practice in this one instance, we, of course, have not departed 
from our practice of refraining from making such statements—and we 
do not want to be perceived as concurring in or adopting such 
statements. 
VI. Congressional Testimony Explaining the July 5 Statement 
A. July 7, 2016 
Two days after his statement, on July 7, 2016, Comey testified for several 
hours before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
(HOGR).152  During this hearing, Comey was asked numerous questions about the 
basis for the decision to recommend declining prosecution of former Secretary 
Clinton and whether there was evidence that former Secretary Clinton violated any 
criminal statutes, including the gross negligence provision in 18 U.S.C. § 793(f).  
He also was asked about the specific language used in his statement.  In response 
to a question about the meaning of “extremely careless,” Comey stated, “I intended 
it as a common sense term....  Somebody who is—should know better, someone 
who is demonstrating a lack of care that strikes me as—there’s ordinary accidents, 
and then there’s just real sloppiness.  So I kind of think of that as real sloppiness.” 
Representative John Mica noted the proximity of the tarmac incident on June 
27, Lynch’s announcement that she would “defer to the FBI” on July 1, Comey’s 
                                       
152  See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Oversight of the State Department, 114th Cong., 2d sess., July 7, 2016, 
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/7-7-2016-Oversight-of-the-State-
Department.pdf (accessed May 8, 2018). 
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statement on the morning of July 5, and former Secretary Clinton’s campaign 
appearance with then President Obama on the afternoon of July 5.  In response to a 
series of questions about the circumstances of his statement, Comey responded, 
“Look me in the eye and listen to what I’m about to say.  I did not coordinate [my 
statement] with anyone.  The White House, the Department of Justice, nobody 
outside the FBI family had any idea what I was about to say.  I say that under oath.  
I stand by that.  There was no coordination.”  Comey also testified that there was 
no interference in or attempt to influence the investigation by then President 
Obama, the Clinton campaign, or former Secretary Clinton herself. 
Comey also was asked questions about his reasons for doing an independent 
press conference.  In response to a question about whether the system was 
“rigged,” Comey stated: 
I get a 10-year term to ensure that I stay outside of politics, but in a 
way that it’s easy.  I lead an organization that is resolutely apolitical. 
We are tough aggressive people.  If we can make a case, we’ll make a 
case.  We do not care what the person’s stripes are or what their bank 
account looks like. 
And I worry very much when people doubt that.  It’s the reason I did 
the press conference 2 days ago.  I care about the FBI’s reputation, I 
care about the Justice Department.  I care about the whole system 
deeply.  And so I decided I’m going to do something no Director’s ever 
done before.  I’m not going to tell the Attorney General or anybody 
else what I’m going to say, or even that I’m going to say it.  They did 
not know, nor did the media know, until I walked out what I was going 
to talk about. 
And then I offered extraordinary transparency, which I’m sure 
confused and bugged a lot of people. 
Responding to another question about his statement, Comey stated: 
[E]verything I did would have been done privately in the normal 
course.  We have great conversations between the FBI and 
prosecutors.  We make recommendations.  We argue back and forth.  
What I decided to do was offer transparency to the American people 
about the “whys” of that, what I was going to do because I thought it 
was very, very important for their confidence in the system of justice.  
And within that their confidence in the FBI. 
And I was very concerned that if I didn’t show that transparency, that 
in that lack of transparency people would say, “Gee.  What is going on 
here?  Something—you know, something seems squirrely here?”  So I 
said I would do something unprecedented because I think it is 
unprecedented situation. 
Now, the next Director who is criminally investigating one of the two 
candidates for President may find him or herself bound by my 
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precedent.  Okay.  So if that happens in the next 100 years they’ll 
have to deal with what I did.  So I decided it was worth doing. 
B. September 28, 2016 
Comey also testified in an oversight hearing before the House Judiciary 
Committee on September 28, 2016, several weeks after the FBI released various 
materials from the Midyear investigation to Congress and in response to Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests.153  During this hearing, Comey answered 
questions about the conduct of the Midyear investigation, including questions about 
the reliance on voluntary production of information, the destruction of devices used 
by former Secretary Clinton, decisions to grant immunity to witnesses, and the 
interpretation of the gross negligence provision. 
Comey was asked again about the independence of the investigation.  
Representative Steve King asked about the interview of former Secretary Clinton 
and whether “Loretta Lynch had her people in there?”  Comey responded, “There 
was no advice to me from the Attorney General or any of the lawyers working for 
her.  My team formulated a recommendation that was communicated to me.  And 
the FBI reached its conclusion as to what to do uncoordinated from the Department 
of Justice.”  Asked whether he was responsible for the decision to decline 
prosecution, Comey said that the decision to decline was made in the Department, 
but acknowledged that there was “virtually zero chance” that the Department would 
make a different decision once Comey had made his recommendation public.  He 
stated, “But part of my decision was based on my prediction that there was no way 
the Department of Justice would prosecute on these facts in any event.” 
Importantly, at the September 28 hearing, Comey was asked, “Would you 
reopen the Clinton investigation if you discovered new information that was both 
relevant and substantial?”  Comey answered, “It is hard for me to answer in the 
abstract. We would certainly look at any new and substantial information....  What 
we can say is...if people have new and substantial information, we would like to see 
it so we can make an evaluation.” 
C. June 8, 2017 
On June 8, 2017, following his firing as FBI Director, Comey testified about 
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).154  In an exchange with Committee Chairman 
Senator Richard Burr, Comey was asked about the Midyear investigation, including 
whether his decision to publicly report the results of the investigation was 
                                       
153  See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 114th Cong., 2d sess., September 28, 2016, https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/114-91_22125.pdf (accessed May 8, 2018). 
154  See U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing with Former FBI 
Director James Comey, 115th Cong., 1st sess., June 8, 2017, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-former-fbi-director-james-comey# 
(accessed May 8, 2018). 
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influenced by the tarmac meeting between former Attorney General Lynch and 
former President Clinton.  Comey replied, “Yes. In—in an ultimately conclusive way.  
That was the thing that capped it for me that I had to do something separately to 
protect the credibility of the investigation, which meant both the FBI and the Justice 
Department.” 
Senator Burr then asked whether there were other things that contributed to 
Comey’s decision that he could describe in an open session.  Comey stated: 
There were other things that contributed to that.  One significant item 
I can’t, I know the committee’s been briefed on. There’s been some 
public accounts of it, which are nonsense, but I understand the 
committee’s been briefed on the classified facts. 
Probably the only other consideration that I guess I can talk about in 
an open setting is at one point the Attorney General had directed me 
not to call it an “investigation,” but instead to call it a “matter,” which 
confused me and concerned me.  But that was one of the bricks in the 
load that led me to conclude I have to step away from the Department 
if we’re to close this case credibly. 
The classified facts indicating potential bias by the former Attorney General 
referenced in Comey’s testimony are discussed in the classified appendix to this 
report.  As described in more detail in that appendix, Comey had concerns about 
Lynch’s ability to credibly announce the closure of the investigation, in part because 
of classified information learned by the FBI in March 2016 regarding alleged 
attempts to influence the Midyear investigation by Lynch, as well efforts by Comey 
to extend the investigation to impact the election.  Although the FBI did not find 
these allegations credible, did not investigate the allegations, and did not inform 
Lynch about the information until August 2016, Comey was concerned that, if the 
allegations became known, it could affect the public’s perception of Lynch’s 
involvement in the investigation. 
Comey was asked to provide additional details about Lynch’s instruction to 
call the Midyear investigation a “matter” by Senator James Lankford.  Comey 
stated: 
Well, it concerned me because we were at the point where we had 
refused to confirm the existence, as we typically do, of an investigation 
for months, and it was getting to a place where that looked silly, 
because the campaigns were talking about interacting with the FBI in 
the course of our work. 
The Clinton campaign at the time was using all kind of euphemisms—
security review, matters, things like that—for what was going on.  We 
were getting to a place where the Attorney General and I were both 
going to have to testify and talk publicly about [it].  And I wanted to 
know, was she going to authorize us to confirm we had an 
investigation? 
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And she said, “Yes,” but don’t call it that, call it a “matter.”  And I said, 
why would I do that?  And she said, just call it a “matter.” 
And, again, you look back in hindsight, you think should I have 
resisted harder?  I just said, all right, it isn’t worth—this isn’t a hill 
worth dying on and so I just said, okay, the press is going to 
completely ignore it.  And that’s what happened.  When I said, we 
have opened a matter, they all reported the FBI has an investigation 
open. 
And so that concerned me because that language tracked the way the 
campaign was talking about FBI’s work and that’s concerning.155 
In response to a follow up question about this testimony, Comey stated: 
And again, I don’t know whether it was intentional or not, but it gave 
the impression that the Attorney General was looking to align the way 
we talked about our work with the way a political campaign was 
describing the same activity, which was inaccurate.  We had a criminal 
investigation open with, as I said before, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  We had an investigation open at the time, and so that 
gave me a queasy feeling. 
Comey also had an extended exchange with Senator John Cornyn about 
whether Lynch had an appearance of a conflict of interest requiring appointment of 
a special counsel. 
SENATOR CORNYN:  But it seems to me that you clearly believe that 
Loretta Lynch, the Attorney General, had an appearance of a conflict of 
interest on the Clinton email investigation. Is that correct? 
COMEY:  I think that’s fair.  I didn’t believe she could credibly decline 
that investigation, at least not without grievous damage to the 
Department of Justice and to the FBI. 
SENATOR CORNYN: And, under Department of Justice and FBI norms, 
wouldn’t it have been appropriate for the Attorney General, or, if she 
had recused herself—which she did not do—for the Deputy Attorney 
General to appoint a special counsel?  That’s essentially what’s 
happened now with Director Mueller.  Would that have been an 
appropriate step in the Clinton email investigation in your opinion? 
COMEY:  Certainly a possible step, yes, sir. 
                                       
155  In an interview on September 8, 2015, former Secretary Clinton described the FBI’s 
investigation as a “security investigation....  It’s not, as has been confirmed, a criminal investigation.”  
Interview with Hillary Clinton, ABC News (Sept. 8, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/full-
transcript-abcs-david-muir-interviews-hillary-clinton/story?id=33607656 (accessed June 1, 2018).  
Her campaign also referred to it as a “security review.”  See Eugene Kiely, More Spin on Clinton 
Emails, FactCheck.org (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.factcheck.org/2015/09/more-spin-on-clinton-
emails (accessed June 2, 2018).   
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SENATOR CORNYN:  And were you aware that Ms. Lynch had been 
requested numerous times to appoint a special counsel and had 
refused? 
COMEY: Yes, from—I think Congress had, members of Congress had 
repeatedly asked.  Yes, sir. 
SENATOR CORNYN: Yours truly did on multiple occasions.  And that 
heightened your concerns about the appearance of a conflict of 
interest with the Department of Justice, which caused you to make 
what you have described as an incredibly painful decision to basically 
take the matter up yourself and led to that July press conference. 
COMEY:  Yes, sir. After President Clinton, former President Clinton, 
met on the plane with the Attorney General, I considered whether I 
should call for the appointment of a special counsel and had decided 
that that would be an unfair thing to do, because I knew there was no 
case there.  We had investigated it very, very thoroughly. 
I know this is a subject of passionate disagreement, but I knew there 
was no case there.  And calling for the appointment of a special 
counsel would be brutally unfair because it would send the message, 
aha, there’s something here.  That was my judgment.  Again, lots of 
people have different views of it.  But that’s how I thought about it. 
SENATOR CORNYN:  Well, if the special counsel had been appointed, 
they could’ve made that determination that there was nothing there 
and declined to pursue it, right? 
COMEY: Sure, but it would’ve been many months later or a year later. 
VII. Analysis 
We found no evidence that Comey’s public statement announcing the FBI’s 
decision to close the investigation was the result of bias or an effort to influence the 
election.  Instead, the documentary and testimonial evidence reviewed by the OIG 
reflected that Comey’s decision was the result of his consideration of the evidence 
that the FBI had collected during the course of the investigation and his 
understanding of the proof required to pursue a prosecution under the relevant 
statutes.  Nevertheless, we concluded that Comey’s unilateral announcement was 
inconsistent with Department policy, usurped the authority of Attorney General, and 
did not accurately describe the legal position of the Department prosecutors. 
Although we found no evidence that Lynch and former President Clinton 
discussed the Midyear investigation or engaged in other inappropriate discussion 
during their tarmac meeting on June 27, 2016, we also found that Lynch’s failure to 
recognize the appearance problem created by former President Clinton’s visit and to 
take action to cut the visit short was an error in judgment.  We further concluded 
that her efforts to respond to the meeting by explaining what her role would be in 
the investigation going forward created public confusion and did not adequately 
address the situation.  Finally, we found that Lynch, having decided not to recuse 
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herself, retained authority over both the final prosecution decision and the 
Department’s management of the Midyear investigation, including whether to 
respond to Comey’s call to her on the morning of July 5 by instructing him to share 
his statement with her.   
A. Comey’s Decision to Make a Unilateral Announcement 
Beginning in early 2016, and certainly by late April 2016, the Midyear team 
reached a general consensus that the evidence would not support a prosecution, 
absent major unexpected developments in the form of newly discovered emails or 
testimony.  This assessment was based on a lack of evidence showing that former 
Secretary Clinton, her senior aides, or other State Department officials knew that 
they were emailing unmarked classified information or intended to introduce 
classified information onto an unclassified system.  Witnesses told us that, at the 
time, they understood the emails in question were sent by State Department 
employees to other State Department employees in the course of doing their jobs, 
and that both the senders and recipients had the appropriate clearances and the 
need to know the information.  As described in Chapter Two, the prosecutors 
determined based on their legal research and review of past Department practice 
that evidence of knowledge or intent was necessary to charge any individual with 
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 793(e), or 793(f)(1). 
Comey understood and agreed with this assessment.  He told us that, as he 
realized that the case likely would not result in charges, he became concerned that 
senior Department officials were unable to announce a declination in a way that the 
public would find credible and objective.  Comey said that these concerns were 
based on the public perception created by an Attorney General appointed by a 
Democratic President announcing that the Democratic Presidential candidate would 
not be prosecuted, not on any actions by or concerns specific to Lynch or Yates; 
however, as discussed below, Comey also pointed to public comments made by 
then President Obama and his White House Press Secretary about the Midyear 
investigation, concerns that classified information referencing Lynch would be 
publicly released and would impact her credibility, Lynch’s alleged admonition to 
him early on to refer to the FBI’s investigation as a “matter,” and Lynch’s meeting 
with former President Clinton as contributing to his concerns about her. 
In April 2016, Comey initiated discussions with Yates and Axelrod about how 
to credibly announce the conclusion of the investigation based on the likelihood that 
the case would result in a declination.  During this discussion, Comey stated that he 
was likely to request the appointment of a special counsel “the deeper we get into 
summer” without concluding the investigation.  Comey told the OIG that his 
reference to a special counsel was intended to induce the Department to move 
more quickly to obtain the Mills and Samuelson laptops.  We did not find evidence 
that Comey at any time seriously considered requesting a special counsel. 
Lynch told us that she was aware that Yates met with Comey, and that 
Comey indicated that he was not sure there was a “there there”—i.e., it was not a 
prosecutable case.  Lynch also was receiving periodic briefings about the Midyear 
investigation, and said that she thought that any discussions about announcing a 
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declination were “very premature” at that time because there were remaining 
investigative steps to be taken.  Lynch told us that she did not know that Comey 
mentioned requesting a special counsel during his discussion with Yates, and that 
no one in the Department or the FBI ever suggested to her that a special counsel 
was needed. 
Discussions about a strategy for announcing a declination also took place 
within the FBI.  Comey told the OIG that he considered every option for announcing 
a declination, from a one-line press release issued by the Department to an FBI-
only press conference providing a detailed statement about the investigation.  
Comey said that foremost in his mind was the need to minimize the “reputational 
damage” to the Department and the FBI that would result from a declination, and 
to preserve the credibility and integrity of the institution. 
In late April 2016, Comey raised the possibility of “doing something solo” in a 
meeting with Baker, McCabe, and Rybicki.  He also began drafting a public 
statement that contemplated that he would act alone in announcing the declination, 
sending a first draft of this statement to Baker, McCabe, and Rybicki on May 2, 
2016.  Witnesses told us that Comey had not yet made a firm decision to deliver a 
public statement when he sent this draft, but that he wanted to discuss it as one 
possible option for announcing a declination. 
According to various witnesses we interviewed, Comey and other senior FBI 
officials knew that delivering a separate public statement held substantial risk.  
McCabe said that he expressed concerns that such a statement would represent a 
“complete departure” from Department protocol and could set a “potentially 
dangerous precedent” for the FBI.  Rosenberg said that in discussions with Comey, 
he raised the possibility that doing a separate statement would create an 
irreparable breach with the Department.  Comey said that he knew it was a “crazy 
idea, but we were in a [500]-year flood.” 
Comey discussed the draft public statement in meetings with members of the 
Midyear team and with senior FBI officials at various times in May and June 2016.  
These discussions included whether to do a separate statement at all, in addition to 
the specific language revisions discussed in Section III.B and C above.  Comey said 
that by June 27, 2016, the date of Lynch’s tarmac meeting with former President 
Clinton, he was “90 percent there, like highly likely” in terms of deciding to deliver 
the statement. 
Despite this, Comey and other senior FBI officials continued to engage their 
Department counterparts in discussions about how to credibly announce a 
declination.  These discussions occurred at various levels:  between Comey and 
Yates; between McCabe and Carlin; and between Strzok and Laufman.  At no time 
did anyone from the FBI inform anyone from the Department that Comey was even 
considering making a statement on his own, let alone that he had already drafted 
such a statement.  Department witnesses at all levels told us that they believed 
that shortly after the interview of former Secretary Clinton was completed, the 
Department and the FBI would work together to deliver some sort of coordinated 
statement, and that Comey would be involved.  Yates told the OIG that her 
241 
understanding was that they would be “all holding hands and jumping off the bridge 
together.” 
Comey said that from the time he first conceived of making a separate 
statement, he intended to deliver it without coordinating with the Department.  He 
told the OIG that he made a conscious decision not to tell Department leadership 
about his plans to “go it alone” because he was concerned that they would instruct 
him not to do it.  Comey admitted that he concealed his intentions from the 
Department until the morning of his press conference, and instructed his staff to do 
the same, to make it impracticable for Department leadership to prevent him from 
delivering his statement. 
We found that it was extraordinary and insubordinate for Comey to conceal 
his intentions from his superiors, the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney 
General, for the admitted purpose of preventing them from telling him not to make 
the statement, and to instruct his subordinates in the FBI to do the same.  Comey 
waited until the morning of his press conference to inform Lynch and Yates of his 
plans to hold one without them, and did so only after first notifying the press.  As a 
result, Lynch’s office learned about Comey’s plans via press inquiries rather than 
from Comey.  Moreover, when Comey spoke with Lynch he did not tell her what he 
intended to say in his statement. 
Factors Cited by Comey as Influencing His Decision 
Comey cited several factors that he said influenced his decision to make a 
statement on his own and without coordinating with the Department.  In addition to 
public comments made by former President Obama and his White House Press 
Secretary about the Midyear investigation, Comey cited four things that he said 
caused him to be concerned that Lynch could not credibly participate in announcing 
a declination:  her alleged instruction to call the Midyear investigation a “matter” in 
a meeting held on September 28, 2015, which Comey said “made [his] spider 
sense tingle” and caused him to “worry...that she’s carrying water for the [Clinton] 
campaign”; concerns that highly classified information referencing Lynch would be 
publicly released and would impact her credibility; the tarmac meeting between 
Lynch and former President Bill Clinton; and the fact that Lynch was appointed by a 
President that was the same political party as former Secretary Clinton. 
We found none of these reasons persuasive, either standing alone or 
considered together, as a basis for deviating from well-established Department 
policies and acting unilaterally in a way intentionally designed to avoid supervision 
by Department leadership over his actions. 
Lynch’s Reference to the Investigation as a “Matter.”  We found that 
the discussion between Lynch and Comey on September 28, 2015, was not 
generally viewed as a particularly significant event, other than by Comey.  As 
described in Chapter Four, Department and FBI officials present at this meeting did 
not interpret Lynch’s reference in the way Comey did, and contemporaneous notes 
indicate that the discussion at the meeting was focused on the need to track 
language in recent letters to Congress and the State Department.  Lynch told us 
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that her intent in suggesting that Comey refer to Midyear as a “matter” was to 
allow them to answer questions about staffing and resources while also complying 
with longstanding Department policy to refrain from confirming ongoing criminal 
investigations, not to downplay the significance of the investigation.  Other 
Department witnesses present at this meeting interpreted Lynch’s comment as a 
suggestion, not an instruction from Lynch.  We found no evidence that this phrasing 
was intended to “track” the language used by the Clinton campaign or was an 
attempt to influence the investigation.  Remarkably, Comey never told Lynch or 
Yates that this (or any other) incident raised questions about Lynch’s impartiality in 
his mind, or that such concerns might influence his actions in handling the case. 
Concerns about Future Leaks of Classified Information.  As described 
in the classified appendix to this report, Comey told the OIG that he became 
concerned in mid-June 2016 that classified information suggesting that Lynch was 
exerting influence on the Midyear investigation would be publicly released, and that 
this would impact her ability to credibly announce a declination.  However, by mid-
June Comey was already very far along in his plans to make a unilateral statement.  
Moreover, witnesses told us that the FBI determined based on various factors that 
the allegations that Lynch had interfered with the investigation were not credible, 
describing the information as “objectively false.” 
Comey told the OIG that he never saw any actions by Lynch to interfere with 
the investigation, stating, “I’ll say this again, I saw no reality of Loretta Lynch 
interfering in this investigation.”  Rather, Comey said he was concerned that leaks 
of this non-credible information about Lynch would undermine her credibility.  The 
FBI did not inform Lynch about the allegation in the highly classified information 
until August 2016, more than a month after Comey’s announcement, and then 
(according to Lynch) did so in a way that highlighted the FBI’s assessment that the 
information lacked credibility.156  At no time did Comey alert Lynch or Yates that the 
information raised concerns about Lynch’s ability to participate credibly in the 
Midyear investigation or in any declination announcement.  At no time did Comey 
consult with Lynch or Yates about how to deal with this false information to protect 
the credibility of the declination decision. 
Finally, the OIG found that the same classified information also included an 
allegation, equally lacking in credibility, that Comey planned to delay the Midyear 
investigation to aid Republicans.  Comey did not inform Lynch or Yates of this fact, 
let alone discuss with them whether this information might be leaked or whether, if 
it was, it might undermine his credibility as a spokesman. 
Lynch’s Tarmac Meeting with Former President Clinton.  Comey told us 
that by the time the tarmac incident occurred on June 27, 2016, he was already “90 
percent there” in terms of the decision to make a public statement, but that the 
tarmac meeting “tipped the scales” towards making his mind up to go forward with 
an independent announcement on the Midyear investigation.  While Comey’s 
                                       
156  As described in the classified appendix to this report, the FBI notified senior career 
Department officials about this information in March 2016, but did not convey that it raised concerns 
about Lynch’s ability to credibly participate in announcing a declination in the Midyear investigation. 
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concerns about the impact of the meeting were legitimate, and warranted his 
informing Lynch of his concerns and providing her with any views he had on how it 
should be addressed, ultimately the decision whether Lynch should voluntarily 
recuse herself was Lynch’s to make, not Comey’s. 
In his October 2016 SAC Conference speech, Comey emphasized the damage 
to the FBI that would result if he “did the normal thing” in the wake of the tarmac 
meeting.  He stated that he was concerned that if the FBI made a private 
recommendation to Lynch, “the Department of Justice will screw around it for Lord 
knows how long, issue probably a one sentence declination, and then the world will 
catch on fire[.]”  However, the stated concerns are inconsistent with what Comey 
had already discussed with the Department about the “endgame” of the 
investigation.  Comey knew that the Department was well aware of his view that 
the Midyear investigation needed to be completed promptly.  Comey had previously 
discussed with Yates the prospect of requesting a special counsel if the 
investigation continued past the nominating conventions, and Yates told us that she 
and Comey had made plans to “hold hands and jump off the bridge together” in 
announcing a declination.  Moreover, notes from discussions of the Midyear team 
that occurred shortly before the Clinton interview on July 2 reflected that the 
prosecutors understood that Comey wanted to make the announcement by July 8 
and therefore there would be “withering pressure” to complete the LHM and 
memorialize the Midyear prosecutors’ conclusions immediately after the Clinton 
interview.  There simply was no basis for Comey to believe that the Department 
would take weeks to act on the FBI’s recommendation on such a consequential 
matter. 
Moreover, Comey never raised his concerns about the tarmac meeting with 
Yates or requested that Lynch recuse herself.  Instead, Comey viewed the tarmac 
meeting as a justification for proceeding with his existing plan to act alone.  Comey 
admitted that had Lynch recused herself he might have reconsidered his decision to 
make a separate announcement, stating, “Had Loretta said, I’m stepping out of 
this.  I’m making Sally Yates the Acting Attorney General and had I gone and sat 
down with Sally and heard her vision for it, maybe we would have ended up in a 
different place.”  While Comey indicated that he did not speak with Yates because 
Lynch had already made her announcement on July 1, we found that he still could 
and should have done so. 
Lynch was Appointed by a Democratic President.  Comey cited a 
general concern that Lynch was appointed by a President who was from the same 
political party as former Secretary Clinton.  Yet that fact existed at the beginning of 
the Midyear investigation.  At no time did Comey inform either Lynch or Yates that 
he viewed Lynch as having a “conflict of interest,” or that he thought she should be 
recused from the investigation on the basis of party affiliation, or for any other 
reason.  While Comey did mention the prospect of a special counsel in his April 
2016 meeting with Yates, he did so seemingly as a bargaining chip to get the 
Department to move more quickly on the Mills and Samuelson laptops, and we 
found no evidence that he seriously pursued this option. 
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We found it troubling that Comey would have formed views about Lynch’s 
inability to participate in or credibly decline prosecution of the Midyear 
investigation, yet never once raised them with Lynch or Yates.  If Comey genuinely 
believed that Lynch could not credibly participate in the Midyear investigation or 
announce a declination, he should have raised these concerns with Yates or Lynch 
and requested that Lynch recuse herself.  If he believed that neither Lynch nor 
Yates could credibly make a prosecutive decision, he should have discussed this 
with them at the beginning of the investigation and requested appointment of a 
special counsel.  He did not. 
Impact of Comey’s Decision to Make a Unilateral Statement 
Comey’s decision to depart from longstanding Department practice and 
publicly announce the FBI’s declination recommendation without coordinating with 
the Department was an unjustified usurpation of authority.157  Although Comey was 
aware that the Midyear prosecutors and Department leadership viewed the case as 
a likely declination, Comey made the decision to announce the conclusion of the 
investigation before prosecutors had a chance to render their own formal 
prosecutorial decision.  Comey’s views on what a “reasonable prosecutor” would 
do—while informed by the prosecutors’ views on the likely outcome of the case and 
the Department’s research on past mishandling cases—were nonetheless made 
without consulting the Department in advance.  Although Comey stated in his press 
conference that “the prosecutors make the decisions about whether charges are 
appropriate based on evidence the FBI has helped collect,” by making this public 
announcement about the FBI’s charging recommendation, and by stating his view 
that “no reasonable prosecutor” would bring charges, he effectively made the 
decision for the prosecutors because it would thereafter have been virtually 
impossible for them to make any other decision. 
Even if Comey had every reason to believe that Lynch and Yates agreed with 
him, speaking unilaterally and publicly for the Department about a decision to 
decline prosecution is not a function granted to the Director.  The authority to make 
such a statement had not been delegated to him by his superiors, the Attorney 
General and the Deputy Attorney General.  Comey acknowledged this, but argued 
that “the potential for damage to the institution” outweighed the need to follow 
Department practice, stating, “[I]n a normal circumstance it’s the right of the 
                                       
157  After reviewing a draft of the report, counsel for Comey stated that even before Lynch’s 
July 1 statement that she would accept the recommendation of the career staff, the decision about 
whether to prosecute former Secretary Clinton was publicly framed as belonging to him, and 
Department leadership did not correct this impression.  See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi, Inside the FBI 
Investigation of Hillary Clinton’s Email, TIME, Mar. 31, 2016 (noting that Lynch testified in February 
2016 that she was waiting for a charging recommendation from Comey, and that some Republicans 
were referring to the investigation as the “Comey primary”).  As a result, counsel said that Comey did 
not “usurp” the Attorney General’s authority, but rather had the role of the Attorney General given to 
him by Department leadership.  However, waiting for a charging recommendation from the FBI 
Director is substantially different than making a public announcement without any prior consultation 
with or approval from the Attorney General.  Indeed, there would have been no need for Comey to 
have affirmatively concealed his plans for a public statement from Lynch if he believed Lynch had 
effectively ceded authority over the prosecution decision to him. 
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Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to make those decisions and the FBI 
Director should tell them, but this was not the normal circumstance.” 
In our criminal justice system, the investigative and prosecutive functions are 
intentionally kept separate as a check on the government’s power to bring criminal 
charges.  While Comey’s statement acknowledged those differing roles and 
responsibilities, his actions violated those separate authorities by arrogating to 
himself and the FBI the ability to make judgments about whether a case of the 
highest political consequence should be charged, and he did so by intentionally 
seeking to prevent Department leadership from being able to stop him based on 
concerns that he never even gave them an opportunity to consider.  In making a 
statement announcing the conclusion of the Midyear investigation and opining on 
what the only possible prosecutorial decision could be, Comey made it virtually 
impossible for any prosecutor to make any other recommendation.  He thereby 
effectively operated as not only the FBI Director, but also as the Attorney General.  
It is the Attorney General who is accountable to the public and to Congress for 
prosecutorial decisions made by the Department, not the head of the investigating 
law enforcement agency.  Comey took that accountability away from Lynch and 
placed it on himself when he decided to deliver a unilateral statement. 
Additionally, Comey’s decision to make an announcement without consulting 
or obtaining approval from Department leadership violated the Department’s media 
policy and also may have violated regulations regarding the public release of 
information.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(9).  Although Baker told the OIG that 
Comey’s call to Lynch and Yates on the morning of his press conference constituted 
approval for purposes of this regulation, Comey’s testimony that he concealed his 
plans from Lynch until the morning of July 5, only contacted her after the FBI had 
notified the press in order to make it impossible for her to stop him, and told Lynch 
when they did speak that he was not going to tell her what he intended to say in 
his statement, does not constitute consulting with or obtaining approval from 
Department leadership.  In light of these events, we recommend that the 
Department consider making explicit in the USAM what we thought was obvious in 
light of Department policy and protocol—that an investigating agency cannot 
publicly announce its recommended charging decision in a criminal investigation 
prior to consulting with the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. 
Attorney, or his or her designee, and cannot proceed to publicly announce that 
decision prior to obtaining a final prosecution decision from one of these officials.158 
B. Content of Comey’s Unilateral Announcement 
We identified two significant substantive concerns with the content of 
Comey’s July 5 statement.  First, Comey included criticism of former Secretary 
Clinton’s uncharged conduct, including calling her “extremely careless,” thereby 
violating longstanding Department practice to avoid what others described as 
“trash[ing] people we’re not charging.”  Second, having improperly decided to 
comment on what were prosecutorial decisions, Comey proceeded to inadequately 
                                       
158  Such a policy would necessarily need to include exceptions for certain situations where the 
law required or permitted disclosure. 
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and incompletely explain how the Department’s prosecutors applied the relevant 
statutory provisions and why they believed the evidence was insufficient to support 
a prosecution.  For example, Comey described former Secretary Clinton’s handling 
of classified information as “extremely careless” but then asserted that such 
conduct did not amount to “gross negligence” under the relevant statute.  In so 
doing, Comey failed to explain that, since at least 2008, it had been the 
Department’s position that, before bringing a “gross negligence” case, prosecutors 
had to be able to prove that a defendant knew at the time that the information was 
gathered, transmitted, or lost that it was in fact classified information.  As 
delivered, Comey’s statement led to greater public confusion and second guessing, 
not greater public clarity. 
Many of the problems with the statement resulted from Comey’s failure to 
coordinate with Department officials.  By deciding not to consult with the Midyear 
prosecutors about their assessment of the Department’s historical approach to and 
interpretation of the “gross negligence” statute or their assessment of the evidence 
under the applicable legal standard, Comey lost the opportunity to hear the views 
of the career prosecutors responsible for prosecuting violations of the mishandling 
statutes.  Based on our interviews, these prosecutors would likely have warned him 
about the substantive questions presented by his statement.  In addition, 
Department witnesses told the OIG that the presentation of the case by the Midyear 
prosecutors at the briefing of the Attorney General on July 6, 2016, which is 
described in Chapter Six, differed significantly from Comey’s statement, leading 
these witnesses to conclude that the presentation of the facts in Comey’s statement 
was “very skewed” or delivered with a “slant.” 
Description of Uncharged Conduct 
It is not unprecedented for the Department to announce the completion of an 
investigation without a prosecution.  In fact, it happens frequently in high profile 
matters, including in many federal civil rights investigations.  Such an 
announcement may serve several legitimate purposes, including allowing the public 
to know that the Department thoroughly investigated the matter and lifting the 
cloud over an individual known to have been under investigation.  In limited 
instances, the Department has included criticism of individuals not charged with a 
crime.  Comey cited as precedent for his July 5 public statement the June 2004 
press conference by then DAG Comey summarizing the evidence against Jose 
Padilla, who was designated as an enemy combatant, and the Department’s 
October 2015 letter to Congress summarizing the results of the criminal 
investigation into IRS officials, which did not result in criminal charges.  However, in 
both of those instances, the Department was responsible for issuing the statement, 
not the FBI Director. 
Moreover, Comey’s announcement was unusual in that it concentrated in 
substantial part on criticizing former Secretary Clinton’s uncharged conduct.  This 
was contrary to longstanding Department practice and protocol.  Witnesses told us 
that criticizing individuals for conduct that does not warrant prosecution is 
something that the Department simply does not do.  For example, Toscas stated, 
“We don’t say we’re closing something, but let me tell you some bad stuff that we 
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saw along the way, but it doesn’t rise to the level of bringing a case.  We just don’t 
do it.”  Prosecutor 1 characterized the negative comments about former Secretary 
Clinton as “declining to prosecute someone and then sort of dirtying them up with 
facts that you develop along the way.” 
Department witnesses did not identify a specific regulation or USAM provision 
that required Comey to refrain from commenting on uncharged conduct, and we 
found none.  Rather, witnesses described this as a practice that is “ingrained” in 
every Department prosecutor.  This principle underlies other Department policies 
and practices that do not directly apply in these circumstances, but that are 
nonetheless salient.  USAM 9-27.760 requires prosecutors to remain sensitive to 
the privacy and reputation interests of uncharged third parties—for example, by not 
identifying or causing a defendant to identify a third-party wrongdoer by name or 
description in public plea and sentencing proceedings, without the express approval 
of the U.S. Attorney and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General prior to the 
hearing absent exigent circumstances.  USAM 9-27.760 states, “In other less 
predictable contexts, federal prosecutors should strive to avoid unnecessary public 
references to wrongdoing by uncharged third-parties.” 
Similarly, when a case is closed without charges being filed, the Department 
does not seek to unseal a search warrant for the purpose of revealing to the public 
that there was probable cause that someone engaged in criminal activity.  In 
addition, where the Department has concluded that an uncharged individual was a 
participant in a criminal conspiracy, the Department’s rules specifically prohibit 
prosecutors from naming the uncharged co-conspirator in an indictment or 
including sufficient detail in public filings that would allow the co-conspirator to be 
identified.  See, e.g., USAM 9-11.130.  The common principle underlying these 
policies is that neither the FBI nor Department prosecutors are permitted to 
insinuate or allege that an individual who has not been charged with a crime is 
nevertheless guilty of some wrongdoing.  We see no reason why an unindicted co-
conspirator should be afforded greater protection than a person who has been 
investigated and found not to be criminally liable.  We therefore recommend that 
the Department and the FBI consider adopting a policy addressing the 
appropriateness of Department employees discussing uncharged conduct in public 
statements. 
Several witnesses acknowledged that one major purpose of including 
negative comments about former Secretary Clinton was to send the message that 
the FBI was not condoning her conduct:  essentially, to protect the FBI from 
criticism that it failed to recognize the seriousness of her conduct and was “letting 
her off the hook.”  We recognize that this investigation was subject to scrutiny not 
typical of the average criminal case, but that does not provide a basis for violating 
well-established Department norms and, essentially, “trashing” the subject of an 
investigation with uncharged misconduct that Comey, every agent, and every 
prosecutor agreed did not warrant prosecution.  Such norms exist for important 
reasons and none of the justifications provided by witnesses for why such criticism 
was warranted in the Midyear investigation—including expressing disapproval of 
former Secretary Clinton’s conduct to the FBI workforce, “counter[ing]” statements 
made on the campaign trail that the emails in question were classified after the 
248 
fact, or informing the American people about the facts of the investigation—
provided legitimate reasons to depart from normal and appropriate Department 
practice. 
Substantive Issues with the Statement 
Department witnesses told the OIG that they considered Comey’s statement 
to be both factually and legally incomplete.  These witnesses said that critical facts 
supporting the decision to decline prosecution were not included in Comey’s 
statement.  Axelrod told the OIG that Comey’s most notable omission was the 
failure to explain that the Department has never prosecuted mishandling violations 
“where the classified information was shared between people who work for the 
Government....  That’s a pretty important fact.”  Axelrod and other Department 
witnesses also noted that Comey did not include information explaining that “the 
majority of the emails that turned out to be classified had been sent late at night or 
on the weekends,” suggesting that State Department employees sending the emails 
tried to “talk around” classified information in the course of doing their jobs.  
Department witnesses described the characterization of the evidence in Comey’s 
statement as “very skewed” or unintentionally “slant[ed].” 
Comey also included in his statement a comment that although the FBI did 
not find direct evidence that former Secretary Clinton’s private email account was 
hacked, the FBI assessed that it was “possible” that hostile actors gained access to 
former Secretary Clinton’s personal email account based on various factors.  He 
added that the FBI assessed it would be unlikely to see such direct evidence given 
the nature of the system and the actors potentially involved in hostile intrusions, 
and that former Secretary Clinton had used her personal email in the territory of 
foreign adversaries.  The statement thus insinuated that hostile foreign actors may 
have in fact gained access to former Secretary Clinton’s private email account, 
based almost entirely on speculation and without any evidence from the Midyear 
investigation to support his claim.  As described in Chapter Five, the FBI Midyear 
Forensics Agent told the OIG that, although he did not believe there was “any way 
of determining...100%” whether Clinton’s servers had been compromised, he felt 
“fairly confident that there wasn’t an intrusion.”  The LHM summarizing the Midyear 
investigation similarly stated, “FBI investigation and forensic analysis did not find 
evidence confirming that Clinton’s email server systems were compromised by 
cyber means.” 
In addition, Comey’s statement failed to describe accurately what the 
Midyear prosecutors deemed was essential to make out a violation of the “gross 
negligence” statute.  As described in Chapters Two and Seven, the Midyear 
prosecutors took into account the legislative history of the statute, previous military 
prosecutions and indictments brought under it, and the Department’s historical 
interpretation of the provision in declinations dating to at least 2008.  Based on this 
authority, the Midyear prosecutors determined that a violation of Section 793(f)(1) 
requires (1) a state of mind that is “just a little short of being willful,” “criminally 
reckless,” or “so gross as to almost suggest deliberate intention,” and (2) evidence 
that the individuals who sent emails containing classified information did so 
“knowingly.”  With respect to former Secretary Clinton, the Midyear prosecutors 
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determined that in the absence of evidence showing that she knew that emails she 
received contained classified information, such as through obvious classification 
markings, Department practice and precedent required that they decline 
prosecution. 
Comey told the OIG that he understood Section 793(f)(1) to require 
“something closer to actual knowledge.”  Yet nowhere in his statement did Comey 
say that the FBI concluded that former Secretary Clinton lacked knowledge that the 
information in question was classified, and that prosecutors determined that 
evidence of such knowledge was needed to bring charges under the “gross 
negligence” statute.  On July 6, 2016, Prosecutor 3 sent an email to the other 
Midyear prosecutors highlighting this problem.  He stated: 
It’s unfortunate that Comey didn’t differentiate the standard of proof 
between 793(f) and the other statutes.  He glossed over all with 
mention of the absence of intent and made no mention of the 
necessity of proving knowledge of classified [information] with regard 
to 793(f) and why that proof was deficient.  By using the phrase 
“extremely careless” he lit up the talking heads last night, many of 
whom opined that such verbiage warranted a gross negligence charge 
and that Comey was giving Clinton an unwarranted pass.  Even the so-
called legal experts didn’t seem to understand the elements of that 
statute and why it did not apply to the facts. 
By describing former Secretary Clinton’s conduct as “extremely careless” while 
failing to explain what the Midyear team concluded was the lack of proof for the 
other requirements of Section 793(f)(1), Comey created confusion about the FBI’s 
assessment of her culpability and the reasons for recommending that prosecution 
be declined.  The focus on former Secretary Clinton’s “extremely careless” handling 
of classified information foreseeably and predictably led the public to question why 
former Secretary Clinton was not being charged with “gross negligence.” 
The issue for the Midyear prosecutors was never whether former Secretary 
Clinton’s conduct was “extremely careless,” but whether her conduct met the 
requirements for charging a violation of Section 793(f)—i.e., whether there was 
sufficient evidence to establish that she knowingly included classified information on 
her unclassified private email server, or learned that classified information was 
transferred to her unclassified server and failed to report it.  The prosecutors 
concluded that there was not.  As described in Chapter Seven below, the 
prosecutors found no evidence that former Secretary Clinton believed or was aware 
that the emails contained classified information, or had concerns about the 
information included in unclassified emails sent to her. 
C. Lynch’s Decision Not to Recuse after the Tarmac Meeting 
After the tarmac meeting with former President Clinton, Lynch obtained an 
opinion from the Departmental Ethics Office that she was not legally required to 
recuse herself from the Midyear investigation.  Although the opinion was not 
memorialized in writing, former OAG staff and former officials in the Departmental 
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Ethics Office confirmed that Lynch obtained this opinion, and that the conclusion 
was that recusal was not required.  Lynch was entitled to rely on that ethics opinion 
in the face of subsequent questions about her involvement in the Midyear 
investigation. 
Lynch told the OIG that she considered voluntarily recusing herself.  
However, she thought that doing so would create the impression that something 
inappropriate had occurred during her conversation with former President Clinton.  
Lynch said that she felt a responsibility to remain involved in the Midyear 
investigation, because if she decided to recuse herself, she would be “asking 
someone else to step up and endure all the hits the Department will take for the 
case for the result, whatever it is.” 
Lynch said that she applied her usual process in the Midyear investigation, 
and that her role did not change after the tarmac meeting.  Lynch told the OIG that 
the only thing that differed was that she decided to speak publicly about how the 
Department’s process typically works.  However, Lynch’s July 1, 2016 statements at 
the Aspen Institute were confusing and created the impression that, while she 
would not formally recuse from the investigation, she also would not remain in a 
deciding role in the investigation (by stating “I will be accepting their 
recommendations”).  In an effort to address the confusion, Lynch sought to clarify 
her remarks by providing the reporter with another formulation of her intentions, 
stating, “I can’t imagine a circumstance in which I would not be accepting their 
recommendations.”  However, these statements continued to make it appear that 
Lynch would cede her decisionmaking authority to the career staff and the FBI 
Director in a way that was akin to some type of recusal. 
In our view, Lynch should have either made it unambiguously clear that she 
did not believe there was a basis for recusal and that she was going to remain the 
final decisionmaker (thereby making her accountable for the final decision, not 
Comey), or recused herself and allowed Yates to serve as Acting Attorney General, 
or sought a special counsel appointment.  Instead, Lynch took none of these 
actions, leaving it ambiguous to the public as to what her role would be.  
Ultimately, that left the public with the perception that the FBI Director, and not the 
Attorney General, was accountable for the declination decision. 
D. Lynch’s Response to Comey’s Notification 
As described above, Comey concealed his plans to make a public statement 
from senior Department officials, and instructed his subordinates to do the same.  
He did not inform Lynch and Yates of his plans to hold a press conference until the 
morning of July 5, 2016.  Comey intentionally left Department leadership a short 
time to respond to his information, admitting that he did this to avoid having them 
tell him not to do it. 
Comey notified Lynch and Yates of his plans only after first contacting the 
press.  He did not tell Lynch what he planned to say when she asked.  According to 
Lynch, Comey told her he would not go over his statement with her so they both 
could say that it was not coordinated.  Department officials understandably had 
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concerns about directing Comey to cancel the press conference after he had already 
announced his plans to hold one. 
Lynch said while Comey told her that his statement would be about the 
Midyear investigation, it did not occur to her that Comey would announce the end 
of the investigation or the FBI’s recommendation.  She explained that while she 
knew that former Secretary Clinton had been interviewed, she was not aware that 
the investigation was considered complete.  Lynch told the OIG that if she had 
known what Comey was planning to do, she would have told him to stop.  However, 
Lynch said that she trusted him based on her long relationship with Comey and his 
comment to her that it would be better if they could both say that they did not 
coordinate his statement.  Lynch told the OIG that she thought this was a 
reasonable decision, and that it was the right decision under the circumstances 
because the Comey she knew followed the rules.  She said that once Comey started 
speaking and she realized what he was doing, she had “no way to stop him at that 
point, I mean, short of, you know, dashing across the street and unplugging 
something.” 
Nonetheless, we found that Lynch retained authority over both the final 
prosecutive decision and the Department’s management of the Midyear 
investigation.  This included the authority to insist that Comey share his statement 
with her and allow the Department to review and comment on it.  Although we 
recognize that Comey made it impracticable for her to tell him not to make any 
statement given the FBI had already notified the press, there was time still 
available for her to review his proposed statement and to instruct him to make 
changes to it.  Even if Lynch did not think that Comey was going to announce that 
the FBI was closing its Midyear investigation, Comey told her the statement was 
going to be about the Midyear investigation, a case over which she retained the 
authority and responsibility as the Attorney General.  As such, we believe she 
should have instructed Comey to tell her what he intended to say beforehand, and 
should have discussed it with Comey. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
THE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE 
After former Director Comey’s statement on July 5, 2016, the Midyear 
prosecutors finalized their analysis and conclusions under the relevant statutes, 
recommending that prosecution of former Secretary Clinton and others be declined.  
They then provided their conclusions to NSD supervisors. 
On the afternoon of July 6, 2016, former AG Lynch held a briefing attended 
by Comey, McCabe, and other senior Department and FBI officials.  The Midyear 
prosecutors briefed Lynch on the relevant evidence, the applicable statutes, and the 
basis for their recommendations.  Following the briefing, the Department issued a 
brief statement announcing that Lynch had accepted the recommendation of the 
career prosecutors and agents who worked on the Midyear investigation. 
In this chapter we discuss the prosecutors’ conclusions and the July 6 
briefing, focusing on issues that have been subject to public criticism.  Consistent 
with the role of the OIG and our statement that we will not substitute the OIG’s 
judgment for the judgments made by the Department or the FBI regarding the 
substantive merits of investigative or prosecutive decisions, we reviewed whether 
there was evidence that the Department’s decision to decline prosecution was 
based on improper considerations or bias.  As with our review of investigative 
decisions, our role was not to determine whether a prosecution should or should not 
have been brought but rather whether the Department’s explanations for its 
declination decision were not unreasonable and whether there was evidence that 
the justifications offered for the decision were a pretext for improper, but unstated, 
considerations. 
I. The Declination Recommendation 
As described above, prosecutors and NSD supervisors began to realize that 
the investigation could lead to a declination in early 2016.  As the investigation 
continued into the Spring of 2016, the prosecutors began to consider how to 
summarize the investigation and memorialize their legal conclusions to provide to 
their supervisors and to Department leadership.  The prosecutors told the OIG that 
they wanted to wait until the end of the investigation before making a charging 
recommendation. 
The prosecutors planned to complete their legal analysis after former 
Secretary Clinton was interviewed on July 2, 2016.  Following Comey’s 
announcement on July 5, 2016, they realized they had a much shorter time period 
to do so and worked until almost midnight on July 5 to finish their legal analysis.  
They completed this process the following afternoon and provided their analysis and 
conclusions to Toscas. 
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The prosecutors’ legal analysis referenced an FBI letterhead memorandum 
(LHM) summarizing the Midyear investigation.159  In their analysis, the Midyear 
prosecutors categorized the witnesses that had been interviewed in the 
investigation into four categories: 
 Originators of classified information (i.e., individuals who introduced 
classified information into unclassified emails, including State 
Department Bureau of Public Affairs employees, an individual who 
regularly interfaced with State Department employees, State 
Department Operations Center employees, and other State 
Department employees responsible for conveying information to their 
superiors); 
 U.S. government employees who had involvement with a specific Top 
Secret//Special Access Program (“TS//SAP”); 
 Senior aides to former Secretary Clinton, including Huma Abedin, 
Cheryl Mills, and Jake Sullivan; and 
 Former Secretary Clinton herself. 
The prosecutors referred to the first three categories of witnesses—the Originators, 
the officials involved with the TS//SAP, and former Secretary Clinton’s senior 
aides—collectively as the “senders.” 
The prosecutors analyzed the conduct of former Secretary Clinton and the 
“senders” under five statutes: 
 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and 793(e) (willful mishandling of documents or 
information relating to the national defense); 
 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (removal, loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction of 
documents or information relating to the national defense through 
gross negligence, or failure to report such removal, loss, theft, 
abstraction, or destruction); 
 18 U.S.C. § 1924 (unauthorized removal and retention of classified 
documents or material by government employees); and 
 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (concealment, removal, or mutilation of government 
records). 
The requirements of these statutes are described in more detail in Chapter Three. 
As summarized below, the Midyear prosecutors concluded that there was not 
a basis to prosecute former Secretary Clinton, her senior aides, or others under any 
of these statutes.  The prosecutors cited the following factual conclusions from the 
investigation as critical to its recommendation not to prosecute: 
                                       
159  A redacted version of the LHM is publicly available on the FBI’s website.  See FBI Records:  
The Vault, Hillary R. Clinton, Part 1, https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton (accessed March 6, 2018). 
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 None of the emails contained clear classification markings as required 
under Executive Order 13526 and its predecessor.  Only three email 
chains contained any classification markings of any kind.  These email 
chains had one or two paragraphs that were marked “(C)” for 
“Confidential” but contained none of the other required markings, such 
as classification headers. 
 There was no evidence that the senders or former Secretary Clinton 
believed or were aware at the time that the emails contained classified 
information.  In the absence of clear classification markings, the 
prosecutors determined that it would be difficult to dispute the 
sincerity of these witnesses’ stated beliefs that the material was not 
classified. 
 The senders and former Secretary Clinton relied on the judgment of 
employees experienced in protecting sensitive information to properly 
handle classified information. 
 The emails in question were sent to other government officials in 
furtherance of the senders’ official duties.  There was no evidence that 
the senders or former Secretary Clinton intended that classified 
information be sent to unauthorized recipients, or that they 
intentionally sought to store classified information on unauthorized 
systems. 
 There was no evidence that former Secretary Clinton had any 
contemporaneous concerns about the classified status of the 
information that was conveyed on her unclassified systems, nor any 
evidence that any individual ever contemporaneously conveyed such 
concerns to her. 
 Although some witnesses expressed concern or surprise when they 
saw some of the classified content in unclassified emails, the 
prosecutors concluded that the investigation did not reveal evidence 
that any U.S. government employees involved in the SAP willfully 
communicated the information to a person not entitled to receive it, or 
willfully retained the same. 
 The senders used unclassified emails because of “operational tempo,” 
that is, the need to get information quickly to senior State Department 
officials at times when the recipients lacked access to classified 
systems.  To accomplish this, senders often refrained from using 
specific classified facts or terms in emails and worded emails carefully 
in an attempt to avoid transmitting classified information. 
 There was no evidence that Clinton set up her servers or private email 
account with the intent of communicating or retaining classified 
information, or that she had knowledge that classified information 
would be communicated or retained on it. 
In addition to these facts as described by the prosecutors, various witnesses told us 
that one reason it was difficult to establish intent was that the mishandling of 
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classified information was a persistent practice at the State Department.  These 
practices made it difficult for the Midyear team to conclude that particular 
individuals had the necessary criminal intent to mishandle classified materials.  
According to Prosecutor 4, “[T]he problem was the State Department was so 
screwed up in the way they treated classified information that if you wanted to 
prosecute Hillary Clinton, you would have had to prosecute 150 State Department 
people.” 
Based on facts evincing a lack of intent to communicate classified information 
on unclassified systems, the prosecutors concluded that there was no basis to 
recommend prosecution of former Secretary Clinton or the senders of classified 
information under Sections 793(d) or (e). 
In addition, as described in Chapter Two, prosecutors reviewed the legislative 
history of the gross negligence provision in Section 793(f)(1) and court decisions 
impacting the interpretation of it.  The prosecutors noted that the congressional 
debate at the time the predecessor to Section 793(f)(1) was passed indicated that 
conduct charged under the provision must be “so gross as to almost suggest 
deliberate intention,” criminally reckless, or “something that falls just a little short 
of being willful.”  The prosecutors also reviewed military and federal court cases 
and previous prosecutions under Section 793(f)(1), and concluded that they 
involved either a defendant who knowingly removed classified information from a 
secure facility, or inadvertently removed classified information from a secure facility 
and, upon learning this, failed to report its “loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction.”  
In addition, based on a review of constitutional vagueness challenges of Sections 
793(d) and (e), the Midyear prosecutors observed that “the government would very 
likely face a colorable constitutional challenge to the statute if it prosecuted an 
individual for gross negligence who was both unaware he had removed classified 
information at the time of the removal and never became aware he had done so.” 
The prosecutors concluded that based on case law and the Department’s 
prior interpretation of the statute, charging a violation of Section 793(f) likely 
required evidence that the individuals who sent emails containing classified 
information “knowingly” included the classified information or transferred classified 
information onto unclassified systems (Section 793(f)(1)), or learned that classified 
information had been transferred to unclassified systems and failed to report it 
(Section 793(f)(2)). 
Applying this interpretation, the prosecutors concluded that there was no 
evidence that the senders of emails knew that classified information had been 
improperly transferred to an unclassified system, or that former Secretary Clinton 
acted in a grossly negligent manner with respect to receiving emails determined to 
contain classified information.  According to information reviewed by the OIG, the 
prosecutors also considered whether the decision to conduct official business using 
a personal server could itself constitute gross negligence, but concluded that 
there was no evidence that former Secretary Clinton ever considered the possibility 
that classified information would be present in unclassified emails or on her private 
email server. 
257 
Distinguishing military prosecutions for “grossly negligent” mishandling, the 
prosecutors also noted that there was no evidence that classified emails were 
provided to or discovered by people who were unauthorized to receive them.  The 
prosecutors stated, “[A]ll of the emails containing information subsequently 
determined to be classified were sent for work purposes and were delivered to 
State Department or other U.S. government officials.” 
Regarding Section 1924, the prosecutors stated that the statute requires 
proof that an individual knew of the removal of classified information and intended 
to retain that information in an unauthorized location, and that such proof was 
lacking.  The prosecutors cited the absence of classification markings on the emails 
sent by the senders, with the exception of the three emails forwarded to Clinton 
containing paragraph markings denoting Confidential information, as well as the 
lack of evidence that the senders knowingly took classified information and sent it 
in unmarked emails over unclassified systems.  The prosecutors similarly concluded 
that former Secretary Clinton did not recognize or have reason to believe that the 
information sent to her contained classified information.  Prosecutors cited Clinton’s 
reliance on the judgment of senior aides and other State Department staff, their 
attempts to talk around sensitive information in unclassified emails, and her 
testimony that she did not have reason to question their use of unclassified systems 
to send that information.  The prosecutors concluded that the evidence was 
insufficient to charge former Secretary Clinton under Section 1924. 
The prosecutors also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 
support prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2071, which prohibits the willful 
concealment, removal, or destruction of federal records.  They concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that former 
Secretary Clinton or her senior aides intended to conceal records, citing testimony 
that these witnesses expected that any emails sent to a state.gov address would be 
preserved.  The prosecutors acknowledged that this testimony was undercut by 
former Secretary Clinton’s admission that she sometimes communicated with her 
senior aides using their personal email accounts, as well as an email she received 
from former Secretary of State Colin Powell at the beginning of her tenure outlining 
his use of personal email.  However, the prosecutors noted that Section 2071 had 
“never been used to prosecute individuals for attempting to avoid Federal Records 
Act requirements by failing to ensure that government records are filed 
appropriately.” 
Finally, the prosecutors evaluated whether Mills and Samuelson intentionally 
deleted emails during the culling process used to separate former Secretary 
Clinton’s “personal” and “work-related” emails for production to the State 
Department.  They concluded that there was no evidence that emails intentionally 
were deleted by former Secretary Clinton’s lawyers to conceal the presence of 
classified information on former Secretary Clinton’s server, particularly because 
some of the emails produced as “work-related” later were determined to contain 
highly classified, compartmented information. 
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II. The Attorney General Briefing 
A briefing for Lynch and Yates on the prosecutors’ recommendation was held 
in the Attorney General’s Conference Room at 4 p.m. on July 6, 2016.  According to 
the prosecutors, they learned about the briefing after they completed their legal 
analysis, and had only a short time to prepare.  Prosecutors 1 and 2 said they 
quickly divided the topics and prepared bullet points for the presentation based on 
their legal analysis. 
Attending the briefing were Lynch, Yates, Axelrod, and David Margolis, at the 
time the most senior career official in ODAG, as well as several OAG and ODAG staff 
members.  Toscas and Laufman were present from NSD, while Carlin participated 
by phone.  Present from the FBI were Comey, McCabe, Rybicki, Baker, FBI Attorney 
1, and Strzok.  All four prosecutors attended the briefing. 
Toscas told the OIG that he gave a brief introduction at the meeting.  Toscas 
prepared handwritten talking points that he used as a guide for his comments at 
the meeting, but he said that these did not end up being his “precise script.”  
Toscas said that he “frontloaded” his comments with an acknowledgement that 
Lynch had stated publicly that she planned to accept the recommendation of the 
career staff, and that the prosecutors and the FBI were in agreement that no 
charges should be filed.  According to Toscas’s handwritten talking points, he 
stated, “[A]t the conclusion of the meeting you will have the unanimous 
recommendation of the FBI [and] DOJ team that this investigation should be closed 
[and] that charges should not be brought against anybody within the scope of the 
investigation in this matter.” 
The notes indicate that Toscas then praised the team and handed the briefing 
over to Laufman to introduce the prosecutors.  Following their introduction, 
Prosecutors 1 and 2 walked through the various legal statutes and the facts 
developed in the investigation.  Prosecutor 2 handled sections 793(d) and (e), while 
Prosecutor 1 handled discussion of the other statutes, including the gross 
negligence provision. 
Lynch described the briefing as “very, very thorough.”  She said that it lasted 
about an hour-and-a-half, and included a “very specific, very dense” briefing of the 
case.  Lynch told the OIG that the prosecutors showed her various documents, 
including some of the emails that were determined to contain classified information.  
She said that she asked questions about access to the classified emails and who 
saw them, as well as numerous questions that related to the issue of intent.  Lynch 
described the prosecutors as “very responsive” to her questions. 
Lynch told the OIG that the meeting included a briefing on key interviews, 
including the interview of former Secretary Clinton.  Lynch said that the prosecutors 
provided a synopsis of her interview, her reaction when shown documents, and 
their opinions about what she said.  Lynch said that she asked whether any of the 
witnesses, including former Secretary Clinton, had engaged in obstruction of 
justice, committed perjury, or made false statements, and she was told that they 
had not. 
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Prosecutor 1 told the OIG that the discussion with Lynch about Secretary 
Clinton’s interview included whether Clinton was credible when she testified that (C) 
paragraph markings in an email could mean subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), 
rather than that the paragraph contained information classified at the “Confidential” 
level.  Prosecutor 1 stated that he told Lynch that Clinton’s testimony “strained 
credulity a little bit because, well, if anyone knows Confidential, the State 
Department is the entity that uses Confidential information a lot.”  He said that 
they discussed with Lynch that their reaction to this explanation was skeptical, but 
that they also did not know what “people at the very highest levels” understood 
about classification markings. 
Prosecutor 4 said that he recalled Yates also asking whether former 
Secretary Clinton was truthful in her interview, and that they all responded that she 
was.  He said that this answer caused him some “consternation” but that he did not 
disagree.160  Asked to explain this statement, Prosecutor 4 told the OIG that he did 
not think that former Secretary Clinton lied in a provable way, but that her 
responses to questions about paragraph markings for information designated as 
“Confidential” and her statement that the private server was set up for convenience 
were questionable.  Prosecutor 4 stated, “My view was and still remains that the 
private email server was set up to avoid FOIA....  [I]f you look at Colin Powell’s 
email, he pretty much was trying to avoid FOIA too.” 
Various witnesses told the OIG that the briefing included legal discussion of 
the gross negligence provision, and that prosecutors fielded questions from Comey 
and Baker about the provision.  Prosecutor 2 stated: 
I think their attorneys hadn’t really gotten him up to speed on the 
prior use of 793(f), and how it hadn’t been used, and the 
Department’s views on the statute.  So I think it was kind of an 
opportunity for him and his team to figure out how Comey was going 
to explain the decision [to Congress] under 793(f).  And following the 
briefing, questions from his team came our way, specifically about 
793(f). 
Prosecutor 1 similarly told the OIG that Comey was “very interested” in section 
793(f), and that “a lot of notebooks came out from the Bureau” when Prosecutor 1 
                                       
160  On July 8, 2016, following Comey’s congressional testimony about the Midyear 
investigation described in Chapter Six, Prosecutor 3 emailed Strzok and Prosecutors 1, 2, and 4 and 
stated the following: 
[O]ne thing that was apparent just from the highlights of the Committee hearings that 
I saw last night was the fact that the Director’s statements about the number and 
levels of classified doc[ument]s found are being used by the Hill and others to claim 
that [Clinton] was lying when she has said in the past that she never sent or received 
classified info[rmation].  What undercuts the ability to prove intent in support of a 
false statement charge is that when [Clinton] made these statements she didn’t have 
the benefit of later findings by those who did the classification reviews and of course 
there weren’t the classification markings on the emails to put her on notice, and give 
us the ability to prove, that she was lying.  This never seemed to get discussed or 
emphasized in the clips I saw last night. 
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began to talk about the provision.  Prosecutor 1 stated that his briefing about 
section 793(f) included “[w]hat kind of factors we considered..., what gross 
negligence meant in the criminal context, what it meant in the statute, [and] how it 
had been applied in the [Uniform Code of Military Justice].” 
Witnesses told the OIG that they did not discuss Comey’s statement at the 
briefing.  However, Yates said that she recalled thinking that “you’d kind of wonder 
if it’s the same case” when she heard the facts as laid out by the prosecutors at the 
briefing and compared them to Comey’s statement.  She said that she recalled 
discussing with Axelrod, Lynch, and Carlin after the briefing whether the briefing 
impacted what Comey’s thinking was about the case and how those facts were cast 
in his statement. 
Witnesses said that at the end of the discussion, Lynch went around the 
room and asked for people’s opinions to see if anyone objected to declining 
prosecution.  According to several witnesses, Margolis responded that he did not 
see a prosecutable case, and that if the Department prosecuted former Secretary 
Clinton, it would be because she was a high-profile public official.  Toscas, Baker, 
and Comey said that Margolis described this as “celebrity hunting.”  Lynch said that 
she recalled that Margolis then said, “[W]e at the Department don’t do that....  We 
will bring cases when they should be brought.  We don’t when they shouldn’t be 
brought.” 
Lynch told the OIG that after everyone had the opportunity to provide his or 
her opinion, she expressed her appreciation to the team and asked Comey and 
Strzok to convey her appreciation to the agents who had worked on the case.  She 
said that she then told the group that she accepted the recommendation to decline 
prosecution, and that the Department would issue a statement reflecting the 
decision shortly.  Lynch said that about half of the group stayed behind to talk 
about how to announce the declination, and that Toscas drafted a short statement.  
That afternoon, the Department released the following statement: 
Late this afternoon, I met with the FBI Director James Comey and 
career prosecutors and agents who conducted the investigation of 
Secretary Hillary Clinton’s use of a personal email system during her 
time as Secretary of State.  I received and accepted their unanimous 
recommendation that the thorough, year-long investigation be closed 
and that no charges be brought against any individuals within the 
scope of the investigation. 
III. Analysis 
We analyzed the Department’s decision to decline to prosecute former 
Secretary Clinton or anyone else according to the same analytical standard that we 
applied to other decisions made during the investigation.  We sought to determine 
whether the declination decision was based on improper considerations, including 
political bias.  We both looked for direct evidence of improper considerations and 
analyzed the justifications offered for the decision to determine whether they were 
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a pretext for improper, but unstated, considerations.  We did not substitute the 
OIG’s judgment for the judgments made by the Department. 
We found that the prosecutors’ decision was based on their assessment of 
the facts, the law, and past Department practice in cases involving these statutes.  
We did not identify evidence of bias or improper considerations.  Our analysis 
focuses substantially on 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(1), the “gross negligence” statute that 
has been the focus of much criticism of the Department’s decision.  However, we 
first address the declination decision with respect to the other statutes that the 
Department considered. 
We begin with 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e), which prohibit the “willful” 
mishandling or retention of classified information.  As detailed in Chapter Two, 
Courts have interpreted “willfully” to mean an act done “intentionally and purposely 
and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to 
disobey or to disregard the law.”  All of the prosecutors and agents we asked told 
us that they could not prove that Clinton had actual knowledge that the emails in 
question were classified or that Clinton used private servers and a private email 
account with the purpose or intent of receiving classified information on them.  
None of the emails Clinton received were properly marked to inform her of the 
classified status of the information.161  Additionally, investigators found evidence of 
a conscious effort to avoid sending classified information by writing around the 
most sensitive material.  The investigators did not find any emails in which the 
sender communicated information to someone not authorized to receive it.  In brief, 
we found no evidence that the decision not to prosecute Clinton under these 
statutory provisions was tainted by bias or other improper considerations. 
We reached a similar conclusion with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 1924, which, as 
described in Chapter Two, prohibits the “knowing” removal of classified information 
with “intent to retain” it in an unauthorized location.  In determining that a Section 
1924 prosecution was not viable, the prosecutors pointed to the same absence of 
evidence that Clinton had actual knowledge that any of the emails were classified or 
that she used private servers and a private email account with the purpose or 
intent of receiving classified information on them.  The prosecutors distinguished 
the Petraeus case brought under this section (discussed in Chapter Two) on the 
basis that this case involved clear evidence that the defendant knew the 
information at issue was classified and took actions reflecting knowledge that his 
handling or storage of it was improper.  This was precisely the evidence that the 
investigators told us was conspicuously absent in the Midyear case.  We found no 
basis to conclude that the decision not to pursue a Section 1924 case was tainted 
by bias or other improper considerations. 
The Department also determined that prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2071 
was not viable.  Section 2071 prohibits the concealment, removal, or destruction of 
a record filed in a public office.  The prosecutors concluded that, as to emails on the 
                                       
161  As noted above, even the handful of emails in which some paragraphs were marked “(C)” 
did not bear the required classification headers or footers, and Clinton testified that she did not 
recognize these paragraph markings as denoting classified information. 
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Clinton servers that were sent to or from government email accounts, because they 
also existed on government systems there was no evidence that Clinton or anyone 
else took any actions to conceal, remove, or destroy them from the government 
systems on which they resided.  As to the work-related emails that were not sent to 
or from any government system, the prosecutors concluded that such emails were 
never “filed within a public office.”  The prosecutors also noted that every 
prosecution under Section 2071 involved the removal or destruction of documents 
that had already been filed or deposited in a public office.  Additionally, the 
prosecutors found no evidence that the laptop “culling” process involved the 
intentional destruction of government records in an effort to conceal them in 
violation of Section 2071.  We did not identify any evidence to suggest that these 
determinations were based on bias or other improper considerations. 
The statute that required the most complex analysis by the prosecutors was 
18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(1), which criminalizes the removal, delivery, loss, theft, 
abstraction, or destruction of national defense information through “gross 
negligence.”  Due in part to Comey’s July 5 statement criticizing Clinton for being 
“extremely careless,” which many observers equated with being “grossly 
negligent,” this provision became the focus of much of the questioning of the 
declination decision.  As detailed above, the prosecutors identified statements in 
the legislative history of Section 793(f)(1) that they found indicated that the state 
of mind required for a violation of that section is “so gross as to almost suggest 
deliberate intention,” criminally reckless, or “something that falls just short of being 
willful.”  In addition, based on a review of constitutional vagueness challenges of 
Sections 793(d) and (e), the Midyear prosecutors stated that “the government 
would very likely face a colorable constitutional challenge to the statute if it 
prosecuted an individual for gross negligence who was both unaware he had 
removed classified information at the time of the removal and never became aware 
he had done so.”  Based on all of these circumstances, and a review of the small 
number of prior civilian and military cases under Section 793(f), the prosecutors 
interpreted the “gross negligence” provision of Section 793(f)(1) to require proof 
that an individual acted with knowledge that the information in question was 
classified.  The investigators and prosecutors told us that proof of such knowledge 
was lacking. 
We found that the prosecutors’ interpretation of the requirements of Section 
793(f)(1) was consistent with prior Department declination decisions that the 
prosecutors considered and that we reviewed.  As noted in Chapter Two, in 2008 
the Department declined to prosecute former Attorney General Gonzales based on 
an interpretation that would have required them to prove that his state of mind was 
“criminally reckless,” or that he had “a state of mind approaching ‘deliberate 
intention’ to remove classified documents from a secure location.”  The same year, 
the Department declined prosecution of an AUSA for mishandling classified 
information because of its inability to prove that he was “criminally reckless.”  
Prosecutors told the OIG that they reviewed these declination decisions to see how 
the Department had construed Section 793(f)(1) in the past.  These prior cases 
demonstrate that the interpretation of the gross negligence requirement of Section 
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793(f)(1) used as a basis to decline prosecution of former Secretary Clinton was 
consistent with interpretations applied in prior cases under different leadership. 
We found no evidence that the conclusions by Department prosecutors were 
affected by bias or other improper considerations; rather, we concluded that they 
were based on the prosecutors’ assessment of the facts, the law, and past 
Department practice.  In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that much of the 
questioning of the Department’s prosecutorial decision in this case has focused on 
whether the Department too narrowly interpreted the “gross negligence” provision 
of Section 793(f)(1) and should have pursued a prosecution because the FBI found 
Clinton to be “extremely careless.”  That, however, is a legal and policy judgment 
involving core prosecutorial discretion for the Department to make. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
OCTOBER EFFORTS BY FBI LEADERSHIP TO RESPOND TO 
CRITICISM OF THE MIDYEAR INVESTIGATION 
During October 2016, we found that FBI leadership devoted significant time 
and attention responding to both internal and external interest in, and criticism of, 
the Midyear investigation.162  This included remarks by Comey about the Midyear 
investigation at the FBI’s SAC Conference, the development of Midyear talking 
points for all FBI SACs, a Midyear briefing for the Society of Former Special Agents 
of the FBI, and continued monitoring of media discussion of the Midyear 
investigation. 
As described in Chapter Nine, these events occurred immediately after FBI 
Headquarters and the FBI Midyear team were made aware of the potential 
significance of the Weiner laptop by the FBI’s New York Field Office (NYO) on 
September 28 and 29.  And as we further describe in Chapter Nine, at the same 
time that FBI leadership was taking the steps we describe in this chapter to defend 
its handling of the Midyear investigation as thorough and complete, it was taking no 
action in response to the notification by NYO regarding the Weiner laptop. 
I. SAC Conference (October 11 to 14) 
The FBI held its annual SAC Conference in San Diego, California, from 
October 11 through October 14.  The SAC Conference was immediately followed by 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Conference from October 15 
through October 18.  Almost the entire FBI executive workforce attends the SAC 
Conference and top leadership frequently stays for the IACP Conference as well.  
Comey and McCabe attended both of the conferences in San Diego. 
On October 12, Comey spoke to the SAC Conference about a variety of 
topics.  This speech included lengthy remarks about the Midyear investigation.  In 
part, he stated: 
I do want to hit Hillary Clinton’s emails which I never tire of talking 
about, as you know.  Because I want to make sure that you are 
equipped especially to answer questions and comments from our 
formers who are out trapped in a Fox News bubble and are hearing all 
kinds of nonsense.  I want to make sure you have the information you 
need to bat some of that stuff down.... 
At the end of [the investigation], [the team’s] view of it was there 
really isn’t anything here that anybody would prosecute.  My view was 
the same.  Everybody between me and the people who worked this 
case felt the same way about it.  It was not a cliffhanger.  What 
                                       
162  For example, during the presidential debate on Sunday, October 9, 2016, and at a 
campaign rally two days later, then candidate Trump, among other things, criticized the outcome of 
the investigation of Clinton. 
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sometimes confuses our workforces, and I have gotten emails from 
some employees about this, who said if I did what Hillary Clinton did 
I’d be in huge trouble.  My response is you bet your ass you’d be in 
huge trouble.  If you used a personal email, Gmail or if you [had] the 
capabilities to set up your own email domain, if you used an 
unclassified personal email system to do our business in the course of 
doing our business even though you were communicating with people 
with clearances and doing work you discussed classified matters in 
that, in those communications, TS/SCI, special access programs, you 
would be in huge trouble in the FBI.... 
...Of that I am highly confident.  I’m also highly confident, in fact, 
certain you would not be criminally prosecuted for that conduct.... 
...What I’m getting from the left is savage attacks for violating policy 
and law by talking publicly about somebody who wasn’t indicted, by 
revealing facts that you should’ve been prescribed from revealing by 
decades of tradition.  All of that’s nonsense just as this is nonsense.  It 
is a uniquely difficult time.  I expect after the election, which is coming 
up I’m told, we will have probably more conversations about this.... 
We asked Comey in general about the SAC Conference and whether he 
recalled receiving criticism about the Midyear investigation while at the conference.  
Comey said he did not recall specific criticism, but noted that “given how prevalent 
the criticism was, I would have expected it to be talked about.” 
II. Midyear Talking Points Distributed to FBI Field Offices (October 21) 
On October 17, Page sent an email to Baker and Anderson entitled “MYE TPs 
(LCP).”163  Strzok, the Lead Analyst, FBI Attorney 1, and FBI Attorney 2 were cc’d 
on the email.  The email stated: 
Last week, Jim Rybicki and Mike Kortan reached out to a couple of us 
to ask that we put together some detailed MYE information related to 
the topics SACs most frequently get asked about.  I’m not 100% 
certain about the uses these talking points will be used to,  (I think the 
current thinking is that they would be provided to SACs to use with 
formers, in Citizen’s Academies, etc.), but attached is a very quick 
attempt at answering the specific questions requested by Jim and 
Mike.  Could you both please take a look, and edit at will?  Thanks. 
The Midyear talking points were ultimately distributed to FBI SACs on October 21. 
The talking points, which included a section on frequently asked questions, 
were nine pages and largely tracked Comey’s July 5 statement and his July 7 
testimony before Congress.  At the top of the first page of the talking points was a 
                                       
163  After reviewing a draft of the report, Page asked the OIG to clarify that she did not draft 
the talking points, but was the conduit through which they were distributed. 
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note to FBI executives, the first sentence of which stated, “The purpose of these 
talking points is to provide FBI executive management with a factual basis by which 
to inform discussions with employees or interested parties in the community.” 
Comey described the talking points as “part of an effort to make sure that 
the workforce, given the prominence of the issue, understood why we had done 
what we did.”  Comey described this commitment to transparency as part of his 
management philosophy.  When asked if he was concerned with essentially 
deputizing 56 different spokesmen for the Midyear investigation, Comey stated, 
“No, in fact I think it cuts the other way.  They’re all going to be talking about it 
anyway in lunchrooms, in town halls and sidebars, and so it makes sense to me to 
equip people who are going to be talking about it anyway with the actual facts and 
our actual perspective on it.” 
McCabe described the talking points as part of a broad effort “to keep the 
SACs particularly more well-informed about all the major issues” the FBI was 
dealing with.  McCabe said that the SACs were being asked about Midyear 
frequently and this was an effort to “give them some information to work off of.”  
McCabe also noted that the SACs requested this information from headquarters.  
When asked why the FBI did not just refer the SACs or anyone else to Comey’s July 
5 statement, McCabe stated that he believed the FBI did send Comey’s statement 
to the field, but “maybe that didn’t answer the mail.” 
Rybicki told us he agreed with the assessments given by Comey and McCabe 
and that SACs were contacting FBI Headquarters stating “that they weren’t getting 
enough information from headquarters” about the Midyear investigation.  Rybicki 
described the Midyear talking points as an effort by headquarters to arm SACs with 
information they could use to respond to questions they received. 
Priestap attributed the revival of Midyear talking points in mid-October to the 
“churn” and the fact that “the issue [of Midyear] just didn’t go away.”  Strzok 
agreed with this assessment, stating: 
[B]ecause SACs were still getting an extraordinary number of 
questions because it had become a campaign issue and that was still 
being batted around by the Hill and by then candidate Trump.  And 
SACs were getting questions.  The thought was, you know, give them 
enough information so they can at least accurately answer some of 
those questions rather than just saying, you know, I don’t know, or 
here is what I’ve read. 
III. Midyear Briefing for Retired FBI Special Agents (October 21) 
On October 7, the President of the Society of Former Special Agents of the 
FBI (the “Society”) sent an email to Bowdich entitled “Controversy over the 
Director/Clinton Email Situation.”  The Society’s President stated, in part: 
I continue to hear negative comments about the Bureau’s handling of 
the Clinton email controversy from former agents.  This is after a 
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period where things seemed to quiet and comments mellowed.  The 
renewed negative comments appeared to be timed with the release of 
additional emails in the Clinton situation and with the Director’s recent 
congressional testimony. 
I would like to offer a strategy which would possibly lower the rhetoric 
on this issue.  My sense is there are probably 10-15 hard core issues 
that are at the heart of former agents’ discontent.  I know what those 
issues are based on the many emails and phone calls I’ve received. 
My proposal is to have a small group of Society people meet with the 
Director and discuss those issues and formulate thorough in-depth 
answers, to be published in the Grapevine, or to be directly emailed to 
our members.... 
Bowdich replied that he would be “happy to discuss this weekend.”  Bowdich told us 
he recalled the Society wanting a sit-down with Comey, which Bowdich considered 
a bad idea, and we did not find evidence that the meeting with Comey occurred 
prior to the election. 
However, on October 21, Strzok briefed a group of retired FBI personnel on 
the Midyear investigation during a conference call.  This call was organized by 
Kortan, and Page also dialed into the call, although she did not speak.  Strzok told 
us that the call was the idea of “the seventh floor,” meaning top leadership at FBI 
Headquarters, and added, “Rybicki might have been the one whose idea it was.”  
According to Strzok: 
[O]ur Office of Public Affairs got a bunch of the former folks, like John 
Giacalone and other former EADs and Deputies and the head of the 
Society of Special Agents, to essentially say, okay, please sit down 
with them.  And kind of walk through the investigation.  And give a 
very fact-based pattern of, despite the huge turn of everything you’re 
hearing and the allegations and people saying you gave immunity out 
like candy, and you didn’t even issue subpoenas.  Sit down to the 
extent you can and walk through, from the beginning to the end, what 
we did investigatively....  [S]it there and say...you know, we, we did a 
thorough job.  This is what we did.  This is what our mandate was.  
This is how we went about doing it.  You know, here are, there are a 
lot of falsehoods and exaggerations being thrown around.  This is the 
truth.  And again, not giving out classified information, not giving the 
6(e) information out.  But to the extent that any of these folks, 
whether they are getting asked by CNN, whether they’re appearing in 
front of a congressional committee, whether they are going to a 
Citizens Academy, that they have the facts. 
We asked Page about this call and she told us: 
[W]e got a ton of criticism from the formers about the, why we let her 
off the hook, and why she should have been prosecuted, and why if 
she had, if they had done this, they would have prosecuted, all those 
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sort of criticism that you have surely heard.  And so Steinbach and 
Kortan, Mike Kortan, came up with the idea of well why don’t we put 
Pete on, you know, kind of agent-to-agent to sort of, because we need 
to get the formers to stop sort of criticizing the, the case.  And get 
them to understand actually the facts and why the facts led to not 
having a prosecution. 
Page described her role on the call as “trying to like give advice along the way to 
sort of help them explain.” 
Comey told us that he is not sure he knew about Strzok’s call beforehand, 
but “it rings true to me.”  We asked him if it was normal to have the agent who 
oversaw an investigation directly brief the retired agents on that case.  Comey 
stated, “No...there’s nothing normal at all about this, but it seemed a reasonable 
thing to do given the stakes which was the credibility of the organization.” 
Steinbach described a separate speech he gave to the Washington, D.C., 
chapter of the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI in October 2016.  A news 
article from October 31, 2016, reported on Steinbach’s remarks and his comments 
on the Midyear investigation.  Steinbach told us that his “intention” in giving the 
remarks was “to kind of level set that from one investigator to another former 
investigator.  Say, hey look, you know, here is why we did it.” 
IV. FBI Office of Public Affairs Research Project (October 14 to 31) 
On October 14, Rybicki and Kortan assigned an FBI Office of Public Affairs 
(OPA) Public Affairs Advisor a “research project.”  The Public Affairs Advisor’s initial 
email to Kortan and Rybicki on October 14 stated, “Per Mike [Kortan]’s suggestion, 
I’ll compile a list of stories from the past 24 hours that I’ve found that revolve 
around the recent email story from Fox.”164  Rybicki responded that evening, 
“Thanks....  This is very helpful.  I think the idea is that you would also track all 
email investigation stories each day and then we can figure out which ones are so 
inaccurate that we need to respond in some way.”  Consistent with this assignment, 
from October 14 and continuing through the end of October, we identified a series 
of almost daily emails from the Public Affairs Advisor to Kortan and Rybicki 
highlighting critical media coverage of the Clinton email server investigation.  The 
emails typically included links to and summaries of the articles cited. 
We identified October 13 notes from FBI Attorney 1 entitled “MYE—Fox article 
w/Rybicki + Kortan.”  The notes included the following entry: 
● Special projects person—fact check news of the day 
                                       
164  Based on the content of emails and the timing, we believe “the recent email story from 
Fox” refers to an October 13, 2016 article on Fox News entitled, “FBI, DOJ roiled by Comey, Lynch 
decision to let Clinton slide by on emails, says insider.”  See Malia Zimmerman and Adam Housley, 
FBI, DOJ Roiled by Comey, Lynch Decision to Let Clinton Slide by on Emails, Says Insider, FOX NEWS, 
Oct. 13, 2016. 
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 to SACs 
 and maybe bkgd to reporters? √ OPA 
 or maybe reach out to people who wrote article 
FBI Attorney 1 told us she did not remember this meeting and “had no idea” what 
the “special projects person” notation signified. 
An October 22 email from the Public Affairs Advisor to Kortan and Rybicki 
provided some insight into his assignment.  He stated, “I’ve done several searches 
on the topic we discussed today and yesterday, and I’m not seeing anything falling 
under the themes that we discussed (destruction of materials, dissention [sic], etc.) 
that is creeping into the main stream.” 
We asked Rybicki about the Public Affairs Advisor’s assignment and showed 
him examples of the emails cited above.  Rybicki did not recall giving the Public 
Affairs Advisor “any directive to look at specific outlets or anything like that.”  
Rybicki did recall that “the Director had [the Public Affairs Advisor] tracking stories 
I think from back in, you know, early July, maybe even prior to that about the 
[Midyear] investigation.”  Similarly, Kortan told us, “I think the Director or the 
Director’s Office actually asked him during some period of time there just to keep 
track of the reporting on everything to see how it was, how things were being 
reported.” 
The Public Affairs Advisor said he recalled very little about this research 
assignment “other than...if there was an article that had c[o]me out, and they said 
can you see if, find the other stories that, that were like this or had this similar 
narrative, and if it was being picked up.”  He told us that he “can’t imagine 
[Rybicki] would ask me to track all email investigation stories.  As there were a 
mountain, a flood of them.”  When we pointed out the specific guidance about 
“destruction of materials” and “dissention” in the October 22 email, the Public 
Affairs Adviser said that he assumed the destruction guidance related to an 
inaccurate story about the destruction of Clinton’s server and he was unsure what 
the “dissention” guidance meant.  Kortan told us that he thought the “dissention” 
reference referred to stories about “all kind of conflict within the [Midyear] team 
about...the conclusion of the [Midyear] investigation.” 
The Public Affairs Advisor said he was not sure why he was given this 
assignment in mid-October, but recalled more coverage of the Midyear investigation 
“popped up” at this time.  The Public Affairs Advisor also could not recall if he was 
given similar research assignments during other time periods. 
We asked Comey about the Public Affairs Advisor and the assignment.  
Comey told us that he first met the Public Affairs Advisor when Comey worked in 
EDVA.  Comey stated that he recruited the Public Affairs Advisor to SDNY after he 
became the U.S. Attorney there.  The Public Affairs Advisor then followed Comey to 
the Department when Comey was appointed DAG and later to the FBI after Comey 
became Director.  We pointed out to Comey that almost all of the media coverage 
identified by the Public Affairs Advisor in the October time period was negative 
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coverage of the FBI’s handling of Midyear and asked if that was a particular focus of 
the FBI’s efforts at the time.  Comey stated that “knowing what critics are saying is 
very, very important.”  Comey added that this sometimes permitted the FBI to push 
back on inaccurate reporting. 
We asked Comey more generally about the FBI’s role in the run up to the 
election.  Specifically, we cited several of the above examples—correcting 
inaccuracies in the media, issuing talking points to SACs, briefing former agents—
and we asked Comey why the FBI was essentially inserting itself into the back and 
forth dialogue of two political campaigns.  Comey replied: 
It’s not our role, but it’s our role to be believed by the American 
people.  And you’ve heard me say this before, when we rise and say, I 
found this under the car seat or I heard this statement or I seized this 
document in the bureau drawer...we have to be believed.  And so my 
worry was, actually I had a great sense of relief after the July 5th 
thing, like that’s over and now what I need to worry about is making 
sure that I did what I did in July as we talked about a million times 
because I thought it was best calculated to preserve the institutions, 
now I need to do my absolute best to make sure that the poison that 
follows doesn’t continue to undercut the credibility of the institution in 
American life.  And so I could have just pulled back, but if I pulled 
back without any push back, a doubt about the FBI’s political 
independence first would be pushed in from the right and then it would 
be pushed in from the left and then I’d be left after the election trying 
to un-ring a bell and a lot of what I was trying to avoid to start with 
would have crept in and then the FBI would have been, oh they’re 
those people with the Clintons or fix-it, we need to, so I was with the 
Clintons, then I was with the Trumps, and if—and so it’s not, the 
reason I disagree with your characterization, it’s not pushing our way 
into a political campaign, all this is flowing out from the campaigns and 
lots of other[s] through the media at the FBI and its reputation with 
the American people; I have to worry about that in my view. 
V. FOIA and Congressional Requests in October 
Throughout the month of October, the FBI responded to various Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) and congressional requests for information about the 
Midyear investigation.  McCabe told us, “[T]he fact is, we were meeting about 
Midyear-related things constantly, like during [the October] time period.  FOIA 
requests, Congressional requests.”  For example, McCabe, Rybicki, Anderson, 
Strzok, Page, FBI Attorney 1, Baker, and Priestap were invited to a meeting entitled 
“Mtg. w/DD RE Decision Points” at 2:30 p.m. on September 29.  Contemporaneous 
notes from the meeting showed that this meeting involved a discussion of 
congressional requests for materials from the Midyear investigation.  In another 
example, McCabe sent an email to Comey on October 17 to summarize the events 
of the day.  Rybicki and Bowdich were copied on the email.  The email stated, in 
part, “Lots of OPA action on the Midyear investigation email front with eh [sic] 
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release of the 302s.  Nothing unexpected, will likely drive some additional 
committee requests....” 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
DISCOVERY OF CLINTON EMAILS ON THE 
WEINER LAPTOP AND REACTIVATION OF THE MIDYEAR 
INVESTIGATION 
In this chapter, we discuss the discovery of Clinton emails on the Weiner 
laptop and the eventual reactivation of the Midyear investigation.  Section I details 
the discovery of these emails by the FBI’s New York Field Office (NYO) and Section 
II discusses the numerous notifications of this fact to FBI Headquarters in late 
September and early October.  Section III describes the initial response by FBI 
Headquarters and Midyear personnel to this discovery.  Section IV discusses NYO’s 
processing of the Weiner laptop.  Section V details the ensuing inaction by FBI 
Headquarters and Midyear personnel, and the explanations we received from FBI 
leadership and Midyear personnel for this inactivity.  In Section VI, we discuss the 
Weiner case agent’s concerns about this inactivity and, in Section VII, we describe 
the actions taken by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 
(SDNY) as a result of these concerns.  In Section VIII, we discuss the response by 
the Department and FBI to SDNY’s notification about the Weiner laptop.  Section IX 
examines the reengagement on this issue by FBI Headquarters and Midyear 
personnel.  Section X describes the events that led to the decision to seek a search 
warrant for the Weiner laptop.  We provide our analysis in Section XI. 
I. Discovery of Emails by the FBI’s New York Field Office 
A. Seizure of Weiner Laptop and Devices 
In September 2016, the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York (SDNY) began investigating former Congressman Anthony 
Weiner for his online relationship with a minor.  The FBI’s New York Field Office 
(NYO) was in charge of the investigation.  A federal search warrant was obtained on 
September 26, 2016, for Weiner’s iPhone, iPad, and laptop computer.  The FBI 
obtained these devices the same day.  The search warrant authorized the 
government to search for evidence relating to the following crimes:  transmitting 
obscene material to a minor, sexual exploitation of children, and activities related to 
child pornography. 
B. Emails and BlackBerry PIN Message Viewed by Case Agent 
The case agent assigned to the Weiner investigation was certified as a Digital 
Extraction Technician and, as such, had the training and skills to extract digital 
evidence from electronic devices.  The case agent told the OIG that he began 
processing Weiner’s devices upon receipt on September 26.  The case agent stated 
that he noticed “within hours” that there were “over 300,000 emails on the laptop.” 
The case agent told us that on either the evening of September 26 or the 
morning of September 27, he noticed the software program on his workstation was 
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having trouble processing the data on the laptop.165  The case agent stated that he 
went into the email folder on the laptop to see why the processing was “hung up.”  
He explained that, because the laptop was still processing, he was only able to view 
the emails that were immediately visible in the window on his computer screen.  
The case agent told us that the first item he clicked on was “either an email 
between Hillary and Huma [Abedin] or a BlackBerry PIN message.”  The case agent 
stated that, in the window of items visible to him, he saw a “couple” of emails 
between Clinton and Abedin and at least one BlackBerry PIN message between 
Clinton and Abedin.  The case agent told us that the BlackBerry PIN message in 
particular caught his attention because his “general understanding” was that those 
messages reside on a “BlackBerry proprietary-like backbone” and would not “leave 
much of a trace because it doesn’t go through any external servers other than a 
BlackBerry server.”  When asked specifically how he identified this BlackBerry PIN 
message as being between Clinton and Abedin, the case agent stated that “it was 
obvious” from the domains, which were “something like HR15@BBM-dot-
something, and HAbedin@BBM-dot.”  With respect to the emails he observed, the 
case agent said he recalled seeing emails associated with “about seven domains,” 
such as yahoo.com, state.gov, clintonfoundation.org, clintonemail, and 
hillaryclinton.com. 
The case agent told us that he asked another agent to take a quick look at 
his computer to “make sure, am I, am I seeing what I think I’m seeing?”  The other 
agent told the OIG that he “vividly” recalled what he described as the “oh-shit 
moment” when the case agent said that Hillary Clinton’s emails were on the laptop.  
The other agent stated that, while he did not view the content, he believed that he 
did see the domain portion of the emails and remembered thinking at the time that 
it was the same domain that had been associated with Clinton in news coverage.  
The other agent told the OIG that he and the case agent agreed that this 
information needed “to get reported up the chain” immediately. 
C. Reporting of Clinton-Related Emails to FBI NYO Supervisors 
The case agent told us that, after speaking with the other agent, he 
immediately told his Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) what he had observed, 
including that he had seen “private BlackBerry messages, private messages 
between Hillary and Huma to which Anthony Weiner was not a party.”  The NYO 
SSA corroborated this account, stating that the case agent came into his office on 
September 27 and told him “he had discovered emails that could be tied to Hillary 
                                       
165  No electronic record exists of the case agent’s initial review of the Weiner laptop.  The 
case agent told us that at some point in mid-October 2016 the NYO ASAC instructed the case agent to 
wipe his work station.  The case agent explained that the ASAC was concerned about the presence of 
potentially classified information on the case agent’s work station, which was not authorized to 
process classified information.  The case agent told us that he followed the ASAC’s instructions, but 
that this request concerned him because the audit trail of his initial processing of the laptop would no 
longer be available.  The case agent clarified that none of the evidence on the Weiner laptop was 
impacted by this, explaining that the FBI retained the Weiner laptop and only the image that had been 
copied onto his work station was deleted.  The ASAC recalled that the case agent “worked through the 
security department to address the concern” of classified information on an unclassified system.  He 
told us that he did not recall how the issue was resolved. 
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Clinton.”  The SSA told us that he specifically recalled the case agent mentioning 
domain names associated with Hillary Clinton, the Clinton Foundation, and possibly 
Clinton for President.  The SSA also recalled the case agent telling him “early on” 
that there were “hundreds of thousands” of emails.  The case agent and SSA told 
us that because the search warrant for the laptop was limited to child exploitation 
offenses, they agreed during this meeting that the emails were not covered under 
the search warrant and the case agent should not review those emails.  The SSA 
and the case agent met with their Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) to 
make him aware of the emails.  The ASAC told us that the SSA and case agent 
initially briefed him on September 28.  The ASAC stated they reported that the 
laptop was still processing, but there were approximately 141,000 emails of interest 
at that moment.  The ASAC further stated that the case agent and SSA identified 
seven different domains of interest.  The ASAC’s notes from the morning of 
September 28 corroborated this account.  The notes included references to 
“imaging, processing ½ way through,” “141k emails,” and seven domains, which 
were @clinton.com/gov, @state.gov, @clintonemail.com, @AW.com, 
@clintonfoundation.org, @presidentclinton.com, and @hillaryclinton.com. 
The ASAC told us that he immediately instructed the case agent and SSA to 
stay focused on the Weiner investigation and to “stay completely out of” the Clinton 
email case.  The SSA and case agent stated that the ASAC told them to stop 
reviewing the emails pending further guidance from FBI Headquarters.  The ASAC 
told us that he briefed the information that he received from the SSA and case 
agent to his immediate supervisor, the Acting SAC (A/SAC), that day.  The A/SAC 
confirmed this account, stating that he was “told there were emails here related to 
Hillary Clinton and others.” 
According to both the A/SAC and NYO Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) 
William Sweeney, the A/SAC relayed this information to Sweeney on September 28 
immediately after the FBI’s weekly 3:00 p.m. secure video teleconference (SVTC) 
for SACs, which is a SVTC held by the Director or, in his absence, the Deputy 
Director or another FBI senior executive.  The weekly SAC SVTC is followed by 
another SVTC for FBI Assistant Directors (AD).  Sweeney explained: 
Between those two SVTCs, so there’s a pause so all the other offices 
bail out, and then they basically reset.  Between that pause I think is 
the first time I hear about Clinton domain names on this thing.  And 
that comes from [the A/SAC]....  And so he tells me about this laptop.  
I don’t know if he described [it as] a laptop, but I think he did.  Hey, 
and there’s a whole bunch of Clinton email domain names.  I don’t 
know if he described it as domain names, but, and I wrote them on an 
index card—which I can’t find for the life of me right now.  But it was 
like Clinton.com, state-dot—like, it was clearly it was her stuff.  And 
that they had about 141,000. 
The A/SAC told us that he and Sweeney both had concerns about not exceeding the 
scope of the Weiner search warrant.  The A/SAC’s notes from that meeting stated, 
“400 PM—Spoke w/Sweeney.  Do not do anything with the emails [illegible] move 
forward with other agents.” 
276 
D. Reporting of Clinton-Related Emails to SDNY 
On September 27, the case agent also began advising the two SDNY 
Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) assigned to the Weiner case about what 
he was finding on the Weiner laptop.  Many of the case agent’s communications 
with SDNY were captured in a timeline created by the two AUSAs detailing key 
events in the Weiner investigation in September and October 2016.  This timeline 
was created in late October and AUSA 2 told us that she and AUSA 1 created the 
timeline because they thought that “at some point somebody is going to want to 
know sort of what was happening when, and [it’s] better to piece this together 
now.”  That timeline showed, and the prosecutors confirmed during interviews, that 
the case agent first told the prosecutors about the presence of Abedin’s emails on 
the Weiner laptop on September 27.  Similar communication was also occurring 
between higher levels of NYO and SDNY.  On September 27 at 3:30 p.m., the 
A/SAC and SDNY Deputy U.S. Attorney Joon Kim spoke by telephone.  The A/SAC’s 
notes stated, “Spoke with Joon Kim who advised we need to be very careful looking 
at that server because it is apparently a shared computer with Huma.  SDNY will 
provide protocol and guidance.”  Similarly, Kim emailed prosecutors and 
supervisors at SDNY after the call, “I just got a call from [the A/SAC] about what to 
do with his computer in light of the facts that there are lots of emails, etc. including 
what appear to be [Abedin’s].  We need to come up with a clear protocol.” 
The AUSAs provided written guidance to the case agent about how to handle 
review of the laptop.  In a September 28 email to the case agent and the SSA, 
AUSA 1 advised that the case agent should review “only evidence of crimes related 
to the sexual exploitation of children, enticement, and obscenity” and instructed the 
case agent “that all emails and other communications between Anthony Weiner and 
Huma Abedin (even if there are other parties to the communication) should be 
sequestered and not reviewed at this time.”  The case agent agreed and responded 
that the “[o]nly emails I will review are those to/from Weiner accounts to which 
[Huma Abedin] is not party.” 
Later in the day on September 28, the AUSA-created timeline noted: 
[The case agent] informed AUSAs that the header info previously 
described seen in plain view search revealed numerous emails 
between Abedin and HRC (on which Weiner was not a party) using 
potentially sensitive email addresses, which indicated that Abedin had 
used the laptop.  [The case agent] said that his chain of command was 
aware of the information.  AUSAs informed supervisors of these facts.  
Later that day, SDNY USAO and FBI NY leadership discussed situation 
and agreed that Rule 41 prevented any search in this case beyond 
scope of warrant, and that any emails outside that scope should be 
segregated and not reviewed in this case.  Same day, FBI NY ASAC [] 
asked AUSA to forward him the guidance for conducting the search 
that the AUSA had sent to [the case agent] because FBI counsel was 
interested in issuing guidance for review and seeing what we had 
already said on this point. 
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This timeline entry was consistent with testimony by the case agent and AUSAs 
during their interviews with the OIG. 
II. Reporting of Clinton-Related Emails to FBI Headquarters 
A. AD Secure Video Teleconference on September 28 
As noted above, ADIC Sweeney and the A/SAC both told us that, just before 
the start of the weekly AD SVTC on September 28, the A/SAC briefed Sweeney 
about the discovery of emails on the Weiner laptop that were potentially relevant to 
the Clinton email investigation.  The AD SVTC typically includes the FBI Director, 
the Deputy Director (DD), the Associate Deputy Director (ADD), the General 
Counsel, all Executive Assistant Directors (EAD), all ADs, and the ADICs of the New 
York, Los Angeles, and Washington Field Offices.  However, on September 28, 
Comey testified in front of the House Judiciary Committee until approximately 1 
p.m.  Comey and others told us that Comey was not present for the SVTC, and the 
SVTC was also not included on his calendar for September 28.  Instead, the SVTC 
was chaired by then DD McCabe, which McCabe told us would be the typical 
practice in the absence of the Director.  McCabe’s calendar for September 28 
included time for the weekly SVTC at 3 p.m.  The FBI was unable to provide the 
OIG with a roster of attendees for the September 28 SVTC.  However, based upon 
the leadership structure of the FBI at the time, there would have been 
approximately 39 FBI executives on the SVTC, including the DD, the ADD, 6 EADs, 
28 ADs, and 3 ADICs.  Any executive on leave or travel would have typically been 
replaced by a subordinate. 
Sweeney stated that, during the September 28 AD SVTC, he reported that 
NYO agents involved in the Weiner investigation had discovered 141,000 emails on 
Weiner’s laptop that were potentially relevant to the Clinton email investigation.  
Paul Abbate, then the ADIC for the Washington Field Office, recalled Sweeney 
stating that NYO had discovered “a large volume of emails that might be relevant to 
the Clinton email matter” on a computer in the Weiner investigation.  Abbate told 
us that he believed Sweeney also provided specific numbers and added that 
Sweeney “very much emphasized the significance of what he thought they had 
there.”  Abbate described the moment as like “dropping a bomb in the middle of the 
meeting” and stated that “everybody realized the significance of this, like, potential 
trove of information.” 
Sweeney told the OIG that McCabe responded to his briefing by stating, 
“Hey, I’m going to Quantico.  I’ll call you en route.”  Abbate also recalled someone, 
possibly McCabe, telling Sweeney that they would “talk offline afterwards.”  
McCabe’s Outlook calendar for September 28 showed that he was scheduled to be 
at Quantico at 6:00 p.m. that evening. 
McCabe told us that he did not remember Sweeney briefing the Weiner 
laptop issue on a SVTC, although he said it was possible that Sweeney had done so.  
McCabe explained that the reports by the ADICs on the SVTC are usually “like 10 
seconds.”  We showed McCabe his notes from September 28, which contained the 
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following entry:  “NY - … Weiner – atty took data off cloud – 2007 emails.”  McCabe 
told us the notes did not refresh his recollection but agreed that they “would be a 
pretty good indication” that he was made aware of the issue. 
Other witnesses also provided recollections of this briefing.  
Counterintelligence Division AD Priestap (one of the 39 FBI executives who 
regularly participated in the weekly AD SVTC) told us he vaguely recalled Sweeney 
mentioning the discovery of emails on the Weiner laptop that were potentially 
relevant to the Midyear investigation in a forum similar to the AD SVTC.  The 
Human Resources Division AD told us that he recalled Sweeney mentioning “emails 
relevant to the Clinton investigation” that had been discovered on a laptop 
associated with Anthony Weiner.  He added, “I remember Bill saying like hey, we 
think there’s some stuff on here you guys may not have seen.” 
Comey, who was not present for the SVTC, stated that he was unaware that 
Sweeney had reported the discovery of Clinton emails on the Weiner laptop during 
the September 28 AD SVTC.  When asked if this was information he would have 
expected to have been told, he stated, “Yeah, I would think so,” adding that he was 
surprised that he had not been informed. 
B. McCabe Post-SVTC Phone Call and Meeting on September 28 
1. Phone Call with Sweeney 
Sweeney told us that he had not heard back from McCabe after the 
September 28 SVTC, so he called McCabe on his drive home that evening.  Phone 
records show two calls from Sweeney to McCabe on September 28.  The first 
occurred at 4:51 p.m. and lasted for 9 minutes and 50 seconds, and the second 
occurred at 5:03 p.m. and lasted for 56 seconds.  In addition, Sweeney’s Outlook 
calendar for that day contained the following entry at 5:00 p.m.:  “Telcal w/DD re: 
Weiner invest & Garner.”  Sweeney stated that NYO personnel had continued 
processing the laptop in the time since the initial notification on the AD SVTC and 
he had been informed there were now 347,000 emails on the laptop.  Sweeney told 
us that he informed McCabe that there were now 347,000 emails. 
McCabe, who told us that his earliest recollection of learning about the 
Weiner laptop was in a telephone call with Sweeney in late September or early 
October, recalled Sweeney informing him that NYO had seized a laptop from 
Anthony Weiner “and they thought there would be Clinton stuff in it.”  When asked 
what Sweeney specifically told him, McCabe stated, “I just remember him saying 
we think, you know, like, we’ve got this laptop and we opened it up, and it looks 
like there’s stuff on there from Clinton, and, you know.  Oh, my gosh, what do we 
do kind of thing.”  McCabe also recalled that Sweeney made “very clear” that “it 
was a large volume” of emails.  McCabe stated that he understood “large volume” 
to mean “like many thousands of emails.”  McCabe recalled telling Sweeney that 
Counterintelligence Division personnel and NYO personnel should connect “[t]o 
figure out, like, what do we have or what do we do with this?” 
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McCabe stated that shortly after this call he contacted Priestap and said, 
“[Y]ou need to get somebody up to New York right away to take a look at what they 
have because it might be Clinton emails.”  Priestap told us that he did not recall 
either this conversation or McCabe telling him to send a team to New York to 
examine the Weiner laptop.  As described below, Priestap’s emails on the evening 
of September 28 reflect that he spoke with Sweeney and then instructed Strzok to 
have someone from his team contact NYO regarding the information. 
2. Meeting with Strzok and Priestap 
Our review of Strzok’s text messages revealed that McCabe discussed the 
Weiner laptop with Strzok and Priestap on September 28.  Later that same day, 
Strzok and Page discussed the meeting in a series of text messages.  Their 
exchange is quoted below.  The sender of each text message is identified after the 
timestamp. 
7:25 p.m., Strzok:  “Got called up to Andy’s earlier...hundreds of 
thousands of emails turned over by Weiner’s atty to sdny, includes a 
ton of material from spouse.  Sending team up tomorrow to 
review...this will never end....” 
7:27 p.m., Page:  “Turned over to them why?” 
7:28 p.m., Strzok:  “Apparently one of his recent texting partners may 
not have been 18...don’t have the details yet” 
7:29 p.m., Page:  “Yes, reported 15 in the news.” 
7:31 p.m., Strzok:  “And funny. Bill [Priestap] and I were waiting 
outside his door. He was down with the director....” 
7:51 p.m., Strzok:  “So I kinda want to go up to NY tomorrw [sic], 
coordinate this, take a leisurely Acela back Friday....” 
Strzok stated that he was sure that “got called up to Andy’s” referred to 
McCabe’s office, but he had no recollection of that meeting.  Strzok could not recall 
who first told him about the Weiner laptop, only recalling that someone told him 
that some “Clinton-type emails” had been discovered in New York.  Strzok’s notes 
from September 28 stated, “NY invest Weiner sexting 15 y’o.  Weiner atty produces 
copy of everything Weiner has on iCloud to SDNY.  Significant email from Huma 
[NFI – their email vs. her independent email]?  Relevance to MYE, Clinton 
Foundation?  MYE go review.”  Strzok stated that he initially planned to send a 
team to New York to review the emails, but that a conference call with NYO was 
scheduled instead.  (This conference call, which occurred on September 29, is 
discussed below.) 
Strzok told us that he did not consider the new information all that 
noteworthy because “throughout the summer [we had] retired Foreign Service 
officers...any number of people coming and saying, hey, I’ve got, you know, a 
handful of emails related to, you know, the Secretary or Cheryl Mills or something.  
And so we would run if they, we thought they had potential merit.  We would track 
them down.”  Strzok conceded that this lead was more credible since it came from 
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an FBI field office and involved information obtained from Abedin’s husband.  He 
added, though, “[T]here is no inkling, there is not a shadow of the, you know, 
what’s going to unfold a month later.” 
Page said she believed the September 28 text message from Strzok was the 
first time she heard about the emails on the Weiner laptop and told us that she 
knew little information about it.  Page explained that she was “not really that 
involved” in “most of the October stuff.”  Page stated her lack of involvement was 
due in part to the FBI’s Russia investigation.  Page explained that the many of the 
supervisors on the Midyear team were also assigned to the Russia investigation and 
they were “super-occupied” with the Russia investigation during October.  Page 
stated that most of her information about the Weiner laptop came from either 
Strzok or FBI Attorney 1. 
We showed McCabe these text messages and he said he did not recall talking 
to Strzok about the Weiner laptop on September 28.  McCabe also did not recall 
Sweeney describing the quantity of emails numerically, other than to say there 
were a “large volume.”  When asked about Strzok’s text message that he was 
“sending [a] team up tomorrow to review,” McCabe noted that the text message 
would be consistent with what McCabe told Priestap.  McCabe told us that the issue 
of the Weiner laptop “kind of falls off my radar” at this point, but when he 
reengaged with the team at a later point (he could not recall the amount of time 
that had elapsed), he discovered, “that [the team] did go up, but there [was] a 
problem, a legal, you know, an access problem because what they want to look for 
[was] not covered within the warrant, and yada, yada, yada.”  McCabe could not 
recall who told him this information about the trip to New York, but speculated it 
was Priestap. 
C. Comey and McCabe Communications After AD SVTC on 
September 28 
Phone records show two phone calls between McCabe and Comey on the 
evening of September 28.  The first call was from McCabe to Comey at 7:34 p.m. 
for 1 minute and 31 seconds.  The second call was from Comey to McCabe at 8:36 
p.m. for 8 minutes and 13 seconds.  McCabe told us he could not recall the content 
of either phone call.  When asked specifically if they discussed the issue of the 
Clinton emails on the Weiner laptop, McCabe said he did not recall and noted that 
he would talk with Comey at the end of the day on an almost daily basis.  
Additionally, as noted above, Strzok’s text message on September 28 reflected 
that, while Strzok was waiting outside McCabe’s office to meet with him regarding 
the Weiner laptop emails, McCabe “was down with the director.”  McCabe told us 
that he did not recall that and noted that the text message did not “seem 
consistent” with McCabe’s calendar, which showed that he was at Quantico the 
evening of September 28. 
McCabe said he recalled talking to Comey about the Weiner laptop issue 
“right around the time [McCabe] found out about it.”  McCabe described it as a “fly-
by,” where the Weiner laptop was “like one in a list of things that we discussed.”  
McCabe continued, “[A]nd it would have been like, hey, Bill Sweeney called.  This is 
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what he has.  I’m going to have [the Counterintelligence Division] take a look at it.  
I’ll let you know.”  McCabe stated that he would have told Comey about the 
importance of sending a team up the next day in order “to get eyes on this thing 
and figure out what we have.”  McCabe did not recall Comey “weighing in on it at 
all.”  Given the scrutiny of the Clinton email server investigation, we asked McCabe 
why he believed Comey did not have a stronger reaction to this information and 
whether this was considered a “big deal.”  McCabe responded: 
Well, it was a big deal to me.  I can’t tell you what he was thinking 
when I told him about it.  But I, I represented to him that we were 
taking steps to figure out what we had and would come back with 
some sort of an assessment as to what we need to do.  So, I mean, 
there’s, I’m not sure that there’s anything else that he would have said 
to do. 
Comey told the OIG that he recalled first learning of the presence of the 
additional emails on the Weiner laptop at some point in early October 2016, 
although Comey said it was possible this could have occurred in late September.  
Comey explained: 
I was aware sometime in the first week or two of October that there 
was a laptop that a criminal squad had seized from Anthony Weiner in 
New York and someone said to me that—and I’m thinking it might 
have been Andrew McCabe, but someone said to me kind of in 
passing, they’re trying to figure out whether it has any connection to 
the Midyear investigation.  And the reason that’s so vague in my head 
is I think—I never imagined that there might be something on a guy 
named Anthony Weiner’s computer that might connect to the Hillary 
Clinton email investigation, so I kind of just put it out of my mind. 
Comey described himself as having a “reasonably good memory” and speculated, 
“[T]he reason I didn’t index it is, it was a passing thing that almost seemed like he 
might be kidding, and so I don’t think I indexed it hard.  And I think it was the 
beginning of October and then I think it disappears from my memory.  And then I 
remember for certain when Andy emails me, I think it’s the 27th [of October] 
saying, the Midyear team needs to meet with you urgently or right away or 
something.” 
We asked Comey to explain why this initial information about the Weiner 
laptop did not “index” with him given that Abedin was closely connected to Clinton.  
Comey stated, “I don’t know that I knew that [Weiner] was married to Huma 
Abedin at the time.”  Comey told us that even if he had had known that Abedin was 
married to Weiner “it wouldn’t have been [at the] top of [my] mind.”  Comey also 
stated that the manner in which he was informed of this information affected his 
reaction.  Comey told us that he was “quite confident” that he was not told this 
information in a “sit down” briefing in his office.  Instead, Comey thought it most 
likely that McCabe was “passing the office” and said, “hey Boss, I just want you to 
know that the criminal squad in New York has got Anthony Weiner[‘s] laptop and I 
think it may have some connect to Midyear.”  Comey said he knew that “if it’s 
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important, Andy [McCabe] will make sure that I focus on it.”  Comey said that it 
“could be” that whoever told him about the Weiner laptop “understated the 
significance of the information.”  He said, “The notion that I knew something 
important was on that laptop and did what—concealed or hid it or something?—is 
crazy.” 
We asked Comey if McCabe told him that Sweeney had called McCabe about 
the emails on the Weiner laptop.  Comey responded, “No.”  We also showed Comey 
the Strzok text messages and asked him if he recalled being briefed in person by 
McCabe on September 28.  Comey said he did not recall that occurring.  Comey 
stated that he would have expected to be briefed if NYO had discovered a large 
volume of Hillary Clinton’s emails.  However, if NYO had only discovered a large 
volume of Abedin’s emails, he was not sure that information would be briefed to 
him since there would not necessarily be a connection to Midyear.  He 
acknowledged, however, that it “would be significant” if the laptop contained 
Abedin’s emails on a clintonemail.com domain. 
We asked Comey, “[I]f [McCabe] had been told on September 28th that 
there were…at one point 141,000 and at another 347,000 emails related to the 
Clinton investigation and didn’t tell you, would you be concerned by that?”  Comey 
responded, “Sure, I’d want to know why, what the thinking was.”  Since Comey told 
us he did not recall being told this information, we asked for his reaction.  Comey 
stated: 
I’m mystified.  First of all doubting, worried that I’m crazy is my first 
instinct, but I don’t think I’m crazy.  You said and I think I would 
remember if I were being told, so the question is, why wouldn’t you 
tell me.  I always try and keep an open mind and maybe some 
explanation and one I can’t see, but I’d want to know, why, what’s the 
thinking.  Why didn’t the, given the Director is closely associated with 
this, why, what’s the reasoning.  Maybe there is one I can’t see, but I 
certainly would want to ask. 
As detailed in the next section, Sweeney told us he also called EAD Coleman, 
EAD Steinbach, and AD Priestap on September 28 regarding the Weiner laptop 
emails.  We asked Comey if any of those officials or anyone else informed him at 
this time (late September) of Sweeney’s report that Midyear-related information 
had been discovered on the Weiner laptop.  Comey responded, “Unless I’m having 
a stroke, no.  I don’t remember any of that.”  We also asked Comey if he would 
have expected someone on his leadership team other than McCabe to bring this to 
his attention.  Comey stated that he would “not necessarily” have expected this if 
“they were assuming that the Deputy Director is briefing the Director.”  He 
described the FBI as “a big chain of command place.” 
D. Sweeney Calls Other FBI Executives on September 28 
In addition to the phone call with McCabe detailed above, Sweeney told us 
that on September 28 he also called Criminal EAD Randy Coleman, National 
Security Branch EAD Mike Steinbach, and Counterintelligence AD Bill Priestap with 
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updates on the Weiner laptop.  Sweeney stated that he told all three essentially the 
same thing that he told McCabe, that NYO had continued processing the laptop and 
the number of emails was now at 347,000. 
1. Criminal EAD Coleman 
Sweeney’s phone records show several calls with EAD Coleman during the 
afternoon of September 28.  Coleman said Sweeney told him that NYO had 
reviewed a computer belonging to Anthony Weiner and had found thousands of 
“emails that pertain to Clinton…[during] her time as the Secretary of State and to 
Huma that were connected with the Midyear investigation.”  Coleman stated that he 
told Sweeney to make sure “to let management and headquarters know” about this 
development. 
Coleman drafted a “Memorandum for Record” on November 7, 2016, 
documenting his involvement in the discovery of Clinton emails on the Weiner 
laptop.  Coleman’s memorandum stated, in part: 
On 09/28/2016, EAD Randall Coleman received for [sic] call from AD 
Bill Sweeney indicating team of Agents investigating Anthony Weiner 
sexting case had discovered emails relevant to Clinton email 
investigation.  AD Sweeney advised team had halted further review 
and would be requesting guidance from FBIHQ.  EAD Coleman agreed 
and advised he would notify FBI General Counsel James Baker and DD 
Andrew McCabe.  The call was concluded.  On 09/28/2016, 
immediately after call with AD Sweeney, Coleman telephonically 
contacted DD McCabe at his office number to advise him of the 
circumstance described by AD Sweeney.  DD McCabe advised he had 
already been made aware of matter. 
Coleman told us that he called McCabe immediately because he “considered this 
important.”  Coleman stated that McCabe’s secretary answered his call and he told 
the secretary to get McCabe on the phone because Coleman “need[ed] to talk to 
him.”  Coleman described his conversation with McCabe as “very short.”  Coleman 
stated, “I said, hey listen, I just got called by Sweeney.  Here is what he told me.  
And I think Andy is like, yeah, I already know.  I got it.”  After his conversation with 
McCabe, Coleman told us, “[T]here was no doubt in my mind when we finished that 
conversation that [McCabe] understood the, the gravity of what the find was.” 
McCabe told us he did not recall receiving a phone call from Coleman.  He 
told us Coleman’s memorandum did not refresh his memory, but that he had no 
reason to doubt Coleman’s account. 
2. National Security EAD Steinbach 
Steinbach stated that he believed the discovery of Midyear-related material 
on the Weiner laptop was first discussed at a meeting that he was unable to attend.  
Steinbach recalled receiving a phone call from Sweeney “just to give me a heads up 
saying, hey, you weren’t here but just FYI we may have found something.”  
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Steinbach told us this conversation may have occurred in late September.  
Steinbach said he could not recall specifics and stated that he did not think NYO 
“knew exactly what they had” at the time, but added that he received “some 
indication that there may be some Clinton domain emails.” 
3. Counterintelligence AD Priestap 
On September 28, at 7:04 p.m., Priestap sent an email to Strzok, with the 
Lead Analyst and the NYO A/SAC copied, that stated, “I spoke to Sweeney.  Our 
agent and analyst should call [the NYO A/SAC]....  Sweeney said [the A/SAC] will 
get them access to what they need.”  At 9:26 p.m. on September 28, Sweeney sent 
the following email to Priestap, “Bill, The NYO POC for the sensitive email issue is 
A/SAC [] (cc’d).  He can coordinate for your team.  Have a quiet night. – Bill.” 
Priestap told us he could not recall if he heard about the discovery of 
Midyear-related material on the Weiner laptop during the September 28 AD SVTC.  
However, Priestap stated that he thought Sweeney “mentioned something to that 
effect in one of those” forums.  Priestap told us that believed that he first learned of 
this issue in a phone call with Sweeney.  Priestap described what information he 
was provided, stating: 
When I first was told about it, if I’m recalling correctly, it was 
something to the effect of it’s Anthony Weiner’s laptop or computer.... 
His wife’s emails are on it.  And his wife has email communication with 
the former Secretary, or probably then Secretary.  And that the time 
frame overlaps with some of the time frame we were interested in.  In 
other words, it was explained like this is in...the Midyear lane.  I don’t 
remember getting into any volume then, although...one of my first 
questions, if not the first question is, I would ask is what’s the volume. 
Priestap told us that he “would have certainly talked” to his immediate 
supervisor, EAD Steinbach, about this information because “the bottom line is this 
was explosive.”  Priestap stated that he did not recall talking to McCabe directly, 
although he stated that he may have if Steinbach was out of the office that day.  
Priestap stated that either he or Steinbach would have advised McCabe of 
“something of this magnitude” very quickly.  Priestap described the information he 
received from Sweeney about the Weiner laptop as “hot information” and stated, 
“[I]t’s the type of thing where I don’t need an appointment.  I walk upstairs and 
just, I make sure they know that before they go home.” 
III. Initial Response of FBI Headquarters to Discovery of Midyear-Related 
Information on the Weiner Laptop 
A. Phone Call between Sweeney and Priestap on September 29 
On September 29 at 6:09 a.m., Sweeney sent the following email to 
Priestap, “Can you give me a call on the ride in?  Not clear under what authorities 
we have.  Thx.”  Sweeney told us that he conveyed to Priestap in the phone call 
that NYO did not have the legal authority to look at the Midyear-related material on 
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the Weiner laptop.  Priestap told us he could not recall this specific conversation, 
but noted that it would be standard practice to examine what legal authority was 
needed.  At 8:12 a.m., the A/SAC forwarded to Sweeney the 7:04 p.m. email from 
Priestap the night before.  The A/SAC stated, “FYI There is no way that they can 
just look at the emails.  I even went over the guidance from SDNY.  Not happening 
unless they have some authority I am in the dark on.  Let me known [sic] if you 
want to discuss.” 
At 9:02 a.m. on September 29, Sweeney forwarded Priestap the September 
28 email from SDNY AUSA 1 (detailed above) advising the Weiner case agent on 
the limited scope of the Weiner search warrant and instructing him not to review 
any communication to which Abedin was a party.  Priestap forwarded the email to 
FBI Attorney 1 and commented, “Per our conversation.”  Priestap described FBI 
Attorney 1 as someone he typically relies on when legal issues arise.  FBI Attorney 
1 confirmed that Priestap told her about the issue with the Weiner laptop and asked 
her “to follow up on it.”  We asked FBI Attorney 1 what she understood this to 
mean.  FBI Attorney 1 told us that she believed there was a question of whether 
the Midyear team should go to New York and review the Weiner laptop.  FBI 
Attorney 1 continued, “And, you know, we had over the course of the investigation, 
we would have various means of people saying, we have all of Clinton’s emails.  
And so this was just to follow up on that.  This obviously is more, a more solid lead 
than some of the other things we had, but it was just to find out really what were 
the details of this.  Should we send a team up there.” 
B. Conference Call between NYO and Midyear Personnel on 
September 29 
Early on September 29, the Midyear SSA called the NYO A/SAC supervising 
the Weiner investigation and, according to the A/SAC, informed the A/SAC that he 
was the supervisor of the Clinton email server investigation.  The A/SAC and SSA 
both told us that they had a brief discussion about what NYO had found on the 
Weiner laptop.  The A/SAC stated, “I’m sure I told him exactly what I’d been 
representing to others, that, look, there are a lot of emails.  You may want to get a 
search warrant.  We can’t, we’re not looking at anything.  That’s the normal stuff I 
would have said.”  The SSA stated that the A/SAC told him, “[W]e’ve got some 
Clinton emails here, explained what it was.  And they weren’t sure what to do with 
it in that it was outside the scope of what they were working on.”  The SSA stated 
that the A/SAC explained that NYO wanted to notify FBI Headquarters about what 
they had found and were also seeking “guidance on how to deal with this.” 
The A/SAC and SSA scheduled a conference call, also known as a Lync call, 
between NYO and Midyear personnel at 11:30 a.m. that morning.  Nine people 
participated in this conference call.  This included the NYO A/SAC, ASAC, and SSA 
supervising the Weiner investigation; a NYO SSA assigned to public corruption 
matters; and five members of the FBI Midyear team:  the SSA, FBI Attorney 1, 
Agent 2, and two analysts.  FBI Attorney 1 told us that she participated in the call 
at the request of Priestap.  The Midyear SSA told us that he gave Strzok a “heads 
up” that the SSA was going to have a conference call with NYO about the Weiner 
laptop. 
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1. Testimony and Contemporaneous Notes from Call 
Participants 
We interviewed all nine participants to the September 29 call and reviewed 
the contemporaneous notes taken by eight of them (one participant, the NYO SSA 
on the Weiner investigation, took no notes). 
The NYO participants told us that they provided the Midyear team with an 
overview of what they had found on the Weiner laptop.  This included the fact that 
the laptop contained “hundreds of thousands” of emails potentially relevant to the 
Midyear investigation.  Both the ASAC and public corruption SSA recalled the 
number 141,000 being provided.  Each of the NYO participants said that the 
connection to both Hillary Clinton and the Clinton email server investigation was 
made clear on the call.  The ASAC and public corruption SSA told us that NYO 
reported that there were emails addresses that appeared to be “directly tied” to 
Abedin and Clinton.  NYO personnel stated that they informed the Midyear team 
that the laptop was “still downloading.”  The public corruption SSA’s notes from the 
call also included the notation “2007 present,” which he explained was the timeline 
for “the span of information that they had seen to date on the laptop.”  Each of the 
NYO participants told us that the limited nature of Weiner search warrant was 
discussed.  The ASAC stated, “I know that we said to them that the warrant didn’t 
authorize us to look at these particular emails.”  He continued, “And [the Midyear 
personnel] understood that.  There was no pushback from them on that.”  NYO 
personnel told us that they were given no tasks to complete after the call.  The 
ASAC explained, “I had the feeling like the ball is down in somebody else’s court.  
Because...we were done.” 
The Midyear SSA stated that he “knew right off the bat” that NYO had emails 
from Clinton’s server and that they “appeared to be government in nature.”  As for 
volume, the Midyear SSA recalled that “it wasn’t a one-off” and NYO had seen 
either “hundreds or thousands” of emails.  Either way, the SSA described it as a 
“significant number.”  The Midyear SSA also told us that “content-wise” NYO “had 
only seen a couple” of emails because “they couldn’t review content.”  He said he 
understood that NYO had seen more of Abedin’s emails, but they had seen Clinton 
emails as well, including emails from the @clintonemail.com domain.  The Midyear 
SSA told us that he asked NYO personnel why they thought these were Clinton’s 
emails and NYO responded, “Well, because they’re her initials”, indicating that they 
had seen something beyond the domain name.  The Midyear SSA stated that 
Midyear personnel were informed that the Weiner search warrant had a very limited 
scope.  He stated that Midyear personnel knew that they “were going to need to get 
a warrant to review this.”  We asked the Midyear SSA if NYO had mentioned seeing 
BlackBerry domain emails on the Weiner laptop.  The SSA responded, “Yeah....  
[T]hey had looked from the forensic side, that they had determined that it 
appeared to be like an entire” file.  The Midyear SSA described the conclusion of the 
call as follows: 
Well, from my standpoint, I said we were going to, we were going to 
address whether we had enough for a warrant.  And that we would run 
this up the chain on our side.  And...they agreed especially that they 
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would go back to SDNY and see what the exact parameters of what 
they could and couldn’t do, because they were not going to cross a line 
that would compromise their case. 
Agent 2, Analyst 1, and Analyst 2 told us that NYO reported a large volume 
of emails on the laptop and noted that they were still processing the laptop.  Notes 
for each of these three referenced “350k items,” with Agent 2’s notes also stating, 
“350k items in messages tab.”  All three told us that NYO reported the presence of 
emails related to Clinton.  Analyst 1 stated that NYO reported that they had seen 
metadata showing “what they were characterizing as like [Hillary Clinton’s] email 
addresses.”  Analyst 1 stated that the Midyear team was trying to determine if 
these were Clinton’s or were from the clintonemail.com domain.  Analyst 2 stated 
that she had only a vague recollection of the call, but told us that she recalled that 
NYO had seen a large volume of emails between Clinton and Abedin.  Agent 2 
stated that NYO reported seeing emails from the clintonemail.com domain.  Analyst 
1’s notes referenced the following domains:  state.gov, clinton.com, 
hillary@clinton.com, clintonfoundation, and clintonemail.com.  Analyst 2’s notes 
included a reference to “2007 dates on PC.”  Each of the three also said that NYO 
emphasized the limited nature of the Weiner search warrant and the fact that the 
Midyear team was “going to need to get a warrant to review this.”  Agent 2’s notes 
included the following references:  “SDNY advised to avoid emails” and “not looked 
@ any content.”  Analyst 2’s notes included the following references:  “SDNY—said 
put them aside” and “Huma has not waived marrital [sic] priv.”  Analyst 2 described 
the limited nature of the Weiner search warrant as an “overarching theme” of the 
call. 
FBI Attorney 1 provided a slightly different account of the call.  She stated 
that NYO said on the call that it was still processing the evidence and they were not 
sure “whether or not it had anything to do with” Midyear.  FBI Attorney 1 
explained: 
We didn’t know if it was the right timeframe.  So, you know, Huma we 
knew, Huma had...worked for [Clinton] for a long time.  So we weren’t 
sure of exactly, one, what, how much of the information on this was 
Huma’s versus Weiner’s.  Because we thought it was his laptop.  And 
then, two, whether it would have been relevant to the right timeframe.  
We were looking for Clinton’s emails, not Huma’s emails.  We also 
knew Huma had a clintonemail address, so she could have been using 
that for her own personal activities, so we just didn’t know the full 
extent of what was on there. 
When asked about volume, FBI Attorney 1 told us that she “knew that it was a 
large amount of data” and FBI Attorney 1’s notes from the call referenced “over 
350k items.”  However, FBI Attorney 1 added: 
We always got things that said the data was larger than, it always 
ended up getting narrowed down after we got more, got it processed 
more.  It doesn’t change for me though, even though the 350k that’s 
what we think.  Like, there was also all the talk about it hadn’t been 
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fully processed.  So, to me, that number was just sort of a preliminary 
number. 
FBI Attorney 1 stated that NYO said it had seen either Clinton’s emails or emails 
from the clintonemail.com domain.  FBI Attorney 1 told us that NYO relayed that 
“SDNY was very concerned about staying within the scope of their warrant.”  FBI 
Attorney 1 stated that the Midyear team told NYO, “well when you get further 
clarity about what this laptop is, get back to us and let us know, and we’ll try to 
figure out what to do from there.”  She told us that Midyear personnel specifically 
requested that NYO look for emails related to the clintonemail.com domain.  When 
asked whether NYO was supposed to create an inventory or list for Midyear, FBI 
Attorney 1 stated that she “thought we talked about [the Weiner case agent] not 
being able to do that.  Because of the instructions.  I mean, because of how the 
warrant was drafted.”  FBI Attorney 1’s notes were entitled “NYO Lync – MYE 
Emails” and included references to “image – not complete b/c so large,” “SDNY told 
them to avoid emails,” “over 350k items – including emails + IMs different 
addresses including state.gov Clinton.com,” “not sure if they saw 
clintonemail.com,” “WFO interest - @clintonemail.com @state.gov,” and “2009-
2013 time frame / early next week.” 
2. Post-Call NYO Communications 
Shortly after the call concluded, at 11:52 a.m., the NYO ASAC forwarded to 
the Midyear SSA and FBI Attorney 1 the September 28 email from AUSA 1 to the 
Weiner case agent (detailed above) outlining the limited scope of the Weiner search 
warrant and providing instructions for the case agent’s search of the laptop.  The 
ASAC told us that he forwarded this email to make sure “they understood the 
directives that we had from [SDNY] in terms of limitations and really kind of under 
what circumstances we would be able to look at anything that was attached to an 
email.”  Witnesses in NYO and SDNY told us that the case agent was told not to 
affirmatively search the emails for information unrelated to the Weiner child 
exploitation investigation.  At 12:42 p.m. on September 29, the A/SAC informed 
Sweeney by email:  “Just had the lync call with HQ/WFO.  They were misinformed 
about the accessibility.  All good for now.  We can discuss further if you like.” 
The NYO A/SAC and ASAC told us they did not recall any tasking of NYO 
related to the material on the Weiner laptop that was potentially relevant to the 
Midyear investigation.  The A/SAC told us, “I fully expected [the Midyear team] to 
reach back out to ask me for certain things, and, and for assistance of some sort.  I 
know that’s what I’d do.”  The NYO A/SAC, ASAC, and SSA told us they had no 
further contact with FBI Headquarters about the Clinton email issue until late 
October.  The SSA told us that he felt like NYO had done its job reporting the 
information to FBI Headquarters and he “assumed they were doing something.” 
3. Post-Call Midyear Team and FBI Headquarters Response 
We asked members of the Midyear team what steps were taken immediately 
after the September 29 call.  FBI Attorney 1 recalled discussing the September 29 
call with both Strzok and Deputy General Counsel Trisha Anderson.  FBI Attorney 1 
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stated that it was clear the Midyear team would need “additional process or 
consent” to be able to do anything with the laptop.  Despite this, FBI Attorney 1 
stated that she did not reach out to the AUSAs at SDNY at this time.  FBI Attorney 
1 explained, “[A]fter the SVTC, I thought, well I’m not sure we’re that far along, 
and I think I get what, where New York is.  And so I didn’t feel the need to reach 
out to SDNY at that time.”  We asked FBI Attorney 1 whether NYO was supposed to 
follow up with the Midyear team or the Midyear team was supposed to follow up 
with NYO after the call.  FBI Attorney 1 stated, “I don’t have an answer to that.  I 
don’t think it was very clear.  I would have expected New York to follow up because 
they were the one that had to process the computer....”  We asked FBI Attorney 1 
what she expected NYO to do as a result the call.  FBI Attorney 1 stated: 
I would have expected that the computer would have been processed, 
New York would have been continuing their investigation, and to the 
extent that they saw more things that could have helped us—that 
would have been relevant to our case—they would have reached back 
out and told us like they did on [October] 26th or whatever that date 
was, on that Wednesday....  It just took three weeks to do that. 
Strzok told us that either the Midyear SSA or FBI Attorney 1 briefed him on 
the call.  In a 12:26 p.m. email to Strzok on September 29, the Midyear SSA 
stated, “No travel planned for tomorrow.  [FBI Attorney 1] will brief you at 1 pm.”  
FBI Attorney 1 told us she recalled this discussion with Strzok.  She stated: 
...Bill [Priestap] was wondering if we were going to send a team to 
New York, to go with them and review this material with them.  And 
based on the call, I didn’t think it was the right time yet.  Obviously 
that’s not my decision as counsel, but I did explain to Pete, like, we 
didn’t know the volume.  We didn’t know if it was related to our 
material.  The search warrant was about Weiner’s activities, so there 
would be limited utility in sending a team to New York at this point. 
Strzok’s notes from September 29 stated, “NY:  SW – Saw some 
@clintonemail.com, @state.gov.”  Strzok did not recall being briefed in any detail, 
but stated that he was told about the limited scope of the Weiner search warrant.  
Strzok told us his takeaway was: 
[T]hat there is material there....  [T]he upshot of what I recall is, you 
know, we need to, we need to kind of go down this route.  It isn’t a 
crank lead.  It is something that we need to look into.  There is work 
they’ve got to do.  We’re not there yet, but it isn’t something we can 
just say, ah, let, there’s nothing relevant there. 
Strzok said the next step was for NYO to process the laptop and for NYO to look for 
the type of data on the laptop that the Midyear team would need.  Strzok 
continued: 
[A]nd...when you’re done with that, you know, call us back and let us 
know.  And again...there is no sense of this is going to be huge and 
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horrible and the election is a month away, and God, are we going to 
say something, do we need to say something to Congress?  This is 
just, oh, good lead and, you know, we’ll get to the end of the year, 
next year.  We’ll get to it as they process through it. 
Anderson told us she vaguely recalled a “preliminary conversation” with FBI 
Attorney 1 on this issue.  At 10:27 a.m. on September 29, FBI Attorney 1 sent a 
message to Anderson on the FBI’s Lync system that stated, “Sorry I missed the 
10:15.  I was meeting with [Priestap] about a new development in MYE.  I believe 
he also reached out to you, but you were in a meeting.  I can bring you up to speed 
when you have a minute.”  Anderson said she recalled a “very skeletal” overview of 
the facts, including that some Abedin materials may have been found on a laptop 
obtained in an investigation of Weiner.  Anderson said that she was informed that it 
was unclear what was on the laptop at this point and NYO was going “to try to 
figure out as much as they could” consistent with the terms of their search warrant.  
When asked if FBI Attorney 1 would have been responsible for following up with 
NYO after the call, Anderson stated, “[I]t wouldn’t have been [FBI Attorney 1’s] job 
to call New York and say, hey, where are you guys on this?  You know, as a lawyer, 
that’s not what she would have been doing.”  Anderson said she thought it would 
have been the job of “the Midyear investigative team” to reach out to NYO to find 
out “where things stood.”  Anderson did not recall hearing about the Weiner laptop 
issue again until approximately October 27. 
Priestap’s notes from September 29 contained the following entry:  “Baker 
Voluntarily provided emails from 2007 on (347,000 emails) – state.gov, - 
foundation.gov.”  Priestap explained that the “Baker” notation meant that either 
Priestap received this information from FBI GC Baker or Priestap felt that he needed 
to tell Baker this information.  As noted below, Baker recalled first learning about 
the Weiner laptop issue from EAD Coleman on October 3.  Priestap provided the 
following interpretation of his notes, “[M]y guess, I’m not positive, is that this was 
an indication, you know, we thought the time frame was roughly 2007 on, there 
were roughly this many emails [347,000], and that it included both” State 
Department and Clinton Foundation business.  Priestap told us that he met with the 
Lead Analyst, Strzok, and FBI Attorney 1 on a nearly daily basis during this period 
and the information in his notes may have been provided by one of those 
individuals. 
McCabe told us he could not recall if he learned about the September 29 call 
before or after it occurred.166  He stated that the call was the Midyear team’s way 
“of following through with my direction to them to kind of get their hands around 
this thing and let us know what do we have.”  We asked McCabe if anyone informed 
him of the limited scope of the Weiner search warrant at this time and he stated 
that he did not recall being told that until later.  McCabe stated if he had been told 
                                       
166  As noted in Chapter Eight, McCabe held a meeting on the afternoon of September 29 
entitled “Mtg. w/DD RE Decision Points” that Rybicki, Anderson, Strzok, Page, FBI Attorney 1, Baker, 
and Priestap were invited to attend.  Contemporaneous notes from the meeting reflected a discussion 
of congressional requests for materials from the Midyear investigation.  The notes did not reference 
the NYO call. 
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about the limited scope of NYO’s search warrant on September 29, “I would have 
said well what do we have to do to get another warrant if that’s the route we need 
to take.” 
C. McCabe Call to NSD Leadership on October 3 
NSD Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) Mary McCord told 
us that on or about October 3, she received a phone call from McCabe.  McCord 
stated that this was the first time she learned that there was a potential issue 
relating to emails in an iCloud account used by Abedin and Weiner.  We found no 
evidence of any other contact between the FBI Midyear team and the Midyear 
prosecutors regarding any material obtained from Weiner until October 21, as 
discussed below. 
McCord described their conversation as follows: 
[W]hat he says to me is that there’s this criminal case.  New York is 
investigating Anthony Weiner.  And his counsel...provided a copy of 
the content of his iCloud account.  It includes a substantial number of 
emails from his wife’s email account.  And Andy [McCabe] said he was 
sending a Midyear agent up to look at what it is.  You know, hopefully 
it’s all duplicates and we don’t have to, you know, worry about, about 
it.  And at the time, he was, he was saying to me you may want to 
touch base with [SDNY U.S. Attorney] Preet [Bharara] to make sure 
he’s not like charging ahead like doing some sort of process, like, that 
would bump up against the work of Midyear. 
According to McCord, she and McCabe thought that these emails were likely 
duplicates given the “thorough scrub of everything” during Midyear.  McCord told us 
that she did not think this was “a major thing,” but agreed that they should “make 
sure that there’s nothing new there.” 
McCord’s notes from the call stated, “Andy McCabe.  NY CRM investigating 
Anthony Weiner, his counsel provided copy of content of his i-cloud account – 
includes substantial # of emails from wife’s email account.  Andy sending mid-year 
agent up to look at what it is.  Hopefully all duplicates.  May want to touch base 
w/Preet to make sure doesn’t charge ahead.  Consent?”  McCord stated that the 
“Consent?” entry was a thought about whether consent would have been “good 
enough” to allow a forensic review to determine if these were duplicate emails.  
After the conversation, McCord stated, “And then, honestly, I get busy with things.  
I don’t really think much about this again until, and I did not call Preet.  I just 
decided it wasn’t” warranted at that time.  McCord stated that she did not hear 
about the issue again until McCabe called a second time later in October.  As we 
discuss below, we believe this call occurred on October 25. 
McCabe only vaguely recalled a conversation with McCord.  He told us that he 
believed that he contacted McCord, but he thought that the conversation occurred 
later in October. 
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NSD DAAG Toscas recalled being informed of McCabe’s call to NSD in early 
October and stated that he thought it related to emails in an iCloud account used by 
Weiner and Abedin.  Toscas did not remember the exact timing of the call and 
thought that McCabe called NSD AAG John Carlin instead of McCord.  Nevertheless, 
the information provided by Toscas was similar to McCord’s testimony.  Toscas 
stated that he did not hear about this issue again until he received a phone call 
from SDNY Deputy U.S. Attorney Kim on October 21.  We discuss that call below. 
We also asked NSD AAG Carlin about an early October call between either 
McCabe and himself or McCabe and McCord related to the Weiner investigation.  
Carlin, who had announced on September 27, 2016, that he would resign as AAG 
effective October 15, 2016, told us he did not recall a conversation between 
McCabe and himself or McCabe and McCord. 
D. FBI Headquarters Discussions on October 3 and 4 
1. EAD Coleman October 3 Meeting with Baker and Bowdich 
As noted previously, Coleman drafted a “Memorandum for Record” on 
November 7, 2016, documenting his involvement in the discovery of emails on the 
Weiner laptop that were potentially relevant to the Midyear investigation.  The 
memorandum contained an entry for October 3 that stated, “On or about 
10/03/2016, EAD Coleman verbally advised OGC Baker and Associate Deputy 
Director David Bowdich of the matter described by AD Sweeney in a ‘sidebar’ 
meeting after normal DD [Deputy Director] daily update meeting.  OGC Baker 
advised he was not aware of the matter and would need to look into it further.”  
Coleman told us that he believed McCabe was out of the office on October 3 and 
ADD Bowdich was leading the daily update meeting.  McCabe was scheduled to 
travel to New York on October 3 to attend a symposium the following day.167  
Coleman told us that after a meeting on October 3, he informed Bowdich and Baker 
about the information he had received from Sweeney concerning the laptop.  
Bowdich told us that he did not “specifically remember” this discussion with 
Coleman, but had no reason to doubt the memorandum’s accuracy. 
We showed Baker the Coleman memorandum and Baker stated that 
Coleman’s account “sounds about right.”  We asked Baker what he was told about 
the Weiner laptop.  Baker stated: 
Pretty basic, but along the lines of we have this laptop in this other, 
unrelated case.  And somehow they figured out that there were some 
additional emails on there that were outside the scope of the warrant, 
if I recall correctly, that they were working on, and that they needed 
to do more work to get access to them, and they would be...working 
on it to try to get access to it. 
                                       
167  In McCabe’s absence, Bowdich as ADD would run the daily update meeting. 
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Coleman’s memorandum stated that Baker planned to look into the issue further.  
We asked Baker about that and he stated he did not recall specifics, but he believed 
he asked “somebody on the Midyear team” about the issue. 
In the Coleman memorandum’s next and final paragraph, which is undated, 
it stated, “It was determined by DD McCabe and EAD Steinbach that any follow on 
investigative activity concerning the emails located on Anthony Weiner’s laptop 
would be reviewed by the MIDYEAR investigative team.”  Coleman said he did not 
recall why this entry was undated and was unsure at what point this occurred.  He 
told us that he shared an office with Steinbach and that this could have been a 
dialogue between himself and Steinbach at some point later in October. 
2. Email from Bowdich to Comey on October 3 
On October 3, at 7:42 p.m., Bowdich sent an email to Comey and McCabe 
briefing them on items of interest from that day.  Rybicki was cc’d on the email, 
which was entitled “Daily Report.”  After highlighting three unrelated items, 
Bowdich stated, “I asked Randy Coleman to stay behind tomorrow to quickly brief 
you on the Weiner matter which is growing more complicated, but it can wait until 
then.”  Bowdich told the OIG that he did not remember what was “growing more 
complicated” with the Weiner matter.  Bowdich noted that when dealing with issues 
of this type he typically “would have pushed that up to Andy, and/or the Director, 
and Baker would have been right in the middle of it.” 
Comey told us he did not recall this email and also did not recall what was 
“growing more complicated” in the Weiner matter.  Comey stated that he was “only 
dimly” aware of the Weiner child exploitation investigation at this point in time. 
We also asked Rybicki about this email.  Rybicki stated that he did not know 
what was meant by “the Weiner matter which is growing more complicated.”  
Rybicki told us that he first recalled hearing about the issue of Clinton emails on the 
Weiner laptop on October “26th into the 27th.”  When asked if this email made 
Rybicki think that he and Comey were aware of the Weiner laptop issue earlier than 
he recalled, Rybicki responded, “I don’t think so....  I remember on the 27th right 
when I heard about it thinking this is [unintelligible].  That would, that’s my first 
recollection as well of hearing anything about it.” 
3. Meeting between Comey and Coleman on October 4 
Comey’s Outlook calendar for October 4 contains an entry for “Morning 
Briefs” from 8:15 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. that is immediately followed by an entry for 
“Meeting w/EAD Coleman” from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.  Coleman told us that he 
could not recall this briefing with Comey.  Coleman stated that staying behind to 
brief Comey would be consistent with normal practice, but added that he did not 
recall this specific instance.  Coleman told us that it would be unusual to have a 
one-on-one meeting with Comey and told us someone else would typically be 
present at these briefings, such as the DD or ADD.  While not remembering this 
meeting, Coleman speculated that this may have been a one-on-one meeting with 
Comey to discuss Coleman’s upcoming retirement from the FBI in December 2016. 
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Coleman told us that he kept regularly took notes in a journal.  Coleman’s 
notes from October 4 contained the following entry: 
(1)  Anthony Wiener [sic] 
(2)  [Unrelated] 
(3)  Wiener [sic] – texting 15 yo – Sexually Explicit 
 9/26 – Federal SW – IPhone/IPAD/Laptop 
 Initial analysis of laptop – thousands emails 
 Hillary Clinton & Foundation 
 Crime Against Children 
We asked Coleman about these notes and he told us that, given their placement in 
his notebook, the notes would most likely represent information he was briefed on 
first thing in the morning by his subordinates in the Criminal Investigative Division.  
Coleman stated that he may have passed this information to other FBI executives 
after the morning briefing with the Director, but he could not remember if that 
occurred here. 
Comey told us that he did not recall the briefing by Coleman reflected in his 
calendar.  We asked Comey if this briefing could have been the time in early 
October that he recalled being told about the connection between Midyear and the 
Weiner investigation.  Comey stated: 
It’s possible, possible this is what is knocking around in the back of my 
head, but I really, see I know the frailty of memory from having done 
a lot of this work, at least in my memory it’s much more of an informal 
than a meeting about it, but it’s possible. 
We showed Coleman’s notes from October 4 to Comey.  Comey did not recall being 
briefed on the information contained in the notes.  When asked about Coleman, 
Comey said he “thought very highly of him” and described him as a “straight 
shooter.” 
We asked Comey if this information was something that he likely would have 
“put out of his mind” after being informed of it in early October.  Comey responded, 
“I don’t think so unless, unless the way it was passed to me was with some, you 
don’t need to do anything.  We’re doing, we’re running it down or something.  
Something that pushed it down on my priority list.” 
When asked if he recalled this meeting between Coleman and Comey, Rybicki 
stated that he did not.  Bowdich told us that it is possible that he would have been 
at this meeting between Comey and Coleman, but he had no recollection of it.  
McCabe continued to be on travel and was not in Washington, D.C., on October 4. 
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IV. NYO Completes Processing of Weiner Laptop Around October 4 
As noted previously, the Weiner case agent told us that he noticed on 
September 26 or 27 that the software program that he was using on the Weiner 
laptop was having trouble processing the data on it.  The case agent told us that he 
reached out to a CART examiner for assistance and the CART examiner decided to 
process the laptop on the CART examiner’s workstation.  CART logs show that the 
CART examiner received the laptop on September 29 and imaged, or made an 
exact copy of, the laptop the same day.  The CART examiner told us that he began 
using FBI software programs to analyze and categorize the contents of the laptop 
the next day and that was completed by around October 4.  In total, there were 
approximately 675,000 emails on the laptop. 
The CART examiner told us once the processing was completed he conducted 
a spot check of the results to ensure everything had processed completely.  The 
CART examiner stated that the first file he clicked on was an image of a document 
marked “Sensitive But Unclassified” with the initials “HRC” written on it in a blue 
felt-tipped marker.  The CART examiner stated that he immediately ceased his 
examination and reported this to the case agent and the CART supervisor.  The 
case agent recalled the CART examiner showing him this document and told us that 
he commented, “We can’t be looking at this.” 
V. FBI Headquarters Inaction and Explanations for the Delay 
After October 4, we found no evidence that anyone associated with the 
Midyear investigation, including the entire leadership team at FBI Headquarters, 
took any action on the Weiner laptop issue until the week of October 24, and then 
did so only after SDNY raised concerns about the lack of action.  In this section, we 
detail the explanations given to us by FBI Headquarters and Midyear personnel 
about the reasons for this inaction. 
When we asked McCabe about this period from late September until late 
October and the lack of activity on the Weiner laptop, he stated: 
During that period in between, you know, I expected that we were 
making progress on it.  I probably met with some combination of the 
Midyear team every day of that month.  Near to every single day on a 
whole kind of range of Midyear-related issues.  And I would have 
expected that if they were having problems with that issue and not 
making progress on something that I had put on, on their radar as an 
important thing, that that would have come to my attention.  And it 
didn’t.  So I don’t, I can’t sit here and tell you with perfect clarity why 
it didn’t, whether they thought they had it under control but they 
didn’t, or it was being ignored and not given the attention it, it 
needed, but it, it didn’t come to me during that time. 
McCabe stated that he was “absolutely” disappointed that the team had not found 
out more information about what was on the Weiner laptop during this period.  
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McCabe added, “So to find out that we didn’t know the answers to any of those 
questions at the end of October was very concerning to me.” 
FBI Headquarters and Midyear personnel provided multiple explanations for 
the apparent inactivity on the Weiner laptop during this period.  Explanations 
included claims of delay by NYO in processing the Weiner laptop, a lack of specific 
information about what had been discovered on the laptop, a focus on the Russia 
investigation, the fact that the Weiner laptop was not considered a priority during 
this period, and legal impediments to reviewing the materials on the laptop.  We 
discuss each of these explanations below, recognizing that these explanations are 
interrelated and not mutually exclusive. 
A. Delays in Processing the Weiner Laptop 
Numerous witnesses cited delays in processing the Weiner laptop by NYO 
personnel as a primary reason for the apparent inaction by FBI Headquarters and 
Midyear personnel.  Strzok told us that, after the September 29 call, he understood 
that NYO was going to continue processing the laptop and then when they were 
“done with that, you know, call us back and let us know.”  FBI Attorney 1 also 
stated that the Midyear team was waiting on NYO to finish processing the laptop.  
When asked why it would take so long, FBI Attorney 1 stated that this “is not that 
long of a period of time for the Bureau to take to get something done.”  Rybicki told 
us that he learned after the fact that NYO had “technical issues” with the laptop, 
but he did not know “why it took a month.”  Comey recalled being told after the 
fact of a “technical delay” or “something about a glitch with getting a mirror image 
of the Weiner laptop,” which ultimately “had to be sent to the Operational 
Technology Division.” 
Page stated that NYO was “having trouble” processing the Weiner laptop and 
“that gap represents the time that New York is getting a workable image of the 
Weiner laptop because it is so large.”  She noted that there was “no particular 
urgency” on this issue, however.  Page explained, “[N]ot to say it’s not an 
important case, but it’s not, there’s no specific reason why like all hands on deck 
need to be helping New York CART sort of get this thing loaded or whatever else.”  
Later in the interview, Page again reiterated that NYO did not really know what they 
had “until they finally sort of have it up and imaged, and start doing their...forensic 
review.”  She continued: 
And the reality is, emails had been found lots of other places that 
ultimately weren’t worth pursuing lots of other times.  And so, until we 
understand that, that the volume of emails is not simply the volume 
with respect to Weiner, but that it represents Huma emails as well, 
you know, my understanding is, like, it’s just not super-significant yet. 
B. Prioritization of Weiner Laptop and Russia Investigation 
Priestap told us that the Weiner laptop was not his top priority at this time 
due to his involvement in the Russia investigation.  Priestap explained: 
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[I]f you’re wondering, you know, hey, this is a really big deal, and why 
aren’t you asking about it every, every minute of every day type thing, 
whatever, it was the, we went from this thing to the Russia thing.  And 
the Russia thing took them as much as my time as this thing before.  
And I don’t want to say distracted, but yeah.  My focus wasn’t on 
Midyear anymore, even with this new, yes, we’ve got to review it.  
Yes, it may contain evidence we didn’t know, but I’d be shocked if it’s 
evidence that’s going to change the outcome of the case because, 
again…aside from this, did we see enough information previously in 
which I felt confident that we had gotten to the bottom of the, of the 
issue?  I did.  And so, again, I would have been shocked if it was 
information that, and so the bottom line is, as important as this was, it 
was, some ways it was water under the bridge.  The issue of the day 
was what’s, what’s going to be done to possibly interfere with the 
election. 
In written comments provided to the OIG after reviewing the draft report, 
Priestap further explained: 
With respect to the criticism that the FBI should have placed a higher 
priority on obtaining legal authority to access and review the 
potentially relevant emails on [the Weiner] laptop, I maintain that we 
made the correct judgments.  In this regard, our work on [Midyear] 
was extensive and included the review of tens of thousands of emails, 
(over 7 million email fragments), and interviews of more than 70 
individuals.  We amassed and analyzed an enormous volume of 
information, reaching the recommendation in July 2016 that no 
prosecution be initiated.  I sincerely doubted that the emails identified 
on [the Weiner] laptop were likely to alter our informed view of the 
matter, and therefore did not prioritize the follow-on work over higher 
priority matters. 
Regarding these higher priority matters, Priestap stated that in late September 
2016 Comey had tasked the Counterintelligence Division with a multifaceted effort 
to protect the 2016 election from foreign interference.  This tasking included the 
implementation of “a national supply chain risk management effort to identify 
vulnerabilities in voting infrastructure,” engaging state election officials about 
potential threats, the investigation of “whether foreign adversaries were attempting 
to interfere with or improperly influence the” 2016 election, and the investigation of 
certain U.S. persons’ contacts with foreign adversaries.  Priestap told the OIG that, 
as the AD of the Counterintelligence Division, he was in charge of all of these 
efforts.  Priestap stated: 
In sum, I do not believe that the Bureau made a conscious decision to 
specifically assign a lower priority to the review of [the Weiner] laptop, 
but rather—given the other extremely significant matters being 
handled by the Counterintelligence Division and the time typically 
associated with obtaining legal authority and processing data—it was 
not viewed as a mission critical activity.  My team was prepared to 
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pursue this matter in the normal course, recognizing that it might not 
be completed until after the presidential election.168 
Strzok echoed this notion that the Weiner laptop was not initially his highest 
priority.  He stated: 
This is just, you know a lead that likely is going to result in some 
investigation, maybe some data we’re going to have to review, you 
know, January, February 2017, whenever it gets done.  In my 
experience, it is not unusual at all for processing to crap out and have 
to get restarted, or to have problems with certain types of media....  
This isn’t a, a ticking terrorist bomb.  This is a, you know, again, 
despite the high-profile nature of the client, a, and a very serious case, 
something where it goes in the queue and gets prioritized and they’re 
going through it.  So, if you were to ask me, you know, were there 
alarm bells going off in my head on October 15th that we haven’t 
heard back?  No, absolutely not.  I didn’t expect, it would not have 
surprised me to have heard back in early-November or to have heard 
back in early-December. 
Strzok explained that he had no crystal ball that could have foreseen the events 
that ultimately occurred in late October and he thought it “a misplaced assumption 
and belief that there should have been some sense of urgency after September 
29th, and we should have reprioritized everything we were doing to go after this.  
We did not know what was there.”  Strzok also cited his assignment to the Russia 
investigation as an explanation for why the Weiner laptop was not seen as his top 
priority.  He stated: 
We were consumed by these ever-increasing allegations of [Russian] 
contacts and coordination and trying to get operations up, and 
following people....  Doing a lot of stuff that was extraordinarily 
consuming and concerning.  So this pops up, and it’s like...another 
thing to worry about.  And it’s important, and we need to do it.  Okay, 
get it handled.  Come back to us, and then back to this, you know, is 
the government of Russia trying to get somebody elected here in the 
United States?” 
Likewise, Page stated that she and other members of the Midyear team were 
“super-focused” on the Russia investigation at this point. 
We also asked Comey whether the fact that key members of the Midyear 
team, including Strzok, were also assigned to the Russia investigation contributed 
to the delay in reviewing the Weiner laptop.  Comey told us that he remembered 
                                       
168  Priestap further explained his thought process at the time, noting that he considered the 
Weiner laptop to be an important issue when first informed about it on September 28 and made sure 
it received his immediate attention.  However, Priestap told us that once he was informed of potential 
legal and technical issues regarding the laptop, he believed from past experience that those issues 
would take time to resolve and therefore expected no immediate update. 
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being told that the team assigned to the Russia investigation was “overwhelmed.”  
Comey continued: 
It was Russia, Russia, Russia all the time....  Well not just Russia, 
Russia, Russia.  [It was also] Midyear Congress, Midyear Congress –
because they had, somebody had to review the documents that were 
going up to Congress and there was a constant demand for documents 
and briefings on Midyear and Russia at the same time. 
We asked Comey if, in retrospect, the team should have been bigger.  Comey 
responded, “Yeah maybe, yeah....  I think that’s a reasonable question to ask and 
I’m sure in hindsight I needed another Strzok and maybe I needed two teams, and 
you always have in the Bureau, the challenge is the talent is not necessarily that 
deep when it comes to counterintelligence matters, people who can work this stuff.” 
C. Lack of Specific Information 
We were also told that FBI Headquarters and Midyear personnel were waiting 
on NYO to provide more specific information about what was on the Weiner laptop.  
FBI Attorney 1 explained: 
And you also have to remember too, like, throughout this whole 
investigation, we would randomly occasionally get someone that said, 
oh, I know where all the emails are.  So...this was more certain than 
that.  But it wasn’t, it wasn’t like, oh, I think we have the smoking gun 
on this laptop.  We better hurry up and make sure we get it processed.  
It was like let’s see what the process turns out to be.  There may not 
be that much, you know, it may just be duplicative of what we already 
have. 
When asked if she was receiving updates during this period, FBI Attorney 1 stated 
that she was not and did not know if anyone else was getting updates either.  FBI 
Attorney 1’s supervisor, Anderson, also told us that her understanding was that 
NYO was processing the materials and trying to figure out what they had during this 
time period. 
Strzok discussed this issue of a lack of information as well, stating that only 
when NYO reported “the scope and content” of what was on the laptop did it 
become a significant development.  Specifically, Strzok cited the facts that the 
Weiner laptop contained “a variety of backups from Huma’s devices,” it contained 
information she forwarded to Weiner, and, most importantly, had BlackBerry 
backups from “the missing three months.”169 
                                       
169  As noted in Chapter Five, the 30,490 emails provided by Clinton’s attorneys contained no 
emails sent or received by Clinton during the first two months of her tenure, January 21, 2009, 
through March 18, 2009, and the FBI investigative team was unable to locate the BlackBerry device 
she used during that time, although they were able to obtain some of the BlackBerry emails from 
other sources.  Witnesses, including former Director Comey, told us that they believed these missing 
emails could contain important evidence regarding Clinton’s intent in setting up a private email server. 
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The Midyear SSA told us that he believed NYO was able to provide more 
information on the volume of emails on the laptop later in October.  When asked if 
there was any additional information provided beyond volume, the Midyear SSA 
stated that there may have been “something more specific too” that he could not 
recall at the time of our interview.  The Midyear SSA told us: 
I remember walking away the first time thinking that...we probably 
had enough [probable cause to get a search warrant to review the 
emails].  But I understood why that discussion wanted to be made, is 
that, you know, well let’s see what happens....  [T]hat lag in time was 
as a result of allowing [the Weiner] investigation to proceed.  And then 
they contacted us when they felt that they had a lot more information 
that needed to be addressed by, by our team.  And then we proceeded 
with moving forward. 
The Midyear SSA stated that he did not seek an update from NYO in this period 
because it was “an [FBI] OGC [and] SDNY type thing.” 
D. Questions About Legal Authority 
Another reason cited by McCabe, Baker, and Priestap for the inactivity during 
this period was the need to resolve questions about the legal authority.  Priestap 
explained: 
[W]hat is our legal basis by which we can conduct the review?  And 
again...it’s not the first time, and...I run into this all the, all the time 
with trying to cross the T’s, dot the I’s on the legal end before we take 
activity.  Now, again, why it took so long, should it have took so long?  
I don’t know.  But I saw it as a, let’s, we don’t have, I don’t have 
knowledge that we have the legal authority to say go. 
Baker stated that he thought the Midyear team was “struggling with trying to figure 
out” a way to access the material on the Weiner laptop since “it was beyond the 
scope of the original search warrant.”  Baker told us he thought that the FBI and 
SDNY “were continuing to work on” overcoming these “legal complications.” 
FBI Attorney 1 did not share this view.  She told us that “it had already been 
concluded” on the September 29 call that the Midyear team would not be able to 
use the Weiner search warrant to review the laptop and, instead, the Midyear team 
“would need additional process or consent if we needed to do anything.”  The 
Midyear SSA agreed with this assessment, stating that there was a “consensus” on 
the September 29 call that the only way they would be able to review the Clinton 
emails on the Weiner laptop was with a new warrant. 
E. Strzok Timeline 
We asked Strzok about a document he subsequently created entitled “Weiner 
timeline” and included in an email he sent to Page on November 3, 2016.  The 
document contained the following entries for the period from September 26 through 
October 21: 
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09/26/2016  – NYO obtains [search warrant] for Weiner laptop 
09/28/2016  – ADIC NY notes potential MYE-related material following 
weekly SAC SVTC 
09/29/2016  – Conference call between NYO and MYE team 
  – NYO notes processing is crashing system and not 
complete, but during troubleshooting observes material 
potentially related to MYE (clintonemail.com and 
state.gov domains) seen during course of review 
   – No numbers/volume available 
– Discussion about ability to search for material 
determines such activity would be outside scope of 
warrant 
– Request to NYO to gather basic facts (numbers, 
domains, etc) based on their review 
Approx. 10/19/2016 – NYO completes carving 
– NYO observes [Sensitive But Unclassified] 
attachment 
10/21/2016  – 6:00 PM DOJ/NSD advised MYE leadership that SDNY 
informed them of MYE-related media on Weiner media 
We asked Strzok why he created this timeline on November 3, which was 
days after Comey sent his letter to Congress informing it that the FBI had 
discovered additional emails.  Strzok stated: 
Because I think the, the question was, okay, here we are.  We’re 
having to reopen and it’s right in the middle of, you know, the last 
week of the election.  You know, potentially we would need to do this.  
And that people are going to come afterwards and say either you 
delayed to help Hillary, you delayed to help Trump, whatever it was.  
Let’s, while it is fresh or as fresh as possible, let’s kind of document 
out.  And I, you know, again, I don’t know if the political hue and cry 
had already begun of, you know, conspiracy.  But I think the sense 
was, okay, let’s kind of write down and while it’s still sort of fresh, 
yeah. 
Strzok told us he could not remember if he was directed to put together the 
timeline.  He stated that he sent the timeline to Page for “her and Baker” and FBI 
executive leadership “consumption.” 
As for the contents of the timeline, we asked Strzok about the September 29 
entry of “[n]o numbers/volume available” and how that squared with his September 
28 text message to Page that stated there were “hundreds of thousands of emails” 
on the laptop.  Strzok replied: 
Because this is specific to the Huma Midyear stuff.  I think when they 
gave that volume, and I don’t know what, again, I wasn’t there, my 
302 
read of that text is that New York said they had in total hundreds of 
thousands of emails, Anthony’s, Huma’s, who-knows-who.  But that 
the sum total were hundreds of thousands.  And within that, there was 
more than the de minimis amount of Huma stuff.  And that is a result 
of the conference call, they were able to say we don’t know how many 
we have. 
We also asked Strzok about the October 19 entry and why he wrote that it was 
approximately October 19 when NYO had completed “carving” the laptop.170  As 
noted in Section 9.IV above, processing of the Weiner laptop was, in fact, 
completed by NYO around October 4 and the Sensitive But Unclassified attachment 
was observed by NYO around the same time.  Strzok stated, “It was roughly that 
time table.  And I don’t know how I arrived at the 19th, if there was a notation that 
clearly indicated that on or prior to that date, something had come in.” 
We asked Strzok to respond to the accusation that this inaction on the 
Weiner laptop was a politically motivated attempt to bury information that could 
negatively impact the chances of Hillary Clinton in the election.  Strzok responded: 
No, I’d say quite the opposite....  I think every act was taken with an 
objective reason to say, okay, here is why we did it, and why it was 
prioritized the way it was....  [The Midyear SSA] and [FBI Attorney 1] 
were the ones engaging with New York.  You had agents and AUSAs up 
in New York who were involved in pursuing it, that ultimately, you 
know, we sat there, and we decided when we found out what was 
there that we needed to get the case and reopen the case.  And if you 
want to pitch in the conspiracy perspective, everything we pushed to 
do, the Clinton side is going to say, what you did absolutely killed my 
chances at the election.  So, you know, pick it.  Which is your 
conspiracy?...  [I]t angers me because there is not, if there were bias, 
and there is not bias, if there were bias...it didn’t result in actions 
which would be indicative of bias. 
VI. Concerns of Weiner Case Agent and Conversation with SDNY AUSAs 
on October 19 
As early as October 3, the case agent assigned to the Weiner investigation 
expressed concern that no action appeared to be occurring with regard to the 
Clinton emails discovered on the Weiner laptop.  He began documenting these 
concerns in contemporaneous emails and also discussed his concerns with his 
supervisor and the SDNY AUSAs assigned to the Weiner investigation.  In an 
October 3 email, the case agent stated that a “significant number” of the emails on 
the Weiner laptop “appeared to be between Huma Abedin and Hillary Clinton (the 
latter who appears to have used a number of different email addresses).”  The case 
agent also noted in that email that he was “obviously” unable to “review any emails 
                                       
170  “Data carving” is typically the last phase of processing an electronic device and involves 
recovering files and data that have been either deleted or no longer contain complete metadata. 
303 
to which Anthony Weiner is not a party (such as emails between Ms. Abedin and 
Mrs. Clinton).”  The October 3 email was serialized and inserted into the Weiner 
case file in Sentinel, the FBI’s case management system, on October 5. 
The case agent told the OIG that no one had contacted him about the laptop 
and, as the case agent, “the only person who has the authority to release that 
laptop’s image is me.”  The case agent explained his growing concern by stating: 
The crickets I was hearing was really making me uncomfortable 
because something was going to come crashing down....  And my 
understanding, which is uninformed because...I didn’t work the Hillary 
Clinton matter.  My understanding at the time was I am telling you 
people I have private Hillary Clinton emails, number one, and 
BlackBerry messages, number two.  I’m telling you that we have 
potentially 10 times the volume that Director Comey said we had on 
the record.  Why isn’t anybody here?  Like, if I’m the supervisor of any 
CI squad in Seattle and I hear about this, I’m getting on with 
headquarters and saying, hey, some agent working child porn here 
may have [Hillary Clinton] emails.  Get your ass on the phone, call 
[the case agent], and get a copy of that drive, because that’s how you 
should be.  And that nobody reached out to me within, like, that night, 
I still to this day I don’t understand what the hell went wrong. 
The case agent told us that he scheduled a meeting on October 19 with the 
two SDNY AUSAs assigned to the Weiner investigation because he felt like he had 
nowhere else to turn.  He described AUSA 1, the lead prosecutor, as a friend.  He 
added, “I felt like if I went there and [AUSA 1] got the attention of Preet Bharara, 
maybe they’d kick some of these lazy FBI folks in the butt and get them moving.”  
The case agent stated that he told the AUSAs in detail about the emails he had 
seen between Clinton and Abedin.  He continued: 
And I told her, I’m a little scared here.  I don’t know what to do 
because I’m not political.  Like I don’t care who wins this election, but 
this is going to make us look really, really horrible.  And it could ruin 
this case, too.  And...I said the thing that also bothers me is that 
Comey’s testimony is inaccurate.  And as a big admirer of the guy, and 
I think he’s a straight shooter, I wanted to, I felt like he needed to 
know, like, we got this.  And I didn’t know if he did. 
The AUSAs both told us that the case agent appeared to be very stressed and 
worried that somehow he would be blamed in the end if no action was taken.  AUSA 
1 stated that the case agent worried that the information relating to the Clinton 
emails had not been provided to the right people and AUSA 2 observed that the 
case agent “was getting, for lack of a better word, paranoid that, like, somebody 
was not acting appropriately, somebody was trying to bury this.” 
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VII. SDNY Response to Weiner Case Agent Concerns 
A. SDNY Internal Discussions on October 20 
On October 20, 2016, the AUSAs met with their supervisors at SDNY and 
informed them of their conversation with the Weiner case agent.  The AUSAs stated 
that they told their supervisors the substantive information reported by the case 
agent, the case agent’s concerns that no one at the FBI had expressed interest in 
this information, and their concern that the case agent was stressed out and might 
act out in some way. 
SDNY Deputy U.S. Attorney Joon Kim said that after being briefed on this 
issue and discussing it with U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara and other supervisors in 
the office, SDNY leadership made the decision to call the Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General (ODAG) about this information.  As Kim told us, “I remember our 
discussing it and saying, look, it’s not really our business.  And, but maybe to be 
safe we should reach out and call.” 
Bharara also recalled being briefed on the case agent’s concerns and being 
told that the discovery of the Clinton emails had been “reported up the chain of 
command at the FBI.”  He stated that SDNY recognized that they had no 
involvement in the Clinton email server case and “wanted to stay in our lane.”  
Nevertheless, given the concerns and “agitation” of the case agent, Bharara said 
that he and the SDNY leadership team decided to contact ODAG in case “something 
had fallen through the cracks.” 
B. SDNY Calls to ODAG and NSD on October 21 
The following day, October 21, Kim reached out to ODAG about this issue.  
Kim told us that he was unsure about whom to call because SDNY did not know 
which office had handled the Clinton email server investigation.  Kim called the 
Associate Deputy Attorney General (ADAG) who was SDNY’s primary point of 
contact in ODAG.  Kim stated that the ADAG told him to contact DAAG George 
Toscas in NSD.  The ADAG told us that she vaguely recalled a conversation where 
she put Kim and Toscas in touch with each other to discuss an issue arising out of 
the Weiner case.  The ADAG stated that PADAG Axelrod “wanted me to make sure 
that SDNY and George from NSD connected directly so that whatever it was that 
SDNY was doing would be coordinated with whatever it was NSD was doing.”  The 
ADAG told us that Axelrod “check[ed] in with me a number of times” to ensure Kim 
and Toscas had connected.  At 7:08 p.m. that evening, the ADAG emailed Axelrod, 
“One last FYI—I also spoke with George [Toscas] earlier to give heads up and then 
to Joon [Kim].  They have since connected and will take it from there.”  Axelrod 
recalled that SDNY contacted the ADAG about the presence of Clinton emails on the 
Weiner laptop.  Axelrod told us that this call “set off alarm bells” and he wanted to 
make sure the information was immediately provided to Toscas and NSD.171 
                                       
171  Axelrod also recalled hearing about the Weiner laptop issue at some point prior to this call.  
He told us that he thought SDNY had called the ADAG at an earlier point to inform ODAG that some of 
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Kim did not recall the specifics of his conversation with Toscas, but stated 
that he generally gave Toscas an overview of the Weiner investigation and told him 
he wanted to make sure those connected with the Clinton email server investigation 
were aware of the information the case agent had found.  Toscas told us the 
information provided by Kim was much more substantive than the prior information 
that NSD had received from McCabe on October 3.  Toscas described his call with 
Kim as “the first time that I actually got information like something you could 
actually think through and analyze.”  Toscas’s notes from the call stated: 
10/21/16, 3:50 p.m.:  Anthony Weiner.  N.C. 15 yr-old  asked her to 
send video/photos.  Got his laptop/phone etc. + got SW for child 
exploitation  FBI following normal protocol (to/from images).  
Although its his laptop, his wife apparently used it.  100K’s of her 
emails some to/from HRC. 
Told [NSD Prosecutor 1] to tell Pete [Strzok] + DHL [Laufman] 10/21 
4:05 p.m. 
According to Toscas, his notes represent in essence the entirety of the information 
he received from Kim.  In our interview, Toscas specifically commented on the fact 
that he was told by Kim that there were hundreds of thousands of Abedin’s emails 
on this laptop, some of which were to and from Clinton.  Toscas stated that he 
immediately called NSD Prosecutor 1 and told him to contact Strzok and Laufman.  
Toscas explained that he meant Prosecutor 1 should tell them “that there’s this 
issue and we’re going to be getting together to talk…and get more information on 
it.” 
At 4:04 p.m. on October 21, Kim emailed the SDNY prosecutors and 
leadership to inform them that he had just spoken with Toscas.  AUSA 2 then called 
the Weiner case agent to let him know that SDNY had raised this issue with Main 
Justice.  The case agent emailed AUSA 2 that evening, “Thanks for the call.  I feel 
much better about it.  Not to sound sappy, but I appreciate you guys understanding 
how uneasy I felt about the situation.”  The case agent also emailed his SSA and 
another agent at 5:51 p.m.: 
Just got a call from SDNY.  [The AUSAs] understood my concerns 
yesterday about the nature of the stuff I have on Weiner computer (ie, 
that I will be scapegoated if it comes out that the FBI had this stuff).  
They appreciated that I was in a tight spot and spoke to their chain of 
command who agreed. 
So they called down to DOJ, who will apparently now make a decision 
on what to do.  This is a good thing according to SDNY because it 
means we (FBI C20) went above and beyond to make known that the 
material was of potential concern.  It is out of my hands now so now I 
know I did the right thing by speaking up. 
                                       
Abedin’s emails had been found on Weiner’s laptop.  Axelrod stated that this information “didn’t 
trigger any alarm bells.” 
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SDNY probably will talk to crim management at NYO to inform them 
that DOJ is aware and handling.  I feel much better about this now.  
But I wanted you to have a heads up in case [the ASAC] called you. 
At 4:41 p.m. that same day, Kim called the A/SAC to inform him of the call 
to ODAG.  The A/SAC’s notes stated, “Joon Kim – Weiner – looking at the computer 
– ton of emails related to Huma that we are not looking at.  SDNY reached out to 
DOJ and advised there are a lot of emails between Huma and Hillary and others but 
that we are doing nothing and have no basis to do that.”  The A/SAC told us that he 
was “glad” that Kim had made the call, explaining that “I’ve been an agent for 21 
years, so I knew that this was something I would try to get probable cause for.” 
C. SDNY Memo on October 21 
On October 21, the SDNY Chief Counsel began drafting a memorandum 
summarizing SDNY’s involvement with the issue of the Clinton emails on the Weiner 
laptop.  Bharara told us that he instructed the Chief Counsel to write the 
memorandum in order to “put down, precisely, and with a hundred percent 
accuracy, you know, what we did, what the timeline was, and why we did what we 
did.”  Bharara told us that he decided to take this step because “things seemed 
unusual to” him and he anticipated that SDNY would be asked questions about this 
in the future.  Kim provided a similar explanation for the memorandum, stating that 
SDNY leadership “concluded at this point that we should have something in the 
document, either email or memo, that laid out the chronology as, to make sure that 
if people did ask that, you know, we had it, we had it down on paper.” 
The memorandum was dated October 21, 2016, and the Chief Counsel 
emailed the memorandum to the relevant SDNY personnel on October 24.  We have 
excerpted the portions most relevant to our review below: 
...[The Weiner search warrant] did not provide authority to search for 
evidence of any other crimes [beyond the child exploitation offenses 
detailed above].  We advised the [Weiner] agents of the proper scope 
of the search warrant and they understood the scope. 
...[The case agent’s] search of emails stored on the computer 
apparently recovered in excess of 700,000 emails.  In order to stay 
within the scope authorized by the warrant, [the case agent] sorted 
the emails recovered by sender.  In performing that sort, we 
understand that header information for all of the emails was visible, 
and he noticed a very large number of emails that appear to be 
between Huma Abedin and Hillary Clinton.  [The case agent] believes 
that, although Weiner’s counsel provided the computer to us, the 
computer was used by both Anthony Weiner and Huma Abedin. 
We understand that the FBI agents in our case will not be reviewing 
the contents of the Abedin-Clinton emails because it would not be 
appropriate to do so under the search warrant issued in support of our 
child exploitation investigation.  The agents, however, have reported 
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the existence of the emails up their chain of command at FBI to enable 
other agents to take any action that is appropriate for their cases. 
Because we understand that another component of DOJ may be 
conducting an investigation related to Hillary Clinton’s emails, we have 
advised ODAG and George Toscas at NSD, who we’re told is the most 
senior career prosecutor involved in investigations of Hillary Clinton 
and the Clinton Foundation, of the existence of the emails so that they 
can take any steps that may be appropriate in their investigation, 
including, if proper, making an application for the content of 
potentially hundreds of thousands of emails that are outside the scope 
of the warrant in our case, which authorized a search only for evidence 
of child exploitation crimes.172 
VIII. DOJ and FBI Response to SDNY Notification 
As mentioned above, Toscas called Prosecutor 1 on October 21, after his 
phone call with Kim, and told Prosecutor 1 to notify Strzok and Laufman about the 
issue.  Laufman stated that he could not recall the date he first heard about the 
Weiner laptop, but told us that he recalled Prosecutor 1 coming into his office and 
telling him that he had gotten a call from SDNY.  Laufman said Prosecutor 1 stated 
that the prosecutors on the Weiner case told him that material on Weiner’s laptop 
“appeared on its face potentially to relate to the Clinton investigation.” 
As discussed previously, until Prosecutor 1 called Strzok on October 21 to see 
if he was aware of the Weiner laptop issue, no one from the FBI had spoken with 
anyone from the Midyear prosecution team to inform them about the issue.  The 
only contact that occurred prior to that regarding the laptop was the call previously 
described from McCabe to McCord on October 3. 
A. Prosecutor 1-Strzok Call on October 21 
At 5:41 p.m. on October 21, Prosecutor 1 sent an email to Strzok entitled 
“Call.”  The email stated, “Pete, George Toscas called me and wanted me to pass 
along some information to you as soon as I could.  Let me know if you have a 
couple of minutes to talk.  I left a message on your cell.  I am about to head out 
and can be reached on my cell.  Thanks.” 
Strzok and Page exchanged the following text messages on the evening of 
October 21.  The sender of each text message is identified after the timestamp. 
6:49 p.m., Strzok:  “Also, work-wise, [Prosecutor 1] called b/c Toscas 
now aware NY has hrc-huma emails via weiner invest.  Told he [sic] 
we knew.  Wanted to know our thoughts on getting it.  George 
                                       
172  After reviewing a draft of the report, Toscas asked that the OIG clarify that he was not 
involved in the investigation of the Clinton Foundation. 
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[Toscas] wanted to ensure info got to Andy [McCabe].  I told Bill 
[Priestap].” 
6:55 p.m., Page:  “I’m sure Andy is aware, but whatever.” 
Strzok told us he had a conversation at some point with either Toscas or Prosecutor 
1, and thought that the conversation with Prosecutor 1 referenced in the text 
message was likely that conversation.  Strzok told us that he had not talked about 
the Weiner laptop issue with Prosecutor 1 previously and he believed this was his 
first discussion with the Midyear prosecutors about the Weiner laptop.  Strzok 
stated that Prosecutor 1 asked if Strzok was aware of “the potential Huma stuff up 
in the Weiner laptop in New York.”  Strzok said that when he responded 
affirmatively, Prosecutor 1 asked, “And, you know, what are you doing about it, 
and, you know, kind of what do we need to do, and kind of the path forward on it.”  
Page told us that she did not remember any of the specifics about this text 
message. 
Prosecutor 1 stated that Toscas told him “the basic facts” about the Weiner 
laptop and told Prosecutor 1 to call Strzok.  Prosecutor 1 stated that he did not 
“recall getting much detail” from Toscas.  Prosecutor 1 told us that the October 21 
phone call from Toscas was the first time he was informed of the potential presence 
of Midyear material on the Weiner laptop. 
B. FBI Leadership Knowledge of SDNY Notification on October 21 
We asked other FBI officials about the call by SDNY to ODAG.  McCabe, 
Priestap, and Rybicki told us that they were unaware of the call.  McCabe also said 
he did not recall any discussion with Page about the Weiner laptop at this time.  We 
asked McCabe if he we was aware of the fact that the Weiner case agent had 
expressed concern that nothing was happening with the Clinton emails discovered 
on the Weiner laptop.  McCabe stated that he was not aware of that and told us he 
found it “disturbing.” 
Comey did not recall being briefed about either the SDNY call to ODAG or 
NSD contacting the FBI about the Weiner laptop issue.  Comey told us, though, that 
the fact of these communications is not something that would necessarily need to 
be briefed to the Director.  We asked Comey—looking only at the Strzok-Page text 
messages excerpted above—if he found it concerning that McCabe, Priestap, 
Strzok, Page, Toscas, and Prosecutor 1 were all apparently aware of the presence 
of “hrc-huma emails” on the Weiner laptop by October 21 and no one bothered to 
inform him.  Comey replied: 
[T]he fact that who these people are doesn’t matter, but if there’s 
something that I found hugely significant on the 27th, if I was in a 
position to know that before then, then I should have been informed 
earlier.  And like I said, honest to God I can’t remember being 
informed before that. 
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C. Toscas Asks McCabe About Weiner Laptop on October 24173 
McCabe told the OIG about a passing interaction with Toscas after a morning 
Attorney General briefing that he had “towards the end of October.”  McCabe 
stated: 
I wouldn’t even characterize it as a discussion, but a comment, I think, 
that I think that George Toscas mentioned to me on the tail end of a 
morning AG brief, like hey, whatever, whatever happened to that thing 
with the laptop in New York or whatever.  And I remember thinking, 
like, I got to, oh, I don’t know.  Let me find out.  I’ve got to follow up 
on that. 
McCabe also stated: 
I think he thought, like...you should ask about this.  You should take a 
look at this thing.  Like, or what, what are you guys thinking you want 
to do with this kind of thing was, was how he asked about it.  And so 
he was clearly bringing it to my attention because he wanted to make 
sure that I was tracking it, and weighing in on it. 
McCabe stated that this interaction with Toscas caused him to follow up with 
the team on the Weiner laptop issue and also to call Mary McCord at NSD.  McCabe 
stated that all of this occurred “right around the same time” and “maybe even the 
same day.”  He stated that “this all is what compels me to talk to the Director and 
to tell him that we need to have a meeting about this.”  We discuss McCabe’s call to 
McCord and his conversation with Comey in more detail below. 
McCabe noted during our interview that briefings for the Attorney General 
were typically held three times a week on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.  
McCabe’s calendar contained entries for an “AG/OGA Brief” at 9.a.m. on both 
Monday, October 24 and Wednesday, October 26.  As noted above, Kim’s call to 
Toscas occurred in the afternoon of Friday, October 21, and therefore after the 
usual time for the morning AG briefing.  Also, as noted below, McCabe spoke to 
McCord on Tuesday, October 25.  Based on this timing and McCabe’s testimony that 
he spoke with Toscas prior to calling McCord, we believe the conversation with 
Toscas occurred on Monday, October 24.174 
Toscas described this interaction as “just a passing comment at the end of 
our [Attorney General] briefing.”  Toscas stated that either he or someone else 
                                       
173  The day before, Sunday, October 23, the Wall Street Journal published online its story 
about McCabe’s wife and her prior run for elective office in Virginia in 2015, including donations to her 
campaign by entities connected to then Governor McAuliffe.  The story raised questions about 
McCabe’s participation in Clinton-related investigations, which we discuss in detail in Chapter Thirteen. 
174  According to both Comey and McCabe’s Outlook calendars, they met at 9:30 a.m. on 
Monday, October 24 for a “Weekly Update.”  Rybicki was also scheduled to attend this meeting.  Their 
calendars showed that this meeting occurred immediately after the Monday morning briefing for the 
Attorney General where we believe Toscas and McCabe spoke.  Neither Comey nor McCabe said that 
they recalled any discussion of the Weiner laptop at this 9:30 a.m. meeting. 
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asked McCabe, “[H]ey, what’s happening...what’s the next step with respect to 
these, you know, what we learned about the stuff on the laptop.”  According to 
Toscas, McCabe stated that “the [Midyear] team was going to be either sent or had 
been sent or tasked with doing that.” 
Page also told us about this interaction between McCabe and Toscas.  She 
said that Toscas’s comment prompted McCabe to ask, “[H]ey, where are we on the 
Weiner stuff?”  Page described this a catalyst for the Midyear team to reengage on 
the issue of the Weiner laptop. 
Strzok’s contemporaneous notes from October 25 included a reference to this 
conversation between Toscas and McCabe on October 24.  The notes stated, 
“Toscas saw Andy: What’s the Bureau doing?  DD spoke w/Mary McCord.”  
(Emphasis in original).  We asked Strzok about these notes.  Strzok stated: 
[M]y recollection is that on this date, or whenever it was, at some 
point, Toscas runs into the Deputy and says, hey, there are, and I 
think this might have been, I heard there are potentially emails having 
to do with Clinton on the case up in New York.  What are you guys 
doing?  And then, so, and I don’t know if the, if the Deputy then spoke 
to Mary [McCord] about it or not.  But in any event, Toscas prompting 
Andy, then caused Andy to ask Bill [Priestap], hey, what’s going on?  
Where are we with regard to that process?  What are we, what do we 
need to do to look at it?  Are you engaged, essentially?  And get an 
update.  And so Bill then brings that back down and relays that to me. 
McCabe described himself as “concerned” when the Weiner laptop came to 
his attention again and said that he asked the team to explain why he had not been 
updated.  McCabe stated: 
Ultimately, when I got the feedback on the status, what I was told was 
that when the team went up the first time because of their legal 
limitations they, they really weren’t able to dig into the thing, to make 
an assessment of what was there.  And so therefore they couldn’t 
recommend to us what we should do with it.  And so that some, they 
had to go back to the district, either get a new search warrant or 
modify the previous search warrant, and that’s essentially what had 
taken place over the intervening time. 
McCabe said he would have expected the team to report this information to him 
directly rather than getting asked about it by Department personnel.  We asked 
McCabe who was responsible for following up on the Weiner laptop.  McCabe told us 
his understanding was that Strzok “was actually doing it” and Priestap would have 
had an oversight role.  In fact, as discussed previously, nobody on the FBI Midyear 
team had taken any steps to follow up on the laptop, including steps to obtain legal 
authority to review its contents, after they learned about it in late September. 
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D. Call between McCabe, Sweeney, and NYO Criminal SAC on 
October 24 
NYO ADIC Sweeney’s Outlook calendar contained the following entry for 
October 24:  “7:30 pm-7:45 pm Telcal w/DD and [the incoming NYO Criminal 
SAC].”  At the time of the call, the SAC was transitioning from an FBI job in 
Washington, D.C. to the Criminal SAC job in NYO.  Although not reflected in his 
calendar entry, Sweeney told us he was “pretty sure” that during this call he 
mentioned to McCabe that SDNY had called Main Justice about the Weiner matter.  
Sweeney stated that he did not recall McCabe’s response to this information. 
The SAC told us that Sweeney called him at some point during the week of 
October 24 while McCabe was giving him a ride home.  The SAC told us that he 
almost immediately put Sweeney on speaker phone and the three discussed several 
topics.  The SAC continued, “I don’t remember specifics.  But I do remember 
talking about, it did come up regarding the Weiner laptop.”  The SAC stated that he 
also believed that it “wasn’t a first impression,” meaning it did not seem like the 
first time Sweeney and McCabe had discussed the Weiner laptop. 
McCabe told us that he had no recollection of this phone call. 
IX. Reengagement of FBI Headquarters and the Midyear Team on the 
Weiner Laptop 
Beginning on October 25, both McCabe and the FBI Midyear team took a 
renewed interest in the issue of the Weiner laptop.  We discuss this renewed 
interest below, including conversations by McCabe with both the Department and 
Comey about the laptop, and reengagement by the Midyear team. 
A. McCabe Phone Call with McCord on October 25 
McCabe and McCord both told us that they discussed the Weiner laptop in a 
phone call in late October, though neither could recall the specific date.  McCord 
provided contemporaneous notes from the call, but they were undated.  Page also 
provided notes that referenced this call and her notes suggest the conversation 
occurred on October 25.  Given the timeline of other events, we believe October 25 
is the date on which this conversation occurred. 
McCabe stated that he wanted to update McCord on the status of the Weiner 
laptop and tell her that “we have a problem here that we need to deal with.”  
McCabe said he thought that he would have asked McCord about “scope of the 
warrant issues,” although he told us he did not remember many details about the 
conversation. 
Page’s contemporaneous notes from October 25 included McCord’s name and 
phone number, and stated:  “Anthony Weiner — ADIC NY – where are we on this?  
□ Not sure we can legally look at the material — Mary McCord needs to will find out 
where it is, status of the request.” 
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McCord stated that McCabe told her that NYO had found “many hundreds of 
thousands of emails from Huma Abedin to Secretary Clinton” on the laptop.  
According to McCord, McCabe stated that the Midyear team had planned to review, 
but SDNY told them to hold off while they examined the legality of doing that under 
the Weiner search warrant.  McCord’s notes from the phone call included entries 
that stated, “mid-year team to try to determine if duplicative or new” and “Spoke to 
Sweeney last night.”  McCord told us that the entry about Sweeney referred to a 
conversation McCabe stated that he had with Sweeney the prior night.  
McCord told us that she spoke with Toscas after the call with McCabe.  
According to McCord, Toscas stated that “SDNY had not shopped a search warrant 
on the laptop” and that the Midyear team was “getting together tomorrow to decide 
whether they want to search it and if they have probable cause to get a warrant.”  
Toscas told us that he did not recall a conversation between McCabe and McCord, 
but added that “it seems like something that would be in the ordinary course of 
what happened and would not stand out to me.”  We also showed McCord’s notes to 
Toscas.  Toscas commented that he did not know what the word “shopped” could 
mean in this context. 
B. Comey, McCabe, and Sweeney Discuss the Weiner Laptop on 
October 25 
On October 25 from 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., numerous FBI executives 
participated in one of Director Comey’s Quarterly Strategy Review sessions.  
According to Sweeney, who participated in the session by phone, at the conclusion 
of the discussions, McCabe asked him to stay on the line.  Sweeney told us that 
only he, McCabe, and Comey remained.175 
Sweeney’s notes from the October 25 discussion stated: 
4:15 to 4:30 p.m. – SVTC – Short discussion w/D/DD/ADD following 
main SVTC re: [Clinton Foundation] matter.  Follow-up following 
Strategy Briefing.  Brief update re: Weiner investigation; overt legal 
process and ability to get fed SW for computer.  DD – need to move 
forward and request action consistent with DOJ guidelines/election. 
Sweeney described the discussion: 
And then when the room clears, [McCabe] starts talking about the 
Weiner laptop....  [I]t goes into an explanation of who Weiner is, Huma 
Abedin’s husband.  She’s the chief of staff.  This is how these emails 
would likely be there.  And that gets into a conversation about 
authority, like we can’t look at this stuff, and we’re not doing. 
According to Sweeney, the conversation then turned to the NYO Clinton Foundation 
investigation. 
                                       
175  Sweeney told us that he did not recall Bowdich participating in this discussion despite the 
“ADD” notation in his calendar.  Bowdich likewise told us he did not recall this discussion. 
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Sweeney stated that he did not remember McCabe going into detail about 
what had been discovered.  For example, Sweeney said that he did not recall 
McCabe providing the total number of emails on the laptop, although Sweeney 
stated McCabe may have mentioned that a large volume of emails had been 
discovered.  According to Sweeney, McCabe stated that the Midyear team was 
“going to look at” the laptop and “get a search warrant.”  We asked Sweeney about 
Comey’s reaction to the discussion of the Weiner laptop.  Sweeney described 
Comey as “just absorbing the information.” 
That evening, according to Sweeney’s notes, he made calls to the NYO 
A/SAC, incoming NYO Criminal SAC, the Criminal Investigative Division AD, and 
Rybicki.  The notes also included an entry for a follow-up call to McCabe.  Each of 
these entries noted a discussion related to Sweeney’s earlier call with Comey and 
McCabe and the Clinton Foundation investigation.  The entries for the calls with 
Rybicki and the Criminal Investigative Division AD also mentioned the Weiner 
investigation. 
McCabe told us that he did not recall the discussion with Comey and 
Sweeney about the Weiner laptop and Clinton Foundation investigation.  With 
regard to the Weiner laptop discussion, McCabe stated, “[T]he only conversation I 
recollect with the Director, it probably took place on the 26th, was telling him you 
need to have a meeting on this tomorrow.  And as I said before, I remember that 
as being a one-on-one in his office.”  Comey said that he did not recall the 
discussion with McCabe and Sweeney about the Weiner laptop and Clinton 
Foundation. 
C. Midyear Team Emails on October 25 
Strzok and FBI Attorney 1 exchanged the followings emails on October 25.  
The subject line of the email was “Weiner Material” and the sender of each email is 
identified after the timestamp. 
2:55 p.m., Strzok:  “Sorry to bother you, DoJ called [McCabe] looking 
for status of our potential review of the huma-hrc emails.  Where/with 
who is that decision now?  What would we need to do to get a 
decision?  Thanks, Pete”. 
3:31 p.m., FBI Attorney 1:  “Is this the NY search warrant issue?  We 
were waiting for NYO to get back to us about the volume of Huma 
related emails on the devices.” 
3:35 p.m., Strzok:  “Yes.  I thought they said thousands?  But I have 
no idea who I heard that from.  Who at NYO is supposed to tell us?” 
3:38 p.m., FBI Attorney 1:  “I’miss [sic] not sure.  [The Midyear SSA] 
was working with the NYO SSA.  Thousands?  I hadn’t heard any 
numbers.” 
3:45 p.m., Strzok:  “OK I’ll ask [the Midyear SSA]”. 
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This exchange is immediately followed by an email exchange between Strzok, FBI 
Attorney 1, and the Midyear SSA entitled “Weiner emails.”  Again, the sender of 
each email is identified after the timestamp. 
3:47 p.m., Strzok:  “[H]ave you gotten an idea how many Huma-HRC 
emails are in the Weiner stuff?  Has popped up on people’s radars 
again”. 
4:34 p.m., Midyear SSA:  “NY did not have an estimate of the number 
of emails during our lync call on 9/29/2016.  I have not heard back 
from NY but can contact [the A/SAC] or ASAC...if needed for an 
update.  [FBI Attorney 1] – do you know the status of the SW and 
whether we can review the emails?” 
4:58 p.m., FBI Attorney 1:  “They never did send me the actual SW, 
but based on they’re [sic] representations, we won’t be able to review 
the emails without additional process or consent.” 
5:00 p.m., Strzok:  “Yes please contact NY for #s.  Thanks”. 
We asked Strzok, FBI Attorney 1, and the SSA about this exchange.  We told 
Strzok that this exchange suggested that nothing had happened since the 
September 29 call.  Strzok replied, “That’s right.  That’s my assumption I believe.  
Yep.”  FBI Attorney 1 stated that Strzok’s email was the first time she recalled 
hearing about the Weiner laptop issue since September 29.  The Midyear SSA 
agreed that this was probably his first contact about the issue since September 29. 
We asked Strzok whether any action would have occurred without the 
Department notification to McCabe.  Strzok stated: 
Probably not.  I mean, at some point, yes.  At some point, there would 
have been a, God, what happened to that follow-up....  [T]his caused 
that to happen.  There certainly would have been action.  Whether that 
was the 25th or November 8th, or whenever, I’m not sure when that 
would have occurred. 
However, Strzok emphasized that, at this point, there “was no indication on 
anybody’s radar that this was going to result in a notification to Congress.”  
Instead, Strzok stated that this was something the Midyear team would have to 
pursue, but he did not think it had any relevance to the election. 
The Midyear SSA told us that the reason this was “coming on people’s radar 
again” was because NYO “was saying, hey, once again, we’ve got this stuff.  What 
do you want us to do with it?”  The Midyear SSA stated that he reached out to NYO 
after receiving this email.  He recalled that “New York was somewhat frustrated.” 
X. Events Leading to the Decision to Seek a Search Warrant 
In this section, we discuss the meetings, discussions, and emails that 
preceded the October 27 briefing where Comey authorized the Midyear team to 
seek a search warrant for the Weiner laptop. 
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A. Midyear-NYO-SDNY Call on October 26 
At 2:30 p.m. on October 26, Midyear FBI personnel, Midyear prosecutors, 
NYO, and SDNY participated in a conference call about the Weiner laptop.  The 
highest ranking participants for each group on the call were Strzok, Toscas, the 
NYO A/SAC, and Kim. 
The NYO A/SAC, ASAC, SSA, and Weiner case agent all participated in the 
call.  This was the first time that the Weiner case agent had spoken directly with 
anyone associated with the Midyear investigation.  The case agent told us that he 
felt he was asked questions about information that he had already reported up the 
chain of command in September.  He stated: 
They were asking questions that I had already repeatedly answered in 
other calls.  In other words, people were asking what domains are you 
seeing?  How many emails are you seeing?  What do you think you’re 
seeing?  Who are they to, who are they from?  What are the domains?  
Oh, we have that domain?  What years?  Like, questions that we, I had 
been asked and either had answered preliminarily, and then we 
became uncomfortable legally searching for those answers.  But these 
were things that were known to me and had been made known above 
me for weeks. 
The Weiner case agent stated that “the only thing that was new” was that others on 
the call asked him to speculate on what he had seen.  According to the case agent, 
he stated, “Based on the number of emails, we could have every email that Huma 
and Hillary ever sent each other.  It’s possible, given the pure volume, it’s 
possible.” 
The NYO SSA described the call as “just basically discussions and information 
about...potentially what...was there, which we still didn’t know because we hadn’t 
looked at anything.”  The A/SAC thought the call was “matter-of-fact” and said it 
was the first time they were questioned by an NSD lawyer.  According to the 
A/SAC’s notes, NYO briefed that there were 675,000 emails on the laptop spanning 
a time period from 2006 to 2016, and stated that there “appears to be blackberry 
messages” on the laptop. 
The FBI’s Midyear team told us that they learned important new information 
on the call.176  Strzok described it as “the triggering event” and FBI Attorney 1 
stated that this was the “call where it was crystallized to me what was on the 
laptop.”  Strzok, FBI Attorney 1, and the Lead Analyst each cited two important 
pieces of information provided by NYO on the call.177  First, the presence of a large 
                                       
176  Except for the September 29 call with NYO, the Midyear case agents and analysts had 
limited knowledge of and involvement with the Weiner laptop until after Comey’s October 28 letter to 
Congress.  Our references to the “FBI Midyear team” in this Chapter generally refer to the leadership 
of the team, including Strzok, the Midyear SSA, and FBI Attorney 1. 
177  In comments provided to the OIG after reviewing a draft of this report, the Lead Analyst 
stated that he believed the October 26 call “was the first time [he] had ever personally heard the 
details related to the” Weiner laptop. 
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volume of emails on the Weiner laptop, particularly the potential for a large number 
of @clintonemail.com emails.  Second, the indication that the “missing emails,” 
meaning emails from Clinton’s first three months as Secretary of State, could be 
present on the laptop.  Strzok explained that this was the most important factor 
and he did not believe that the Midyear team knew about the potential presence of 
the BlackBerry data earlier.  Strzok added, “We need[ed] to try and get this 
because this is, potentially would alter, would change our understanding of the 
investigative conclusions that we arrived at in July.” 
We asked Strzok what he was specifically told about the BlackBerry backups 
and if he thought these might be Blackberry backups for Clinton.  Strzok stated: 
[I]t wasn’t Clinton’s backups.  It was the sense that it was Huma’s 
backups, and that Huma was frequently used, my recollection, as kind 
of a proxy for the, for Secretary Clinton.  So if people wanted to get 
something to Clinton, they’d email it to Huma and say please print for 
the Secretary.  And she would, she was a gatekeeper in that way.  
And, you know, would print it out and then take it to the Secretary. 
I don’t, my recollection is that we certainly saw the domain.  And that, 
the domain, because I think it was, and again, I’m, if I’m wrong 
forgive me.  Att.Blackberry.net I think was that domain they used for 
the first three months, and we saw that on there.  I don’t know if we 
had the granularity of detail to say Huma’s account on that domain in 
that time frame.  I don’t know if we had that granularity.  But I do 
know we had, I think, that domain in the span, coupling with the kind 
of overall volume that we thought there was a reasonable likelihood 
that, that it would be in there. 
When asked how this information differed from the information presented on 
the September 29 call, Strzok, who did not participate in the September 29 call, 
stated that his understanding from the Midyear SSA and FBI Attorney 1, who were 
on that call, was that NYO did not have “the numbers” or “the volume of domains.”  
Strzok said that he also thought that NYO had only provided preliminary data on 
the September call and “they weren’t quite sure what they had yet.”  Strzok added 
that he knew NYO “couldn’t review it because it was outside the scope of their 
warrant.” 
FBI Attorney 1 told us, “I don’t...even think they discussed any of that stuff 
[on the September 29 call].  They certainly said there was some clintonemail.com, 
but again, like I said, that we were finding, people had clintonemail.com emails all 
over the place.  There was nothing with this sort of certainty that this is what was 
on there.”  The Midyear SSA stated that NYO provided “numbers” on this call, which 
he believed had not been provided previously. 
Page told us that as a result of the conference call “we now understand that 
the Huma emails are of a volume that it could be meaningful and that there could 
be meaningfully new evidence that we have not previously seen in other materials 
we had reviewed.”  She added that the “volume of emails” coupled with the 
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presence of a “BlackBerry backup” were the two most important new facts that 
came out of this call.  Page’s notes from the call were entitled “Good news, in a bad 
news way (MYE).”  She explained this heading by stating: 
[M]y good news in a bad news way is a reflection of like, well, more 
evidence is always good news.  It might either change our decision or 
outcome or further substantiate the outcome we reached.  In a bad 
news way because, like, I cannot believe we are, we are here.  We are 
doing this again on October 26th.  Like, oh, my goodness. 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that the decision to obtain a search warrant was made 
either on the call or shortly after it.  FBI Attorney 1 noted that Toscas was on the 
call and “seemed to be on board” with the idea that the Midyear team needed to 
get the Weiner laptop.  FBI Attorney 1 added that she was “surprised” that the 
Department left the call “talking about getting a search warrant.”  She explained 
that she was surprised because it “definitely was...more aggressive than they had 
been before,” but thought this may have been due to “the time pressure.” 
Prosecutor 2 told us that this call was when she first learned about the 
Weiner laptop.  Prosecutor 2 stated that the prosecutors asked numerous questions 
to NYO and SDNY personnel “to try to figure out what they knew about the emails 
and, and about the devices, so we knew what the scope of like what we could look 
at.”  Toscas stated that the information he learned in late October about the Weiner 
laptop, including information provided on this call, was markedly different than 
what he had been told McCabe had informed NSD about in early October.  Toscas 
described the information provided earlier in October as “totally off base” and he 
told us that he attributed this discrepancy to a “garble,” or miscommunication. 
B. Briefing of McCabe on October 26 
Page told us that the team briefed McCabe about the information from the 
conference call on the evening of October 26.  Page stated that McCabe indicated 
that “we’re going to need to reopen.  This, this is significant.  Or we’re going to 
need to at least seek a search warrant to sort of look at this material.”  Page 
stated, “We informed the Deputy Director, and he says, yeah, we’ve got to get this 
in front of the Director tomorrow.  And so that gets scheduled for the next 
day...[to] tell him what we found and what the team thinks, which is certainly we 
need to go get a warrant for this information.”  On the morning of October 27, at 
6:10 a.m., Baker sent Page an email entitled “Follow up” and asked her if she had 
talked to McCabe yet and whether “[McCabe] talked to [Comey]?”  Page replied at 
6:19 a.m., stating, “Yes I did talk to Andy, but he did not connect with [Comey].  
Andy sent him an email this morning asking that he get a briefing from the MYE 
team.”  We describe McCabe’s email and the events of October 27 below. 
Strzok said that he thought that he and possibly the Lead Analyst and FBI 
Attorney 1 briefed McCabe after the conference call.  Strzok stated that he 
explained the scope of what NYO possessed, why that was important, and why the 
Midyear team thought they should review the material.  FBI Attorney 1 said that 
318 
she recalled briefing “the executives” about what they had learned on the 
conference call and the need to “look into this” using process. 
Priestap told us that he did not recall this briefing with McCabe, but stated 
that he would normally be present for such a briefing.  Priestap stated, “Very rarely 
would my team be there if I wasn’t there.” 
McCabe told us that he could not recall who informed him of the substance of 
the conference call with SDNY and NYO, but stated it would have been some 
combination of Strzok, Priestap, the Lead Analyst, Page, and FBI Attorney 1.  When 
asked what he was told, McCabe stated: 
The only thing I remember is like we had at that point confirmed that, 
yes, there is no doubt what appears to be relevant email for us on this 
laptop.  So the question then becomes like do we go full-bore into 
another round of exploitation along the lines of what we had already 
done in Midyear?  How do we handle this thing?  And then the 
implications of like notification and, and everything that they ended up 
struggling with the next day. 
McCabe said that he did not recall any mention of seeing domains or emails 
associated with a BlackBerry device.  We asked McCabe what was relayed that was 
not known in late September.  McCabe replied: 
I think they had looked a little bit deeper than just the tos and froms 
and could actually say, like, you know, I seem to remember in the kind 
of legally restricted view it was just kind of a snapshot having looking, 
you know, at stuff and then determined they couldn’t look further.  
That’s how they had a sense of what was there.  Now, at this point, we 
had done some sort of more extensive review to say, okay, yeah, it’s 
like this number between these people, that sort of thing. 
McCabe stated that he could not remember who had conducted this “more 
extensive review” and “was surprised” to learn that no one from the Midyear team 
reviewed the laptop until October 30.  McCabe told us that he assumed someone on 
the Midyear team had reviewed the laptop “[b]ecause that’s what I initially asked 
for.”  We asked McCabe if the fact that no one from Midyear had reviewed the 
laptop was an important fact that the team should have been brought to his 
attention.  McCabe stated: 
I know that I asked them to go up there and look at it.  And they had 
a...SVTC with the team I think the following day.  I think at some point 
I learned that they had a SVTC early on in this.  In this process rather 
than traveling up there.  But I certainly expected that our folks would 
be in New York looking at what we had on that laptop. 
We asked McCabe why this issue was coming back to the forefront on 
October 26 instead of sometime earlier.  McCabe stated that it was “[b]ecause I 
started asking questions about it probably.”  We also asked McCabe what would 
have occurred if SDNY had not contacted ODAG and Toscas had not mentioned the 
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Weiner laptop to McCabe after the morning briefing.  McCabe said he could not 
speculate on what would have happened if the facts were different, but stated that 
“it certainly is a good thing that George Toscas brought it to my attention.”  
McCabe added, “Is it something that I should have been getting briefed upon as the 
month went on?  Absolutely.”  McCabe told us that he had no idea why the topic of 
the Weiner laptop “wasn’t making its way into the agenda for those regular 
meetings and interactions with [Page], [Strzok], Steinbach, the Director.” 
We also asked Baker why the Weiner laptop issue reemerged at this time.  
Baker stated: 
[M]y understanding, it was simply that senior managers thought that 
they had delegated this to the right people and that the issue was 
being worked.  And that they would come back with a proposal about 
what to do, and that we took the, took our collective eyes off the ball, 
didn’t pay attention to it, and when it came back and we were 
informed that it was not resolved, then it became a crisis.  That’s the 
best I can reconstruct for you. 
C. McCabe Recollection of Discussion with Comey on October 26 
McCabe told us that he remembered mentioning the issue of the Weiner 
laptop to Comey twice.  The first, as we described previously, McCabe stated was 
shortly after he learned of the laptop in late September.  The second time McCabe 
stated was toward “the end of October”—McCabe estimated it was on October 26—
when he sat down with Comey “one-on-one” in Comey’s office.  McCabe stated: 
I told him we need to have a meeting on this because now we have 
some, you know, some clarity on, on what’s in this laptop.  I 
specifically remember telling him, this is about that laptop we 
discussed a couple of weeks ago.  I don’t know if he remembered it. 
McCabe stated that he did not remember Comey asking him about the Weiner 
laptop during the period between the two meetings.  McCabe told us that he 
believed that second meeting with Comey “was truly the second time that we 
discussed it.” 
We asked McCabe to describe Comey’s reaction to this second conversation 
about the Weiner laptop.  McCabe stated: 
The best of my recollection it was just kind of an acknowledgement 
that, like, this was a very complicated issue that had a lot of 
problematic, you know, kind of downstream, there are all kinds of 
decision and issues that were related to this.  It would be complicated 
and, and we need to figure it out. 
McCabe said that he did not recall Comey mentioning the issue of congressional 
notification during this conversation. 
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As mentioned earlier, Comey told us that he dimly recalled being informed 
about the Weiner laptop in the “beginning of October.”  Comey stated that he did 
not remember hearing of the Weiner laptop again until McCabe emailed him on the 
morning of October 27. 
D. McCabe Email to Comey on October 27 
On October 27, at 5:20 a.m., McCabe sent an email to Comey entitled “MYR.”  
Rybicki, Bowdich, and Page were cc’d on the email.  It stated, “Boss, The MYR team 
has come across some additional actions they believe they need to take.  I think we 
should probably gather today to discuss implications if you have any space on your 
calendar.  I am happy to join by phone.  Will push to Lisa and Jim to coordinate if 
you are good.”  At 7:13 a.m., Comey responded, “Copy.” 
McCabe told us that he felt the situation was “absolutely urgent” and that is 
why he proposed an October 27 meeting with Comey even though McCabe knew he 
would be out of town that day.  When asked why it was urgent, McCabe stated that 
the situation was urgent because “it’s been sitting around for three weeks,” “it’s 
important,” and “it’s getting closer to” the election.  We questioned McCabe about 
the tone of the email, pointing out that phrases such as “we should probably gather 
today” and “if you have any space on your calendar” did not suggest urgency.  
McCabe disagreed, stating, “I mean, by me saying I think we should probably 
gather today, that’s me saying this can’t wait until tomorrow.”  McCabe told us that 
he assumed his second conversation with Comey, which he estimated was on 
October 26, “predated this email” and the email was simply the notification to 
Comey to set up the meeting. 
We also asked Comey about the tone of McCabe’s email and whether the 
phrasing suggested a lack of urgency.  Comey replied:  
No, I didn’t take it that way since he’s emailing me at 5:20 a.m.  I 
mean I took this, and the reason I remember it that way is, you don’t 
send the Director a dawn email about it would be nice to get together 
to talk about how we’re going to celebrate Arbor Day.  I mean this is, 
the Midyear team has come across some additional actions they 
believe they need to take.  And so I took it as, I believe what it 
intended is, we need to speak to you. 
We asked Comey if knew what this email was about when he received it.  He 
stated: 
I don’t think so.  I don’t remember—when I got this, I don’t 
remember, because my recollection is as I told you, is walking into the 
conference room with this grin on my face because they’re all sitting in 
the same seats and sitting down and saying something like the band is 
back together, what’s going on?  And seeing these sort of dark faces, 
so I don’t—at least to my recollection, this is the first time that this 
dawn email from Andy is we need to speak to you because the Midyear 
team has some additional actions they need to take and it didn’t, I 
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don’t remember this resonating context, resonating from this like, 
okay, let’s do it. 
Comey also told us that he did not initially recall that he had been previously 
notified about the Weiner laptop.  He explained: 
October 27th, Andy...sent me an email early in the morning saying 
that the Midyear Team needs to meet with you today.  And I 
responded, of course.  And I actually don’t—I’ve thought about it 
since, I remember now, but I didn’t focus on it at the time.  I was 
aware sometime in the first week or two of October that there was a 
laptop that a criminal squad had seized from Anthony Weiner in New 
York and someone said to me...kind of in passing, they’re trying to 
figure out whether it has any connection to the Midyear 
investigation....  And it’s funny, when I was first reminded, I didn’t 
even remember—by my staff saying, remember this is the laptop they 
mentioned to you.  And I said, I don’t remember being told about a 
laptop, but it definitely was sometime in early October. 
E. Midyear Team Communications Preceding Comey Briefing on 
October 27 
On October 27, at 6:49 a.m., Page sent an email entitled “MYE” to Bowdich, 
Rybicki, Baker, Anderson, FBI Attorney 1, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, Priestap, 
McCabe, and Comey’s administrative assistant.  The email stated, “Team, The 
Deputy has asked that we convene today to inform the Director about what we 
know regarding the laptop in NY.  Time is TBD, but I just wanted to alert you all 
now.” 
Strzok sent an email to the Lead Analyst a few minutes later about the 
briefing, stating, “I’ve got this.  Will grab you and run down brief.  Promise to make 
at least one sponsorship plug for William and Mary and one gratuitous yuck yuck 
joke about de-duping or getting the band back together.”  We asked Strzok about 
the tone of the email and his state of mind at the time.  Strzok stated that it was a 
“here we go again” moment, meaning that he was thinking that “we’ve got to get 
the team back together and make sure all the systems are set up and figure out 
how we’re going to get CART to do it.”  Strzok added that he was not thinking 
about a letter to Congress at this point.  Strzok told us that the first time the issue 
of congressional notification came up is during the briefing with Comey. 
At 6:55 a.m., Strzok sent an email to the Midyear SSA and FBI Attorney 1 
asking “Would you please find out when NY got the [Weiner] laptop?” and to 
provide “a rough date [for] when you initially talked to them about their warrant.”  
FBI Attorney 1 responded: 
[The Midyear SSA] and I had a conference call with NYO on Sept 29.  I 
believe they got the devices several days prior to that, but I’m sure 
[the Midyear SSA] can find the exact date.  At the time of the call, due 
to the volume, the system doing the imaging had just crashed so they 
thought it would take into the next week to find out any specifics 
322 
about the volume or email domains.  We also discussed the fact that 
we received this via SW, not consent, so we really couldn’t look at the 
other emails without additional process or consent.  But we wanted to 
find out more about what was on the device before deciding what to 
do next.... 
F. Comey Briefing on October 27 
At 10:00 a.m. on October 27, the Midyear team briefed Comey on what NYO 
had discovered on the Weiner laptop.  The following individuals were present for the 
briefing:  Comey, Rybicki, Bowdich, Baker, Steinbach, Priestap, Strzok, Anderson, 
Page, FBI Attorney 1, and the Lead Analyst.  McCabe was out of the office on 
October 27, but phoned in at the start of the briefing.  However, shortly after 
phoning in, Comey asked McCabe to “drop off” the call, stating, “I don’t need you 
on this call.”  Comey told us that he asked McCabe to leave the call because of the 
Wall Street Journal article on October 23 about then Governor McAuliffe’s 
contributions to McCabe’s wife’s campaign in 2015.  (The circumstances leading up 
to Comey’s decision to exclude McCabe from this call and ultimately to McCabe’s 
recusal are discussed in detail in Chapter Thirteen of this report.)  Comey told us 
that from that point forward McCabe had no involvement in the Midyear 
investigation.  Page also left the meeting once Comey asked McCabe to “drop off” 
the call. 
Comey stated that he was told during the briefing:  
[T]hat the criminal squad had gotten this laptop from—through a 
search warrant in New York.  They had obtained it in some odd way 
from like Anthony Weiner’s lawyers or something, but it came from 
Anthony Weiner who had been married to Huma Abedin for a number 
of years.  And that the criminal squad had a search warrant, the scope 
of which they obviously were going to abide carefully, but that they 
had alerted—sometime in the previous couple of weeks, they had 
alerted the Midyear team that from the metadata they could see, there 
may be materials that the Midyear team would want to look at.  And 
then they told me they had engaged in some sort of process where 
they got—I don’t know what it was, but somehow technically they got 
the stuff transferred down here and figured out how they could—what 
they could look at properly without a warrant and had been able to 
look at an image of that computer and what they saw led them to 
believe that they needed to go get a search warrant. 
And I said, well tell me what you see.  And they said, we see evidence 
of many, many, many, thousands and thousands of emails from the 
period of Secretary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State that—I 
forget how they said it, but basically that involved the Clinton email 
address domain.  And they said that’s one.  Two, we see 
Verizon.Blackberry.net email metadata.  We don’t know what the 
content is, from the period of time when Secretary Clinton was using a 
Blackberry, Verizon.Blackberry.net account at the beginning of her 
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tenure as Secretary of State.  And I remember them telling me this 
specifically, we think this may be the missing three months of emails.  
And as we talked about earlier, the reason that would be so important 
is that could be germane to an evaluation of her intent which is a 
central part of our investigation.  They said we think we may have 
found the missing emails.  We see thousands and thousands of others 
and so we’re highly confident that there are Secretary Clinton emails 
on there.  Logic tells us that there will be classified emails on there 
because even if it’s a dup[licate] of what she had elsewhere, those 
classified emails would be there and we think it may be the missing 
emails and so we have—we feel compelled to go get a search warrant. 
Comey reiterated that “the volume of emails” and the presence of the BlackBerry 
emails were “two highly significant facts” and that the presence of the BlackBerry 
emails in particular “weighed very heavily on me.” 
Comey told us that the decision to authorize the Midyear team to seek a 
search warrant for the Weiner laptop “was an easy decision” and that there was no 
controversy over this decision.  He noted that the Department agreed with the 
decision to seek the search warrant.  Comey stated that “the harder decision [was] 
going to be what obligation do we have in the wake of that.”  We describe these 
discussions, which led to the October 28 letter to Congress, in more detail in 
Chapter Ten. 
Others present for the briefing provided a similar account.  Priestap told us 
that he recalled Comey asking if the Midyear team needed to review the Weiner 
laptop to be satisfied that they have “turned over the necessary stones” and “be 
comfortable with the decision we made.”  Priestap continued: 
And I remember telling him, yes.  We don’t know with certainty what’s 
in there.  It could be information that we’ve not seen, you know, thus 
far, and so yes...in effect it’s dereliction of duty to not, you know this 
thing is out here to pass it over.  So yes, we’ve got to, we have to do 
it. 
Strzok stated that Comey agreed “fairly quickly” with the team’s suggestion to seek 
a search warrant.  Strzok continued, “And then it very quickly turns to a, okay, so 
do we need to tell Congress?  And that, I think, in my mind, my recollection the 
first time that kind of comes up....” 
Anderson told us that Comey asked Strzok and the Lead Analyst: 
[I]f we ignore this pool of material, you know, can we still stand 
behind the assertion that we’ve done everything that, that, that we 
should have done?  And the answer that, you know, that Pete and [the 
Lead Analyst] gave...these are not quotes or anything like that.  But 
this is sort of like generally the sense, was that, no, we have to pursue 
this material, because, you know, we, we would do it in any other 
case.  And it is, you know, a pool of evidence that hypothetically, now 
understandably it’s very speculative, but there is that possibility that it 
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could change our outcome, because of that, you know, that possibility 
that it could contain something about intent.   
Strzok also cited the missing emails, stating that if data from “that first three 
months” was present on the laptop it could be “substantively different from what 
we have recovered” to date. 
Priestap provided a different perspective on the potential impact of the 
material on the Weiner laptop.  He told us that he thought the review of the Weiner 
laptop was necessary even though he “would have been shocked” if they found 
anything on the laptop that changed the outcome of the Midyear investigation.  
Priestap explained:  
I felt that we had reviewed so much stuff that even if this was all stuff 
we hadn’t reviewed, the chances that it was going to be some smoking 
gun in this subset of communications that didn’t come up in all of this 
other stuff, again, would have been, would have shocked me.  Could it 
have been possible?  Absolutely.  That’s why we had to review it.  But 
again, we had just done so much work and learned and seen so much 
else that to think there is going to be a sliver of, you know, 
information on nefarious activity that we weren’t seeing other places, 
I, I just doubt it. 
XI. Analysis  
A. Failure of the FBI to Take Earlier Action on the Weiner Laptop 
In this section we analyze the failure of the FBI to take any significant action 
to obtain access to the contents of the Weiner laptop for purposes of the Midyear 
investigation between late September, when NYO communicated the essential facts 
about the laptop to the Midyear team, and late October, when the FBI finally 
obtained a search warrant and began the accelerated process of analyzing the 
laptop’s contents.  As detailed below, we found most of the explanations offered for 
this delay to be unconvincing.  Faster action could and should have been taken to 
review the laptop’s emails. 
By no later than September 29, the FBI had learned virtually every fact that 
was cited by the FBI in late October as justification for obtaining the search warrant 
for the Weiner laptop, including that the laptop contained: 
 Over 340,000 emails, some of which were from domains associated 
with Clinton, including state.gov, clintonfoundation.org, 
clintonemail.com, and hillaryclinton.com; 
 Numerous emails between Hillary Clinton and Huma Abedin; 
 An unknown number of BlackBerry communications on the laptop, 
including one or more messages between Abedin and Clinton, 
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indicating the possibility that the laptop contained communications 
from the early months of Clinton’s tenure;178 and 
 Emails dated beginning in 2007 and covering the entire period of 
Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State. 
Much if not all of this information was communicated to FBI Headquarters 
and to the FBI Midyear team before the end of September.  NYO ADIC Sweeney 
described facts about the laptop to senior headquarters personnel on a September 
28 video teleconference.  Testimony and documents show that Sweeney also 
briefed McCabe, Coleman, Steinbach, and Priestap individually on September 28.  
Of equal significance, NYO briefed the FBI Midyear team about the Weiner laptop in 
another conference call on September 29, including providing information that NYO 
lacked legal authority to review emails between Abedin and former Secretary 
Clinton under the existing search warrant.  Witness interviews and 
contemporaneous notes show that most or all of the above information was known 
to the FBI Midyear team by late September. 
The explanations given to the OIG for the FBI’s failure to take immediate 
action on the Weiner laptop fell into four general categories: 
1. The FBI Midyear team was waiting for additional information about the 
contents of the laptop from NYO, which was not provided until late October. 
 
2. The FBI Midyear team could not review the emails without additional legal 
authority, such as consent or a new search warrant. 
 
3. The FBI Midyear team and senior FBI officials did not believe that the 
information on the laptop was likely to be significant. 
 
4. Key members of the FBI Midyear team had been reassigned to the 
investigation of Russian interference in the U.S. election, which was a higher 
priority. 
We examine each of these explanations in turn below. 
The FBI Midyear Team was awaiting further information from NYO:  
Several members of the Midyear team offered this explanation, which we found 
unpersuasive.  To begin with, all participants in the September 29 conference call 
knew that no one in the FBI could examine the contents of the emails of interest to 
the Midyear investigation without first obtaining either consent or a new search 
warrant, because the scope of the existing search warrant issued in the Anthony 
Weiner investigation was strictly limited.  In addition, Sweeney informed Priestap of 
this fact on September 29.  Although NYO was still processing the laptop as of 
                                       
178  Although Comey identified this fact as critical to his assessment of the potential 
significance of the emails on the Weiner laptop, the information was not included in the October 30 
search warrant application for the Weiner laptop. 
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September 29, the completion of this task would not eliminate the need to obtain 
proper search authority.  It was up to the Midyear team and the NSD prosecutors to 
obtain authority to review the emails, not NYO or SDNY.  Yet the FBI Midyear team 
took no action to inform the prosecutors about the laptop or to obtain authority to 
search it.179 
Even if the FBI Midyear team somehow misapprehended the intentions and 
ability of NYO to provide more information about the emails, no one from the 
Midyear team followed up when NYO provided no update in the weeks following the 
September 29 call.  Had the Midyear team inquired, they would have learned that 
NYO completed processing the laptop by around October 4, but was taking no 
further actions to review any information, including emails, unrelated to the Weiner 
child exploitation investigation—a fact that had previously been briefed to the FBI 
Midyear team. 
The FBI Midyear Team needed legal authority to review the emails:  
This explanation for the absence of action, which was given by several witnesses, is 
illogical.  As described above, the lack of legal authority to search the laptop related 
to the investigative interests of the FBI Midyear team, not to those of the NYO 
Weiner team.  Thus, the factual information necessary to establish probable cause 
to obtain a search warrant for the information that the Midyear team was seeking 
resided with the FBI Midyear team, not the NYO Weiner investigation team.  
Moreover, this lack of authority to review emails between Abedin and former 
Secretary Clinton was known to the FBI Midyear team by September 29.  If 
anything, this explanation should have served as a rationale for the FBI Midyear 
team to take affirmative steps to obtain a new search warrant that provided them 
with authority to review the emails between Abedin and Clinton on the Weiner 
laptop.  Instead, the FBI Midyear team took no action at all to solve this problem.  
Indeed, they did not even tell the Midyear prosecutors, who would have to be 
involved in any search warrant application process (as they were in late October), 
about the NYO discovery on the laptop. 
The FBI Midyear Team did not believe the laptop evidence was likely 
to be significant:  Strzok described his view of the Weiner laptop in late 
September as simply “a lead that likely is going to result in some investigation.”  
Strzok stated that the suggestion that the matter should have been treated with 
more urgency was “misplaced” because “[w]e did not know what was there.”  He 
stated the team would have reviewed the emails at some point, perhaps in January 
or February 2017.  Page also told us that the emails were not yet considered 
significant at that time because “emails had been found lots of other places that 
ultimately weren’t worth pursuing lots of other times.”  Priestap similarly stated 
                                       
179  We found that McCabe called NSD Principal DAAG McCord on October 3 and flagged the 
issue of emails in an iCloud account shared by Abedin and Weiner.  However, McCord told us, and her 
contemporaneous notes indicated, that McCabe provided minimal information about this issue, and did 
not mention the potential presence of emails between Abedin and Clinton on Weiner’s laptop.  We 
identified no other FBI Headquarters or Midyear personnel communications with the Department about 
the Weiner investigation—and no communications about the presence of Midyear-related emails on 
the Weiner laptop—until October 21. 
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that he did not expect any new information discovered on the laptop to “change the 
outcome of the case” because the team had seen enough information previously to 
make him “confident we had gotten to the bottom of the...issue.”  While the FBI 
ultimately concluded, after obtaining a search warrant and reviewing the Clinton-
Abedin emails, that the Weiner laptop contained no significant new evidence, 
Comey had a very different view of its potential importance after being briefed on it 
on October 27. 
The view that the Weiner laptop was unlikely to contain significant evidence 
arguably accorded with the FBI’s investigative strategy in this matter, although this 
approach was inconsistent with what witnesses told us was a “leave no stone 
unturned” approach to the investigation.  As detailed in Chapter Five, the FBI 
Midyear team had decided to obtain or exploit only those personal devices directly 
associated with Clinton or the servers hosting clintonemail.com.  The FBI sought no 
personal devices used by any other individual to conduct State Department work, 
including Mills, Abedin, and Sullivan.  This included a decision not to seek the 
devices and culled work-related emails in the possession of Abedin’s attorney.  
Witnesses told us that the team’s focus was on Clinton’s conduct as opposed to the 
conduct of others, including Clinton’s senior aides, and the team assessed that 
Clinton’s devices and the laptops used to cull her emails were the most likely places 
to find the complete collection of emails from her tenure or evidence of Clinton’s 
intent.  In addition, witnesses told us that the Midyear team deemed Abedin’s 
emails to be less likely to contain classified information given her role and the 
nature of her communications with Clinton. 
We found the belief that the Weiner laptop was unlikely to contain significant 
evidence to be an insufficient justification for neglecting to take action on the 
Weiner laptop immediately after September 29.  Unlike the personal devices that 
the FBI had previously decided not to attempt to acquire, the Weiner laptop was 
already in the FBI’s custody and known to contain potentially relevant emails.  Even 
those FBI officials who told us they did not expect to find new evidence agreed that 
it was a logical investigative step to seek to obtain a search warrant so that they 
could review the contents of the potentially relevant emails.  In addition, and as we 
note below, the FBI developed little additional information about what was on the 
Weiner laptop between September 29 and October 27.  However, Comey’s reaction 
to the information he was presented on October 27—which was substantially similar 
to what FBI Midyear and Headquarters personnel knew on September 29—suggests 
that the Weiner laptop should have been viewed as a more significant discovery.   
We hasten to add that not every witness described the Weiner laptop as 
being unlikely to contain significant evidence.  In particular, McCabe said he 
thought that the discovery of the emails on the Weiner laptop was a “big deal” and 
that he understood that the FBI Midyear team was proceeding with obtaining 
authority to review the laptop contents during the period immediately after 
September 29.  Yet McCabe took no action for weeks to obtain a progress report or 
otherwise ensure completion of the analysis and when he did finally do so it was in 
response to Toscas mentioning the laptop issue to him on October 24.  McCabe also 
did not convey a much-needed sense of urgency about this matter to Comey.  
Instead, he told us he gave Comey a “fly-by” briefing about the discovery shortly 
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after hearing about it on September 28.  Comey told us he vaguely recalled hearing 
about the Weiner laptop around this time, but did not recall learning at that time 
any of the details that later caused him to announce the reactivation of the 
investigation on October 28.  As the Deputy Director who was overseeing the 
Midyear investigation and who had been briefed by NYO on September 28 on the 
Weiner laptop discovery, McCabe should have demanded a progress report from the 
Midyear team and should have provided a full briefing to Comey well before October 
27.180 
The Russia investigation was a higher priority:  On July 31, 2016, just 
weeks after the conclusion of the Midyear investigation, the FBI opened its 
investigation of Russian interference in the ongoing presidential election.  Strzok 
and several others from the Midyear investigation were assigned to the Russia 
investigation, which we were told was extremely active during this September and 
October time period.181  Several witnesses, including Priestap, Strzok, and Page, 
                                       
180  After reviewing a draft of the report, McCabe’s counsel submitted a written response 
stating that McCabe shared all of the information he knew about the Weiner laptop with Comey soon 
after he first learned about it, and that any claim that McCabe “failed to fully inform Director Comey of 
what he initially knew about the Weiner laptop is inaccurate.”   
The submission also asserts that “[t]he OIG places inordinate weight on Mr. McCabe’s 
apparent reference during his OIG interview to a ‘fly by’ briefing of Director Comey in late September 
or early October.”  However, as noted above, our primary concern was with McCabe’s failure to take 
any action in the weeks prior to October 24, and then doing so only in response to Toscas mentioning 
the laptop issue to him on October 24.   
McCabe also asserts in his written response that the “importance of exploring this collection of 
emails [on the Weiner laptop] was not immediately obvious” because the FBI had learned about 
various collections of allegedly relevant emails throughout the Midyear investigation, most of which 
turned out to be duplicative of previously examined emails or of marginal significance—a statement 
that we note is at odds with his description of the emails to us during his testimony as a “big deal.”  
McCabe stated that it was “unfair and misleading” to place the blame squarely on him for failing to 
follow up on the Weiner laptop with sufficient urgency, “even though many people in both FBI 
Headquarters and the New York Office were responsible for pushing the matter forward and failed to 
do so."  McCabe described the delays in reviewing the Weiner laptop as a “failure with many fathers, 
including many other FBI executives, and not a shortcoming attributable to Mr. McCabe alone.”  
McCabe added, “And, while the OIG holds Mr. McCabe responsible for failing to demand progress 
reports, it is undeniable that Director Comey could have asked for updates based on what he had been 
told by Mr. McCabe, and he did not....  The OIG’s exercise of hindsight that leads it to place blame on 
Mr. McCabe—and only Mr. McCabe—for the failure to more promptly ‘demand a progress 
report,’...ignores the other FBI managers and executives who dropped the ball.” 
181  We were surprised to learn that FBI leadership decided to assign many of the key 
members of the Midyear team, immediately after determining that no charges should be brought 
against then candidate Clinton, to the Russia investigation, which touched upon the campaign of then 
candidate Trump.  This is particularly so given the questions being raised by candidate Trump and his 
supporters regarding the declination decision in the Midyear investigation.  While we recognize that 
staffing decisions are for management to make, we question the judgment of assigning agents who 
had just determined that one candidate running in an election should not be prosecuted to an 
investigation that relates to the campaign of the other candidate in the election.  The appearance 
problems created by such a staffing decision were exacerbated here due to the text messages 
expressing political opinions that we discuss later in this report.  Surely, the FBI’s Counterintelligence 
Division had talented agents who were not involved in the Midyear investigation who could have fully 
staffed the Russia investigation.  Such a decision also would have eliminated the excuse we were 
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stated that the Russia investigation was a higher priority in October than reviewing 
the Weiner laptop.  Priestap, in particular, provided convincing justifications for the 
prioritization decisions he made in light of his management responsibilities, 
including that Comey had tasked him with overseeing the FBI’s multifaceted efforts 
to protect the 2016 election from foreign interference. 
Nevertheless, from an institutional perspective, we found this explanation 
unpersuasive and concerning.  Strzok and the other Midyear personnel reassigned 
to the Russia investigation were not the only agents in the FBI.  Had the FBI 
considered the Weiner laptop significant, additional personnel could have been 
assigned to handle it.  Moreover, not all of the Midyear personnel were assigned to 
Russia.  This was a staffing choice, not an excuse for inaction. 
This is even more evident when contrasted with the attention that the FBI 
gave to other activities in connection with the Midyear investigation during the 
same period.  As detailed in Chapter Eight, these activities included the preparation 
of Comey’s speech at the FBI’s SAC Conference on October 12—a speech designed 
to help equip SACs to “bat down” misinformation about the July 5 declination 
decision; the preparation and distribution of detailed talking points to FBI SACs in 
mid-October in order, again, “to equip people who are going to be talking about it 
anyway with the actual facts and [the FBI’s] actual perspective on [the 
declination]”; and a briefing for retired FBI agents conducted on October 21 for the 
purpose of describing the investigative decisions made during Midyear so as to arm 
former employees with facts so that they, too, might counter “falsehoods and 
exaggerations.”  Some of these discretionary activities required significant efforts 
by members of the Midyear team.  Moreover, some of the claims made in those 
talking points and presentations concerning the thoroughness of the investigation 
were at odds with the approach that these Midyear team members were taking with 
regard to the Weiner laptop. 
In assessing the decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over following 
up on the Midyear-related investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop, we 
considered the text messages that Strzok exchanged with Page expressing hostility 
for then candidate Trump and preference for a Clinton victory.  We were particularly 
concerned about text messages sent by Strzok and Page that potentially indicated 
or created the appearance that investigative decisions they made were impacted by 
bias or improper considerations.  Most of the text messages raising such questions 
pertained to the Russia investigation, and the implication in some of these text 
messages, particularly Strzok’s August 8 text message (“we’ll stop” candidate 
Trump from being elected), was that Strzok might be willing to take official action 
to impact a presidential candidate’s electoral prospects.  Under these 
circumstances, we did not have confidence that Strzok’s decision to prioritize the 
Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related investigative lead 
discovered on the Weiner laptop was free from bias. 
                                       
given here about the Russia investigation impacting the ability of agents to address the Weiner laptop 
issue. 
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We searched for evidence that the Weiner laptop was deliberately placed on 
the back-burner by others in the FBI to protect Clinton, but found no evidence in 
emails, text messages, instant messages, or documents that suggested an 
improper purpose.  We also took note of the fact that numerous other FBI 
executives—including the approximately 39 who participated in the September 28 
SVTC—were briefed on the potential existence of Midyear-related emails on the 
Weiner laptop.  We also noted that the Russia investigation was under the 
supervision of Priestap—for whom we found no evidence of bias and who himself 
was aware of the Weiner laptop issue by September 29.  However, we also did not 
identify a consistent or persuasive explanation for the FBI’s failure to act for almost 
a month after learning of potential Midyear-related emails on the Weiner laptop. 
In sum, we concluded that the explanations given for the failure of the FBI to 
take action on the Weiner laptop between September 29 and the end of October 
were unpersuasive.  The FBI had all the information it needed on September 29 to 
obtain the search warrant that it did not seek until more than a month later.  The 
FBI’s neglect had potentially far-reaching consequences.  Comey told the OIG that, 
had he known about the laptop in the beginning of October and thought the email 
review could have been completed before the election, it may have affected his 
decision to notify Congress.  Comey told the OIG, “I don’t know [if] it would have 
put us in a different place, but I would have wanted to have the opportunity.” 
B. Decision to Seek Search Warrant on October 27 
Several FBI witnesses told us that the reason the FBI decided to seek a 
search warrant on October 27 was because the Midyear team learned important 
new information about the contents of the Weiner laptop at around that time.  We 
concluded, however, that this decision resulted not from the discovery of dramatic 
new information about the Weiner laptop, but rather as a result of inquiries from 
the Weiner case agent and prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for SDNY on 
October 21. 
We begin by noting that every fact that would ultimately be included in the 
October 30 search warrant that the Midyear team obtained to review the Weiner 
laptop was known to the FBI in late September.  As we discuss in Chapter Eleven, 
the October 30 search warrant included limited factual information about what the 
Weiner case agent had seen during his review of the laptop.  The search warrant 
stated that the FBI had “information indicating that there are thousands of Abedin’s 
emails on the [Weiner laptop] – including emails, during and around Abedin’s 
tenure at the State Department, from Abedin’s @clintonemail.com account as well 
as a Yahoo! Account appearing to belong to Abedin.”  As detailed above, these facts 
were not only known to FBI NYO, but had been communicated to FBI Headquarters 
and FBI Midyear personnel on multiple occasions in late September. 
Moreover, the information known to the Midyear team on October 27 when it 
briefed Comey about the laptop was substantially similar to the information that 
NYO had made known to FBI leadership and the FBI Midyear team on September 
28 and 29.  This information is summarized in the bullet points in the prior section.  
There was a conference call on October 26 between NYO and the FBI Midyear team 
331 
which involved some participants who had not participated in the September 29 
conference call, including Strzok and the Weiner case agent.  However, apart from 
an update on the total number of emails on the laptop, we found no evidence the 
October 26 call involved the communication of significantly more specific 
information about the nature of the messages on the laptop. 
Witnesses, including Comey, cited two pieces of information from the October 
26 call that they described as new and of particular importance in triggering the 
decision to reactivate the investigation.  The first involved the total volume of 
emails on the Weiner laptop.  Contemporaneous notes show that during the 
September 29 call NYO reported that there were approximately 350,000 emails on 
the Weiner laptop, that these included emails between Huma Abedin and former 
Secretary Clinton using various Clinton-related domain names, and that the laptop 
was still being processed.  On the October 26 call, NYO reported approximately 
675,000 emails were on the laptop.  We found that the increased volume of emails 
on the Weiner laptop—from 350,000 to 675,000—to have little or no significance in 
the absence of additional information about the content or metadata of the emails. 
The second piece of new information cited by witnesses was the presence of 
BlackBerry backups on the laptop.  However, this information was not new.  One of 
the first messages the Weiner case agent saw on the laptop in late September was 
a BlackBerry message between Clinton and Abedin.  And the Midyear SSA told us 
that the presence of BlackBerry information on the laptop was mentioned during 
the September 29 call between Midyear and NYO personnel. 
While Comey and other witnesses gave much significance to the BlackBerry 
data (the former describing them as the “golden emails”), very little specific 
information was known about those messages as of October 27.  No specific 
information had been developed or provided regarding the volume or date range of 
the BlackBerry data.  We found no evidence that NYO provided any more specific 
information about the BlackBerry data in late October than they had previously 
provided in late September.  Indeed, this seems even more apparent given the fact 
that NYO was legally prohibited under the scope of the Weiner search warrant from 
reviewing any information unrelated to their child exploitation investigation. 
We found that what changed between September 29 and October 27 that 
finally prompted the FBI to take action was not new information about what was on 
the Weiner laptop but rather the inquiries from the SDNY prosecutors and then 
from the Department.  The only thing of significance that had changed was the 
calendar and the fact that people outside of the FBI were inquiring about the status 
of the Weiner laptop. 
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CHAPTER TEN:  
THE DECISION TO NOTIFY CONGRESS ON OCTOBER 28 
In this Chapter we address Comey’s decision to send a letter to Congress on 
October 28, 2016, about the emails discovered on the Weiner laptop.  Comey made 
the decision to send the letter on October 27, following the briefing he received 
from the Midyear team that morning. 
In Section I of this Chapter, we address various factors that Comey and 
others in the FBI said they considered with respect to the decision to make the 
disclosure.  In Section II we compare the decision to notify Congress about the 
Midyear investigation with the way in which the Russia and Clinton Foundation 
investigations were handled.  In Section III we discuss certain internal FBI 
messages about the decision that we discovered in the course of our review.  In 
Section IV we address the process by which the FBI announced Comey’s decision to 
the Department and how Department leadership reacted to his decision.  In Section 
V we discuss how the October 28 letter was drafted, edited, and finalized.  In 
Section VI we provide our analysis of Comey’s decision. 
I. Factors Considered as Part of Comey’s Decision to Notify Congress 
The question of whether to notify Congress of the Midyear team’s discovery 
of emails on the Weiner laptop was first raised during the briefing to Comey on the 
morning of October 27.  FBI personnel involved in the decision told us that over the 
next 24 hours, numerous discussions occurred about whether to notify Congress of 
this development.  Below we address the various factors relevant to this decision 
that Comey and others in the FBI told us they considered. 
A. Belief That Failure to Disclose Would Be an Act of Concealment 
Two broad categories of longstanding Department and FBI policies, norms, 
and practices were potentially relevant to the decision to announce the reactivation 
of Midyear.  First, the Department and the FBI regularly decline to comment 
publicly or to Congress regarding ongoing criminal investigative activity.  Comey 
endorsed this principle in general, stating, “I believe very strongly that our rule 
should be, we don’t comment on pending investigations.” 
Second, the Department has a longstanding practice of avoiding actions that 
could impact an imminent election, which Comey described as a “very important 
norm.”  Comey stated: 
I said to [the team] here’s the way I think about it.  I’ve lived my 
entire career in the Department of Justice under the norm, the 
principle, that we, if at all possible, avoid taking any action in the run 
up to an election, avoid taking any action that could have some 
impact, even if unknown, on an election whether that’s a dogcatcher 
election or president of the United States.... 
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Comey told us that the circumstances surrounding the discovery of emails on 
the Weiner laptop did not permit him to conform to these policies and norms, and 
that, in particular, remaining silent did not appear to be an option.  Comey 
explained: 
I couldn’t see a door—I said to the people inside the organization—I 
can’t see a door labeled, no action here.  I can only see two doors and 
both were actions.  One is speak, the other is conceal.  Because having 
testified about this multiple, multiple times, like working backwards in 
September, July and having spoken about it on July 5th, and told 
Congress, the American people, a material fact which is, this is done 
and there is no there there.  To now restart and not just in a marginal 
way, in a way where we may have found the missing emails, that to 
not speak about that would be, in my view, an affirmative act of 
concealment.  And so I said okay, those are the doors.  One says 
speak, the other says conceal.  Let’s see what’s behind the speak door.  
It’s really bad.  We’re 11 days from a presidential election.  Given the 
norm I’ve long operated under, that’s really bad.  That will bring such 
a storm.  Okay, close that one, really bad.  Open the second one.  
Catastrophic.  And again this is something reasonable people can 
disagree about, but my view was to conceal at that point given all I 
had said would be catastrophic.  Not just to the Bureau, but beyond 
the Bureau and that as between catastrophic and really bad, that’s 
actually not that hard a choice.  I’ll take really bad over catastrophic 
any day.  And so I said to the team, welcome to the world of really 
bad. 
Comey testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 3, 2017, and 
spoke at length about the Midyear investigation.  When talking about the October 
28 letter, Comey testified:  
[W]hen the Anthony Weiner thing landed on me on October 27 and 
there was a huge—this is what people forget—new step to be taken, 
we may be finding the golden missing emails that would change this 
case.  If I were not to speak about that, it would be a disastrous, 
catastrophic concealment. 
B. Perceived Obligation to Update Congress 
Comey told us that he felt he had an obligation to update Congress that the 
FBI was seeking a search warrant for the Weiner laptop in the Midyear investigation 
because the email discovery was potentially very significant and that made Comey’s 
prior testimony no longer true.  Comey stated: 
I don’t think the obligation was rooted in my having promised to come 
back to them if I learned new evidence.  I have read some of that in 
the open source; people saying the reason he did it is he had made a 
promise to Congress that he would supplement the record.  No.  I 
mean maybe I did in some form, but that’s not how I thought about it.  
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I thought my obligation to Congress is—I testified under oath for 10 
hours and said there’s no there there; we’re done....  And now that is 
materially untrue and that’s the obligation I felt. 
Comey stated that his July 5 statement was “actually irrelevant” to this obligation.  
Comey told us that the Department could never have closed the Midyear 
investigation with a “no comment.”  Instead, he said that, in the absence of his July 
5 statement, the Department would have had to state that it conducted a “fair, 
honest, and independent” investigation and that the investigation was now closed.  
Comey stated that once that statement was made—in whatever form it came—“the 
decision that came in October [was] inevitable because all of a sudden that’s not 
true.” 
In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Comey stated, “I’ve got 
to tell Congress that we’re restarting this, not in some frivolous way, in a hugely 
significant way.”  Comey added that “everyone on my team agreed we have to tell 
Congress that we are restarting this in a hugely significant way.” 
Comey added that the significance of the potential evidence on the Weiner 
laptop was a factor in assessing his obligation to notify Congress and the public.  He 
stated: 
Yeah, so I’m sitting there.  It’s October 27th and there’s a reasonable 
likelihood that we are going to find material—one possibility—that will 
change our view of the Hillary Clinton case.  Two, even if it doesn’t, 
that we know something that is materially different than what the rest 
of the world knows and has relied upon since I spoke about this....  
The FBI is done.  There is no there there and that to conceal that, in 
my view, would be—subject the FBI and the Justice Department, 
frankly more broadly...to a corrosive doubt that you had engineered a 
cover up to protect a particular political candidate.  And that especially 
given your pledges of transparency, not—I don’t actually put much 
stock in the notion that I promised to get back to Congress, but that I 
had said to everybody, the credibility of the Justice enterprise is 
enhanced by maximal credibility, maximal transparency.  I offer that 
transparency, and then I know something that materially changes that 
picture and I hide it, I think the results would be generations-long 
damage to the credibility of the FBI and the Justice Department.  
That’s what I think about it. 
Comey told us to put aside any hindsight bias about what was actually found 
on the laptop and “sit with me on October 28th and make this decision.  And where 
you have a reasonable prospect of something that is world changing with respect to 
that investigation, then decide whether you speak about it or not."  Comey 
emphasized that this was “not just any investigative step, again you have reason to 
believe that there are hundreds of thousands of germane emails, including which is 
a very important fact to me, potentially the missing BlackBerry...emails from early 
in her tenure.”  He continued, “[S]o this isn’t a frolic and detour, this is, it’s the 
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reason the Department thought we had to get a search warrant, there’s potentially 
highly significant information there.” 
We asked other FBI personnel about the nature of this obligation to update 
Congress.  Rybicki told us that Comey felt he had an obligation “to basically 
supplement [the] record” with Congress because he had testified that the 
investigation was complete.  Bowdich told us that he thought the obligation grew 
out of Comey’s July 5 press conference.  Bowdich stated, “The Director felt like, 
hey, if we don’t notify them, after the July 5th notification, we could potentially be 
accused of concealing information.  I remember him using that, that word.” 
Steinbach described Comey’s decision and his obligation by stating: 
[T]he overriding question was say nothing and get accused, worst case 
scenario, of covering up.  Or be transparent and say we have 
something, we just don’t know what it is, and let that course play out.  
And I, you know, again, I, I describe the Director as a very 
transparent, communicative...person.  And I want to say that that 
transparent piece probably weighed on him more than the not saying 
anything piece.  And also I think his, his belief that he had somehow 
made that pledge to Congress. 
The Lead Analyst stated that at one of the meetings during this period, 
Comey asked everyone in the room their opinion on whether the FBI had an 
obligation to notify Congress.  When it was his turn, the Lead Analyst told us: 
I will never forget what I told him.  I said, sir, every instinct in my 
body tells me we shouldn’t do it, but I understand your argument that 
you have to make a, a factual representation, a factual correction to 
Congress to amend essentially what you told them, that otherwise, 
because I think that was really where he had coalesced or the 
discussion had, that he had made this statement to Congress, and that 
doing things like serving process is contrary to what he had told 
Congress.  So he felt like he had to correct that record. 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that an OGC attorney was tasked with researching 
whether Comey had a legal obligation to correct the record with Congress.  FBI 
Attorney 1 stated, “I think what we decided was that he did not make a promise to 
come back to them.  But that [the] implication was that the investigation was 
over.”  We asked FBI Attorney 1 to explain her understanding of Comey’s 
obligation.  She stated: 
I think [Baker] and the Director just believed that, yes...the letter of 
what he said did not say I will come back to you.  But they believed 
that he had an obligation to do so under...just general standards of 
candor...that we had finished the investigation.  It was not finished....  
I just think he felt that what he had said, the impression he had left, 
because he was the one testifying, was that he would come back to 
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them.  And [Baker] thought that, and [Baker] agreed with that part, 
definitely. 
Baker told us that he believed that he was the person who first raised the 
issue of Comey’s obligation to update Congress.  Baker stated that this obligation 
arose because Comey had “told Congress repeatedly this thing is closed” and had 
now authorized “a significant step forward in the investigation.”  Baker stated that 
this obligation had nothing to do with the July 5 statement and was instead related 
to Comey’s testimony to Congress.  Baker stated that even if Comey had not done 
the July 5 statement, eventually “[Comey] would have had to go to Congress, talk 
about the FBI’s investigation, talk about our conclusions.  Say that we agreed or 
disagreed with the Department’s decision.  And then, having done that, he would 
have been in the soup in the same way at the end of October.”  Baker told the OIG 
that he believed that the perceived need to notify Congress was the overriding 
factor that drove the decisionmaking. 
Anderson told us that she believed Comey needed to supplement his 
testimony to Congress because it “was such a significant issue” that “it would have 
been misleading by omission.”  Anderson stated that even though Comey did not 
explicitly tell Congress he would update them, it was “implied” in “his testimony 
overall.” 
C. Avoiding the Perception that the FBI Concealed the New 
Information to Help Clinton Win the Election 
Comey told us that he was concerned that if the FBI failed to disclose the 
new information, it could be accused of attempting to help Clinton get elected.  He 
stated that “to conceal that, in my view, would be—subject the FBI and the Justice 
Department, frankly more broadly...to a corrosive doubt that you had engineered a 
cover up to protect a particular political candidate.” 
Baker also expressed this concern.  He stated: 
[N]ot to notify Congress is...an action because it also potentially could 
have an impact on the election...so for example, [imagine] we don’t 
say anything.  We push past the election, and then we announce that, 
well, by the way, we’ve authorized a search warrant, and we found all 
these emails.  Let’s imagine, right?  Because we don’t know what the 
facts are. 
We find all these emails.  You guys have probably heard this story, but 
I’ll just say it again.  And it turns out that, oh, my God, there were 
more classified emails of a different type, or there’s clear evidence that 
she knew what she was doing.  It kind of pushes us from the probable 
cause thing up to the beyond a reasonable doubt.  And now we’re 
going to change our view about charging her....  If she’s been elected 
president of the United States, then Donald Trump would say, oh my 
God, these people knew this beforehand and didn’t say anything.  This 
is a rigged system.  This is, this, these people intentionally hid that 
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until after the election so that they could get her elected and, and 
thwart me. 
Steinbach also stated a similar concern.  He stated: 
I think weighing on everyone’s mind is if, if we get through this and a 
week after the general election we find relevant material, the Congress 
and the American public will never allow the FBI to live that down.  
You clearly hid this from the American public.  And you knew you had 
something, yet you waited until after, until after she became president 
before you disclosed that you found something relevant.  That was one 
course of action.  The other course of action is we, we state it and get 
accused of influencing the election beforehand. 
Steinbach continued: 
We felt that, again, the, the Congress, the American people, would 
never be able to say FBI, you withheld this.  The last thing we wanted 
to have happen was, hey, I wouldn’t have voted for her if I had known 
this.  And so that was weighing on our minds.  We wanted there to be 
transparency, both in November as well as in, in July.  Hey, here is the 
set of facts.  Here is the good and the bad.  You, and again, I think 
that’s, there’s somebody, many feel that’s not your job, but I think the 
discussion items were, lay out the facts and let people decide for 
themselves.  And that, and maybe not in those exact words, that was 
a theme through the course of this. 
Steinbach told us he did not recall if Comey “said it in exactly these words, but, in 
the totality, that’s what he conveyed to us.”  Steinbach added that Comey “wanted 
to be transparent.” 
1. Protecting the Reputation of the FBI 
Several witnesses articulated a concern that failing to disclose the decision to 
seek the search warrant would injure the reputation of the FBI—a concern that, as 
discussed above, was closely related to avoiding the perception that the FBI was 
hiding the information to help Clinton. 
Bowdich stated, “I know [Comey] really felt hung out there with Congress, 
and he was so worried about the institution getting hurt.  He didn’t, he knew it was 
a bad situation.  But the institution getting hurt by thoughts of us concealing this 
information.” 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that the team “certainly considered” what would 
happen if the FBI chose not to disclose this information to Congress and the 
information became known after the election.  She stated that would have had “a 
much more significant impact on the reputation of the FBI” because the FBI would 
have been accused of “somehow hiding” that information from Congress.  We 
pointed out to FBI Attorney 1 that the FBI’s standard practice is not to release 
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information on investigations and asked her if not sending the letter would have 
simply been consistent with standard practice.  She responded: 
It would be, except we had already released information.  And that’s 
what I said about, maybe I would have done something differently on 
the July 5th [statement].  We had already released all of the 
information and said this is what we’re doing.  This is what we’ve 
decided.  And then to then go back to the same stuff and...leave 
everybody with the impression that that’s what we’ve decided, and 
then a week later, everybody finds out that we, we had reopened this 
investigation.  I think that would have been much more detrimental.  
To the FBI’s reputation and to the, the Justice Department’s 
reputation. 
2. Protecting the Legitimacy of a Clinton Presidency 
Comey told us that he was concerned about the perceived illegitimacy of a 
Clinton presidency that would follow from a failure to make the October 28 
disclosure. Comey stated: 
I don’t remember thinking this explicitly, but I’m sure I was operating 
in an environment where she was going to be the next president, and I 
was in a position to have her be an illegitimate president the moment 
she was elected because I would have concealed a material 
development in her investigation.  And the moment she took office, 
the FBI is dead, the Department of Justice is dead and she’s dead as 
president.... 
FBI Attorney 1 expressed similar concerns to us, but said she did not express 
them at the time.  FBI Attorney 1 stated: 
I also think it would have been detrimental....  I was careful not to 
discuss this.  But in my mind, it was detrimental...if Secretary Clinton 
was elected president, then...it would have come out.  It would have 
definitely come out that we had done the search warrant.  And then, 
then it would have been an illegitimate, like it would have been 
grounds for, you know, you couldn’t have elected her.  She was under 
investigation.  All of those sorts of things that would have...had more 
of an impact if you didn’t say anything. 
D. Concerns about the Electoral Impact of the Announcement 
Comey told us that he decided at the time that he would not consider who 
would be helped or hurt by making public the reactivation of the Midyear 
investigation.  Comey stated: 
I will not engage in the exercise of figuring out who will be helped/who 
will be hurt, which way this will cut, who will play it, because then I’m 
starting to make judgments based on a political calculation.  Instead, I 
should think about what is the right thing to do given the circumstance 
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which we find ourselves.  Where I’ve...made material representations 
and what is the best thing for the Justice institution to do given that, 
without regard to what may happen, so consciously I did not. 
Comey described the debate within the FBI about the congressional 
notification as a “family conversation,” where everyone was free to state their 
opinions and concerns.  Comey specifically told us of a concern expressed by 
Anderson during this conversation.  Comey stated: 
[O]ne important part of the family conversation about whether to send 
the October 28th letter was Jim Baker knew from his conversations 
with Trisha Anderson that one of her concerns was how should we 
think about the fact that this might hurt Hillary Clinton and help elect 
another candidate, that kind of thing, and Baker said we should raise it 
with the Director and that’s the kind of stuff he wants you to raise and 
I gather he thought she might not raise it.  So at our next family 
discussion that evening, he said let me ask you a contrarian question.  
You know how do you think about this?  And then I think she spoke 
herself and said, how do you think about the fact that you might be 
helping elect Donald Trump?  And I said, I cannot consider that at all.  
Down that path lies the death of the FBI because if I ever start 
thinking about whose political ox will be gored by this or that, who will 
be hurt or helped, then we are done as an independent force in 
American life and so I appreciate you raising it, I cannot consider it.  
And I was very glad she raised it because it was probably a question 
that was looming in lots of people’s minds and I think my answer was 
the right answer.... 
Anderson stated that she did not remember exactly what she articulated in 
the discussions about the letter, but she told us that she had a conversation with 
Baker prior to the final meeting with Comey on the morning of October 28.  
Anderson stated: 
I do remember saying more explicitly to Jim Baker that I was worried 
that what we were doing was going to have an impact on the election.  
Was that appropriate for the Bureau?  Was that, you know, did, I was 
concerned about that for, you know, for us as a, as an institution.  
And, and at least that that was how we were going to be perceived.  
The FBI was going to be perceived as having impacted the outcome of 
the election.  And, you know, and sort of tied to that...had we reached 
the threshold, you know, that it was essential that we send this letter?  
And this is where, you know my, you know, my concerns about 
materiality and sort of fairness to the former Secretary, you know, 
played in.  You know, in light of the fact that we’re going to be 
perceived to be affecting the outcome of the election, is there really 
enough here to warrant us doing that? 
Anderson stated that Baker first raised Anderson’s concerns to Comey during 
the October 28 morning meeting and “kind of put [Anderson] on the hot seat.”  
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Anderson stated that she articulated her views to Comey and told him, “I’m not so 
certain that this is the right thing to do.”  Anderson told us that a robust discussion 
ensued.  Anderson stated that she did not recall either candidate being mentioned 
by name in this discussion and said any discussion of impact on the election 
“certainly would not have been couched in terms of” helping or hurting either 
candidate.  Anderson added that “it would have been highly inappropriate for there 
to be any partisan you know, motive or interest in influencing the outcome of the 
election.”  Anderson stated, “I don’t know that I walked away from the meeting 
feeling, you know, totally convinced that it was the right thing to do, but I also 
understood why the other options were worse.” 
After reviewing a draft of this report, Anderson clarified her testimony to the 
OIG.  Anderson added: 
While I do not remember the specific words that I used, I recall very 
clearly that I did not couch my concerns in terms of the FBI's actions 
helping or hurting any particular presidential candidate.  Rather, I 
asked [Comey] whether we should take into account that sending the 
letter might have an impact on the outcome of the election, or could 
be perceived as having such an impact.  I stated that I had concerns 
about our actions having such an impact particularly given that it was 
unclear—and perhaps even unlikely—that the emails would be material 
to the investigation.   I also recall raising a concern about it being 
unfair to the former Secretary—in a sort of due process sense—
because no matter how carefully we wrote such a letter, the 
importance of the emails would be overinflated and misunderstood.  
So, in my mind, and what I believe I argued in the meeting, was that 
we were about to do something that could have a very significant 
impact on the outside world even though what we had might not be 
material, yet people would very likely view it as such. 
We asked Baker about Anderson’s concerns.  Baker told us that Anderson 
came to him the morning of October 28 and stated: 
I’ve thought about this overnight.  I have serious reservations about 
going down this road.  I’m very concerned about this, Jim.  Why?  
Well, because I’m concerned that we are going to interject ourselves 
into this process.  We’re going to interject ourselves into the election 
in a way that’s, that potentially or almost certainly will change the 
outcome.  And I am, I, Trisha, am quite concerned about that.  And 
I’m concerned about us being responsible for getting Donald Trump 
elected. 
Baker stated that Anderson was worried about “putting the thumb on the scale” in a 
way that is “going to hurt one candidate and benefit another one right before the 
election.”  Baker told us that he asked Anderson if she wanted to bring this up with 
Comey, but Baker stated that “she was reticent” to do so.  Baker said that he 
brought the issue up with Comey during the meeting that morning in order to make 
sure Anderson’s concern was brought to Comey’s attention without attributing it to 
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her.  Baker stated that Anderson then “chimed in” and “elaborated” on her concerns 
once he raised the issue.  Baker told us that Comey responded “[a]long the lines of 
like we can’t think that way.  We just can’t think that way.” 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that she recalled others expressing “concern about 
what impact this would have on the election.”  Specifically, FBI Attorney 1 stated 
that she spoke directly with Anderson about these concerns, which they both 
shared.  She said that Anderson spoke to Baker about this concern and Baker 
raised it at one of the group meetings.  FBI Attorney 1 stated: 
As I was going through this, I was thinking I should not be bringing 
politics into this.  And so I was trying to be careful about thinking 
about this in an apolitical way and not raising the concern as who is 
going to get elected, because that actually is not something that I 
thought we should be considering as the Bureau.  I brought that up 
with Trisha, because she and I, you know, we’re close and we talked 
about it.  But I did not, no one, I don’t think anyone brought up the 
outcome on the election.  We talked about the policy, about, you 
know, that, making announcements so close in time to the election.  
But we didn’t bring up the fact that if you do this, Trump will get 
elected sort of question, because I, I don’t know that anyone thought 
it was appropriate to bring that up. 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that this issue was raised with Comey in the context of 
having an undue influence on the election, rather the potential impact of the 
decision in an electoral sense.  FBI Attorney 1 stated that Comey recognized the 
concern, but Comey framed the issue in terms of “what was our obligation...to 
Congress and to the people to do the right thing.”  FBI Attorney 1 reiterated that 
although the issue was discussed in terms of the proximity to the election, “we did 
not discuss, but if you say this, then Trump will get elected.  Like, we did not in any 
way talk about it in those stark of terms.  And so at least not in the, you know, as 
the group decision.” 
We asked other participants in the discussion about Anderson’s comments.  
Rybicki stated that Anderson raised a concern that the notification to Congress 
“could help elect candidate Trump at that point.”  Strzok told us that someone 
commented that the letter “might influence the ultimate outcome of the election.”  
Bowdich stated that Anderson made an argument against the letter, but he told us 
that he could not recall what that argument was. 
E. Expectation that Clinton Would Be Elected President 
Comey told us that “like the rest of the world [he] assumed that Hillary 
Clinton was going to be elected president.”  When asked whether this had an 
impact in his decision to notify Congress, he stated: 
I think none and I tried very hard to both be that and maybe 
convinced myself of that....  I’ve often asked myself, so were you 
influenced in any way by the knowledge what the polls were showing?  
Not consciously, and in fact I tried to be very conscious about saying I 
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don’t give a rip.  I don’t care.  But you know if anything, I suppose like 
if it’s unconscious, I may have been consoled that it wasn’t going to 
make any difference anyway.  I don’t remember thinking that 
consciously, but the environment which I was operating—well I don’t 
want to psychoanalyze myself too much more—not consciously is the 
honest answer. 
When asked if his decision would have been the same if Clinton was expected to 
lose by 20 points, he stated: 
[T]hat’s a reasonable question....  I think I would have said still, if you 
conceal something, maybe the matter wouldn’t have been of such 
intense interest if she was down 20 points all summer long or 
something.  But a matter of intense public interest and debate that 
and people have relied upon your credible investigation and your word 
here, even if it was foreordained that she was going to lose the 
election, I think to hide that would have subjected this institution to 
justifiable withering criticism. 
In a subsequent OIG interview, Comey stated:  “I am sure I was influenced by the 
tacit assumption that Hillary Clinton was sure to be the next President.” 
We asked Baker if anyone raised the issue of Clinton being up in the polls 
and likely to win the election no matter what the FBI did.  Baker said that this issue 
“definitely came up” and “somebody said something along those lines.”  Baker 
stated: 
There was some discussion about if she, if we do this and she wins, 
then nobody can allege that it was a rigged system and things had 
been hidden to try to benefit her.  Somebody may have said in that 
context, well, she’s ahead in the polls anyway and that’s probably 
what’s going to happen, and, and so on.  So I think, yes, I think that 
aspect of it came up in that way.  But it was more like, you know, if 
we do this and she gets elected, then she should be thanking us. 
Baker told us that he could not remember who made this comment and added, “It 
could have been the Director, but I don’t specifically remember.” 
F. Belief that Email Review Could Not Be Completed Before the 
Election 
Each of the participants in the FBI discussions to seek the search warrant 
told us that no one expected the review of the Weiner laptop to be completed prior 
to the election.  Comey told us that this fact—that the Midyear team did not expect 
to finish the review of the Weiner laptop prior to the election—“was a really 
important fact for me” in making the decision whether to make the October 28 
announcement. 
Comey stated that he asked the Midyear team directly during these 
discussions if they could “finish the review before the election.”  Comey said that 
the team told him, “There’s absolutely no way we’ll get that done before the 
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election.  It will be long after the election.”  When asked why he did not just assign 
30,000 people to review the laptop, Comey stated: 
Yeah, I could have, but I actually raised this and their answer was, the 
review has to be done by people that understand the context.  If we 
bring in a class out of Quantico it doesn’t do us any good because the 
quality of the work will be such that we can’t rely on.  It’s not like 
searching a field for a bullet fragment...we have to put eyes on them 
to understand this. 
We asked Comey if his decision to notify Congress would have been different 
if the team told him they could finish the review prior to the election.  Comey 
stated: 
Maybe, yeah.  If they could tell me with you know high confidence that 
this is something we can knock out in a week, maybe, yeah, maybe.  
But I do think it was an important consideration that we’re about to 
undertake something of indefinite duration and so I think—maybe—I’m 
not certain that would make it differently, but I would have waited 
probably differently.  If it was October 3rd and they said, we think 
there may be something here and we can knock it out in the next six 
days; I might have.  Then—it’s interesting—I hadn’t thought about 
this—but then I might have been on to considering the prospect of a 
leak you know because I might have said, not going to do it, but what 
would be the effect on the Department if there’s a leak about the 
search warrant, yeah.  
Comey later added that the ultimate impact on his decision would have depended 
“upon how high a confidence read they could give to me that it’ll be finished far 
enough in advance of the election to responsibly report a result.”  Comey 
reiterated: 
[I]f I had known the information or even a reasonable facsimile of the 
information that I was given on the 27th, three weeks earlier, I’m 
highly confident I would have said, let’s get a search warrant and then 
we would have had a conversation about how soon can you finish and 
whether there [was] a prospect of finishing this before the election.  I 
still would have had a very hard decision to make, but I would have 
been making it three weeks earlier.  I don’t know whether it would 
have led to a different place—but I certainly would have wanted to 
have the option to be there and to consider whether...let’s make it up, 
three weeks’ of time, does that make me think differently about the 
choice between speak or conceal?  Is there a reasonable prospect I 
could run this out and have a conclusion far enough in advance of the 
election that if it changes the FBI’s view, I could still, well you’d have 
to go through all that decision tree.  But I don’t know it would have 
put us in a different place, but I would have wanted to have the 
opportunity. 
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G. Fear that the Information Would Be Leaked  
We asked the FBI personnel involved in these discussions if a fear of leaks 
impacted the decision to notify Congress.  Comey told us that he “didn’t make this 
decision because [he] thought it would leak otherwise.”  Comey stated that he 
thought “that would be a cowardly way to make a decision.”  Nevertheless, Comey 
told us, “I kind of consoled myself, this was a hard call and you’re going to get the 
crap beat out of you for it, but it would have come out anyway.”  He reiterated, 
however, “I [don’t] want to leave you with the impression that I sent the letter to 
Congress because I thought it was going to leak otherwise.” 
Others, however, had a different recollection.  Rybicki told us that, while not 
remembering the context, he recalled the issue of leaks being raised during these 
discussions.  Strzok stated that the fear of leaks played a role in the ultimate 
decision.  Strzok explained that the decision to seek a search warrant for the 
Weiner laptop was known to many people beyond the Midyear team and this raised 
a concern that the information could leak.  Draft talking points that were circulated 
to FBI senior management on October 31 regarding the decision to send the letter 
to Congress, which incorporated comments by Strzok, the Lead Analyst, and Page, 
included the following bullet point:  “It’s important to note the [sic] I notified 
Congress before moving forward with additional investigative steps in this 
investigation, because of my commitment to transparency and because I wanted 
Conrgess [sic] to hear it from me first.”  (Emphasis in original).  Page told us that 
her “personal belief” was that there was “a substantial and legitimate fear that 
when we went to seek the warrant in order to get access to the Weiner laptop, that 
the fact of that would leak.”  Page said that this concern related to the suspicion 
that NYO personnel had been leaking negative Clinton Foundation stories.  Bowdich, 
Anderson, and FBI Attorney 1 told us that they did not recall a discussion of leaks 
during the debates about notifying Congress. 
Baker told us that a concern about leaks played a role in the decision to send 
the letter to Congress.  Baker stated: 
We were quite confident that...somebody is going to leak this fact.  
That we have all these emails.  That, if we don’t put out a letter, 
somebody is going to leak it.  That definitely was discussed....  [If] we 
don’t do a letter.  It’s either going to be leaked before or after the 
election, and we either find something or we don’t.  And either way, 
there’s going to be claims that we tried to play games with the 
election, and we tried to steer it in a certain way to help Hillary Clinton 
and hurt Donald Trump.  We’re not about that.  We don’t, we’re not 
making decisions on the basis of which candidate we like or don’t like.  
We’re not going to do that.  And so we are just going to have to ignore 
all that and do what, again, what we think is right, consistent with our 
obligations to Congress. 
Baker told us that “the discussion was somebody in New York will leak this.”  Baker 
continued, “[W]hat we discussed was the possibility that if we go forward with the 
search warrant and take that step, that’s a step being taken in the Hillary Clinton 
346 
investigation.  And that’s what will leak.”  Baker explained, “[T]he sense was that 
that this significant of a step is not going to go unnoticed.  And if we don’t put 
something out, somebody will leak it.  That’s just what we talked about.” 
II. Comparison to Other Ongoing Investigations 
In this section we address the Russia and Clinton Foundation investigations, 
both of which were ongoing in October 2016.  Comey and other witnesses told us 
that these investigations were not discussed during deliberations regarding whether 
to announce to Congress the reactivation of the Midyear investigation. 
A. The Differential Treatment of the Russia Investigation 
On March 20, 2017, Comey testified before Congress that the FBI began an 
investigation in late July 2016 into “the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in 
the 2016 presidential election,” including “investigating the nature of any links 
between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian 
government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and 
Russia’s efforts.” 
Despite the existence of this investigation into individuals associated with the 
Trump campaign in the fall of 2016, none of the participants in the FBI’s internal 
discussions about the October 28 notification to Congress recalled any mention of 
the Russia investigation. 
We asked Comey whether the existence of investigations into individuals 
affiliated with the Trump campaign impacted his consideration as to whether to 
send the October 28 notification to Congress regarding Clinton.  Comey told us that 
“you’ve got to look at each case individually” and stated that comparing those 
investigations is “a calculation you shouldn’t engage in because then you’re starting 
to weigh political impacts of your work—who’s hurt by this, who’s hurt by that.”  
Comey explained: 
Well I don’t think—I shouldn’t think of them in relation to each other.  
I should look at a case involving a John Smith and given our norms 
and rules around that, I don’t see and I don’t think the Department 
sees, a reason for treating those cases as exceptions the way we did 
the Hillary Clinton case.  In part, among the considerations [in] the 
Hillary Clinton case, the whole world knew we were doing it, right?  
The candidate and her campaign themselves had talked about the 
review, the security inquiry.  We know the government is working on 
this.  The referral had been public, so all of that to my mind puts this 
in a different position.  And counterintelligence investigations are very 
different—and for all reasons you can imagine, we are very, very 
careful about—because we don’t want the adversary who’s not 
necessarily the subject, but is the nation-state to know what we’re 
doing or who we may have thought of to focus on, so there it would 
take even more to be the exception to the rule as I just look at—I 
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wouldn’t look at them in relation to each other, but if I found another 
case where I and the Department thought that made sense to make 
an exception, we would. 
Comey was asked during testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 
3, 2017, if it was “appropriate” for Comey to comment on the Midyear investigation 
repeatedly and “not say anything” about the investigation involving “the Trump 
campaign’s connections to” Russia.  Comey replied, “I think I treated both 
investigations consistently under the same principles.  People forget that we would 
not confirm the existence of the Hillary Clinton email investigation until three 
months after it began, even though it began with a public referral and the 
candidate herself talked about it.” 
Whether to make the public aware of the more general issue of Russian 
interference in the U.S. presidential election also arose in the fall of 2016.  On 
October 6, the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence issued a joint statement about election security.  This 
statement was not drafted in connection with the FBI’s Russia investigation, but 
Comey’s reaction to it is highly relevant.  The statement began, “The U.S. 
Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government directed 
the recent compromises of emails from US persons and institutions, including from 
US political organizations.”  The statement then described the nature of these 
compromises and urged “state and local election officials to be vigilant.” 
As a member of the USIC, the FBI was consulted on this statement.  Comey 
told us that he decided the FBI should not be included in the statement because he 
felt that it conflicted with the longstanding Department of Justice norm “that we, if 
at all possible, avoid taking any action in the run up to an election, avoid taking any 
action that could have some impact, even if unknown, on an election.”  Comey 
continued: 
It was actually that norm that drove me to say the FBI should not be 
putting out a statement earlier in October about the Russian hacking, 
that I had advocated inside the U.S. government.  In fact, I drafted an 
op-ed from my own name in August to call out the Russians, to say 
here’s what they are doing in our election.  And our awesome 
interagency system, kicked that around, kicked that around, and then 
come October, there is then discussion about making a public 
statement about the Russians.  And I said my view is...that the goal of 
a public statement is to inoculate the American people against what 
the Russians are doing.  I think the inoculate goals have been by and 
large achieved because of all the press reporting on it.  You had 
legislators talking about it.  I said so there’s only a marginal increase 
in the inoculation by an official statement from the FBI.  And given 
that we are now a month from a presidential election—from an 
election, I think we can reasonably avoid that action....  And so I said, 
I don’t think the FBI should put out such a statement; it’s too late.  
That if we need to do it, we should have done it then and I said that’s 
just how I’ve long operated. 
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In an October 5, 2016 email, Comey explained his position on the statement 
to Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan and Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper.  Comey stated, in part: 
I think the window has closed on the opportunity for an official 
statement, with 4 weeks until a presidential election.  I think the 
marginal incremental disruption/inoculation impact of the statement 
would be hugely outweighed by the damage to the [Intelligence 
Community’s] reputation for independence. 
I could be wrong (and frequently am) but Americans already “know” 
the Russians are monkeying around on behalf of one candidate.  Our 
“confirming” it (1) adds little to the public mix, (2) begs difficult 
questions about both how we know that and what we are going to do 
about it, and (3) exposes us to serious accusations of launching our 
own “October surprise.”  That last bit is utterly untrue, but a reality in 
our poisonous atmosphere. 
B. The Differential Treatment of the Clinton Foundation 
Investigation 
In 2016, the FBI had an open investigation into the Clinton Foundation.  
Comey refused to confirm the existence of the investigation on July 7, 2016, in 
testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee because 
the investigation was not public. 
In addition, numerous witnesses told us that agents involved in the Clinton 
Foundation investigation were instructed to take no overt investigative steps prior 
to the election.  We asked Yates about this instruction.  Yates stated, “[Y]eah, I 
think there was discussion about look, if [agents on the Clinton Foundation 
investigation] want to go do record stuff and stuff that you can do covertly, fine.  
But not overtly....  And the sort of thought being we’ll address that again at the end 
after the election was over.”  Yates explained that this instruction was explicit 
because the Department does “everything [it] can to avoid having an impact on an 
election.”  Yates continued: 
[Y]ou have to be cognizant of the fact that the actions that we take at 
DOJ can have an unintended impact on an election.  And so that you 
do everything you can to avoid that....  Like if somebody wants to 
send you a criminal referral we generally don’t initiate an investigation 
until after the election....  So it’s, you know, sort of basic DOJ practice 
that I don’t think anybody would dispute that you do everything you 
can to avoid having an impact on an election.... 
And the Bureau never pushed back on that concept.  This actually 
came up with, in the connection with Paul Manafort.  And they had an 
investigation on Manafort and I had a lengthy discussion with 
[McCabe], at least one, maybe more, about how important it was at 
that time that our investigation not be overt.  And what they were, 
what the Bureau was doing with respect to Manafort because that 
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could impact Trump even though he was no longer his campaign 
manager.  That unless there was something they really needed to do, 
because they were getting records and doing that kind of, unless there 
was something they needed, really needed to do overt they really 
needed to stay under the radar screen....  Because it’s not fair to 
impact [an election]. 
Axelrod echoed this point, stating that “DOJ’s policy, procedure, and tradition” is to 
avoid overt investigative steps in “the run up to [an] election.”  Axelrod continued, 
“And [this policy] had actually been cited to the Bureau on other investigations 
during this election cycle,” including the Clinton Foundation and Manafort 
investigations. 
We asked Comey about the different instructions given to the Midyear 
investigation and the Clinton Foundation investigation.  Comey told us, “The 
principle is take no action if it can reasonably be avoided and there was nothing 
about the Clinton Foundation investigation that was time sensitive.”  Comey 
continued: 
The challenge of the discovery of the emails on the Weiner thing was, 
given the context that we had told the world, we the Justice 
Department and the FBI, that there was nothing there...to now be 
presented with all these emails that are...highly significant to that 
investigation, how is, where is the door labeled no action, that you 
either speak or you conceal.  And so either one’s an action, so which 
action should we take.  So it was very different, given the context, a 
very different posture than the Clinton Foundation.  And my worry 
was, I have to be careful that people in New York aren’t by virtue of 
political enthusiasm, trying to take action that will generate noise that 
will have an impact on the election.  No time sensitivity whatsoever to 
that.... 
III. Internal FBI Discussions Regarding the Decision to Notify Congress 
A. McCabe, Strzok, and Page Text Messages on October 27 
We reviewed text messages from Strzok, Page, and McCabe that indicated 
their disagreement with Comey’s decision to notify Congress on October 28.  At 
4:03 p.m. on October 27, Page sent a text message to Strzok that stated, “Please, 
let’s figure out what it is we HAVE first. What if we can’t make out [probable 
cause]?  Then we have no further investigative step.”  Strzok replied, “Agreed.”  At 
9:57 p.m. on October 27, McCabe sent a text message to Page that stated, in part, 
“[Baker] says his meetings were mostly about the notification and statement which 
the boss wants to send tomorrow.  I do not agree with the timing but he is 
insistent.”  Page responded, “Fwiw, I also wildly disagree that we need to notify 
before we even know what the plan is.  If we can’t get in, then no investigative step 
has been taken.  Whatever.  I hope you can get some rest tonight.” 
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We asked Strzok about his text message exchange with Page.  Strzok stated 
that there was a “vigorous, healthy debate” within the FBI about whether the 
notification to Congress was a good idea and Strzok told us that he thought the 
concerns expressed in Page’s text message were part of that debate.  Strzok told us 
that he ultimately agreed with Comey’s decision to send the letter to Congress. 
Page told us that she could not remember the context of the text messages 
with Strzok.  Page agreed with the content of the message and stated that she did 
not support Comey’s decision to notify Congress.  Page added, “We just didn’t know 
what we had yet.  It just felt premature to me.”  Page also stated that there was 
“no guarantee” that the FBI would be able to make out probable cause for the 
search warrant and she felt it was “presumptuous of us to sort of say we’re 
reopening and we’re doing this before we have even a search warrant in hand.”  
However, Page told us that she was not involved in the discussions about the letter 
due to McCabe’s recusal.182 
We asked McCabe about this text message exchange with Page.  McCabe 
stated that Baker told him during a phone call that Comey planned to send a letter 
to Congress.  McCabe told us that from his perspective—as someone who had not 
participated in the discussions about the letter—“it just seemed like we should have 
a better understanding of what we had before we made a notification.” 
We also showed these text messages to Comey.  Comey stated he did not 
recall discussing the issue of congressional notification with McCabe.  Comey told us 
that he did not remember hearing Page express these concerns during the debate 
over the letter, adding, “I think I would remember that.” 
B. Strzok Call with Midyear SSA, Agent 1, and Agent 2 on October 
28 
At 5:21 a.m. on October 28, Page sent a text message to Strzok that stated, 
“Any plan to tell the case agents? You know, since so much of this has hinged on 
the credibility of ‘the team.’ 😡.”  At 5:59 a.m., Strzok sent an email to the Midyear 
SSA and Agents 1 and 2, stating, “Would like to talk to the three of you on a 
conference call at 645. Sorry for late notice.” 
Strzok stated that he reached out to the agents and the SSA on his own and 
not at Comey’s suggestion.  Strzok told us that he wanted to make sure the agents 
and the SSA knew what was happening and he wanted their input.  Strzok stated:  
I think it was, hey look, we went, we briefed [Comey].  Our sense is 
they want us to reopen the case, and we need to get a warrant and go 
after it.  And they’re going to send a letter to Congress.  What do you 
think about that?  Are you, are you good?  Are you, objections, are we 
horribly off-base?  Are we not thinking about something? 
                                       
182  As discussed in Chapter Thirteen, Comey asked McCabe to drop out of the discussion 
about this topic on October 27, and Page left the discussion as well.  McCabe formally recused himself 
from Clinton-related matters on November 1. 
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The Midyear SSA told us that Strzok called to inform him of Comey’s decision 
to send the letter and wanted to make sure “the case agents were informed” as 
well.  The Midyear SSA, Agent 1, and Agent 2 told us that they each ultimately 
agreed with the decisions to seek the search warrant and send the letter.  As noted 
previously, Agent 2 was on the September 29 phone call with NYO about the 
Weiner laptop.  Agent 2 told us that around this time was the first he had heard 
about the Weiner laptop since September 29. 
C. Agent 1’s Instant Messages on October 28 
After the letter was sent by the FBI to Congress on October 28, Agent 1 sent 
a series of instant messages to other FBI employees about the reactivation of the 
Midyear investigation. 
Beginning at 1:46 p.m., Agent 1 exchanged the following messages with 
Agent 5.  The sender of each message is identified after the timestamp. 
1:46 p.m., Agent 5:  “jesus christ…  Trump:  Glad FBI is fixing 
‘horrible mistake’ on clinton emails… for fuck’s sake.” 
1:47 p.m., Agent 5:  “the fuck’s sake part was me, the rest was 
Trump.” 
1:49 p.m., Agent 1:  “Not sure if Trump or the fifth floor is worse…” 
1:49 p.m., Agent 5:  “I’m so sick of both…” 
1:50 p.m., Agent 5:  “+o( TRUMP” 
1:50 p.m., Agent 5:  “+o( Fifth floor” 
1:50 p.m., Agent 5:  “+o( FBI” 
1:50 p.m., Agent 5:  “+o( Average American public” 
We asked both Agent 1 and Agent 5 about these messages.  Agent 1 and Agent 5 
both stated the reference to “fifth floor” referred to the location of the FBI WFO’s 
Counterintelligence Division.  Agent 1 continued, “Again, you know, I think a 
general, general theme in a lot of this is some personal comment, or, you know, 
complaining about common topics and leadership and, and venting.”  Agent 5 also 
described this as general complaining to Agent 1 and also as an example of her 
being “very tired of working” these types of cases. 
Agent 1 also sent two instant messages about the Weiner laptop to FBI 
employees not involved in the Midyear investigation.  At 2:16 p.m., Agent 1 
messaged, “Yes.  Its more email found through a separate matter.  Not sure if they 
are even unique yet, but we have to make sure.”  At 2:25 p.m., Agent 1 messaged, 
“emails found through separate matter.  Due diligence—my best guess—probably 
uniques, maybe classified uniques, with none being any different tha[n] what we’ve 
already seen.”  We asked Agent 1 about these instant messages.  Agent 1 stated 
that, as of October 28, any information he had about the contents of the Weiner 
laptop would have come from discussions with the Midyear SSA.  Agent 1 told us he 
did not recall precisely what he meant by these messages, but that given the 
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seemingly small numbers of Abedin-Clinton emails the Midyear team had previously 
found, “I thought there was a chance that we would see more emails that we hadn’t 
seen before.”  We asked Agent 1 to explain his comment about “none being any 
different [than] what we’ve already seen” and whether that indicated Agent 1 did 
not expect to find emails substantively different than what the Midyear team had 
previously reviewed.  Agent 1 responded, “Maybe.  That, right, right.  The classified 
email was in a similar vein that we saw, similar activities and similar talking around.  
Yeah.” 
IV. The FBI Informs DOJ Leadership About Comey’s Decision 
Department personnel were informed of Comey’s decision to notify Congress 
around mid-day on October 27.  Various discussions between FBI and Department 
personnel occurred over the next 24 hours.  These discussions were at both the 
Midyear-team level and between Rybicki and Axelrod.  Notably, Comey never spoke 
directly with either Lynch or Yates about the notification.  We describe these 
interactions between the Department and the FBI below. 
A. FBI and DOJ Midyear Team Discussions 
Strzok stated that FBI personnel assigned to Midyear “had a variety of robust 
discussions with” Department personnel about the letter to Congress.  One such 
discussion occurred on October 27 after Comey had decided that the FBI should 
seek to review the emails on the Weiner laptop, and that Congress should be 
notified.  According to Prosecutor 2’s notes, Strzok, FBI Attorney 1 and the Midyear 
SSA from the FBI, and Toscas, Laufman, Prosecutor 1, and Prosecutor 2 from the 
Department participated in this discussion.  The notes reflect that there was a 
discussion of whether the decision to review the Abedin emails on the Weiner laptop 
was inconsistent with the Midyear team’s investigative approach during the 
investigation.  For example, the notes indicate that Laufman asked, “What 
distinguishes this from other devices we chose not to obtain?  When think of 
[Abedin’s] email, her emails were of less probative significance.”  The notes reflect 
that Strzok responded, “Volume – 500k emails – specifically domains of interest – 
gap period (1st 3 months).”  Strzok also stated, according to the notes, that “it is 
relevant that [the Weiner laptop] is in our possession.”  Toscas agreed that 
possession of the laptop was a relevant factor, stating that if the Midyear team had 
possessed the laptop during the investigation, it “seems like we would’ve looked at 
it.”  Toscas went on to state, according to the notes, “[W]ill beg the question of 
why we’re not going to ask for all these folks’ devices?”  According to the notes, 
Prosecutors 1 and 2 pointed out that the investigative team did not previously seek 
to obtain devices from Clinton’s senior aides.  Regarding a public announcement, 
the notes reflect that Laufman stated, “[P]ublic announcement disproportionate to 
importance of what we’re doing.”  According to the notes, when Laufman asked 
whether the Department would be shown a copy of the FBI’s announcement in 
advance, Strzok responded, “I don’t know.” 
We asked Department personnel involved in the Midyear investigation about 
these discussions.  The Department personnel we interviewed told us they 
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disagreed with Comey’s decision to notify Congress and that they communicated 
that disagreement to the FBI.  We summarize their concerns below. 
Laufman stated that the entire CES team found the notification “highly 
objectionable.”  Laufman told us his concerns, stating:  
(A) We had a very low expectation that, that the substance of what 
this [the laptop] might include would be anything novel or 
consequential that would occasion reassessing, let alone altering the 
findings and analysis and recommendations we had already made. 
(B) [T]o the extent that investigative action was necessary to review 
the data, it’s not uncommon for the Bureau to have to nail down 
something that arises at the end of an investigation. And we ordinarily 
would forgo public comment about that unless and until it’s 
appropriate to say something about the results of that activity.  In 
many instances, it might not be appropriate to say anything publicly 
about it at all.... 
(C) This is October 28th.  We’re about a, a week away from our 
presidential election.  And it particularly struck us as exceptionally 
inappropriate to make a statement that unmistakably would be 
construed as the Bureau’s having reopened this investigation in that 
close a proximity to the day of the election. 
We asked Laufman what he meant when he said there was a “low expectation” that 
this evidence would alter the outcome of the Midyear investigation.  Laufman 
stated: 
[W]e had seen through our investigation, the types of emails that 
Huma Abedin had been party to.  And they were just not the kinds of 
emails that really went to the core issues that were under legal 
analysis, meaning they had to do with sort of scheduling, and...I 
mean, as important as she is in a personal, confidential assistant 
manner to the former Secretary, she wasn’t as substantively engaged 
in, in some matters that would have occasioned access to classified 
information or dealing with classified issues.  So...we had seen quite a 
bit up to that point.  And with respect to her, we hadn’t seen her 
engaged via email with anybody on the types of things that were 
material to our legal analysis.  So, assuming that what was going to be 
reviewed from this new dataset was consistent with that, it seemed 
improbable to us that it was going to, to change anything.  And of 
course as we know now, it was a giant nothing-burger. 
Prosecutor 1 stated that the notification to Congress “didn’t make any 
sense.”  Prosecutor 1 told us that given Abedin’s role and the evidence they had 
previously reviewed there was little “likelihood of finding anything of import in 
there.”  Instead of doing a public announcement, Prosecutor 1 stated, “We should 
just investigate it and do it as quickly as we could.”  We asked Prosecutor 1 about 
the potential presence of BlackBerry emails from early in Clinton’s tenure.  
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Prosecutor 1 stated that the FBI mentioned that “there could be information that 
covered that BlackBerry period from the period at the front end of the tenure,” but 
added: 
I felt like a lot of the analysis was based upon what, what could be in 
there and the opportunity cost of sort of missing out on that.  Of 
course, to me that’s a different analysis than making an 
announcement about it.  We didn’t want to be seen to be in favor of 
forgoing the effort entirely. 
Prosecutor 1 stated that the FBI seemed “very concerned about transparency with 
the public” and “had already kind of decided what they were going to do” prior to 
consulting with the Department. 
Prosecutor 2 told us that the Department was “shocked” that the FBI was 
even considering notifying Congress about this development.  Prosecutor 2 said 
that she did not necessarily view the Weiner laptop as a significant development in 
the Midyear investigation.  Prosecutor 2 stated: 
Because over the course of this investigation, we haven’t sought out 
personal devices of anybody other than Hillary Clinton.  So we haven’t 
asked, for example, for like Huma’s personal laptops, her personal 
BlackBerries.  We have her state.gov stuff, but that’s like, that of 
Huma’s is all we’ve searched. 
So, there’s a threshold question in my mind of whether, like, this is 
even something that needs to be searched.  And based on the, the 
iffyness on that threshold question, and then the likely significance of 
this device, it seems totally nuts to me that they would make an 
announcement having no idea what is on this device, having not 
looked at it.  And in, and in terms of like the impact that this 
announcement could have. 
And I remember being on the phone call like, how are you, asking like 
how on earth are you going to word this announcement so it’s 
accurate and doesn’t, doesn’t like, you know, open a much bigger can 
of worms than is really the significance of this recent finding.  I mean 
at this point...we have no idea....  We just know that like some of 
Huma’s emails are in FBI’s custody.  Like, of course Huma has other 
emails.  Like, how is this a game changer? 
Prosecutor 2 also told us that she believed the FBI would not listen to any of the 
arguments they put forth.  She stated, “[T]here’s a defeated feeling at this point 
that like [Strzok] was given the task of like pretend to DOJ that you’re hearing 
them out.  And he was going to, you know, humor us by having this conference 
call, but like that nothing we said mattered on that call.” 
Recalling a discussion with Strzok in this time period, Toscas stated, “I was 
really upset and I basically said, you know this is BS.  We don’t talk about our stuff 
publicly.  We don’t announce things.  We do things quietly.”  Toscas told us that the 
justification provided by the FBI for why it needed to notify Congress was what he 
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called “the Comey Rule,” meaning a duty to correct the record with Congress 
because Comey testified to “one thing” and circumstances have now changed.  
Toscas told us that, in his opinion, the October 28 letter demonstrates that “as soon 
as you deviate from normal practice” once—meaning the July 5 statement—“you’re 
going to have to adjust to deviations all along.”  Toscas explained: 
One of the things that I tell people all the time, after having been in 
the Department for almost 24 years now, is I stress to people and 
people who work at all levels, the institution has principles and there’s 
always an urge when something important or different pops up to say, 
we should do it differently or those principles or those protocols you 
know we should—we might want to deviate because this is so 
different.  But the comfort that we get as people, as lawyers, as 
representatives, as employees and as an institution, the comfort we 
get from those institutional policies, protocols, has, is an unbelievable 
thing through whatever storm, you know whatever storm hits us, 
when you are within the norm of the way the institution behaves, you 
can weather any of it because you stand on the principle. 
And once you deviate, even in a minor way, and you’re always going 
to want to deviate.  It’s always going to be something important and 
some big deal that makes you think, oh let’s do this a little differently.  
But once you do that, you have removed yourself from the comfort of 
saying this institution has a way of doing things and then every 
decision is another ad hoc decision that may be informed by our policy 
and our protocol and principles, but it’s never going to be squarely 
within them. 
McCord was Acting AAG for the National Security Division at this time and 
she told us that she thought the notification was “a bad idea.”  McCord stated, “I 
believe there were conversations between [Toscas] and ODAG and the Bureau 
expressing our view that we should at least get a handle first on whether these are 
just duplicates because it could be a big nothing.” 
B. Department and FBI Leadership Discussions 
After deciding on October 27 that he needed to notify Congress, Comey told 
us that he instructed Rybicki to reach out to the Department about the notification.  
Comey stated that he told Rybicki, “I want you to tell DOJ that I think I need to 
inform Congress of this step.  And please tell the DAG and the AG I’m happy to 
speak to them, but that’s what I’m thinking.  I welcome their feedback.”  Comey 
stated that he did not remember his specific directions to Rybicki, “but the 
substance would have been something like, call [Axelrod], tell him where we are 
and that I think we have an obligation to notify” Congress “that we’re taking this 
step.” 
We asked Comey why he decided to seek the Department’s advice in 
October, but not in July.  Comey stated: 
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I’m not sure, I think given Loretta’s position, I thought the July 
decision I had to do it given where Loretta had landed and that it was 
the decision best calculated to protect the Department....  In this 
circumstance, I wasn’t positive I was right, making a very hard 
decision, I thought if they want to get involved in this, it’s not 
necessarily a bad thing.  I thought it would be a very bad thing if I 
was...because Loretta might well say, don’t do that, don’t do that in 
July.  Here, I guess I thought about it slightly differently.  I thought it 
was a hard call and if they wanted to weigh in on it, offer their view, 
say we’ll take the decision, that maybe it was a little less courageous 
frankly than in July, I’m just thinking out loud here, maybe it was a 
product of having gotten the pain after July, but I’m not sure, I’ll think 
more about that.  I’m not sure.  Yeah, that’s my reaction to it. 
Comey told us that he did not have any concerns about potential bias when 
consulting with Lynch on this decision.  We asked Comey why that was the case 
given the concerns about Lynch that led to his July 5 statement.  Comey replied, 
“Probably because I saw that reasonable people could see the framing differently 
than I, in the way I didn’t feel that way with her refusal to step out, the semi-
recusal, I think.” 
1. Comey’s Decision Not to Engage Directly with Lynch or 
Yates 
We asked Comey why he delegated communication with the Department to 
Rybicki instead of talking to Yates and Lynch directly.  Comey stated: 
I think because of the way, the distance they’ve been taking on the 
whole thing I wanted to offer them the opportunity to honestly to step 
away from it.  That I wanted to offer them the opportunity—I didn’t 
want to jam them and I wanted to offer them the opportunity to think 
about and decide whether they wanted to be engaged on it. 
Comey emphasized that the reason he had Rybicki reach out to the Department 
was because he “wanted to offer them the opportunity to take this decision.” 
2. Phone Calls between Rybicki and Axelrod 
Rybicki stated that he spoke with Axelrod on the afternoon of October 27.  
Rybicki told us his conversation with Axelrod was “twofold” and explained, 
To let him know that the Director had decided to, the Director had 
decided to authorize the seeking of the search warrant.  And there was 
no real reaction to that from [Axelrod].  I think he, I think he perhaps 
knew that was coming, or, he didn’t seem surprised in any way.  And 
then two was the second part that the Director felt he had the 
obligation to supplement the record....  [Axelrod had a] very strong 
reaction.  You know, you know, no, we just don’t do that.  Right?  We, 
you know, we don’t do that. 
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Rybicki stated that he and Axelrod had “a series of phone calls” the rest of the day.  
After the initial call to Axelrod, Rybicki told us that his understanding was that 
Axelrod was speaking for both Yates and Lynch in their subsequent calls.  We asked 
Rybicki why Comey and Yates did not speak directly.  Rybicki stated that he “had 
asked whether they wanted to speak to the Director, and, and [Axelrod] said no.” 
Rybicki told us that he asked Axelrod to provide the FBI with any Department 
policy or guidance dealing with investigative activity near an election.  Rybicki 
stated that Axelrod did not believe the congressional notification would technically 
violate Department policy, but was outside of “the normal course.”  Rybicki told us 
that he explained Comey’s thinking to Axelrod, stating that Comey “felt strongly” 
and “felt he had the obligation” to notify Congress. 
Axelrod stated that he received a call from Rybicki on October 27 and Rybicki 
informed him “that the Director was intending to send a letter to Congress notifying 
them” of the decision to examine the Midyear-related emails on the Weiner laptop.  
Axelrod described his reaction as “surprise, concern, dismay” and stated: 
I told [Rybicki] like in that initial call look, obviously I’ll have to talk to 
folks here and, you know, call you back.  But I said, but I will give you 
my initial reaction which is that...[this] would be [a] very bad idea.  
Contrary to...Department policies and procedures, both about, you 
know, taking overt investigative steps so close to an election and 
talking to the Hill about, you know, investigations....  It just struck me 
as incredibly problematic. 
Axelrod told us that he and Rybicki “talked it through a little bit” and Rybicki asked 
Axelrod to send him the relevant Department policies.  Axelrod told us that 
contacted Ray Hulser, then Section Chief of the Department’s Public Integrity 
Section, to get information on the relevant policies. 
Axelrod stated that Rybicki told him “that the Director believes he has an 
obligation to correct a misimpression that Congress has” that the Midyear 
investigation is concluded.  Axelrod told us that this was “the key part” of their 
conversation.  Axelrod stated that he asked Rybicki where Comey had promised to 
update Congress and Rybicki replied that it related more to the “overall tenor” of 
Comey’s testimony to Congress.  Axelrod told us that he tried to convince Rybicki 
that Comey and the FBI would be better served following Department policies and 
procedures.  Axelrod continued: 
[Rybicki] never said look, I don’t think that’s the policy or I don’t think 
that’s the procedure or I don’t understand....  [H]e was all like yeah, I 
get all that but this is different.  This is separate.  The Director has 
testified.  The Director believes that Congress has, now has a 
misimpression and so it’s the Director’s you know, butt on the line.  
And he needs to do this.  And you know, and if he doesn’t, you know, 
the concern [is] it’s not survivable for him. 
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We asked Axelrod what he understood Rybicki to mean by the comment that 
this would not be survivable for Comey.  Axelrod stated: 
I understood that to mean that they thought that the heat the Director 
would get from the Hill, right, so that if this doesn’t, you know, he 
doesn’t surface it and then...afterwards when it comes out that [the] 
Bureau had this information but kept it quiet that there would be calls 
for his resignation that he wouldn’t be able to survive. 
Axelrod stated that Rybicki told him that the FBI was also concerned that the 
information would leak if no notification was made. 
We asked Rybicki if he told Axelrod that failing to notify Congress would not 
be survivable for Comey.  Rybicki told us that he did not “remember using that 
language.”  Rybicki stated, “I certainly conveyed how seriously Director Comey felt 
about it.  But I, I don’t recall, you know, the survivability of it.  I just, sitting here I 
don’t.”  We also asked Rybicki if he more generally conveyed that there would be 
“political heat and a call to resign” if Congress was not notified.  Rybicki replied, 
“[N]ot that I can recall.  I remember telling him the Director felt strongly.  But I 
don’t remember sort of political heat, calls to resign, just that he felt strongly and 
that he, he himself felt he had the obligation.” 
We asked Comey if he expressed concerns at the time about not being able 
to survive as the FBI Director if Congress discovered post-election that he had not 
notified them of this development in the Midyear investigation.  As previously 
noted, Comey stated that it would cause “catastrophic damage” to the FBI, the 
Department, and to a Clinton presidency.  He said that he did not remember 
expressing his concerns in terms of survivability, but added, “I’m sure I said 
something like, if I chose conceal over speak, I ought to be fired, I ought to be 
hung out, I would be run out of town because of the damage it will have brought to 
this.  I’m sure I said things like that.” 
We asked others in FBI leadership if they heard Comey state that failing to 
notify Congress would not be survivable.  Bowdich stated he did not recall Comey 
making that comment, but did remember Comey saying: 
I am going to take a huge hit on this, but it’s the right thing to do.  
And I remember him, it struck me that not only was the organization 
going to take a hit, but he even, I remember him pointing and saying I 
am going to suffer personally from this as well.  But he felt it was the 
right decision to make. 
Anderson stated that Comey viewed sending at the letter to Congress as the option 
that “would do the least damage to the Bureau’s long-term credibility and integrity 
as an institution.” 
Baker stated, “I think [Comey] may have said like I could be impeached” or 
“something along those lines.”  We asked Baker to explain the context for that 
remark.  Baker stated: 
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It may have been during the meeting, one of the two meetings on the 
28th [or] 27th....  Some of the stuff that gets talked about at those 
meetings...he and I talked about separately later and kind of repeated 
it.  But at some point in time, he raised, I don’t remember the context 
exactly.  He raised the issue of, you know, potentially he could get 
impeached for this if he doesn’t tell them this. 
Baker told us that because Comey “had testified under oath, and now that 
something different has happened, people are going to react to this big-time” if it 
was leaked or the FBI told Congress “after the election or whatever.” 
3. Internal Department Discussions 
Axelrod told us that he discussed the congressional notification with both 
Yates and Lynch.  Yates stated that Axelrod told her that “he got a call from Rybicki 
about the Director writing a letter” to Congress.  Yates stated: 
[Rybicki told Axelrod] that the Director feels like he has a personal 
ethical obligation.  Because he had told them that the investigation 
was closed.  Because we had these new emails.  And we agreed we 
should get a search warrant for the emails, by the way.  I thought we 
should.  We need to find out what’s on there.  But that because he had 
told them that it was a closed investigation he had a personal 
obligation to tell them that it was, an ethical obligation to tell them 
that they were now reviewing these new emails. 
Yates also told us that she remembered “being told that FBI doesn’t think it’s 
survivable for the Director for him not to” notify Congress.  Yates stated that one of 
the reasons that the FBI “gave for why they felt like [Comey] had to go to Congress 
is that they felt confident that the New York Field Office would leak it and that it 
would come out regardless of whether he advised Congress or not.” 
Lynch stated that she was told that Axelrod “had gotten a call” that the 
Weiner laptop “had potentially relevant emails on it” and Comey “felt that because 
of his prior testimony over the summer, that he had an obligation to notify 
Congress of it.”  Lynch told us that it was presented to her as the FBI was notifying 
the Department that Comey felt he needed to and had an obligation to make this 
notification.  Lynch stated that this obligation was described to her as “an ethical 
obligation both based on testimony, but also as a matter of ethics to notify 
Congress of new information in this investigation.”  Lynch told us that she did not 
recall the FBI asking for the Department’s feedback.  Lynch continued: 
And then at one point, I think [Axelrod] relayed information again 
from Rybicki saying that the Director’s view was that he had to provide 
this information to Congress, that he was concerned about the 
information being leaked from the New York office in even more 
negative ways, that he was concerned about, he was very concerned 
about that.  He expressed that to the FBI and Rybicki shared that.  
And that he also was concerned that if, if in fact he did not provide this 
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information to Congress, and either it was leaked or later on we 
discussed it in some Department-approved way, that it was not 
survivable.  And that was the phrase that was given to us.  And both 
the DAG and I said, I think we both repeated the same, you know, 
what do you mean not survivable, one of those chorus things.  And 
[Axelrod] said that was just the phrase that Rybicki had used.  It was 
not survivable....  [W]e certainly took it as coming from the Director.  
It would not be survivable in his, in his view for either him or the FBI.  
I didn’t think that he was thinking of the Department at large at that 
point, so we never got, and [Axelrod] said he did, when he heard that 
he said the exact same question that anybody would have, for whom?  
But he just got it wouldn’t be survivable. 
Lynch stated that Rybicki’s call started a conversation within the Department 
about the Department’s response.  Lynch told us that Axelrod examined Comey’s 
prior testimony and Department personnel discussed whether or not that created 
an obligation.  Lynch stated:  
And my view was, look, you can, you can read it any way you want, 
but if he’s looking at it and saying it does, that’s his view.  You’re not 
going to change his mind by saying here’s another interpretation of 
this particular statement.  That’s not the issue.  The issue is should 
this happen...should this be done regardless of, of what’s been 
testified to prior or what’s happened. 
Lynch told us that her view was “let’s find out what’s on this computer before you 
start talking about it at all.”  Lynch added, “Even if you view it as I need to say 
something to Congress, you don’t have anything to say” at this point. 
Yates stated that the Department began “almost nonstop” discussion on how 
to respond to the FBI.  Yates told us that, among the factors discussed, were the 
Department’s policies, the lack of knowledge about what was actually on the Weiner 
laptop, and the fact that the Department had not yet obtained a search warrant.  
Yates stated that the FBI did not dispute the Department’s policies.  Instead, Yates 
stated, “It all kept coming back to, and it was always framed as this is a personal 
ethical obligation that Jim Comey has.  Not a Department strategic decision.  Not a 
Department even policy decision.  But a personal ethical obligation that he has.” 
4. Decision Not to Order Comey to Stand Down 
Lynch described the Department’s decision-making process to us.  She 
stated, “[W]e had a discussion about, well, we need to make sure that at least it’s 
conveyed that we don’t want this letter to go out.  We think, we think it’s not only 
against policy but it’s harmful given the calendar, meaning the timing of the 
election.”  Lynch stated that there was also “some discussion about whether either 
the DAG or I should call directly to the Director and whether or not that was a good 
idea.”  Lynch told us that “the staff’s view” was a direct call from either of them 
“was not going to change anything based upon the discussions that [Axelrod] was 
having with Rybicki.”  Lynch continued: 
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And ultimately what we decided to do was to, was to continue to have 
the staff discussions and have [Axelrod] convey the strong view that 
neither the DAG nor I felt this letter should go out.  And that we 
thought that it was going to cause serious problems.  The response we 
got back was essentially the Director heard us, took that into 
consideration.  Also took into consideration whoever he was speaking 
with...at the FBI, and was going to send the letter in any event. 
We asked Lynch why she did not directly order Comey to stand down and not 
send the letter to Congress.  Lynch told us: 
I thought about it.  I went back and forth on it.  And we did in the 
room.  We went back and forth on it.  And ultimately, I did have a 
concern, and we had discussed this in the, in the small group also 
about the perception of Department leadership trying to somehow 
prevent information damaging to a candidate from coming out and 
that also being a political problem, because we also had the, we talked 
about it from the sense of, you know, you talk about reopening an 
investigation into either candidate, you know, whether we had, for 
example, said something about, you know, the, the Russian stuff at 
that point in time.  We wouldn’t have done that. 
[B]ut the concern of appearing to put a thumb on the scale for a 
particular candidate was something we were wrestling with.  And that’s 
what I was wrestling with, was if in fact someone comes to you and 
says I have a legal, moral, and ethical obligation to do something, this 
is what I think is right, and then you say well you can’t do it because 
of this policy and don’t do it, then are you in fact then sort of doing the 
same thing only on the other side.  And I will tell you, we went back 
and forth.  Certainly I went back and forth in my mind over what to 
do, as to whether or not I should call him directly or have the DAG call 
him directly first, then have me call him.  Either way, should there be 
a direct call to him? 
We asked Lynch to respond to the criticism that she essentially abdicated her 
responsibility by not ordering Comey to stand down.  Lynch responded: 
I would say I was trying to get him to do the right thing.  And I was 
hoping he would do the right thing.  And I would say that you can 
have that criticism of me if you, if you would like.  But I really felt 
that, that, frankly, when I say he didn’t need me to tell him, I don’t 
mean to say that I had no role in it at all.  But this shouldn’t have 
come up.  This shouldn’t have been an issue.  This, this should not 
have been something that was being considered. 
Lynch told us that she “went back and forth” on whether to order Comey to stand 
down, but she “thought at that point...it could lead to greater damage,” meaning 
that Comey would disobey and send the letter anyway. 
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We also asked Yates why she or Lynch did not directly order Comey to stand 
down and not send the letter to Congress.  Yates stated: 
I certainly discussed it with Loretta....  [W]e looked at this and 
thought, all right.  It was not presented to us as, again, you know, 
[Comey’s] kind of thinking about this and he’s wanting to know what 
you guys, and I don’t mean to be sarcastic here at all.  But this was 
really important how this was framed.  It wasn’t a he’s seeking your 
view on this or he’s torn and wants to know....  It was framed as he 
feels obligated ethically to do this.  And it was like a notification.  He 
feels obligated to do it.  That’s a difficult situation because, yes, either 
one of us had the authority to order him not to do it.  But you got to 
play out what happens after that.... 
[L]et’s imagine a scenario here where we order him not to do it.  We’re 
then ordering him not to do something he says he feels like he’s 
ethically obligated to do.  There are a couple options.  He can say...I’m 
sorry that you’re saying that but I feel ethically obligated and I’m 
going to do it anyway.  So then we’re in a scenario where he notifies 
Congress.  He’s been telling us it’s going to come out.  Because on top 
of this I’m ethically obligated to do it paired with that was it’s going to 
leak out.  It’s going to come out and if I don’t tell Congress that’s 
going to put me in a very bad position because they’re going to find 
out anyway and they’re going to find out that I didn’t tell them when I 
could have.  So we’re in a scenario where he says he’s ethically 
obligated to do it....  [W]e weren’t at all convinced that he would 
follow such an order not to do it.  If he didn’t follow the order and he 
did it anyway and then it comes out we were ordering him not to do it 
that’s a very bad position for the Department of Justice.  Because 
we’re then telling the Director of the FBI not to do something he feels 
like he’s ethically obligated to do.  And it takes a bad situation and it 
makes it even worse because then you add what would be the 
perception of a concealment on top of this that we thought would be 
even worse for DOJ. 
There’s another option there which is he, we order him not to do it and 
he resigns.  And then it comes out that that’s why he’s resigning.  That 
seemed like a very real possibility to us, particularly against the 
backdrop of the situation with John Ashcroft in the hospital room 
where he had the resignation letter drafted.  That wasn’t even an 
ethical obligation.  That was something where he disagreed with them 
about the statutory authority there.  So we thought it was a very real 
possibility that he could resign and then it’s, of course it’s going to 
come out.  And so that then is a bad situation for DOJ because it’s got 
the concealment there as well. 
So we couldn’t figure out a scenario that was not going to, again, take 
a bad situation and make it even worse when we ordered him to do it 
when it had been framed as his personal ethical obligation.  And we 
looked at it from every conceivable angle. 
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Axelrod stated that he participated in discussions with both Yates and Lynch 
about how to respond to the proposed congressional notification.  Axelrod told us 
that he did not remember anyone advocating that Lynch order Comey not to notify 
Congress.  Axelrod stated that there were “three possible outcomes, all of which 
[were] really bad” should Lynch order Comey not to send to the letter.  First, 
Axelrod told us that Comey could obey the order and that “tees up an obstruction of 
Congress investigation” of Lynch because she has forbidden Comey from correcting 
a misimpression to Congress.  Second, Axelrod stated that Comey could ignore the 
order and send the letter anyway, and then “you’re in the same spot except the FBI 
Director has disobeyed a direct order from the AG so then you have to fire him.”  
Third, Comey could resign.  Axelrod told us, “[N]one of those [are] good for the 
institutions.  None of those [are] good for the policies and the procedures or the, 
sort of the goals of keeping DOJ and FBI out of politics.  None of those good for the 
AG personally.” 
5. Decision Not to Engage Directly with Comey  
We asked Lynch why she or Yates did not contact Comey directly.  Lynch 
stated, “I didn’t get the impression that a private conversation was going to get me 
any more information than we were being given before.”  Lynch stated that she was 
“surprised” that Comey did not contact her or Yates directly and noted that he had 
spoken directly to both of them in July.  Lynch also stated that Comey “set the 
terms of” the conversation by starting it at the Rybicki-Axelrod level. 
We asked Yates why she or Lynch did not contact Comey directly.  Yates 
stated that the FBI decided to have Rybicki reach out to Axelrod initially and “[i]t 
was just a notification to” Axelrod.  Yates continued: 
So we went through the thought process of is there a viable way to 
order him not to do it and we concluded we didn’t think that there was 
without it blowing up in a much worse way than we were already in....  
So the second step in the analysis thing is okay, if we’re not going to 
order him should Loretta get on the phone with him?  Should I get on 
the phone with him and talk about it?  And we went through that 
analysis as well and we came out the same place for these reasons. 
Again, he’s not saying this is a strategic or policy question he has.  He 
feels ethically obligated.  Both of us have the authority to order him 
not to do it.  So if we call him up I can’t have a conversation with him 
about this without telling him I think it’s a huge mistake for him to do 
this.  The feeling was is that that would be portrayed as strong-arming 
him when you have the authority to be able to tell him not to do it and 
you have this conversation with him saying, I really don’t think you 
should do this.... 
Yates told us that she felt this concern about “strong-arming” was later borne out in 
Comey’s description of the meeting with Lynch in September 2015 about whether 
to call the investigation a matter or investigation.  Yates continued: 
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And then you layer on top of that this.  Strategically based on my 
interaction with [Comey] over all of this time I felt like our best chance 
at being able to convince him not to do this was going to be from his 
own, his discussions with his own people.  That I had seen in too many 
meetings, and understand this, that if I had raised an objection to 
something FBI was doing that [Comey] understandably was very 
defensive of his agency and he would push back hard.  I didn’t think 
there was any way in the world he was going to go back to his people 
and say, I just got off the phone with the AG or I just got off the 
phone with the DAG and they convinced me that I really don’t have 
this personal ethical obligation I’ve told all of you that I have.  I felt 
like strategically the best way to convince him not to do it was going 
to be to convince his people that he shouldn’t do it.  And he in 
discussions with them could come to that conclusion because he could 
change his mind internally.  I didn’t think he would change his mind 
through a discussion with either one of us. 
Yates told us that she considered Rybicki to be his “confidant” and the person that 
the Department needed to convince to change Comey’s mind in this situation. 
We asked Axelrod why Lynch did not contact Comey directly.  Axelrod stated 
a direct conversation on the phone could lead to “a misunderstanding” or the 
impression that Lynch “was leaning on” Comey.  Axelrod specifically highlighted the 
matter/investigation meeting between Comey and Lynch in September 2015 as an 
example of such a misunderstanding.  Axelrod also stated that everyone 
understood Rybicki to be “a proxy for the Director.”  Axelrod added: 
I thought about this a lot in the aftermath, right.  And I’ve thought...if 
the reaction from [Rybicki] or the FBI had ever been oh, we didn’t 
know you guys felt that way.  We didn’t know what your guys’ view 
was...then I would have both been really disappointed in myself but 
also wondered like oh, well if only, right, something got garbled 
somewhere.  If only, you know, the, one of the principals had been 
able to speak directly to the Director we could have conveyed the 
message more clearly.  I’ve never heard that...and I don’t think that’s 
the case.  I was quite clear with [Rybicki] as to what our building’s 
view....  It was clear that was not just Matt Axelrod’s view but the 
Department’s view was that the Director should not do this....  I’m 
sure that was his takeaway.  What I put is this, doing this violates our 
policies and procedures and traditions....  I said repeatedly this is, you 
know, this is not only a really bad idea but it, it’s contrary to how we 
do business.  And actually, I used those exact words as well.  It was 
contrary to how we do business. 
6. Comey’s Reaction to the Department’s Response 
Comey stated that Rybicki reported that the Department “didn’t wish to 
speak to me, but that their advice would be not to do it and that they didn’t think it 
was necessary.”  Comey added that Rybicki told him that the Department 
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“recommend[ed] against” the congressional notification and thought it was “a bad 
idea.” 
We asked Comey why he asked for the Department’s feedback and then 
ignored the feedback that he received.  Comey told us, “I thought the better view 
of it was that we had to.  They were leaving it to me essentially and I took it, I 
knew that I was alone at that point in time, but my view was, as between these two 
options, I disagree.”  Comey emphasized that neither Yates nor Lynch gave him a 
direct order.  Comey continued, “I would not have sent it if they had told me not to.  
Instead I got this, we recommend against it.  We don’t think it’s consistent with our 
policy.  But it’s up to him was the message conveyed to me.”  Comey told us that 
he felt that he gave Lynch and Yates “the chance to engage,” but “they didn’t wish 
to participate, it’s up to you, basically I took that as, it’s up to you.  We don’t think 
it’s a good idea.  We advise against it.  I honestly thought they were taking kind of 
a cowardly way out.”183 
We asked Comey if anything short of a direct order would have prevented 
the notification.  He stated: 
I don’t know what, I don’t know is the answer.  I don’t, because I don’t 
know what argument that I haven’t thought of or that hasn’t been 
made or that we didn’t make in discussing this they would’ve made, so 
I don’t know, but, so in the absence of that, if they directed me not to 
do it, I would not have done it. 
Comey stated that he also thought the October 28 congressional notification was 
consistent with Department policy.  He stated, “Well Department policy is we don’t 
comment on investigations unless there’s a, you know whatever the exact language 
is, overriding public interest.  In my view there was a powerful public interest in 
that division between speaking and concealing, between really bad and 
catastrophic.” 
We asked Comey how Lynch or Yates could have ordered him not to send the 
letter if they understood it to be his personal or ethical obligation to Congress.  
Comey stated: 
Of course they could.  They could say, I mean circumstances where a 
Department lawyer thinks that they need to disclose something in a 
particular case and their supervisor says, no we don’t, we don’t do 
that, and so you have to decide then, do you believe it’s reasonable 
and consistent with the obligations of the lawyer for the United States 
or do you believe that your supervisor is doing something unethical 
and then you have to decide what to do about it. 
                                       
183  In his book, Comey stated that after he received the Department’s feedback, “I briefly 
toyed with the idea of communicating to them that I had decided not to tell Congress, just to see what 
they would do if I shifted the responsibility entirely to them, but decided that would be cowardly and 
stupid.  Once again it became my responsibility to take the hit.”  COMEY, supra, at 197. 
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V. Finalizing the FBI’s October 28, 2016 Letter to Congress 
After Comey decided to notify Congress, the FBI began discussing internally 
how that notification should occur.  Anderson told us that because the “animating 
rationale” behind the notification was to update Comey’s prior testimony to 
Congress, the FBI decided that “a letter to Congress was the right way to go about 
it.”  The letter was transmitted on October 28. 
In this section we discuss the drafting of the letter along with several key 
edits made during the drafting process.  We also describe discussions with the 
Department about the letter and Comey’s email to all FBI employees. 
A. October 28, 2016 Letter to Congress 
At approximately 11:50 a.m. on October 28, the FBI transmitted the 
following letter to Congress, which we also provide as Attachment E: 
In previous congressional testimony, I referred to the fact that the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had completed its investigation 
of former Secretary Clinton’s personal email server.  Due to recent 
developments, I am writing to supplement my previous testimony. 
In connection with an unrelated case, the FBI has learned of the 
existence of emails that appear to be pertinent to the investigation.  I 
am writing to inform you that the investigative team briefed me on 
this yesterday, and I agreed that the FBI should take appropriate 
investigative steps designed to allow investigators to review these 
emails to determine whether they contain classified information, as 
well as to assess their importance to our investigation. 
Although the FBI cannot yet assess whether or not this material may 
be significant, and I cannot predict how long it will take us to complete 
this additional work, I believe it is important to update your 
Committees about our efforts in light of my previous testimony. 
Later that day, after the letter was made public, Clinton’s lawyer, David 
Kendall, contacted Baker to ask about the letter.  According to Baker’s email to 
Comey and the Midyear team, during the call Kendall complained that Comey’s 
“letter was ‘tantalizingly ambiguous’ and made statements that were ‘inchoate and 
highly ominous’ such that what we had done was worse than transparency because 
it allows people to make whatever they want out of the letter to the prejudice of 
Secretary Clinton.”  In the email, Baker stated that he told Kendall “that I could not 
respond to his requests at this time.” 
B. Drafting the Letter and Key Edits 
Comey described the drafting of the letter in the following terms: 
Our goal was to make the disclosure to Congress accurate, fair and as 
non-misleading as humanly possible.  So we spent a lot of time that 
night [of October 27] on the wordsmithing of that language to give fair 
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notice that we were taking this action, but not to put us in a position 
where it’s wildly overinterpreted one way or the other.  And so the 
next day, the next morning, I had finally approved the language. 
Comey continued: 
[W]e struggled with the language of it.  Everyone talks about my 
vague letter.  Maybe it’s vague, but it was structured with great care 
not to overstate what might be there or understate what might be 
there because—I think I said this in the letter, I haven’t looked at it in 
a while—we don’t know, but feel an obligation to say that we’re 
undertaking these new investigative steps.  And I think part of the 
public misconception about it is, and I don’t know how I would have 
fixed this, is people have the sense that it was some sort of marginal 
lead, that it was a frolic and detour kind of deal.  And I don’t know 
how we could have done that, but maybe we would’ve been better off 
if there was some way to convey, yeah there could be a real deal here, 
but that then would be unfair because you would be overinterpreting 
the evidence. 
In his book, Comey discussed the “carefully” chosen wording of the October 28 
letter and why it contained limited content.  Comey explained, “Because we didn’t 
know what we had and what we might find, any further public statement would be 
inherently limited and misleading and only add confusion and damage to the 
FBI.”184 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that she and Strzok began drafts of the letter to 
Congress after leaving the initial meeting with Comey on October 27.  FBI Attorney 
1 stated that she and Strzok combined their drafts and presented the joint draft to 
Baker.  FBI Attorney 1 continued, “We talked to [Baker], I remember handwritten 
edits that [Baker] put in, which were wordsmithing a lot of.  And then it moved to 
email so that people could circulate it.” 
We identified two significant phrases in the letter that were discussed during 
the editing process.  We discuss each below. 
1. “Appear to be Pertinent” 
The letter sent to Congress stated that “the FBI has learned of the existence 
of emails that appear to be pertinent to the investigation” and noted that “the FBI 
cannot yet assess whether or not this material may be significant”.  (Emphasis 
added).  FBI Attorney 1’s first draft stated that the emails “may be relevant” and 
noted that “[a]t this time, it is impossible to determine if the emails are new or 
duplicative.”  Strzok’s first draft stated that the emails were “related to the FBI’s 
prior investigation” of the Clinton email server and noted that “the FBI cannot 
assess at this time the significance of this material.”  Various formulations similar to 
                                       
184  COMEY, supra, at 200-01. 
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these were discussed before deciding upon the language ultimately used in the 
letter. 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that two competing considerations resulted in the 
language used.  On the one hand, FBI Attorney 1 stated that the FBI did not want 
to undermine the probable cause needed to obtain the search warrant, “[s]o we 
couldn’t say it may be relevant when we, we needed to have probable cause to 
actually look at” the emails.  On the other hand, FBI Attorney 1 stated that the FBI 
did not want to overstate what was on the Weiner laptop and the FBI wanted “to 
make it clear that even though we were getting a search warrant, that did not 
mean there was a smoking gun there.”  Anderson echoed this stating, “I was 
concerned that...saying that they were relevant or were pertinent wasn’t supported 
by where we were in the process.  In other words, we hadn’t put any eyes on any 
of the emails, so we really didn’t know whether what we were going to find, you 
know, was or wasn’t relevant.” 
Baker stated that he found “may be pertinent” or similar formulations to be 
“too vague” and “too wishy-washy.”  Indeed, Baker stated in an email, on October 
27 at 9:51 p.m., to the FBI officials involved in drafting the letter: 
If everyone wants “may be pertinent” then fine.  All I am saying is that 
even if they are all copies of what we already have, they are still 
pertinent because they are copies and indicate where else the material 
went and who may have had access to it.  And if they only may be 
pertinent why are we bothering with them and putting out this public 
statement which we know will be a big deal. 
Baker told us that because the FBI was seeking a search warrant for these emails it 
was “saying there is probable cause to believe this is evidence of a crime, therefore 
they are pertinent and we should be willing to make that statement.”  Baker said 
there was some “pushback” on this suggestion as others said “we’re not 100% 
confident” that the emails are pertinent.  Baker stated that he came up with the 
“appear to be pertinent” phrasing and “that seemed to thread the needle and make 
everybody happy.” 
2. “Briefed Me On This Yesterday” 
The letter sent to Congress also stated that “[d]ue to recent developments, I 
am writing to supplement my previous testimony” and “I am writing to inform you 
that the investigative team briefed me on this yesterday.”  FBI Attorney 1’s first 
draft stated that the FBI “has recently retrieved emails” and “today, the FBI decided 
to conduct additional investigative steps.”  Strzok’s first draft stated that the FBI 
“recently learned of the potential existence of emails” and “earlier today, I decided 
the FBI will take investigative action.”  The joint draft submitted by FBI Attorney 1 
and Strzok to the others stated that the FBI “recently learned of the existence of 
emails” and Comey decided “earlier today” to take investigative action on these 
emails. 
In providing comments and edits to the draft letter, Baker stated in an email 
on the night of October 27, “[T]he institution has known about these for a while 
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(albeit not long) but not ‘yesterday.’  What happened today was the Director’s 
decision.”  Baker recommended the letter state that “I decided yesterday.”  We 
asked Baker about this recommendation.  Baker stated that he could not recall the 
discussion about this change and also did not remember knowing at the time that 
Comey had been previously briefed about the Weiner laptop. 
3. Discussions About Letter With the Department 
The FBI did not share a copy of the draft letter with the Department, but 
rather read the proposed text of the letter to Axelrod and Toscas during a telephone 
call.  We found that, during the call, Axelrod provided feedback regarding the letter, 
but we did not identify any evidence showing that the FBI accepted his proposed 
edits. 
Comey told us that he recalled telling Rybicki “to share the text of the letter 
with [the Department], ask for feedback.”  Comey further stated that it was his 
understanding the Department provided “a lot” of edits to the draft that were 
accepted.  Comey said, “Yeah I think Matt Axelrod added real value, yeah, is my 
recollection, shaping it in a different way, shortening it at different parts.” 
Rybicki told us that he discussed the proposed letter with Axelrod and Toscas 
on the telephone “and we read it to them, and they provided some feedback.” 
Axelrod told us that the FBI never provided the Department with a copy of 
the proposed letter, but stated that he did discuss the contents of the letter with 
the FBI.  Axelrod stated that Baker and Rybicki read portions of the letter to 
Axelrod and Toscas over the phone, and that he (Axelrod) suggested edits to the 
letter that the FBI did not accept.  Axelrod stated: 
So, on that phone call when they read the first sentence I said to 
them, to Rybicki and Baker is my memory of who was on the phone....  
If that’s how you start the letter the headline is going to be case 
reopened.  We all agree that’s not what we’re doing.  We’re not 
reopening the case, right?  Agreement voiced on the phone by FBI.  
Agreement voiced by [Toscas].  If that’s your opening sentence that’s 
going to be the headline, case reopened.  And what you need to, what 
you ought to do is you’re telling us that you need to send this letter 
because the Director believes that he’s left a misimpression.  But 
remember when I pointed you to the transcript what he said was if 
new information comes to light I will bring it, I will, we will take a look 
at it. 
You, why don’t you reference that?  Explain why you’re, what you’re 
doing.  Don’t just make it seem like, you know, you’re emailing them 
out of nowhere.  Say, I previously testified.  I told you that if new 
information came to light we would, you know, take a look at it.  Some 
new information has come to light.  We’re doing exactly what I said.  
So that was one suggestion we made to them on the phone, which 
they ignored. 
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And a second suggestion we made to them on the phone was that they 
include some context about what the device was.  In other words, that 
it wasn’t a Hillary Clinton device but that it was...the husband of a 
former aide or former senior aide, right?  Because, and that was 
important for context because...if you don’t put that context in there 
could be a notion that something was hidden from the investigators 
that only recently came to light instead of something that came in 
sideways.  But they rejected that suggestion as well. 
Because I think what we, our pitch to them on the call was like, you 
say you need to send this letter to avoid, to correct the misimpression 
Congress has.  You got to make damn sure that by sending the letter 
you don’t just create a different misimpression.  They ignored our two 
substantive suggestions.  Those are the two I remember.  And they 
sent the letter I think basically the way they had, and I didn’t see the 
full text beforehand but basically it was, you know, what sort of, at 
least the parts Baker had read to us on the phone it was consistent 
with, it didn’t, I don’t think they changed a word. 
Toscas said that the entire discussion about the contents of the letter was 
“awkward” since the Department “oppose[d] every aspect of this.”  Toscas stated, 
“But I do remember like at some point on our side feeling like...if you’re going to 
say it, there’s a way to just sort of lay it out a little bit more clearly that takes off 
some of the natural suspicions that are going to be created by less clear, less 
specific, and more ambiguous language.”  Toscas told us that he did not recall if the 
FBI accepted any of the suggested edits provided by the Department. 
4. Comey Email to All FBI Employees 
At 3:08 p.m. on October 28, after news of the letter to Congress had been 
publicly reported, Comey sent the following message to all FBI employees: 
This morning I sent a letter to Congress in connection with the 
Secretary Clinton email investigation.  Yesterday, the investigative 
team briefed me on their recommendation with respect to seeking 
access to emails that have recently been found in an unrelated case.  
Because those emails appear to be pertinent to our investigation, I 
agreed that we should take appropriate steps to obtain and review 
them. 
Of course, we don’t ordinarily tell Congress about ongoing 
investigations, but here I feel an obligation to do so given that I 
testified repeatedly in recent months that our investigation was 
completed.  I also think it would be misleading to the American people 
were we not to supplement the record.  At the same time, however, 
given that we don’t know the significance of this newly discovered 
collection of emails, I don’t want to create a misleading impression.  In 
trying to strike a balance, in a brief letter and in the middle of an 
election season, there is significant risk of being misunderstood, but I 
wanted you to hear directly from me about it. 
371 
VI. Analysis of the Decision to Send the October 28 Letter 
We found no evidence that Comey’s decision to send the October 28 letter 
was influenced by political preferences.  Instead, we found that his decision was the 
result of several interrelated factors that were connected to his concern that failing 
to send the letter would harm the FBI and his ability to lead it, and his view that 
candidate Clinton was going to win the presidency and that she would be perceived 
to be an illegitimate president if the public first learned of the information after the 
election.  Although Comey told us that he “didn’t make this decision because [he] 
thought it would leak otherwise,” several FBI officials, including Baker and Strzok, 
told us that the concern about leaks played a role in the decision.  We concluded 
that, in considering his choices, Comey failed to give adequate consideration to 
long-established Department and FBI norms, policies, and expectations that he 
applied in other cases.  Although we acknowledge that Comey faced a difficult 
situation with unattractive choices, in proceeding as he did on October 28, Comey 
made a serious error of judgment. 
Much like with his July 5 announcement, Comey engaged in ad hoc 
decisionmaking based on his personal views even if it meant rejecting longstanding 
Department policy or practice.  For example, we found unpersuasive Comey’s 
explanation as to why transparency was more important than Department policy 
and practice with regard to the reactivated Midyear investigation while, by contrast, 
Department policy and practice was more important to follow with regard to the 
Clinton Foundation and Russia investigations. 
A. Substantive Assessment of Comey’s Decision 
1. FBI and Department Norms and Policies 
Comey had ample guidance in longstanding Department and FBI policies and 
norms regarding making public statements about pending investigations and taking 
actions that might affect elections. 
To start, the Department and the FBI consistently decline to comment 
publicly or to Congress regarding ongoing investigative activity.  The “stay silent” 
principle exists to protect the privacy and reputational interests of the subjects of 
the investigation, the right to a fair trial for those subsequently accused of crimes, 
the integrity of an ongoing investigation or pending litigation, and the Department’s 
ability to effectively administer justice without political or other undue outside 
influences.  Comey endorsed this principle in general, stating, “I believe very 
strongly that our rule should be, we don’t comment on pending investigations.”  
This principle is embodied in several regulations and policies set forth in Chapter 
Two, including in policies regarding communications with Congress.  USAM 1-8.030; 
Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum for Heads 
of Department Components and all U.S. Attorneys, Communications with Congress, 
August 17, 2009; Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice, letter to Congressman John Linder, January 1, 2000. (“Although Congress 
has a clearly legitimate interest in determining how the Department enforces 
statutes, Congressional inquiries during the pendency of a matter pose an inherent 
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threat to the integrity of the Department’s law enforcement and litigation 
functions.”).185  This principle is also reflected in 28 C.F.R. § 50.2, which provides, 
with respect to the release of information to the news media, that “where 
information relating to the circumstances of...an investigation would be highly 
prejudicial or where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement function, 
such information should not be made public.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3)(iv).186  See 
also USAM 1-7.530, 9-11.130, 9-16.500, 9-27.760; FBI Media Policy Guide 3.1. 
In addition, the Department and the FBI have long observed a norm against 
taking an action during the run-up to an election that could impact an election.  
Although there is no codified “60-day rule,” Comey acknowledged that he has 
consistently adhered to this “take no action” norm in the past: “I’ve lived my entire 
career in the Department of Justice under the norm, the principle, that we, if at all 
possible, avoid taking any action in the run up to an election, avoid taking any 
action that could have some impact, even if unknown, on an election whether that’s 
a dogcatcher election or President of the United States.”  Given the lack of a written 
policy, we recommend that the Department consider providing guidance to agents 
and prosecutors concerning the taking of overt investigative steps, indictments, 
public announcements, or other actions that could impact an election. 
These policies and norms formed the fundamental backdrop for Comey’s 
decision on October 28.  Because of them, Comey’s description of his choice as 
being between “two doors,” one labeled “speak” and one labeled “conceal,” was a 
false dichotomy.  The two doors were actually labeled “follow policy/practice” and 
“depart from policy/practice.”  His task was not to conduct an ad hoc comparison of 
case-specific outcomes and risks.  Rather, the burden was on him to justify an 
extraordinary departure from these established norms, policies, and precedent. 
2. Comey’s Justification for Departing 
Comey’s justification for departing from established norms was that because 
he had previously told Congress and the public that the case was over, staying 
silent would be misleading.  But it is hardly unique for the FBI to receive new 
information that might cause it to reactivate a previously closed or dormant 
investigation.  To our knowledge, the FBI has not generally identified this 
circumstance as nullifying the stay silent principle. 
Comey admitted that he had made no explicit promise to make a further 
announcement if new evidence were discovered.  He stated, instead, that he had 
                                       
185  Current Department policy regarding communications with Congress continues to honor 
this principle.  See Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum 
for All Heads of Department Components, Communications with Congress, May 2, 2018. 
186  28 C.F.R. § 50.2 is directed largely at preventing the prejudice to defendants or subjects 
from media publicity that might influence the outcome of a trial.  However, it states that the 
guidelines it contains—including “stay silent”—are effective “from the time a person is the subject of a 
criminal investigation until any proceeding resulting from such an investigation has been terminated 
by trial or otherwise.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(1).  An unfair trial is obviously not the only form of 
prejudice that may arise from media disclosures, especially in an investigation that does not result in a 
trial. 
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previously offered “maximal transparency” because that “enhances the credibility of 
the Justice enterprise,” and that maintaining that transparency required him to 
update his July statement in October. 
If so, the problem originated with Comey’s elevation of “maximal 
transparency” as a value overriding, for this case only, the principles of “stay silent” 
and “take no action” that the FBI has consistently applied to other cases.  The 
Department and the FBI do not practice “maximal transparency” in criminal 
investigations.  It is not a value reflected in the regulations, policies, or customs 
guiding FBI actions in pending criminal investigations.  To the contrary, the 
guidance to agents and prosecutors is precisely the opposite—no transparency 
except in rare and exceptional circumstances due to the potential harm to both the 
investigation and to the reputation of anyone under investigation. 
Comey told us that the potentially great evidentiary significance of the newly 
discovered emails would have made it particularly misleading to stay silent.  But we 
found that the FBI’s basis for believing, as of October 28, that the contents of the 
Weiner laptop would be significant to the Clinton email investigation was 
overestimated.  Comey and others stated that they believed the Weiner laptop 
might contain the “missing three months” of Clinton’s emails from the beginning of 
her tenure when she used a BlackBerry domain, and that these “golden emails” 
would be particularly probative of intent, because they were close in time to when 
she set up her server.  However, at the time of the October 28 letter, the FBI had 
limited information about the BlackBerry data that was on the laptop.  The case 
agent assigned to the Weiner investigation stated only that he saw at least one 
BlackBerry PIN message between Clinton and Abedin.  As of October 28, no one 
with any knowledge of the Midyear investigation had viewed a single email 
message, and the Midyear team was uncertain they would even be able to establish 
sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant.  Even the description of the 
emails in the October 28 letter is at odds with Comey’s emphasis on the importance 
of the discovery.  The letter was edited to state that the emails “appear to be 
pertinent,” because several members of the team objected to the words “are 
pertinent” as an unsupportable overstatement. 
Moreover, the Midyear team did not treat the BlackBerry emails as if they 
were critical to completing a thorough investigation prior to October.  Rather, the 
team decided during the investigation not to obtain personal devices that Clinton’s 
senior aides used for State Department work, because, among other reasons, they 
did not believe obtaining those devices was necessary for a thorough investigation.  
Indeed, the Midyear team did not ask Abedin’s attorneys to turn over Abedin’s 
personal BlackBerry or laptop that she used during her employment at the State 
Department, even though Abedin told the FBI that she had given those devices to 
her attorneys so that they could produce her work-related emails to the State 
Department. 
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Before October 28, Comey lauded the thoroughness of the investigation and 
stated that declining prosecution was not a close call.187  If the vague and general 
information known about the laptop contents was sufficient to “create a reasonable 
likelihood...that will change our view” of the case, then it is difficult to see how the 
investigation could have been as thorough as Comey represented given the FBI’s 
decision not to obtain similar devices from Clinton’s senior aides prior to July 5.  
Nor could the declination decision have been such an easy call if unseen emails to 
and from one of Clinton’s aides could have resulted in a change in the Department’s 
prosecution assessment. 
In fact, as detailed in Chapter Nine, every pertinent fact that the FBI knew 
about the laptop in October was already known in late September.  Yet none of the 
Midyear investigators thought these were “golden emails” then—a factor that 
contributed to the FBI’s delay in acting on the information, as discussed in Chapter 
Nine.  In short, far too little was known about these emails in October 2016 to 
justify departing from Department norms, policies, and precedent. 
3. Comey’s Comparison of Risks and Outcomes 
Instead of referring to and being guided by longstanding Department and FBI 
policies and precedent, Comey conducted an ad hoc comparison of the risks and 
outcomes associated with each option.  He described the potential consequences 
“concealing” the existence of the emails as “catastrophic” to the FBI and the 
Department, because it would subject the FBI and the Department to allegations 
that they had acted for political reasons to protect Hillary Clinton.  Instead, Comey 
said he chose the option that he assessed as being just “really bad.” 
Even within the flawed analytical construct that Comey set up, he did not 
assess risks evenhandedly.  He assigned paramount significance to avoiding the 
reputational risk of staying silent:  that he and the FBI would be unfairly accused of 
hiding the emails to protect candidate Clinton.  But he appears to have placed no 
comparable value on the corresponding risk from making the public statement:  
that he and the FBI would not only be accused of violating long-standing 
Department and FBI policy and practice, but that he also would be unfairly accused 
of hyping the emails in a manner that hurt candidate Clinton.  We believe that 
Comey’s unequal assessment of these risks was the product of his belief that 
Clinton was going to win the election.  Comey told us, “I am sure I was influenced 
by the tacit assumption that Hillary Clinton was sure to be the next President.”  This 
expectation likely led him to focus too heavily on what he perceived to be the 
consequences of not revealing the new information, namely undermining the 
legitimacy of Clinton’s presidency and harming the reputation of the FBI.  Ironically, 
in his effort to avoid the FBI or himself being seen as political, Comey based his 
decision, in part, on his assessment of the likely outcome of the political process.  
                                       
187  In his book, Comey stated, with respect to the July declination, that “[n]o fair-minded 
person with any experience in the counterespionage world (where ‘spills’ of classified information are 
investigated and prosecuted) could think this was a case the career prosecutors at the Department of 
Justice might pursue.  There was literally zero chance of that.”  COMEY, supra, at 185.  
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In our view, assumptions about the outcome of an election should not affect how 
the FBI or the Department applies longstanding policies and norms. 
We believe that Comey underestimated his own ability to address the unfair 
criticism that he feared would ensue if he stayed silent.  Comey acknowledged to 
us, “I’ve lived my entire career in the Department of Justice under the norm, the 
principle, that we...avoid taking any action that could have some impact, even if 
unknown, on an election....”  Thus, if Comey had chosen to have the FBI seek the 
search warrant but not send the October 28 letter, he would have had a principled 
response if he was asked about his decision:  “This is the way we always do it, for 
the following good reasons.”  And he could have stated, accurately and in good 
conscience, that he applied this principle evenhandedly with respect to the Clinton 
email investigation and other pending FBI investigations.  The FBI never 
commented publicly on the Russia investigation until after the election, and he 
refused to comment publicly about the Clinton Foundation investigation.  And, 
earlier in October 2016, Comey declined on behalf of the FBI to participate in a U.S. 
Intelligence Community statement warning about Russian interference because “it 
exposes us to accusations of launching our own ‘October surprise.’”  Had he 
observed the same principle with respect to the Clinton email investigation, the 
evenhandedness of his decisions would have been apparent.  Indeed, much of the 
criticism that Comey received for not revealing before the election information 
about the Russia and Clinton Foundation investigations was due to the perceived 
lack of evenhandness given the disclosure he made on October 28 in the Clinton 
email investigation. 
In reaching our conclusion about the October 28 letter, we found the 
testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General George Toscas to be on point: 
One of the things that I tell people all the time, after having been in 
the Department for almost 24 years now, is I stress to people and 
people who work at all levels, the institution has principles and there’s 
always an urge when something important or different pops up to say, 
we should do it differently or those principles or those protocols you 
know we should—we might want to deviate because this is so 
different.  But the comfort that we get as people, as lawyers, as 
representatives, as employees and as an institution, the comfort we 
get from those institutional policies, protocols, has, is an unbelievable 
thing through whatever storm, you know whatever storm hits us, 
when you are within the norm of the way the institution behaves, you 
can weather any of it because you stand on the principle. 
And once you deviate, even in a minor way, and you’re always going 
to want to deviate.  It’s always going to be something important and 
some big deal that makes you think, oh let’s do this a little differently.  
But once you do that, you have removed yourself from the comfort of 
saying this institution has a way of doing things and then every 
decision is another ad hoc decision that may be informed by our policy 
and our protocol and principles, but it’s never going to be squarely 
within them. 
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4. Fear of Leaks 
Comey denied that a fear of leaks influenced his decision to send the October 
28 letter to Congress.  However, other witnesses told us that a concern about leaks 
played a role in the decision.  As Baker stated, “We were quite confident that.... [I]f 
we don’t put out a letter, somebody is going to leak it.  That definitely was 
discussed....”  Numerous witnesses connected this concern about leaks specifically 
to NYO and told us that FBI leadership suspected that FBI personnel in NYO were 
responsible for leaks of information in other matters.  Even accepting Comey’s 
assertion that leaks played no role in his decision, we found that, at a minimum, a 
fear of leaks influenced the thinking of those who were advising him. 
We also note that these discussions on October 27 and 28 were occurring at 
almost the same time that FBI leadership was focused on how the Midyear 
investigation was being publicly portrayed.  As detailed in Chapter Eight, the FBI 
was devoting significant time and attention in October 2016 responding to both 
public and private criticism of the Midyear investigation.  That included sending 
talking points to FBI SACs on October 21 for their use in responding to such 
criticism.  Comey told us that these efforts were necessary to “protect the 
credibility of the [FBI] in American life.”  As a result, at the time Comey was 
deciding whether to send the October 28 letter to Congress, the FBI had just one 
week earlier empowered its officials to speak publicly about the FBI’s handling of 
the Midyear investigation.  In our view, this confluence of events inevitably 
increased the risk of leaks. 
B. Lack of Communication Between Comey and Department 
Leadership 
As we describe above, on October 27 and 28, Comey and Lynch decided not 
to speak to one another, in person or by phone, about the decision to notify 
Congress.  Instead, Comey directed Rybicki to contact Axelrod, and the Department 
decided to communicate its response entirely through Axelrod.  Comey explained 
that he decided to ask Rybicki to contact Axelrod rather than speaking directly to 
Lynch or Yates because “...I didn’t want to jam them and I wanted to offer them 
the opportunity to think about and decide whether they wanted to be engaged on 
it.” 
We asked Lynch and Yates why they did not call Comey or ask to meet with 
him after Rybicki’s initial notification to Axelrod.  Both Lynch and Yates told the OIG 
that they made an intentional strategic decision to handle discussions about the 
letter to Congress through Axelrod and Rybicki.  Both Lynch and Yates explained 
that they were concerned that any direct discussion with Comey—particularly any 
discussion in which they told him not to send the letter—would be perceived as an 
attempt to prevent him from fulfilling his “personal ethical obligation” to notify 
Congress.  Both stated that they were concerned that the fact of any such direct 
discussions would leak and would be portrayed as Department leadership 
attempting to “prevent information damaging to a candidate from coming out” 
(Lynch) or “strong-arming” Comey (Yates). 
377 
Lynch and Yates also told the OIG that a significant factor in their decision to 
handle communications through Rybicki and Axelrod was that direct discussions 
likely would have been ineffective.  Lynch said the fact that Comey did not call her 
directly indicated that he did not want a real discussion and had already made up 
his mind to send a letter, because he would call her to discuss other issues that 
were not resolved.  Yates stated that, based on her experience with Comey, he was 
likely to “push back hard” against input from Lynch or her, especially if accepting 
their input meant that he had to go back to his staff and explain that he was 
reversing his decision based on their input.  She told us that she believed 
strategically the best way to convince him not to send the letter was to allow him to 
come to that conclusion through discussions with his own staff, including Rybicki.  
Yates told us that she considered Rybicki to be his “confidant” and the person that 
the Department needed to convince to change Comey’s mind in this situation. 
Comey’s reaction to the input he received as the result of Rybicki’s 
discussions with Axelrod suggests that these concerns were well-founded.  While 
Comey stated that he “welcome[d]” the Department’s feedback, he did not take 
their feedback into account when Rybicki told him that the Department 
“recommend[ed] against” the letter and thought it was “a bad idea.”  When asked 
why he essentially ignored the advice of Department leadership, Comey told us, “I 
thought the better view of it was that we had to [send the letter].  They were 
leaving it to me essentially and I took it, I knew that I was alone at that point in 
time, but my view was, as between these two options, I disagree.”  Comey added 
that he felt that he gave Lynch and Yates “the chance to engage,” but “they didn’t 
wish to participate, it’s up to you, basically I took that as, it’s up to you.  We don’t 
think it’s a good idea.  We advise against it.  I honestly thought they were taking 
kind of a cowardly way out.” 
Although Comey told us that he would not have sent the October 28 letter 
had Lynch or Yates ordered him not to do it, we found no evidence that he or 
Rybicki ever conveyed this to Department leadership.  Both Lynch and Yates cited 
Comey’s description of his “personal ethical obligation” to notify Congress and his 
concerns about the “survivability” of failing to do so as reasons that they believed a 
direct order would be ineffective.  As described above, Axelrod told the OIG that 
they considered three possible negative outcomes should Lynch order Comey not to 
send to the letter:  Comey could obey the order and Lynch would be accused of 
obstructing Congress; Comey could ignore the order and send the letter anyway, 
and Department leadership would have to fire him; and Comey could resign.  
Axelrod told us, “[N]one of those [are] good for the institutions.  None of those 
[are] good for the policies and the procedures or the, sort of the goals of keeping 
DOJ and FBI out of politics.  None of those [are] good for the AG personally.” 
We acknowledge that Comey, Lynch, and Yates faced difficult choices in late 
October 2016.  However, we found it extraordinary that Comey assessed that it was 
best that the FBI Director not speak directly with the Attorney General and Deputy 
Attorney General about how to best navigate this most important decision and 
mitigate the resulting harms, and that Comey’s decision resulted in the Attorney 
General and Deputy Attorney General concluding that it would be counterproductive 
to speak directly with the FBI Director.  We believe that open and candid 
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communication among leaders in the Department and its components is essential 
for the effective functioning of the Department. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN:  
COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATION 
I. The October 30, 2016 Search Warrant 
The FBI obtained a search warrant for the Midyear-related material on the 
Weiner laptop on October 30, 2016.  The search warrant authorized the FBI to 
search for four categories of information on the laptop: 
1.  Data and information associated with the operation, use, 
maintenance, backup, auditing, and security functions of the Subject 
Laptop...; 
2.  Data and information electronically stored on the Subject Laptop 
related to communications with email accounts used by former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of 
State; 
3.  Data and information on the Subject Laptop that might identify the 
person or persons who accessed classified information present on the 
Subject Laptop...; and 
4.  Data and information on the Subject Laptop that might identify 
activity related to a computer intrusion.... 
We discuss the Midyear team’s decision to seek a search warrant rather than 
using consent to review the laptop below.  We also discuss the narrow factual basis 
for the search warrant that the Midyear team included in the application and 
compare the Weiner laptop with the treatment of other devices during the main 
part of the Midyear investigation. 
A. Decision Not to Seek Consent from Abedin and Weiner before 
Seeking a Warrant 
Prosecutor 1 told us that there was “some discussion” of getting consent 
from Weiner and Abedin to search the laptop.  However, Prosecutor 1 stated that 
consent from both was needed and, at that point, the Midyear team’s 
understanding was that Weiner was inaccessible because he was at a location 
where he did not have access to electronic devices.  Prosecutor 1 continued: 
And...there was some concern about [Weiner’s] attorney gladly 
providing consent but wanting something from SDNY for it.  And our 
horse trading on conduct that was egregious and doing something for 
purposes of our case didn’t seem to make much sense.  I think the 
decision was made not to seek consent from either attorney and to get 
a warrant. 
Prosecutor 1 told us that he believed both FBI and the Department agreed with the 
decision to seek a search warrant rather than consent to access the Weiner laptop. 
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Baker agreed that they did not want to try to deal with Weiner or his 
attorney, but also provided an additional explanation for not seeking consent.  
Baker stated: 
I think we were concerned about that being too prolonged and 
dragged [out].  I think that reflects some of our frustration with what 
had happened previously in the investigation.  We’re trying to get 
consent, and those kinds of discussions were long and drawn out.  And 
we were just like, screw it, we’re not going to deal with that.  We’re 
just going to get a damn search warrant.  We’re just not going to, 
we’re not going to let DOJ take us down that road.  We’re just going to 
get a search warrant....  [A]nd in this case, we’ve got SDNY, and we 
think they’ll be aggressive and they’ll go get it. 
After reviewing a draft of this report, Toscas and other prosecutors noted that SDNY 
played no substantive role in the October 30 search warrant. 
B. Factual Basis of the October 30 Search Warrant Application 
The factual basis for the October 30 search warrant application, which was 
prepared by the Midyear team, contained limited information about what the NYO 
case agent had seen on the Weiner laptop and the importance of that information 
to the Midyear investigation.  The entirety of the search warrant application that 
discussed what had been seen on the Weiner laptop stated: 
In executing the search of the laptop computer (the Subject Laptop) 
pursuant to the search warrant issued on September 26, 2016, FBI 
agents sorted the emails on the Subject Laptop to segregate emails 
within the scope of the warrant from those outside of it.  As a result, 
the FBI reviewed non-content header information for emails on the 
Subject Laptop to facilitate its search.  In so doing, the FBI observed 
non-content header information indicating that thousands of emails of 
Weiner’s then wife, Huma Abedin (Abedin), resided on the Subject 
Laptop.  Because Abedin’s emails were outside the scope of the 
September 26 search warrant, the FBI did not review the content of 
those emails. 
...The non-content header information that FBI agents reviewed on the 
Subject Laptop indicates that the emails on the Subject Laptop include 
emails sent and/or received by Abedin at her @clintonemail.com 
account and at a Yahoo! email account appearing to belong to Abedin, 
as well as correspondence between one or both of these accounts and 
State Department email accounts during and around Abedin’s tenure 
at the State Department.  The FBI’s investigation of the improper 
transmission and storage of classified information on unclassified email 
systems and servers has established that emails containing classified 
information were transmitted through multiple email accounts used by 
Abedin, including her @clintonemail.com and Yahoo! email accounts. 
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The FBI’s investigation determined that Abedin, using her various 
email accounts, typically communicated with Clinton’s 
@clintonemail.com account on a daily basis.  Analysis of emails in the 
FBI’s possession revealed more than 4,000 work-related emails 
between Abedin and Clinton from 2009 to 2013. 
The FBI’s investigation established that 27 email chains containing 
classified information, as determined by the relevant original 
classification authorities, have been transmitted through Abedin’s 
@clintonemail and/or Yahoo! accounts.  Out of the 27 email chains, six 
email chains contained information that was classified at the Secret 
level at the time the emails were sent, and information in four of those 
email chains remains classified at that level now, while two email 
chains contain information that is currently classified at the 
Confidential level.  Information in the remaining 21 email chains was 
classified at the Confidential level at the time the emails were sent, 
and of those 21 email chains, information in 16 of them remains 
classified as Confidential. 
Given the information indicating that there are thousands of Abedin’s 
emails located on the Subject Laptop – including emails, during and 
around Abedin’s tenure at the State Department, from Abedin’s 
@clintonemail.com account as well as a Yahoo! account appearing to 
belong to Abedin – and the regular email correspondence between 
Abedin and Clinton, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject 
Laptop contains correspondence between Abedin and Clinton during 
their time at the State Department.  Because it has been determined 
by relevant original classification authorities that many emails were 
exchanged between Abedin, using her @clintonemail.com and/or 
Yahoo! accounts, and Clinton that contain classified information, there 
is also probable cause to believe that the correspondence between 
them located on the Subject Laptop contains classified information.... 
Noticeably absent from the search warrant application prepared by the 
Midyear team is both any mention that the NYO agent had seen Clinton’s emails on 
the laptop and any mention of the potential presence of BlackBerry emails from 
early in Clinton’s tenure.  In explaining the absence of this information, Strzok 
stated: 
I think what we were trying to do was establish as tightly as we could 
the fact that we believed, because I think the basis of the probable 
cause was that there was classified information on there....  I think it 
as that narrative was not designed to tell the whole story.  That 
narrative was to, designed to demonstrate to the magistrate that we 
have probable cause that there was evidence of a crime on there. 
We also asked Prosecutor 1 about the factual statement of probable cause 
outlined in the search warrant.  Prosecutor 1 stated: 
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[T]he [probable cause] was basically that Huma Abedin had an email 
account.  That email account communicated with email accounts where 
classified information was there.  Classified information made it into 
Huma’s email accounts.  We believe information from those email 
accounts is on this computer belonging to her husband based upon 
whatever we could describe about what that agent saw, which we had 
to characterize very carefully, and so that what tethered it to the 
computer was basically what an agent saw doing a search warrant 
from another case.  That’s the [probable cause]. 
We asked Prosecutor 1 if there was any discussion of putting in information relating 
to the BlackBerry emails from early in Clinton’s tenure.  Prosecutor 1 stated: 
I don’t think so.  If it would have helped the probable cause, I would 
have put it in.  I don’t think we had...strong enough basis to do that, 
or I would have put it in I’m sure.  Because it, I mean we would have, 
anything that we could have put in there that was true and would have 
bolstered the probable cause, we would have put in. 
We also reviewed the factual basis of the October 30 search warrant 
application with the NYO case agent for the Weiner investigation.  The case agent 
told us that each of the facts related to the Weiner laptop that were included in the 
search warrant application were known to him “within a day or two” of September 
26. 
We asked Comey for his reaction to the statement that “[e]very fact in [the 
October 30] search warrant was known to the FBI at the highest levels—at least to 
the Deputy Director level—on September 28th.”  Comey responded, “My reaction is 
it likely should have moved faster and I’d want to know, to answer this I’m asking, 
but what would their motive be to delay?” 
C. Difference in Approach to Devices during Main Investigation 
As noted previously, Comey’s decision on October 27 to have the FBI seek a 
search warrant for the Weiner laptop generated discussion among the Midyear team 
about how that approach differed from the approach that the Midyear team agreed 
upon and took during the investigation, namely to only seek Clinton’s personal 
electronic devices and not to seek the personal electronic devices of any of her 
aides.  In addition, in drafting the search warrant application for the Weiner laptop, 
a discussion occurred regarding the scope of the requested search warrant and 
whether it should be limited to emails between Clinton and Abedin, or whether it 
should include all of Abedin’s emails. 
Emails from the night of October 29 show that Baker expressed concerns 
that the draft search warrant request was too narrow.  Specifically, in an email at 
9:13 p.m. to FBI Attorney 1, Strzok, and Anderson, Baker stated, “The main 
question I [sic] have right now is why we are only seeking access to emails 
between Huma and Clinton.  Based on the facts set forth about Huma mishandling 
classified information on all of her accounts, it seems to me there is [probable 
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cause] to look at all of her emails no matter who is the other party.  Am I 
misreading the scope of the warrant or the strength of the [probable cause]?”  
Strzok responded to Baker’s email at 9:28 p.m., stating: 
I think the primary deficiency in trying to go after Huma’s own 
communications is that Huma’s role and expertise was far more 
administrative in nature than that of the other close aides to [Clinton].  
That is, when it came to classified information, she was primarily a 
conduit to/from others to Clinton, not a generator of such 
information/discussion on her own.  Whereas Sullivan or Mills had 
substantive (and sometimes classified) discussions on their own 
absent [Clinton’s] participation, Abedin’s were largely as an 
administrative conduit to the Sec’y.  Thus, it’s more challenging to 
articulate an expectation at the level of [probable cause] that we’d 
expect to find classified in her discussions not involving [Clinton].  We 
can’t exclude it, but it’s challenging.   
FBI Attorney 1 responded to Strzok’s email at 9:55 p.m., stating, “That’s right, 
Pete.  Plus, we can’t say she mishandled on all of her accounts.  Of the 27 classified 
emails, 26 were on her @clintonemail.com account and one was Yahoo.  We also 
cannot say for certain that the 27 classified emails are on this particular device, 
which also weakens our argument generally.”  In response, Baker sent an email at 
10:18 p.m., stating, “There is [probable cause] to believe that Huma used her 
email accounts to mishandle classified information.  I just don’t understand why 
that [i]s not enough to look at all her emails....  Would you please discuss with 
DOJ?”  Baker told us that he believed the FBI should seek the authority to review 
all of Abedin’s emails on the laptop, instead of just emails between Abedin and 
Clinton. 
FBI Attorney 1 told us that she recalled Baker “wanting the search warrant to 
be broader” and in an email on October 29 FBI Attorney 1 stated that Baker’s “point 
is there could be relevant emails that are not between Huma and HRC—particularly 
regarding intent.”  At 11:06 p.m. on October 29, FBI Attorney 1 sent Prosecutor 1 
and Prosecutor 2 an email informing them of Baker’s concern and adding, “I 
understand that the scope of our consensual searches has been limited to emails 
with [Clinton], but the purpose of our investigation was to look for classified 
information that transited the server, which would include Huma’s @clintonemail.  I 
honestly can’t remember how we treated those when we got consent for the second 
server, and I don’t [have] the letter in front of me.”  Prosecutor 1 responded at 
11:12 p.m., “[W]e did not look through all of Huma’s emails before (we searched 
for Clinton’s addresses but did not go through all of her emails).  We can discuss 
but that seems like a pretty big push (we only use examples of comm[uniciation]s 
with Clinton [to] establish [probable cause] for 793 offenses).”  Five minutes later, 
at 11:17 p.m., FBI Attorney 1 responded, “I honestly couldn’t remember how we 
treated Huma @clintonemail emails before given [sic].  Sounds like limiting the 
search to [Clinton] communications is consistent.” 
FBI Attorney 1 told the OIG that the Department “didn’t believe that we had 
the [probable cause] to, to be broader than that.”  Baker stated that someone at 
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either the Department or SDNY “pushed back and said no, we don’t have [probable 
cause] for that.”188 
We asked the prosecutors about this issue.  Prosecutor 1 told us that he felt 
“we need[ed] to treat Huma like we treated her earlier on in the investigation.”  
Prosecutor 1 told us that it did not make sense to “expand the bounds” of what 
they had done before when reviewing the Weiner laptop.  Prosecutor 2 also noted 
this, stating: 
And then there is also the issue of like we didn’t look at everyone’s 
emails over the course of this investigation.  We had Huma’s, some of 
like Huma’s clintonemail.com emails on the server.  And we never got 
consent or a search warrant to look through Huma’s email on the 
server because, you know, the judgment was made that like that was 
not so significant to the investigation.  So, I think from the DOJ 
perspective, we were kind of confused why this was such a significant 
development. 
During this debate with FBI on October 29, Prosecutor 1 sent an email to 
Toscas stating, “Worried that Baker and higher ups over there (or people in the 
chain) are going to say DOJ was standing in their way.  It just seems to me that 
they are pushing the bounds here all of a sudden (when they didn’t do so before).”  
We asked Prosecutor 1 about this email.  Prosecutor 1 stated that part of his 
concern was frustration at the FBI for requesting the search warrant be completed 
immediately, yet trying to suggest major changes after it was substantially 
completed.  Prosecutor 1 stated that he also felt “it didn’t make a lot of sense” for 
the purpose of probable cause “to talk about hypothetical conversations that could 
have” occurred “in order to expand the bounds of what we’re trying to do with the 
search warrant.”189 
II. Lynch-Comey Meeting on October 31 
On Monday, October 31, Lynch requested a private conversation with Comey 
after the regularly scheduled Monday morning meeting between the Department 
and the FBI.  Yates told us that she and Lynch had talked about this meeting 
beforehand and that Lynch told Yates that Lynch planned to make two points to 
Comey:  (1) the October 28th letter “was a blunder,” and (2) that Comey and the 
FBI needed to process the Weiner laptop “as fast as you can.” 
                                       
188  As noted above, after reviewing a draft of this report, Toscas and others noted that SDNY 
played no substantive role in the October 30 search warrant. 
189  In comments provided to the OIG after reviewing a draft of this report, Baker stated that 
he “had not played a significant role, if any, in scoping the prior consent agreements or legal process 
used to obtain other emails in the investigation.”  Baker continued, “Given the intense focus on the 
Weiner laptop, [Baker said he] looked more closely at this warrant application and asked what [he] 
thought were logical questions.”  Ultimately, Baker stated that he “deferred to DOJ on whether there 
was probable cause to support the seizure of additional emails.” 
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We asked Comey about this meeting.  Comey stated: 
So the two of us went into the AG’s private office...and I went over to 
sit in a chair and she closed the door and turned around and started 
walking at me with her head down and her arms out and came up to 
me because I’m so ridiculously tall and pressed her head, her face 
against my solar plexus and wrapped her arms around me and hugged 
me and then I kind of awkwardly—I’m not a hugger because I’m a 
giraffe—and so I kind of patted the Attorney General’s back and then 
the embrace—she broke the embrace and then said, “I just wanted to 
give you a hug.” 
And she went over and sat down. And then...she said, “How are you 
doing?”  I said, “I’m doing okay.”  I said, “Look this is really bad, but 
the alternative is worse.”  And then she said, “Yeah would they feel 
better if it had leaked on November 6th?”  And I just said, “Exactly 
Loretta.”  Because I hadn’t made the disclosure to Congress because 
of the leaks—the prospect of leaks, but it actually consoled me 
because really you’re not that important because even if you hadn’t 
sent a letter to Congress, which was the right thing to do, it probably 
would have leaked anyway that you were going for a search warrant 
on this stuff and she obviously saw it the same way and said, “Right, 
would they feel better if it had leaked on November 6th?”  I think she 
said.  And I said, “Exactly.” 
And then she said a nice thing, “I hope you’re holding up.”  And then 
she said—so we get up and start walking to the door.  She’s in front of 
me and then she turns around and says, “Try to look beat up.”  And so 
then she opens the door, we walk out, her staff is all out in the hallway 
and I walk out. 
And then somebody puts it out within moments that the Attorney 
General had taken me aside to give me a woodshedding or something; 
it was in the media, I think, that morning.  So she and I never spoke 
about that again, but I reasonably understood that.  Her saying you 
did the right thing, and even if you hadn’t sent the letter, it would 
have come out anyway and that would’ve been even worse and so 
that’s—I think that’s the end of the story. 
We also asked Lynch about this meeting.  Lynch told us that the reason she 
called the one-on-one meeting with Comey was primarily because she “wanted to 
talk to him about” leaks and she was concerned that Comey “didn’t want to talk 
about it in front of a larger group.”  Lynch stated: 
We went into a smaller room....  And I recall, we were both sitting 
down.  And I recall saying we have to talk about this letter and the 
aftermath of it....  I don’t recall my exact words, but I remember 
saying, you know, I know that you were aware that I did not think you 
should do this.  But, it is done now, and we have to deal with the 
aftermath of it....  And I said...this has not followed what was at least 
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conveyed to me you thought you were going to do.  And...I made the 
point that it was immediately described as the investigation was 
reopened, the full investigation was reopened. 
And he said, you know, I was very clear...I was very careful not to say 
that.  And I had heard over the weekend that he had been surprised or 
disappointed, or perhaps both, that the letter was being characterized 
in that way.  Because that was not what he wanted to say, not what 
he intended to say.  And I said, I understand that that wasn’t your 
intention, but that’s how it was taken....  I said, in many ways, it’s the 
exact opposite of what you wanted to have happen.  And I said, and I 
think it’s caused a huge problem for the Department because we have 
this perception now that we are essentially trying to harm one of the 
candidates.... 
And I raised the possibility.  I said I think you ought to think about 
sending another letter, a clarifying letter.  You’ve already done this 
now.  You have created a misimpression as to what is going on....  You 
need to clarify this and say that essentially you want to make it clear 
that this is not a reopening of the investigation.  That should be 
conveyed in there somewhere. 
And he said, how would you phrase that?  And I said, you know, I 
have not put pen to paper.  I have not wordsmithed this.  And I said, 
and I don’t think it should come from me.  It needs to come from you 
because you gave the initial letter.  I said if it comes from me, then we 
are essentially talking about internal DOJ fights and disagreements 
and everything.  And that’s throwing more into the public arena that 
shouldn’t be there.  He said, I agree with you on that.  He said I’ll 
think about that.  I’ll think about that. 
…[A]t some point, I said it’s clear to me that, that we’re going to have 
to do some statement at the end of the forensic analysis.  It could be 
part of that.  Or you could do it today.  I said, but I really think you 
need to clarify this.  And he said, I hear you, I hear you.  Which is a 
phrase that Comey uses a lot, I hear you.  And he said, I will give that 
a great deal of thought.  And he said, my concern is, and again, I don’t 
recall the exact words, but he said I have a concern that it would do 
more harm than good at this point.  And I said, okay, well let’s think 
about what it would look like. 
The other issue I raised with him was...I said, look, I’ve known you for 
a long time.  You and I have been in the Department a long time.  I 
said, my view is you would never have done something like this if you 
didn’t feel tremendous pressure to do it.  And I said, and I don’t 
understand that pressure.  I said, but, it was conveyed to me that you 
were very concerned about leaks, specifically.  And I said, I can only 
assume that you were thinking of leaks that would have been of this 
information in a much, much worse way.  And he said, you’re right.  
You’re exactly right about that. 
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Now, I knew that the laptop had been handled in a case out of New 
York.  And so I said, you know, we have to talk about the New York 
office...and the concern that both you and I have expressed about 
leaks in the past.  And I said, do you think that this was the right way 
to deal with the issue, the concern about leaks?...  He didn’t have 
much of a response.  But we were having a conversation....  And I 
said, you know, I’ve talked, you and I have talked about that before....  
[McCabe] and I have talked about them before.... 
And then I said, now, we’ve got to talk about the New York office in 
general.  And he said yes.  And I said we both work with them.  We 
both know them.  We both, you know, think highly of them.  I said, 
but this has become a problem.  And he said, and he said to me that it 
had become clear to him, he didn’t say over the course of what 
investigation or whatever, he said it’s clear to me that there is a cadre 
of senior people in New York who have a deep and visceral hatred of 
Secretary Clinton.  And he said it is, it is deep.  It’s, and he said, he 
said it was surprising to him or stunning to him. 
You know, I didn’t get the impression he was agreeing with it at all, by 
the way.  But he was saying it did exist, and it was hard to manage 
because these were agents that were very, very senior, or had even 
had timed out and were staying on, and therefore did not really feel 
under pressure from headquarters or anything to that effect.  And I 
said, you know, I’m aware of that....  I said, I wasn’t aware it was to 
this level and this depth that you’re talking about, but I said I’m sad to 
say that that does not surprise me. 
And he made a comment about, you know, you understand that.  A lot 
of people don’t understand that.  You, you get that issue.  I said, I get 
that issue.  I said I’m, I’m just troubled that this issue, meaning the, 
the New York agent issue and leaks, I am just troubled that this issue 
has put us where we are today with respect to this laptop. 
And he said again I hear you, I hear you.  I will think about that.  I will 
consider what to do.  He said, but he said again, I’m concerned that 
another letter right now that isn’t tied to a resolution of the forensics 
would just be pouring more, he didn’t say more fuel on the fire, but 
that was the phraseology, something like that that he used.  And I 
said, all right.  I said, well, let me know what you decide about 
whether to do something else or not, particularly as we go through the 
process of finding things out. 
Lynch told us that she was “sure” she “asked [Comey] if he was okay” and that she 
may have hugged him because she “often did.”  Lynch also stated that as they 
departed the room she joked with Comey and said “something like of course you’re 
going to look like I beat you up.”  Overall, Lynch described the conversation as a 
“friendly” but “tough conversation” given the “serious and significant issues” 
involved. 
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Lynch’s Chief of Staff stated that Lynch told her about the conversation with 
Comey afterwards.  Lynch’s Chief of Staff stated: 
[Lynch] said the Director had expressed that he needed to send the 
letter because he was very concerned about leaks, that it was going to 
leak out anyway that they had found these emails in relation to the 
Weiner investigation.  She may have told me something else, but I 
don’t remember.  I remember that being the big thing that he had 
focused on. 
We also reviewed McCord’s notes of a meeting she attended with Lynch on 
October 31, after Lynch’s meeting with Comey, in which the Midyear investigation 
was discussed.  The notes reflect that Lynch stated the following: 
...good vehicle for more clarifying stmt. 
need to correct misimpressions out there 
Told Director this morning [and] he wanted to think about it 
—could recap where we were at end of last week [and] talk 
about process w/out details of what we’re finding 
—will cont. our review [and] take approp. inv. steps 
—should come from Comey to clarify what he said Friday.... 
III. FBI Review of Weiner Laptop Emails 
Midyear agents obtained a copy of the Weiner laptop from NYO immediately 
after the search warrant was signed on October 30.  The laptop was taken directly 
to Quantico where the FBI’s Operational Technology Division (OTD) began 
processing the laptop.  The Lead Analyst told us that given the volume of emails on 
the laptop and the difficulty with de-duplicating the emails that “at least for the first 
few days, the scale of what we’re doing seem[ed] really, really big.”  Strzok told us 
that OTD was able “to do some amazing things” to “rapidly de-duplicate” the emails 
on the laptop, which significantly lowered the number of emails that the Midyear 
team would have to individually review.  Strzok stated that only after that 
technological breakthrough did he begin to think it was “possible we might wrap up 
before the election.” 
FBI leadership, including Comey, was briefed on an almost daily basis during 
the review process.  The Lead Analyst told us that he recalled briefing Comey on 
Friday, November 4, stating: 
I told [Comey], I said...I think there’s a possibility we may be able to 
get through this before the end of the weekend.  So he said if you 
think you can do it, you should try to.  So that’s what we did.  We 
brought in, we basically put all hands on deck for [that Saturday]. 
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The Midyear team flagged all potentially work-related emails encountered during 
the review process and compared those to emails that they had previously reviewed 
in other datasets.  Any work-related emails that were unique, meaning that they 
did not appear in any other dataset, were individually reviewed by the Lead 
Analyst, Strzok, and FBI Attorney 1 for evidentiary value. 
Analysts on the Midyear team subsequently drafted a document summarizing 
the review of the Weiner laptop entitled, “Anthony Weiner Laptop Review for 
Communications Pertinent to Midyear Exam.”  This document, dated November 15, 
2016, showed that the full image of the laptop contained approximately 1,355,980 
items, or files.  According to the document, FBI OTD initially extracted 
approximately 350,000 emails from the laptop and then approximately 344,000 
BlackBerry backup files.190  The FBI determined that 4 of the 13 BlackBerry backups 
“were assessed to belong to Abedin.”  The remaining 9 BlackBerry backups were 
associated with Weiner.  The FBI only reviewed emails to or from Clinton during the 
period in which she was Secretary of State, and not emails from Abedin to other 
parties or emails outside that period.  Analyst 1 stated, “I had very strict 
instructions that all I was allowed to do within the case was look for Hillary Clinton 
emails, because that was the scope of our work.”  Utilizing various searches 
targeting Clinton’s emails, the FBI reviewed in full “approximately 48,982” items on 
the Weiner laptop. 
The FBI ultimately “identified 13 confirmed classified email chains, the 
content of which was duplicative of emails previously recovered during the 
investigation.”  None of these emails were marked classified, but 4 of the 13 were 
classified as Secret at the time sent and 9 were classified Confidential at the time 
sent.  The FBI determined that Abedin forwarded two of the confirmed classified 
emails to Weiner.191  The FBI reviewed 6,827 emails that were either to or from 
Clinton and assessed 3,077 of those emails to be “potentially work-related.”  The 
FBI analysis of the review noted that “[b]ecause metadata was largely absent, the 
emails could not be completely, automatically de-duplicated or evaluated against 
prior emails recovered during the investigation” and therefore the FBI could not 
determine how many of the potentially work-related emails were duplicative of 
emails previously obtained in the Midyear investigation. 
                                       
190  A BlackBerry backup is a file, typically found on a personal computer, containing data from 
a BlackBerry handheld device.  The BlackBerry backup can include data from the handheld device’s 
address book, calendar, browser, email, SMS and MMS messages, phone call logs and history, as well 
as pictures and other media stored on the on-board media storage.  At the time the backup is created, 
the user can configure the specific items to be saved.  As a result, not all of the above items may be 
found in every backup. 
191  The FBI did not determine exactly how Abedin’s emails came to reside on Weiner’s laptop.  
Analyst 2 told us that it appeared that Abedin’s personal devices had been backed up on the laptop at 
various points in time.  Documents we reviewed indicated that Abedin told the FBI that she did not 
know how or why this occurred. 
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IV. Agent 1 Instant Messages from November 1 
On November 1, Agent 1 and an FBI agent uninvolved in the Midyear 
investigation exchanged the following instant messages on the FBI’s computer 
network.  The sender of each message is identified after the timestamp. 
8:31 a.m., Uninvolved Agent:  “A horrible shit sandwich.  Still no 
[grand jury] I imagine.  So, you find Huma lied; BFD.  No one at DoJ is 
going to prosecute.” 
8:33 a.m., Agent 1:  “Rog – noone is going to pros[ecute] even if we 
find unique classified.  [Grand jury] story was inaccurate – 50+ GJ 
subpoenas and 2703d issued,” 
8:37 a.m., Agent 1:  “...We only had several warrants and alot of 
consent searches on media.  I would have liked to use warrants for all 
because the consent agreements had limited scope.  Reasonable 
scope, but I don’t like to stand on the lawn and have the occupants 
throw out the evidence to us.” 
We asked Agent 1 about these messages.  Agent 1 told us that this was another 
example of a friend reaching out to him about the status of the Midyear 
investigation.  Agent 1 continued:  
I think that similar to what I’ve said before, I think this is me venting 
or complaining in a vein of, you know, but I have, I have nothing to 
substantiate.  I don’t have a statement.  I don’t have a, I don’t have 
an action that someone wouldn’t prosecute it if, if we found it. 
We asked Agent 1 about his expectation at the time of what would be found on the 
Weiner laptop and how that could impact the Midyear investigation.  Agent 1 
stated: 
I think my feeling at the time was there was a really good chance we’d 
find emails we hadn’t seen before....  That there might not be 
something that could potentially be classified...but...would it be so 
much different than what we had already seen?  I, my impression 
would probably be no. 
V. Comey Letter to Congress on November 6 
On the afternoon of November 3, the FBI began drafting what ultimately 
became Comey’s letter to Congress announcing that the FBI had completed its 
review of the emails to or from Clinton that were on the Weiner laptop.  That work 
was completed very early on November 6.  Later that same day, Comey sent his 
second letter to Congress, which we provide as Attachment F.  This letter stated: 
I write to supplement my October 28, 2016 letter that notified you the 
FBI would be taking additional investigative steps with respect to 
former Secretary of State Clinton’s use of a personal email server.  
Since my letter, the FBI investigative team has been working around 
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the clock to process and review a large volume of emails from a device 
obtained in connection with an unrelated criminal investigation.  
During that process, we reviewed all of the communications that were 
to or from Hillary Clinton while she was Secretary of State. 
Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that we 
expressed in July with respect to Secretary Clinton. 
I am very grateful to the professionals at the FBI for doing an 
extraordinary amount of high-quality work in a short period of time. 
Comey told us that he met with the Midyear team after they had finished the 
review of the emails on the Weiner laptop and “went through what they had done, 
what they had found, and their conclusion was, it does not change our view with 
respect to Hillary Clinton.”  Comey stated that there was “more work to be done 
with respect to” Abedin and Weiner to understand how the emails ended up on 
Weiner’s computer, but that the review was complete with respect to Clinton.  
Comey continued, “And then I said, okay, you know, basically convince me you’ve 
done it well.”  Once convinced, Comey stated, “I said, okay now we’re done, we 
should notify Congress that we are done.  And then we set to work on that.” 
Comey stated that Steinbach opposed the idea of a second letter.  Comey 
explained: 
And [Steinbach’s] view was, I just think it’s too late that, as I recall 
it...but that we’ve created a storm and if you try to undo the storm 
now, you’ll simply feed the storm more or something—so words to that 
effect.  I said, look I respect that view, but I think you’re wrong.  I 
think having spoken, that led to us having to speak, having spoken we 
need to, in fairness, say that we’re done.  You’ve done it well, you’ve 
been able to do it in time.  So then we shared that also with DOJ, got 
feedback and then sent that letter.  And again the goal there was to be 
as fair as possible while still accomplishing the goal of telling them that 
we’ve finished with respect to her. 
Steinbach told us that he could not recall the specifics of the debate about the 
November 6 letter, but stated, “I think maybe the November 6th one I was thinking 
look, it’s already done.  Just let it, let it go, let it die.  I can’t remember.” 
The Lead Analyst told us that he raised objections to the November 6 letter 
during discussions with Comey.  The Lead Analyst stated: 
I said I, I could understand the first statement because we were 
reopening an investigation.  We were correcting the record.  But I said 
I don’t agree that, that this time we have any obligation to do that 
because the investigation isn’t done.  We have additional investigative 
steps that are going to happen.  We’re not closed in the sense of being 
closed.  We may have, we may have come to a, a position of 
understanding about what’s on this laptop.  But to me, that same 
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obligation, which is to me what drove us to make the first statement, 
does not exist now. 
The Lead Analyst told us that the further investigative steps needed to complete the 
investigation included at least a “malware analysis” to examine the laptop for 
intrusion and a re-interview of Abedin.  Abedin was in fact re-interviewed by the 
FBI on January 6, 2017.  With regard to the malware analysis, the Lead Analyst 
explained: 
[T]he way I explain this in my thinking is, again, from my 
[counterintelligence] perspective, one of the key questions you’re 
trying to answer to any of these circumstances, especially when you’ve 
been confirmed that classified information is resident on a device that 
it shouldn’t be, is did that device get compromised by anyone.  That’s 
a part of the equation of was this of significant or negative impact to 
U.S. national security.  If it’s simply on Weiner’s laptop and that’s 
where it ended, then that’s one thing.  It’s another thing if through 
this, their actions that got on Weiner’s laptop and a foreign power 
obtained those classified, that’s a separate question.  So to me that’s 
not a, that’s not an insignificant aspect of this that was still completely 
unresolved at the time. 
The Lead Analyst stated, “Then ultimately, the Director looked at me, and...he 
thanked me and thanked everybody for our candor, as always.  And he said, but I 
have decided we’re going to do it.  And we’re going to make it, you know, the 
statement and, that’s kind of it.” 
At 7:52 p.m. on November 5, Page sent a text message to Strzok that 
stated, “I don’t want to make a statement anymore.”  Strzok responded at 7:58 
p.m., stating, in part, “Yeah I don’t either.  We’re kind of out of the news cycle, 
let’s leave it that way.”  At 8:11 a.m. on November 6, Page sent another text 
message to Strzok that stated, “I still don’t know that we should make this 
statement.”  Strzok immediately responded, “I don’t either.  Imsg?” 
After being shown these text messages, Strzok stated that he thought the 
decision to send the November 6 letter was “easier” then the decision about the 
October 28 letter.  However, Strzok stated that he was concerned that every time 
the FBI acted it “invigorate[d] the news cycle.”  We also asked Strzok and Page 
about their use of iMessage, a built-in instant message service on Apple devices.  
As described in more detail in Chapter Twelve, Strzok and Page told us that they 
mostly used iMessage and personal email for personal use.  However, Strzok told us 
could not exclude the possibility that he sent work-related information over 
iMessage.  Similarly, Page told us that references to these other forums reflected 
“mostly personal use” as opposed to using them for work purposes.  However, she 
stated that she and Strzok sometimes used these forums for work-related 
discussions due to the technical limitations of FBI-issued phones. 
Unlike the October 28 letter, the FBI sent a draft copy of the November 6 
letter to the Department and the Department participated meaningfully in the 
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drafting process.  Axelrod stated that he “insisted” upon seeing the letter and he, 
along with Toscas and Associate Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools, provided 
comments and edits. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE:  
TEXT MESSAGES, INSTANT MESSAGES, USE OF PERSONAL 
EMAIL, AND ALLEGED IMPROPER DISCLOSURES OF 
NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION 
This Chapter discusses text messages from FBI-issued mobile devices and 
instant messages exchanged on FBI systems that raised concerns of potential bias.  
We describe key text messages and instant messages we identified during our 
review, as well as explanations for these messages that the involved employees 
offered during their OIG interviews.  We also identified instances where FBI 
employees, including Comey and Strzok, used personal email accounts to conduct 
official government business.  Lastly, we discuss allegations that Department and 
FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public information. 
I. Text Messages and Instant Messages 
During the course of our review, we requested and received text messages 
from FBI-issued mobile devices and instant messages exchanged on the FBINet and 
SCINet Lync applications for FBI personnel involved in the Midyear investigation.192  
We also requested text messages for Department personnel involved in the Midyear 
investigation, but were informed that the Department does not retain text 
messages for more than 5 to 7 days.193  The OIG previously expressed concerns in 
a 2015 report about the text message retention practices of the Department’s four 
law enforcement components, and we recommend that ODAG consider taking steps 
to improve the retention and monitoring of text messages Department-wide.194  
After receiving FBI text messages and instant messages responsive to 
keywords we provided to the FBI, we identified messages for certain FBI personnel 
                                       
192  FBINet is the FBI’s computer system for information classified at the Secret level, while its 
SCINet system handles Top Secret and compartmented information. 
193  After reviewing a draft of this report, the Midyear prosecutors told the OIG that they did 
not use text messages, and that the only text messages they received were from the Midyear agents 
about logistical arrangements. 
194  In March 2015, the OIG issued a report pertaining to the handling of sexual harassment 
allegations by the Department’s four law enforcement components, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. 
Marshal’s Service (USMS).  In that report, we noted that all four components had weaknesses 
detecting sexually explicit text messages and images, and that two components did not archive text 
messages sent and received by its employees.  We therefore recommended that all four law 
enforcement components, in coordination with ODAG, should (1) acquire and implement technology 
and establish procedures to effectively preserve text messages and images for a reasonable period of 
time, and should make that information available to misconduct investigators and for discovery 
purposes; and (2) take concrete steps to acquire and implement technology to proactively monitor 
text message and image data for potential misconduct.  See U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG), The Handling of Sexual Harassment and Misconduct Allegations by the 
Department’s Law Enforcement Components, Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 15-04 (March 
2016), https://go.usa.gov/xQGz4 (accessed May 9, 2018). 
396 
that raised concerns about potential bias.  We then obtained all text messages and 
instant messages for those FBI personnel for the entire period of the Midyear 
investigation through July 1, 2017, to capture post-election discussions.  We 
identified communications from five different FBI employees that we discuss in this 
section.195 
First, we identified text messages exchanged between DAD Peter Strzok and 
Lisa Page, Special Counsel to former Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, on their FBI-
issued cell phones.  These text messages included political opinions about 
candidates and issues involved in the 2016 presidential election, including 
statements of hostility toward then candidate Trump and statements of support for 
candidate Clinton.  Several of their text messages also appeared to mix political 
opinions with discussions about the Midyear and Russia investigations, raising a 
question as to whether Strzok’s and Page’s political opinions may have affected 
investigative decisions.  In addition to being involved in the Midyear and Russia 
investigations, both Page and Strzok were also briefly assigned to the investigation 
conducted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller III.  
Next, we identified instant messages exchanged on FBINet involving Agent 1 
and Agent 5.  As noted previously, Agent 1 was assigned to the Midyear 
investigative team and was one of the four case agents.  Agent 5 was assigned to 
the Midyear filter team.  We discussed in Chapter Five a number of Agent 1’s 
instant messages that expressed opinions that were critical of the conduct and 
quality of the Midyear investigation.  In addition to those messages, we identified 
two instant message exchanges involving Agent 1 that appeared to combine a 
discussion of politics with a discussion of the Midyear investigation.  We also 
identified instant messages between Agent 1 and Agent 5 that expressed support 
for candidate Clinton and hostility toward first candidate and then President Trump. 
Finally, we identified instant messages sent on FBINet by FBI Attorney 2.  
FBI Attorney 2 was assigned to the Midyear investigation, the Russia investigation, 
and the Special Counsel investigation.  We found instant messages in which FBI 
Attorney 2 discussed political issues, including three instant message exchanges 
that raised concerns of potential bias.   
In this section, we describe key text messages and instant messages we 
identified during our review, as well as explanations for these messages that the 
employees offered during their OIG interviews.      
A. Text Messages between Lisa Page and Peter Strzok 
Peter Strzok is an experienced counterintelligence agent who was promoted 
to Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) of the Espionage Section in September 2016.  
                                       
195  We identified other text messages and instant messages in which FBI employees involved 
in the Midyear investigation discussed political issues and candidates.  This Chapter does not include a 
discussion of every political text message or instant message that we identified.  Instead, we discuss 
only those messages that we found raised the most significant questions of potential bias or improper 
motivation based on their content, timing, or the individuals involved. 
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As described in the previous chapters, Strzok was assigned to the Midyear 
investigation in August 2015 and was responsible for supervising the investigation 
on a daily basis.  Page was named counsel to then Deputy Director Andrew McCabe 
in February 2016, and served as his liaison to the Midyear investigative team from 
February 2016 forward. 
In addition to their roles in the Midyear investigation, both Page and Strzok 
were involved in the FBI investigation into the Russian government’s efforts to 
interfere in the 2016 presidential election.196  Strzok was assigned to lead the 
Russia investigation in late July 2016.197  Page also worked on the Russia 
investigation, and told us that she served the same liaison function as she did in 
the Midyear investigation.  Both Page and Strzok accepted invitations to work on 
the Special Counsel staff in 2017.  Page told the OIG that she accepted a 45-day 
temporary duty assignment but returned to work in the Deputy Director’s office at 
the FBI on or around July 15, 2017.  Strzok was removed from the Special 
Counsel’s investigation on approximately July 28, 2017, and returned to the FBI in 
another position, after the OIG informed the DAG and Special Counsel of the text 
messages discussed in this report on July 27, 2017. 
As noted above, after finding responsive text messages between Page and 
Strzok that appeared to intermingle political comments with discussions of the 
Midyear investigation, the OIG obtained from the FBI all text messages between 
Strzok and Page from their FBI-issued phones for the entire period of the Clinton 
email server investigation as well as the period of the Russia investigation during 
which Strzok and Page worked on it.  The OIG received more than 40,000 unique 
text messages between Strzok and Page in response to these requests.198  The FBI 
did not provide any text messages for the period from December 15, 2016, to May 
17, 2017, because of issues with the data collection and preservation software used 
on the FBI’s Samsung S5 mobile devices.  However, OIG forensic agents obtained 
the phones used by Strzok and Page, and recovered a large number of the text 
                                       
196  On March 20, 2017, then Director Comey testified before Congress that the FBI began an 
investigation in late July 2016 into “the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 
presidential election,” including “investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated 
with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination 
between the campaign and Russia’s efforts.” 
197  Supervision of the Russia investigation was briefly transitioned from Strzok to another 
Counterintelligence Division DAD in early 2017.  However, AD Priestap told us that FBI leadership 
decided to keep Strzok involved in the Russia investigation and he was therefore reassigned back to it. 
198  The FBI produced 73,900 text messages between Strzok and Page from the period June 
30, 2015, to December 1, 2016; 1,368 text messages from the period December 1 to December 14, 
2016; and 2,054 text messages from the period May 18 to July 1, 2017.  However, these included 
significant numbers of duplicates.  We estimate that the number of unique text messages exchanged 
between Strzok and Page exceeded 40,000.  The FBI pulled the majority of these text messages from 
Page’s archives, as Strzok’s text messages were not consistently preserved due to compatibility 
problems between the FBI’s text message preservation software and the Samsung S5 cell phones 
used by the FBI.  Issues related to the preservation of text messages affected a large number of FBI 
employees, and OIG forensic agents determined that the failure to preserve Strzok’s text messages 
resulted from this compatibility issue, not from the actions of any FBI employee, including Strzok.  
Text message preservation resumed in May 2017, after Page received a Samsung S7 phone. 
398 
messages from this “gap” period.  For the gap period, the OIG recovered 9,311 text 
messages from Strzok’s phone and 10,760 text messages from Page’s phone, some 
of which were duplicates or text messages exchanged with other people.  Although 
the number and frequency of text messages is generally consistent with previous 
time periods, we cannot definitively say that our forensic recovery captured every 
text message exchanged between Page and Strzok during the gap period.199 
The text messages between Page and Strzok covered a wide range of topics.  
For example, we identified a large number of routine work-related communications.  
Many of the text messages were of a personal nature, including discussions about 
their families, medical issues, and daily events, and reflected that Strzok and Page 
were communicating on their FBI-issued phones as part of an extramarital affair. 
We found that this relationship was relevant to the frequency and candid nature of 
the text messages and their use of FBI-issued phones to communicate.  Some of 
these text messages expressed political opinions about candidates and issues 
involved in the 2016 presidential election, including statements of hostility toward 
candidate Trump and statements of support for candidate Clinton.  
We identified three categories of text messages that raised concerns about 
potential bias in FBI investigations. The first were text messages of a political 
nature commenting on Trump and Clinton.  We specifically highlight these text 
messages because Strzok and Page played important roles in investigations 
involving both Trump and Clinton, and the exchange of these text messages on an 
FBI-issued device potentially created an appearance of bias.  The second category 
we identified were text messages that combined expressions of political sentiments 
with a discussion of the Midyear investigation, potentially indicating or creating the 
appearance that investigative decisions were impacted by bias or improper 
considerations.  The third category raised similar questions with respect to the 
Russia investigation.  We also include a fourth category of text messages that have 
received significant public attention.  These messages are included to provide 
context and further explanation as to their meaning, and do not necessarily 
implicate potential bias in either the Midyear or Russia investigations.  Examples of 
these four categories of text messages are discussed below.200  We also include 
                                       
199  The OIG is preparing a separate report on its text message recovery efforts and findings. 
200  This Chapter includes the text messages we found most relevant to our review.  However, 
Page and Strzok sent other text messages about candidates and issues involved in the 2016 
presidential election, unrelated to the Midyear or Russia investigations, and also sent numerous text 
messages, both positive and negative, about other public and government officials from both political 
parties.  These included former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley (“And Martin O’Malley’s a douche,” 
October 14, 2015), Congressman Paul Ryan (“And I hope Paul Ryan fails and crashes in a blaze of 
glory,” November 1, 2015), Ohio Governor John Kasich (“Poor Kasich. He's the only sensible man up 
there,” “Exactly re Kasich. And he has ZERO appeal,” March 4, 2016), former Attorney General Eric 
Holder (“Oh God, Holder! Turn [the television] off turn it off turn it off!!!!” “Yeah, I saw him yesterday 
and booed at the tv,” July 27, 2016), and others.  Page and Strzok told us that these additional text 
messages were relevant because they reflected that Trump was not singled out by them for criticism 
or criticized for partisan reasons. 
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explanations provided by Page and Strzok during their OIG interviews about these 
text messages. 
1. Text Messages Commenting on Trump or Clinton 
In this section, we highlight examples of text messages of a political nature 
commenting on Trump and Clinton.  We include explanations provided by Page and 
Strzok about their use of FBI-issued phones in general and their use of FBI-issued 
phones for political discussions.  The sender of each text message is identified after 
the date. 
 August 16, 2015, Strzok:  “[Bernie Sanders is] an idiot like Trump.  
Figure they cancel each other out.”201 
 February 12, 2016, Page:  “I’m no prude, but I’m really appalled by 
this.  So you don’t have to go looking (in case you hadn’t heard), 
Trump called him the p-word.  The man has no dignity or class.  He 
simply cannot be president.  With a Slur for Ted Cruz, Donald Trump 
Further Splits Voters http://nyti.ms/1XoICkO.” 
 February 12, 2016, Strzok:  “Oh, [Trump’s] abysmal.  I keep hoping 
the charade will end and people will just dump him.  The problem, 
then, is Rubio will likely lose to Cruz.  The Republican party is in utter 
shambles.  When was the last competitive ticket they offered?” 
 March 3, 2016, Page:  “God trump is a loathsome human.” 
 March 3, 2016, Strzok:  “Omg [Trump’s] an idiot. 
 March 3, 2016, Page:  “He’s awful.” 
 March 3, 2016, Strzok:  “God Hillary should win 100,000,000-0.” 
 March 3, 2016, Page:  “Also did you hear [Trump] make a comment 
about the size of his d*ck earlier?  This man cannot be president.” 
 March 12, 2016:  Page forwarded an article about a “far right” 
candidate in Texas, stating, “[W]hat the f is wrong with people?”  
Strzok replied, “That Texas article is depressing as hell.  But answers 
how we could end up with President trump.” 
 March 16, 2016, Page:  “I cannot believe Donald Trump is likely to be 
an actual, serious candidate for president.” 
 June 11, 2016, Strzok:  “They fully deserve to go, and demonstrate 
the absolute bigoted nonsense of Trump.” 
 July 18, 2016, Page:  “…Donald Trump is an enormous d*uche.” 
                                       
201  All text messages produced to the OIG reflected Greenwich Mean Time.  As a result, some 
text messages sent late at night bore the wrong date.  We have corrected times and, where 
necessary, dates in this report to reflect the Eastern Time Zone.  In addition, some text messages 
used emojis and other formatting symbols, which we omitted unless they affected the meaning of the 
text message.  We also excluded other intervening text messages that did not contribute to 
understanding the highlighted text messages. 
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 July 19, 2016, Page:  “Trump barely spoke, but the first thing out of 
his mouth was ‘we’re going to win soooo big.’  The whole thing is like 
living in a bad dream.” 
 July 21, 2016, Strzok:  “Trump is a disaster. I have no idea how 
destabilizing his Presidency would be.” 
 August 26, 2016, Strzok:  “Just went to a southern Virginia Walmart. I 
could SMELL the Trump support....” 
 September 26, 2016, Page:  Page sent an article to Strzok entitled, 
“Why Donald Trump Should Not Be President,” stating, “Did you read 
this?  It’s scathing.  And I’m scared.” 
 October 19, 2016, Strzok:  “I am riled up.  Trump is a fucking idiot, is 
unable to provide a coherent answer.” 
 November 3, 2016, Page:  “The nyt probability numbers are dropping 
every day.  I’m scared for our organization.” 
 November 3, 2016, Strzok:  “[Jill] Stein and moron [Gary] Johnson are 
F’ing everything up, too.” 
 November 7, 2016, Strzok:  Referencing an article entitled “A victory 
by Mr. Trump remains possible,” Strzok stated, “OMG THIS IS 
F*CKING TERRIFYING.” 
 November 13, 2016, Page:  “I bought all the president’s men.  Figure I 
needed to brush up on watergate.”202 
Both Strzok and Page agreed to multiple voluntary interviews with the OIG 
regarding, among other things, their text messages.  The OIG asked Strzok and 
Page each to comment in general on the text messages.  Strzok explained that the 
text messages reflected his “personal opinion talking to a friend.”  He stated that 
ingrained in FBI culture was a “bright and inviolable line between what you think 
personally and belief and the conduct of your official business,” and that the 
political opinions he expressed in the text messages “never transited into the 
official realm.  In any way.  Not in discussions, not in acts.”  Strzok acknowledged 
that “it was dumb to do that all on a government device,” but distinguished his 
private exchanges with Page from a more public forum where expressing such 
views might call into question the integrity of an FBI investigation.  When 
questioned about the possibility that exchanges on his government device could be 
hacked, obtained by the media, or otherwise exposed to the public, he 
acknowledged that “I can envision a number of scenarios” where it could impact an 
investigation. 
Strzok stated most people would have no idea of his partisan affiliation and 
that “[i]t was a point of pride on Midyear that we absolutely conducted that 
                                       
202  Among the text messages forensically recovered by the OIG in May 2018 was another 
exchange about “All the President’s Men.”  On March 14, 2017, Page texted, “Finally two pages away 
from finishing atpm. Did you know the president resigns in the end?!  ”  Strzok replied, “What?!?! 
God, that we should be so lucky.” 
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investigation and pursued the truth in a manner that was protected from bias or 
influence and was simply apolitical.”  He further stated, “I did not either in Midyear 
or any other case act in a vacuum....  I had subordinates, I had peers, I had 
supervisors,” and that none of these people would say that he had acted in a biased 
manner in carrying out his official duties. 
Page told us that these text messages reflected her personal opinions 
regarding candidate Trump’s fitness to be president and her preference for Clinton, 
but that she did not allow her political views to impact investigative steps on the 
Midyear investigation.  She stated, “Because I was on the Clinton investigation, I 
actually felt extremely constrained from talking to anyone about politics at all....  
And so, Pete being a good friend, it was in a way a, like a safe place to sort of have 
a conversation about what was...the normal sort of news of the day because...we 
both knew that we weren’t, it wasn’t impacting anything that we were doing.”  She 
pointed out that many of the text messages in question were sent after the Midyear 
investigation was effectively concluded on July 5, 2016, at which point she said she 
personally felt less constrained to express an opinion.  Page stated that she was 
“responsible for no single decision at all with respect to the case,” but that her role 
was rather to communicate information between FBI executive leadership and the 
investigative team.  She also said she was not the sole source of information to 
executive leadership. 
When asked about using her FBI-issued phone for these exchanges, Page 
told us, “[T]he predominant reason that we communicated on our work phones was 
because we were trying to keep our affair a secret from our spouses.”  Page also 
said, “I guess I didn’t feel like I was doing anything wrong.  I’m an American.  We 
have the First Amendment.  I’m entitled to an opinion....  I saw it as, I still see it as 
so separate from the investigative activity we were taking in the, in Midyear that I 
didn’t, didn’t really think about it, to be honest with you.” 
2. Text Messages Discussing Political Sentiments and the 
Midyear Investigation 
In this section, we highlight examples of text messages that appear to 
combine expressions of political sentiments with discussion of the Midyear 
investigation.  We provide background and context where possible to assist in 
understanding the text messages.  We also include the explanations provided by 
Page and Strzok about these text messages. 
February 24, 2016:  In connection with a discussion about how many 
people from the FBI and Department should be present during a potential interview 
of former Secretary Clinton, Page stated in a February 24, 2016 text message to 
Strzok, “One more thing: she might be our next president.  The last thing you need 
us going in there loaded for bear.  You think she’s going to remember or care that it 
was more doj than fbi?”  Strzok replied, “Agreed....”  Page sent similar text 
messages to McCabe and another FBI employee around the same time, adding that 
having a larger number in the room “is not operationally necessary” and that “[t]his 
is as much about reputational protection as anything.”  These text messages 
occurred at almost the midpoint of the Midyear investigation, before Clinton’s 
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interview was formally scheduled.  Ultimately, Clinton was interviewed on July 2, 
2016, and there were three FBI and five Department officials in the room.  Page did 
not attend the interview. 
Both Page and Strzok told the OIG that these messages did not reflect that 
the FBI took into account the likelihood that former Secretary Clinton would be 
president when conducting her interview.  Page told us that her text message was 
advocating that the FBI should “follow the practice we always, always follow” with 
respect to who would attend Clinton’s interview, “and not do something that might 
otherwise negatively impact [Clinton’s] thinking or her feeling about the FBI in 
general.”  She stated that having fewer people present in an interview is generally 
better for building rapport and ensuring that the right people are asking the 
questions, and that by “loaded for bear” she meant having a large number of 
interviewers in the room, which might look “like we’re trying to intimidate” Clinton.  
Strzok told us he did not interpret Page’s text message to suggest that the FBI 
should treat Clinton differently “because she might be the next president,” and he 
stated that he was certain he “made no decision based on anything [Clinton] might 
be or become or have done.” 
July 26, 2016:  Strzok and Page exchanged a series of text messages on 
July 26, 2016, while they appeared to be watching television coverage of the 
Democratic National Convention.  In the course of this exchange, Page texted, 
“Yeah, it is pretty cool.  [Clinton] just has to win now.  I’m not going to lie, I got a 
flash of nervousness yesterday about trump.  The sandernistas have the potential 
to make a very big mistake here....”  Strzok responded, “I’m not worried about 
them.  I’m worried about the anarchist Assanges who will take fed information and 
disclose it to disrupt.  We’ve gotta get the memo and brief and case filing done.” 
Strzok told us that “the memo” he was referring to was the closing 
Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) summarizing the Clinton email server investigation.  
Strzok said he was not certain what the “brief and case filing” referred to, but 
speculated these could have related to a FOIA filing.  When asked if his text 
message meant that the LHM needed to be completed because he was worried 
about Trump and wanted Clinton to win, Strzok said, “No, not at all.”  He described 
this exchange as a “discussion that is purely in that private, personal realm about 
beliefs and opinions that are personal opinions intermixed [with discussion of work 
tasks] because, as a work colleague, there are a lot of things going on, and they do 
get intermixed.”  Strzok stated that mixing work and personal communications in 
the same text message exchange, on the same device, was “dumb” and 
acknowledged that it could create a perception issue.  He again emphasized that he 
never took any investigative step designed to help or hurt Clinton or Trump. 
Page told us that she was not sure what the “memo and brief and case filing” 
referred to but that it might have been a related classified issue.  She stated that 
she did not read Strzok’s text message to connect the need to “get the memo and 
brief and case filing done” with his political preferences.  Rather, Page stated that 
she thought that the use of “fed” in the text message may have been an erroneous 
auto-correction of an unclassified acronym of a codename and that Strzok was 
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referring to concerns about leaks by actors like Assange (Wikileaks) “who will leak 
classified information.” 
3. Text Messages Discussing Political Sentiments and the 
Russia Investigation 
In this section, we highlight examples of text messages that appear to 
combine expressions of political sentiments with discussion of the Russia 
investigation.  We provide background and context where possible to assist in 
understanding the text messages.  We also include the explanations provided by 
Page and Strzok about these text messages. 
July 31, 2016:  In connection with formal opening of the FBI’s Russia 
investigation, Strzok texted Page:  “And damn this feels momentous.  Because this 
matters.  The other one did, too, but that was to ensure we didn’t F something up.  
This matters because this MATTERS.  So super glad to be on this voyage with you.” 
Strzok told us the “other one” referred to in the text message was the 
Midyear investigation.  He said his text message was comparing and contrasting the 
Midyear investigation with the Russia investigation, and reflected his view that “if 
there is criminal activity there [in Midyear], it is comparatively limited, versus 
allegations [in the Russia investigation] which are of the most extraordinarily, 
potentially grave conduct.”  He said that his assessment of the significance of the 
Russia investigation was not affected by his personal feelings toward Trump and 
that it would be the same if another campaign were involved. 
August 6, 2016:  In an exchange on August 6, 2016, Page forwarded Strzok 
a news article relating to Trump’s criticism of the Khans (the Gold Star family who 
appeared at the Democratic National Convention) and stated, “Jesus.  You should 
read this.  And Trump should go f himself.”  Strzok responded favorably to the 
article and added, “And F Trump.”  Page replied, “So.  This is not to take away from 
the unfairness of it all, but we are both deeply fortunate people.”  She then sent 
another text message, “And maybe you’re meant to stay where you are because 
you’re meant to protect the country from that menace.  To that end, read this:” and 
forwarded a David Brooks column from the New York Times about Trump “enablers” 
in the Republican Party who had not opposed Trump.  Strzok responded, “Thanks.  
It’s absolutely true that we’re both very fortunate.  And of course I’ll try and 
approach it that way.  I just know it will be tough at times.  I can protect our 
country at many levels, not sure if that helps....” 
When asked to explain what she meant by “you’re meant to protect the 
country from that menace,” Page began by stating, “I was totally appalled that the 
President would insult the father of a dead service member....  And just find that 
unconscionable and disgusting and cruel.”  She also stated that the “menace” was 
“the potential threat to national security that Trump or his people pose if [the] 
predication [for the Russia investigation] is true.”  Strzok told us that he did not 
interpret Page’s reference to “protect the country from that menace” to refer to 
Trump.  He stated, “I take menace a little differently.  I take, I take the menace as, 
again, I view any foreign interference with our electoral process to be a threat, to 
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be a violation of law....  So when I see menace, I, you know, is that Trump, is that 
Russian interference, is it the combination of the two?” 
August 8, 2016:  In a text message on August 8, 2016, Page stated, 
“[Trump’s] not ever going to become president, right?  Right?!”  Strzok responded, 
“No.  No he’s not.  We’ll stop it.”203   
When asked about this text message, Strzok stated that he did not 
specifically recall sending it, but that he believed that it was intended to reassure 
Page that Trump would not be elected, not to suggest that he would do something 
to impact the investigation.  Strzok told the OIG that he did not take any steps to 
try to affect the outcome of the presidential election, in either the Midyear 
investigation or the Russia investigation.  Strzok stated that had he—or the FBI in 
general—actually wanted to prevent Trump from being elected, they would not 
have maintained the confidentiality of the investigation into alleged collusion 
between Russia and members of the Trump campaign in the months before the 
election.  Page similarly stated that, although she could not speak to what Strzok 
meant by that text message, the FBI’s decision to keep the Russia investigation 
confidential before the election shows that they did not take steps to impact the 
outcome of the election. 
August 15, 2016:  In a text message exchange on August 15, 2016, Strzok 
told Page, “I want to believe the path you threw out for consideration in Andy’s 
office—that there’s no way he gets elected—but I’m afraid we can’t take that risk.  
It’s like an insurance policy in the unlikely event you die before you’re 40....”  The 
“Andy” referred to in the text message appears to be FBI Deputy Director Andrew 
McCabe.  McCabe was not a party to this text message, and we did not find 
evidence that he received it. 
In an interview with the OIG, McCabe was shown the text message and he 
told us that he did not know what Strzok was referring to in the message and 
recalled no such conversation.  Page likewise told us she did not know what that 
text message meant, but that the team had discussions about whether the FBI 
would have the authority to continue the Russia investigation if Trump was elected.  
Page testified that she did not find a reference in her notes to a meeting in 
McCabe’s office at that time. 
Strzok provided a lengthy explanation for this text message.  In substance, 
Strzok told us that he did not remember the specific conversation, but that it likely 
was part of a discussion about how to handle a variety of allegations of “collusion 
between members of the Trump campaign and the government of Russia.”  As part 
of this discussion, the team debated how aggressive to be and whether to use overt 
investigative methods.  Given that Clinton was the “prohibitive favorite” to win, 
                                       
203  Although we received Page’s August 8 text message to Strzok from the FBI as part of its 
production of text messages in 2017, Strzok’s response to Page was not among those preserved by 
the FBI’s text message preservation software, and therefore was not produced to us.  The OIG’s Cyber 
Investigations Office recovered this text message, along with others, in May 2018 through forensic 
analysis of a folder found on Page’s and Strzok’s Samsung S5 devices.   
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Strzok said that they discussed whether it made sense to compromise sensitive 
sources and methods to “bring things to some sort of precipitative conclusion and 
understanding.”  Strzok said the reference in his text message to an “insurance 
policy” reflected his conclusion that the FBI should investigate the allegations 
thoroughly right away, as if Trump were going to win.  Strzok stated that Clinton’s 
position in the polls did not ultimately impact the investigative decisions that were 
made in the Russia matter. 
May 18, 2017:  Mueller was appointed Special Counsel on May 17, 2017.  
The next day Strzok and Page exchanged text messages in a discussion of whether 
Strzok should join the Special Counsel’s investigation.  Strzok wrote:  “For me, and 
this case, I personally have a sense of unfinished business.  I unleashed it with 
MYE.  Now I need to fix it and finish it.”  Later in the same exchange, Strzok, 
apparently while weighing his career options, made this comparison:  “Who gives a 
f*ck, one more A[ssistant] D[irector]...[versus] [a]n investigation leading to 
impeachment?”204  Later in this exchange, Strzok stated, “you and I both know the 
odds are nothing.  If I thought it was likely I’d be there no question.  I hesitate in 
part because of my gut sense and concern there’s no big there there.” 
Strzok acknowledged that his text messages could be read to suggest that 
Strzok held himself responsible for Trump’s victory and Clinton’s defeat because of 
the Midyear investigation and that he viewed the Russia investigation as providing 
him an opportunity to “fix” this result by working on an investigation that could 
result in the impeachment of President Trump.  However, Strzok said he strongly 
disagreed with this interpretation and provided a lengthy explanation for these 
statements.  Strzok said that he wanted to “finish” the Russia investigation rather 
than be reassigned midway through and lose the institutional knowledge of issues 
being investigated by the Special Counsel.  He further stated that he was referring 
to Russia’s use of the Midyear investigation in its election interference efforts.  
Strzok explained, “[I]t wasn’t so much the investigation about Midyear, but then 
how it played into, how it was being portrayed in the political environment, how it 
was being leveraged by the government of Russia and all the social media 
disseminations....  [W]e then came to see all this kind of overlap and replaying of 
events with regard to the involvement of Russia, and certainly the back-and-forth 
with some elements of the Trump campaign.”  When asked what he wanted “to fix,” 
Strzok identified the misperception that “Russia wasn’t involved,” given that “Russia 
did interfere with our elections.” 
                                       
204  Strzok expressed similar sentiments in an email to Page using his FBI UNET (unclassified) 
account.  On May 22, 2017, at a time when Page was working for the Special Counsel but Strzok had 
not yet joined the Special Counsel investigation, Page forwarded Strzok a Washington Post article 
entitled, “Trump asked intelligence chiefs to push back against FBI collusion probe after Comey 
revealed its existence.”  Strzok responded saying, “Yup.  Assuming you/team will do it via Mueller?”  
When Page confirmed this, Strzok responded, “God I suddenly want on this.  You know why.”  Page 
replied that she would leave the Special Counsel investigation and “happily” return to her work at the 
FBI if Strzok really wanted to join the investigation.  Strzok responded, “I’m torn.  I think – know – 
I’m more replaceable than you are in this.  I’m the best for it, but there are others who can do OK.  
You are different and more unique.  This is yours.  Plus, leaving a S[pecial] C[ounsel] (having been an 
SC) resulting in an impeachment as an attorney is VERY different than leaving as an investigator....” 
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When asked to explain his comment about working on an investigation 
“leading to impeachment?” Strzok denied that he had already prejudged the Russia 
investigation.  He described himself as a person: 
[W]ho has had access to the information about the, all of these cases 
and all of the ins and outs of what the allegations [in the Russia 
investigation] are.  And that he has both, as it matters as a public 
servant, he has a professional concern about the allegations....  And 
he is concerned on the impact of the national security of the United 
States.  He finds that he has an expertise and a competence in this 
line of work, and he feels compelled and driven to pursue that and 
pursue those facts where they lay. 
He stated further that his professional actions, including on the staff of the Special 
Counsel, were not affected by political bias. 
We also asked Strzok about his “no big there there” message.”  Strzok 
stated: 
As I looked at the predicating information, as I looked at the facts as 
we understood them from...the allegations that Russia had these 
emails, and offered to members of the Trump campaign to release 
them.  As we looked at the various actors, the question [was,]...was 
that part of a broad, coordinated effort, or was that simply a bunch of 
opportunists seeking to advance their own or individual 
agendas...which of that is it? 
...My question [was] about whether or not this represented a large, 
coordinated conspiracy or not.  And from that, as I looked at what 
would give me professional fulfillment, what I thought would be the 
best use of my skills and talents for the FBI and for the United States, 
whether to take, which path to take. 
Page stated that she understood Strzok’s reference to “unfinished business” 
that he had “unleashed” and needed “to fix and finish” to be “a reflection of our 
Director having been fired,” and “the purported reason for why the Director was 
fired was his mishandling of the Midyear investigation, and the work force was, you 
know, in mutiny, and it was all about Midyear.”  She disagreed with the suggestion 
that Strzok felt responsible for Clinton’s defeat in the election.  She said she 
interpreted Strzok’s reference to impeachment to mean he wanted to be involved in 
the Russia investigation because it was so important “it might lead to 
impeachment,” not because “it will lead to impeachment.”205  (Emphasis added).  In 
response to the OIG’s question as to whether Strzok’s text messages made it 
appear that he was biased against Trump from the beginning of the Special Counsel 
investigation, Page acknowledged that the text messages could be read that way, 
                                       
205  Strzok gave a similar explanation for the email he sent to Page referencing a Special 
Counsel investigation “resulting in an impeachment.”  He stated, “[W]hile it says that, I think my 
sense was very much, you know, where it could result in an impeachment.  I am, again, was not, am 
not convinced or certain that it will....” 
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but stated, “[T]hat’s just not how I read it.”  She stated, “He wants to finish the 
Russia investigation to do, right, this President fired the Director.  This President’s 
team is being investigated for potentially colluding with the Russians in the 2016 
election.  So, [he] want[s] to finish [his] involvement.” 
4. Other Notable Text Messages 
In this section, we briefly discuss other text message exchanges between 
Page and Strzok that have received significant public attention. 
April 1, 2016:  On April 1, 2016, Page sent the following text message to 
Strzok:  “So look, you say we text on that phone when we talk about hillary 
because it can’t be traced, you were just venting bc you feel bad that you’re gone 
so much but it can’t be helped right now.”  Page told us that this was an example of 
why she and Strzok used their work phones to conceal their affair from their 
spouses.  Page stated, “[T]hat [text message] follows us communicating personally 
on our personal phones, and his wife inquiring what it is he was doing.  And so my 
saying, tell her we’re talking about Hillary is not in fact because we were talking 
about Hillary, but coming up with an explanation for him to provide his wife with 
respect to why we were on that phone.” 
June 30, 2016:  On June 30, 2016, Strzok sent the following text message 
to Page:  “...Just left Bill....  He changed President to ‘another senior government 
official.’”  Based on context, Strzok told us “Bill” referred to Priestap.  Strzok 
stated: 
My recollection is that the early Comey speech drafts included 
references to emails that Secretary Clinton had with President Obama 
and I think there was some conversation about, well do we want to be 
that specific?  Is there some, out of deference to executive 
communications, do we want to do that?  And I remember that 
discussion occurring.  I remember the decision was made to take it 
out.  I know I was not the person who did it. 
Strzok told us that he saw no indication that this decision was done “to curry favor 
or to influence anything.”  Page told us that she could not remember the discussion 
referenced in this text message.  We also discuss this change to Comey’s July 5 
statement in Chapter Six. 
July 24, 2016:  On July 24, 2016, before the Russia investigation was 
formally opened, Page and Strzok exchanged numerous text messages in which 
they discuss U.S. District Court Judge Rudolph “Rudy” Contreras.  Judge Contreras 
is also a current member of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).  
They discuss, among other things, Strzok hosting a social gathering and inviting 
Contreras.  They also discuss whether Contreras would “have to recuse himself” on 
“espionage FISA” cases given “his friend oversees them.”  We asked Strzok about 
this exchange and his relationship with Contreras.  Strzok stated that he considered 
Contreras a friend and explained that they met years ago when their children 
attended the same elementary school.  Strzok stated that this text message 
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exchange reflected that “it had been a while since he had seen” Contreras and he 
was telling Page that it would nice to see Contreras and find out how he was doing.  
Strzok continued: 
What it was not, and I will say this in response to, again, a lot of the 
speculation I’ve seen.  At no time did I ever with Judge Contreras 
think of or in actuality reach out for the purpose of discussing any case 
or trying to get any decision, provide any information, or otherwise 
influence him with regard to any investigative matter that I or others 
were involved with. 
Strzok told us that Judge Contreras “knew that [Strzok] worked or may have 
worked national security matters for the FBI,” but knew nothing about the specifics 
of Strzok’s job or any of the cases he worked.  Strzok stated that he never 
discussed specifics of any investigation with Judge Contreras.  Strzok also told us 
that the social gathering discussed in this text message exchange never occurred. 
We also asked Strzok about the recusal discussion reflected in the text 
messages.  Strzok stated: 
[This] came up in the context of now that he was on the FISC and that 
we did have a relationship, the question about, from an ethical 
perspective and doing the right thing from an ethical perspective, 
where the lines of either notifying the court and/or either his recusal or 
my recusal with regard to matters that might bring us in contact with 
each other on the professional side. 
And so the discussion which then came up...was, whether in the 
context of being the head of the Counterespionage Section, were 
there, noticing the court or at a minimum noticing [the Department’s 
National Security Division Office of Intelligence] of that personal 
relationship to allow the court to make the appropriate decision, or, 
you know, the, the conglomeration of all of us to make the appropriate 
ethical decision of whether or not to do was the substance of this 
discussion.  But all of this discussion is a consideration of doing the 
right, appropriate, ethical thing.  It is the polar opposite of what is 
being suggested by some.  This is, this is the flip side of that saying 
we want to make sure we’re absolutely doing the right thing.  And by 
the way...Judge Contreras is thoughtful and extraordinarily 
conscientious about ethics and doing the right thing.  So this is, if 
anything, and what is particularly personally aggravating to me is this 
speaks highly to him as a person, to us as the way we were thinking 
about it.  And it’s being absolutely twisted in the, the complete 
opposite direction. 
Strzok told us that this text message exchange was not about any particular case 
and represented a more general concern of what he should do. 
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September 2, 2016:  On September 2, 2016, Page and Strzok exchanged 
the following text messages.  The sender of each message is identified after the 
timestamp. 
09:41:30, Strzok:  “Checkout my 9:30 mtg on the 7th” 
09:42:40, Page:  “I can tell you why you’re having that meeting.” 
09:42:46, Page:  “It’s not what you think.” 
09:49:39, Strzok:  “TPs for D?” 
09:50:29, Page:  “Yes, bc potus wants to know everything we are 
doing.” 
09:55:21, Strzok:  “I’m sure an honest answer will come out of that 
meeting....” 
This text message exchange occurred during the period in which Midyear was 
effectively closed—after Comey’s July 5 announcement and prior to the discovery of 
Midyear-related emails on the Weiner laptop in late September.  Strzok told us that 
these text messages referenced a request by the White House to get a 
“comprehensive idea across the U.S. Intelligence Community” about the scope of 
Russian interference activities and details of what Russia was doing.  Strzok stated 
that this was “strictly limited to Russian actors” and he did not believe any 
investigations of U.S. persons were part of this request.  Page stated that this 
exchange had “nothing to do with the Clinton email investigation.” 
November 9, 2016:  The day after the presidential election, on November 
9, 2016, Page sent the following text message to Strzok:  “Are you even going to 
give out your calendars? Seems kind of depressing. Maybe it should just be the first 
meeting of the secret society.”  We asked Page about this message.  Page stated 
that the “calendars” referenced in this text message were “funny and snarky” 
calendars of Russian President Vladimir Putin in different poses, such as “holding a 
kitten.”  Page told us that Strzok had previously purchased these calendars as “dark 
gallows humor.”  Page stated that the reference to the “secret society” was also a 
“dark sort of” humor about Trump winning the election and concerns she and 
Strzok had about Trump.  Page continued: 
And so, we somewhat with dark humor, but also somewhat, you know, 
with real concern as, of course, our Director actually gets fired, talk 
about, like, well, when he shuts down the, when he finds out about the 
investigation and shuts down the FBI, you know, we’ll form a secret 
society so we can like continue the investigation.  So that’s just, that’s 
obviously not real.  I mean, that’s just us being, you know, sort of 
snarky.  But that’s a, that’s a joke.  I mean, a reflection of that sort of 
joke. 
Strzok stated that he “took and certainly believed [this text message] to be a 
joke.”  Strzok explained: 
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I had gotten a bunch of Putin 2017 calendars where he is in various, 
glorious displays of Russian patriotism for each month.  And we were 
going to give it out to the, kind of the, the closer senior members of 
the [Russia investigation] team, just to, you know, hey, we made it to, 
to Election Day just as like, you know, thanks for your hard work 
because people, you know, had been truly working very hard.... 
To give that out and, you know, and Lisa, you know, saying, God, you 
know, and the thought was, you know, give it out like right around the 
election.  And then my, my take of Lisa’s, and I think the everyman, 
commonsense take of this is that it’s like, God, you know, is that 
something you would want to, you know, want to do right now?  And, 
you know, the secret society is entirely in jest. 
B. Instant Messages between Agent 1 and Agent 5 
Agent 1 is an experienced counterintelligence agent and was assigned to the 
Midyear investigative team from August 2015 through the conclusion of the 
investigation.  Agent 1 was one of four agents responsible for the day-to-day 
activities of the Midyear investigation.  Agent 1’s duties included conducting witness 
interviews and Agent 1 was one of the two agents who interviewed former 
Secretary Clinton on July 2.  Agent 5 is also an experienced counterintelligence 
agent and was a member of the Midyear filter team.  As a member of the filter 
team, Agent 5 was responsible for identifying privileged communications among the 
materials obtained by the FBI to ensure that they were not reviewed by the 
investigative team.  Neither Agent 1 nor Agent 5 was assigned to the FBI’s Russia 
investigation or the Special Counsel investigation. 
As noted previously, we identified instant messages sent by Agent 1, often to 
Agent 5, that expressed opinions critical of the conduct and quality of the Midyear 
investigation.  We discussed these message in Chapter Five.  In addition to those 
messages, we identified two instant message exchanges that appeared to combine 
a discussion of politics with a discussion of the Midyear investigation.  We also 
identified instant messages between Agent 1 and Agent 5 that expressed support 
for Clinton and hostility toward Trump.  We discuss these messages in this section, 
along with explanations provided by Agent 1 and Agent 5.  Because it is relevant to 
their explanations, we note that Agent 1 and Agent 5, who are now married, were 
in a personal relationship that predated their assignment to the Midyear 
investigation. 
1. Instant Messages Referencing the Midyear Investigation 
On July 6, 2016, the day after Comey’s Midyear declination announcement, 
Agent 1 and an FBI employee not involved with Midyear exchanged messages about 
the investigation.  During the course of this discussion, Agent 1 described the prior 
weekend’s activities, which included the interview of Clinton.  A portion of this 
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instant message exchange follows.  The sender of each message is noted after the 
timestamp.206 
15:07:41, Agent 1:  “...I’m done interviewing the President – then 
type the 302.  18 hour day....” 
15:13:32, FBI Employee:  “you interviewed the president?” 
15:17:09, Agent 1:  “you know – HRC” [Hillary Rodham Clinton] 
15:17:18, Agent 1:  “future pres” 
15:17:22, Agent 1:  “Trump cant win” 
15:17:31, Agent 1:  “demographics dont line up” 
15:17:37, Agent 1:  “America has changed” 
We asked Agent 1 if he thought of Clinton as the next president while conducting 
the Midyear investigation.  Agent 1 stated, “I think my impression going into the 
election in that personal realm is that all of the polls were favoring Hillary Clinton.”  
We asked Agent 1 if he treated Clinton differently because of this assumption.  
Agent 1 stated, “Absolutely not.  I think the message they said that our leadership 
told us and our actions were to find whatever was there and whatever, whatever 
that means is what it means.” 
Comey sent the first letter to Congress about the Weiner laptop discovery on 
October 28, 2016.  Agent 1 and Agent 5 exchanged instant messages about the 
letter and Trump’s reaction to it later that day.  The sender of each messages is 
noted after the timestamp. 
13:46:48, Agent 5:  “jesus christ… Trump: Glad FBI is fixing ‘horrible 
mistake’ on clinton emails… for fuck’s sake.” 
13:47:27, Agent 5:  “the fuck’s sake part was me, the rest was 
Trump.” 
13:49:07, Agent 1:  “Not sure if Trump or the fifth floor is worse…” 
13:49:22, Agent 5:  “I’m so sick of both…” 
13:50:25, Agent 5:  “+o( TRUMP”207  
13:50:30, Agent 5:  “+o( Fifth floor” 
13:50:34, Agent 5:  “+o( FBI” 
13:50:44, Agent 5:  “+o( Average American public” 
                                       
206  All instant messages produced to the OIG reflected Greenwich Mean Time.  We have 
corrected times to the Eastern Time Zone as a result.  In addition, some instant messages contained 
emojis, which we omitted unless they affected the meaning of the message.  We also do not include 
other intervening instant messages unless they contribute to understanding the highlighted messages. 
207  The symbol used in these messages is a “sick face” emoticon.  See IM Emoticons, at 
http://sheet.shiar.nl/emoji (last accessed April 28, 2018). 
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We asked both Agent 1 and Agent 5 about these messages.  Agent 1 and Agent 5 
both stated the reference to “fifth floor” referred to the location of the FBI WFO’s 
Counterintelligence Division.  Agent 1 continued: “Again, you know, I think a 
general, general theme in a lot of this is some personal comment, or, you know, 
complaining about common topics and leadership and, and venting.”  Agent 5 also 
described this as general complaining to Agent 1 and also as an example of her 
being “very tired of working” these types of cases.  Agent 5 also noted that she was 
not involved in the review of the Weiner laptop.  
2. Instant Messages Commenting on Trump or Clinton 
On August 29, 2016, Agent 1 and Agent 5 exchanged the following instant 
messages as part of a discussion about their jobs.  The sender of each message is 
noted after the timestamp. 
10:39:49, Agent 1:  “I find anyone who enjoys [this job] an absolute 
fucking idiot.  If you dont think so, ask them one more question.  Who 
are you voting for?  I guarantee you it will be Donald Drumpf.” 
10:40:13, Agent 5:  “i forgot about drumpf…” 
10:40:27, Agent 5:  “that’s so sad and pathetic if they want to vote for 
him.” 
10:40:43, Agent 5:  “someone who can’t answer a question” 
10:40:51, Agent 5:  “someone who can’t be professional for even a 
second” 
On September 9, 2016, Agent 1 and Agent 5 exchanged the following instant 
messages. 
08:56:43, Agent 5:  “i’m trying to think of a ‘would i rather’ instead of 
spending time with those people” 
08:56:54, Agent 1:  “stick your tongue in a fan??” 
08:56:58, Agent 5:  “i would rather have brunch with trump” 
08:57:03, Agent 1:  “ha” 
08:57:15, Agent 1:  “french toast with drumpf” 
08:57:19, Agent 5:  “i would rather have brunch with trump and a 
bunch of his supporters like the ones from ohio that are retarded” 
08:57:23, Agent 5:  “:)” 
Agent 5 told the OIG these instant messages “referenced TV programming and 
commentary that Agent 1 and Agent 5 had recently viewed together.”  Agent 5 
continued, “The reference was not a general statement about a particular part of 
the country, rather it was in jest and pertained to individuals’ inability to articulate 
any reason why they so strongly favored one candidate over another.” 
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On Election Day on November 8, 2016, Agent 1 and Agent 5 exchanged the 
following instant messages. 
14:21:10, Agent 1:  “You think HRC is gonna win right?  You think we 
should get nails and some boards in case she doesnt” 
14:21:56, Agent 5:  “she better win… otherwise i’m gonna be walking 
around with both of my guns.” 
14:22:05, Agent 5:  “and likely quitting on the spot” 
14:28:43, Agent 1:  “You should know;…..” 
14:28:45, Agent 1:  “that” 
14:28:50, Agent 1:  “I’m…..”  
14:28:56, Agent 1:  “with her.” 
14:28:58, Agent 1:  “ooooooooooooooooooo” 
14:29:02, Agent 1:  “show me the money” 
14:29:03, Agent 5:  “<:o)” 
14:29:14, Agent 5:  “screw you trump” 
14:19:18, Agent 5:  “wheeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee!” 
14:29:32, Agent 5:  “go baby, go!  let’s give her Virginia” 
14:30:03, Agent 1:  “not to my country.  You just cant get up and try 
to appeal to all the worst things in humans and fool my country….” 
14:30:12, Agent 1:  “Just 49% of us…..” 
14:30:25, Agent 5:  “let’s hope it’s 49% or less…” 
14:30:31, Agent 5:  “we’ll find out…” 
In a December 6, 2016 exchange, Agent 5 complained to Agent 1 about 
being required to be on call on the day of the presidential inauguration.  In the 
middle of expressing displeasure about this, Agent 5 sent a message to Agent 1 
that stated, “fuck trump.”  On February 9, 2017, in the context of an FBI employee 
receiving a presidential award for public service, Agent 5 messaged, “...I think now 
that trump is the president, i’d refuse it.  it would be an insult to even be 
considered for it.”   
We asked Agent 1 and Agent 5 about their use of instant messaging 
generally and about these messages in particular.  As mentioned in Chapter Five, 
Agent 1 told us that he believed that instant messages were not retained by the FBI 
and therefore used less caution with those communications than he would have 
with other types of communications, such as email or text messages.208  Agent 5 
                                       
208  Agent 1 explained the reason for his belief that the instant messages were not retained, 
stating, “So my understanding of [instant messaging] in the FBI is that it was implemented about four 
or five years ago, roughly.  Because I did internal investigations, at the time I was on the espionage 
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also made this point, stating that she considered these exchanges as a private 
“outlet” to Agent 1.  Both Agent 1 and Agent 5 apologized for their use of instant 
messaging in this manner and told us that they were embarrassed. 
We asked Agent 1 whether he believed these political discussions raised 
questions about the integrity or reliability of the Midyear investigation.  Agent 1 
stated: 
I don’t based on knowing my actions.  I guess I would kind of repeat 
what I said before.  Yes, I, I have personal, a personal life, private 
opinions, private views.  I think what happened here is that I used 
instant message and chat like it was my home. 
...I like the job of fact-finding and having it lead you where you go.  I 
don’t start any day with an endgame in mind of let it, let it go to, go to 
that.  That’s the way I think I act, that’s how I think I’ve acted over 
my whole career.  That’s how I, that’s how I know I acted in, in this 
case. 
Yeah, I think that, I understand your question because it’s an FBI 
system.  I just unfortunately did not view it that way and did not use it 
that way.  I used it as, as, you know, some of my worst hits here, as 
a, a way to relieve stress, as a way to be jocular, as a way to 
exaggerate, as a way to blow off steam, as a, you know, potentially 
get sympathy from, and then, you know, it was compounded by 
frustrations from other people coming to me for answers for why 
certain people got elected, and is it our fault, and, so I think there was 
a, kind of a cocktail of, of stress in this case that came out on this 
system like it was a conversation. 
So I, I don’t, I don’t think so based on knowing my actions and what I 
did knowing the actions of the people around me. 
We also asked Agent 1 whether his personal beliefs impacted his investigative 
actions in Midyear.  Agent 1 responded: 
[I]n no way do I think it, it impacted my view.  I guess the best way is 
almost like a, it’s almost like you switch on your, when, when we did 
our morning meetings, it was what do we have and where do we go 
next?  It, it was just like almost, you know, like there’s a, there’s the 
professional side, the do your job side, and there’s a personal side.  
And I think a lot of this falls into the personal side. 
                                       
squad, my awareness was that it was not logged by the FBI because I tried to get those records for 
internal investigations.”  Agent 5 stated the she also had requested instant messages in prior internal 
investigations and been told that they were not preserved.  Agents 1 and 5 told the OIG that they 
learned in April 2017 that the FBI had retained instant messages since February 2015, as the result of 
receiving a memorandum about preservation and criminal discovery obligations stemming from the 
FBI’s instant messaging system.  The FBI email distributing this memorandum advised employees that 
the FBI began preserving instant messages in February 2015 and stated, “Lync should not be used for 
substantive communications.”  
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...It was only to try to do the right thing....  That’s, that’s the only 
thing, the only thought process in my head when I was, when I was 
doing my job. 
We asked Agent 5 how she would respond to someone who read these 
messages and concluded the opinions expressed in them impacted the Midyear 
investigation.  Agent 5 stated: 
Well, I can see someone who doesn’t know us at all saying the same, 
wondering, I guess, if [our political beliefs] could have impacted [the 
Midyear investigation].  I can tell you in no way did my political or 
what I understand of [Agent 1], no political anything is going to 
interfere with us doing our job as professionals. 
I can see me going into these rants.  I can see me ranting in some of 
these, and, you know, again, I think all of these are very personal, off-
the-cuff...these are personal, private messages.  I mean, you could 
probably even see the difference between, if you’ve seen anything in 
my [career] that I put to the file...for, you know, case-related things.  
I am very thorough, methodical, and I think through everything when 
I’m typing it.  I don’t even cut corners with acronyms.  I, I treat that 
extremely seriously in my [career], and even before I became an 
agent. 
So I, I would tell that person that part of being a professional, part of 
the oath that I swore here to work, I...uphold it.  And I upheld it at 
this point.  I, I do have personal beliefs and personal opinions.  You 
know, I expressed some of those.  Some of them come out in 
frustration.  Some of them come out in jokes.  I can see us quoting 
things kind of just to make us smile, you know, make us feel better, 
you know, after sometimes tough days.  And...I would say in, in no 
way has it ever or would it ever affect the way I, I handle any 
investigation, any case, any professional work that I, that I put 
forward. 
C. FBI Attorney 2 Instant Messages 
FBI Attorney 2 was assigned to the Midyear investigation early in 2016.  FBI 
Attorney 2 was not the lead FBI attorney assigned to Midyear and he told us he 
provided support to the investigation as needed.  FBI Attorney 2 told us that he was 
also assigned to the investigation into Russian election interference and was the 
primary FBI attorney assigned to that investigation beginning in early 2017.  FBI 
Attorney 2 told us that he was then assigned to the Special Counsel investigation 
once it began.  FBI Attorney 2 left the Special Counsel’s investigation and returned 
to the FBI in late February 2018, shortly after the OIG provided the Special Counsel 
with some of the instant messages discussed in this section. 
We identified instant messages on FBINet involving FBI Attorney 2 that 
discussed political issues.  Most of these exchanges appeared to be jokes or 
attempts at humor, often involving Trump.  We asked FBI Attorney 2 in general 
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about the use of FBI instant messaging in this manner.  FBI Attorney 2 told us that, 
in general, he regretted his use of instant messaging in this manner and noted “it’s 
not something that I did routinely.”  He described these messages as “commentary” 
on recent political events and not connected to decisions or activities in 
investigations.  FBI Attorney 2 stated that almost all of these messages were sent 
to co-workers he “considered to be” friends and he “was talking to them in that 
capacity,” and “[n]ot in a professional capacity.”  FBI Attorney 2 reiterated that 
these messages or views had “absolutely” no impact on his work on investigations.  
He stated: 
I, like most people, have particular views on, on politics.  I’m a bit of a 
news junkie when it comes to government.  It’s one of the main 
reasons I, I joined the federal workforce is because I’ve always found 
it so fascinating and interesting. 
But when it came to doing my work, I never injected this, this type of, 
of color commentary or this type of water cooler type talk into that.  I, 
I maintained impartiality and just tried to work through the issues 
individually as they came through.  So if they needed some assistance 
on a warrant or some assistance on, you know, potentially pursuing 
contacts with another government agency or something like that, like, 
I just, I assisted with the process more like, kind of like an XO type 
role I guess. 
Among the general discussion of political issues by FBI Attorney 2, we 
identified three instant message exchanges that raised concerns of potential bias.  
The first of these exchanges was on October 28, 2016, shortly after Comey’s 
October 28 letter to Congress that effectively announced the reopening of the 
Midyear investigation.  FBI Attorney 2 sent similar messages to four different FBI 
employees.  The timestamps of these messages are included below.  The messages 
stated: 
13:44:42, to FBI Employee 1:  “I mean, I never really liked the 
Republic anyway.” 
13:44:52, to FBI Employee 2:  “I mean, I never really liked the 
Republic anyway.” 
14:01:52, to FBI Employee 3:  “As I have initiated the destruction of 
the republic....  Would you be so kind as to have a coffee with me this 
afternoon?” 
15:28:50, to FBI Employee 4:  “I’m clinging to small pockets of 
happiness in the dark time of the Republic’s destruction” 
FBI Attorney 2 described these messages as reflecting his surprise and frustration 
that the FBI “was essentially walking into a landmine in terms of injecting itself 
[into the election] at that late in the process.”  FBI Attorney 2 continued: 
I think that, that there is some distinguishment between my 
frustration at the way that the Bureau is operating itself in October in 
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terms of, of wading into the process at that point....  But, I think that 
there is a distinguishment between having reservations about the way 
that we were operating and just expressing the frustration about, 
about us coming into the process.  It’s like, in terms of, of, you know, 
what’s not in here too is like, you know, we, at that point we had 
investigation, the Russia investigation was ongoing as well.  And that 
information was obviously kept close hold and was not released until 
March.  So, you know, it, it was just kind of frustration that we weren’t 
handling both of them the same way with, with that level I guess. 
FBI Attorney 2 described the “destruction” language as “hyperbolic” and “off-the-
cuff commentary to friends.” 
The second exchange we identified occurred on November 9, 2016, the day 
after the presidential election.  FBI Attorney 2 and another FBI employee who was 
not involved in the Midyear investigation exchanged the following instant messages.  
Note that the sender of the instant message is identified after the timestamp and 
intervening messages that did not contribute to the understanding of this exchange 
are not included. 
09:38:14, FBI Attorney 2:  “I am numb.” 
09:55:35, FBI Employee:  “I can’t stop crying.” 
10:00:13, FBI Attorney 2:  “That makes me even more sad.” 
10:43:20, FBI Employee:  “Like, what happened?” 
10:43:37, FBI Employee:  “You promised me this wouldn’t happen.  
YOU PROMISED.” 
10:43:43, FBI Employee:  Okay, that might have been a lie…” 
10:43:46, FBI Employee:  “I’m very upset.” 
10:43:47, FBI Employee:  “haha” 
10:51:48, FBI Attorney 2:  “I am so stressed about what I could have 
done differently.” 
10:54:29, FBI Employee:  “Don’t stress.  None of that mattered.” 
10:54:31, FBI Employee:  “The FBI’s influence.” 
10:59:36, FBI Attorney 2:  “I don’t know.  We broke the momentum.” 
11:00:03, FBI Employee:  “That is not so.” 
11:02:22, FBI Employee:  “All the people who were initially voting for 
her would not, and were not, swayed by any decision the FBI put out.  
Trump’s supporters are all poor to middle class, uneducated, lazy POS 
that think he will magically grant them jobs for doing nothing.  They 
probably didn’t watch the debates, aren’t fully educated on his policies, 
and are stupidly wrapped up in his unmerited enthusiasm.” 
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11:11:43, FBI Attorney 2:  “I’m just devastated.  I can’t wait until I 
can leave today and just shut off the world for the next four days.” 
11:12:06, FBI Employee:  “Why are you devastated?” 
11:12:18, FBI Employee:  “Yes, I’m not watching tv for four years.” 
11:14:16, FBI Attorney 2:  “I just can’t imagine the systematic 
disassembly of the progress we made over the last 8 years.  ACA is 
gone.  Who knows if the rhetoric about deporting people, walls, and 
crap is true.  I honestly feel like there is going to be a lot more gun 
issues, too, the crazies won finally.  This is the tea party on steroids.  
And the GOP is going to be lost, they have to deal with an incumbent 
in 4 years.  We have to fight this again.  Also Pence is stupid.” 
11:14:58, FBI Employee:  “Yes that’s all true.” 
11:15:01, FBI Attorney 2:  “And it’s just hard not to feel like the FBI 
caused some of this.  It was razor thin in some states.” 
11:15:09, FBI Employee:  “Yes it was very thin.” 
11:15:23, FBI Attorney 2:  “Plus, my god damned name is all over the 
legal documents investigating his staff.” 
11:15:24, FBI Employee:  “But no I absolutely do not believe the FBI 
had any part.” 
11:15:33, FBI Attorney 2:  “So, who knows if that breaks to him what 
he is going to do.” 
We asked FBI Attorney 2 about this exchange.  FBI Attorney 2 stated, “I’d 
say that we’re just discussing our personal feelings on [the outcome of the election] 
between friends, yeah.”  When asked about the FBI employee meant by “[y]ou 
promised me this wouldn’t happen,”  FBI Attorney 2 told us that he “did not 
promise [the employee] anything,” and stated, “I think, again, it’s just kind of the 
way that [the employee] and I converse.  We tend to exaggerate some statements 
back and forth to one another.”  We also asked FBI Attorney 2 what he meant by “I 
am so stressed about what I could have done differently.”  FBI Attorney 2 replied: 
That was a, that was a reference to, again, just in terms of the way 
that we opened or how long it took us to open [in October].  You 
know, with the, with the knowledge that the information was there [on 
the Weiner laptop], why we didn’t work on it to, to gain access sooner, 
as opposed to later because it was a, a bit of a, of a gap between us 
learning of the information in New York and, and officially getting the 
case reopened again.... 
Just in terms of like what I could have done to, to either have 
accelerated the process or to, like how I expressed to [FBI Attorney 1] 
that I didn’t know if this was the correct way for the Bureau to be 
doing this notification, et cetera.  Whether, you know, I could have 
said something differently to her that would have resonated in, or, or 
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would have been part of the discussion.  But I wasn’t anywhere near 
the, the room deciding on these factors.... 
It was just kind of like a discussion on how I could have either moved 
the process along more quickly or more efficiently at a, at a more, at 
an earlier time, or whatnot. 
When asked if he thought earlier action on the Weiner laptop would have alleviated 
the need to send the letter to Congress, FBI Attorney 2 stated: 
Well, not, not, I don’t think that that would have alleviated the need 
for the letter in the Director’s eyes.  But if we would have opened a 
few weeks earlier, as opposed to at that time, two weeks before the 
election, I think it, you know, it would have given more time for the 
FBI’s actions and, and required and, and necessary investigation to, to 
occur to allow the, the public a chance to make their own decision-
making. 
FBI Attorney 2 again reiterated that his “personal political feelings or beliefs...in no 
way impacted” his work on the Midyear or Russia investigations. 
The third exchange we identified was on November 22, 2016.  FBI Attorney 2 
sent an instant message to FBI Attorney 1 commenting on the amount of money 
the subject of an FBI investigation had been paid while working on the Trump 
campaign.  FBI Attorney 1 responded, “Is it making you rethink your commitment 
to the Trump administration?”  FBI Attorney 2 replied, “Hell no.” and then added, 
“Viva le resistance.”  FBI Attorney 1 responded that Trump was “going to eliminate 
all of our pensions in order to pay for people like” the person discussed in the 
instant message exchange, and FBI Attorney 1 and FBI Attorney 2 then began a 
discussion of federal pension and retirement issues. 
We asked both FBI Attorney 2 and FBI Attorney 1 about this exchange.  FBI 
Attorney 2 stated: 
So, this is in reference to an ongoing subject.  And then following that, 
like I interpreted [FBI Attorney 1’s] comment to me as being, you 
know, just her and I socially and as friends discussing our particular 
political views, to which I see that as more of a joking inquiry from 
her.  It’s not something along the lines of where I’m not committed to 
the U.S. Government.  I obviously am and, you know, work to do my 
job very well and to continue to, to work in that capacity.  It’s just the, 
the lines bled through here just in terms of, of my personal, political 
view in terms of, of what particular preference I have.  But, but that 
doesn’t have any, any leaning on the way that I, I maintain myself as 
a professional in the FBI. 
We asked FBI Attorney 2 if “Viva le resistance” signaled he was going to fight back 
against President Trump.  FBI Attorney 2 responded: 
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That’s not what I was doing....  I just, again, like that, that’s just like 
the entire, it’s just my political view in terms of, of my preference.  It 
wasn’t something along the lines of, you know, we’re taking certain 
actions in order to, you know, combat that or, or do anything like that.  
Like that, that was not the intent of that.  That was more or less just 
like, you know, commentary between me and [FBI Attorney 1] in a 
personal friendship capacity where she is just making a joke, and I’m 
responding.  Like, it’s not something that, that I personally believe in 
that instance. 
FBI Attorney 2 acknowledged that both he and FBI Attorney 1 were assigned to the 
Russia investigation at this point in time and he “can understand the, the 
perception issues that come from” this exchange. 
FBI Attorney 1 stated that she and FBI Attorney 2 were friends and often had 
discussions unrelated to work.  She acknowledged that that this was “not the right 
place to make those kind of comments.”  We asked FBI Attorney 1 what she meant 
by the message, “Is it making you rethink your commitment to the Trump 
administration?”  She stated, “I think what I meant was are you going to leave the 
government and start working to get more money.”  We also asked FBI Attorney 1 
what she understood FBI Attorney 2 to mean when he messaged, “Viva le 
resistance.”  FBI Attorney 1 told us, “I think it was a joke obviously.  But I think it 
was intended to say that, you know, he was committed to continuing to work for 
the Bureau, for these cases.”  FBI Attorney 1 stated that nothing about this 
exchange affected her work on the Russia investigation. 
D. Analysis 
The conduct of the five FBI employees described in sections A, B, and C of 
this Chapter has brought discredit to themselves, sowed doubt about the FBI’s 
handling of the Midyear investigation, and impacted the reputation of the FBI.  As 
described in Chapter Five, our review did not find documentary or testimonial 
evidence directly connecting the political views these employees expressed in their 
text messages and instant messages to the specific investigative decisions we 
reviewed in Chapter Five.  Nonetheless, the conduct by these employees cast a 
cloud over the FBI Midyear investigation and sowed doubt the FBI’s work on, and 
its handling of, the Midyear investigation.  Moreover, the damage caused by their 
actions extends far beyond the scope of the Midyear investigation and goes to the 
heart of the FBI’s reputation for neutral factfinding and political independence.   
We were deeply troubled by text messages sent by Strzok and Page that 
potentially indicated or created the appearance that investigative decisions were 
impacted by bias or improper considerations.  Most of the text messages raising 
such questions pertained to the Russia investigation, which was not a part of this 
review.  Nonetheless, when one senior FBI official, Strzok, who was helping to lead 
the Russia investigation at the time, conveys in a text message to another senior 
FBI official, Page, that “we’ll stop” candidate Trump from being elected—after other 
extensive text messages between the two disparaging candidate Trump—it is not 
only indicative of a biased state of mind but, even more seriously, implies a 
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willingness to take official action to impact the presidential candidate’s electoral 
prospects.  This is antithetical to the core values of the FBI and the Department of 
Justice.  Moreover, as we describe in Chapter Nine, in assessing Strzok’s decision to 
prioritize the Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related 
investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop in October 2016, these text 
messages led us to conclude that we did not have confidence that Strzok’s decision 
was free from bias. 
Each of the five employees expressed remorse about using FBI devices and 
systems for these discussions, and each also stated that they intended these 
messages to be private conversations.  Several of the employees also expressed 
the belief that their messages would not be preserved or would be exempt from 
public disclosure under FOIA.  We found this reliance on the “private” nature of 
these messages to be misplaced.  Because these messages were exchanged on 
government systems and devices, they were never “private.”  Every Department 
employee sees a notice each time he or she logs onto the Department’s network 
informing him or her that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
communications exchanged on government systems.209  We recommend that the 
FBI add a similar warning banner to all of the FBI’s mobile phones and devices. 
Indeed, rather than being “private” communications, these messages were at 
all times potentially subject to being reviewed by others (including the OIG) and to 
being disclosed to the public.  This point seems even more obvious in light of the 
significant congressional and public interest generated by the Midyear and Russia 
investigations.  The employees exchanging text messages and instant messages 
are trained law enforcement agents or attorneys, and should have known that 
these messages were potentially subject to release in response to FOIA requests, 
subject to disclosure in civil litigation, or discoverable as impeachment evidence 
even in the absence of the OIG investigation.210  We note that these messages also 
                                       
209  After reviewing a draft of the report, Page told the OIG that the Samsung phones used by 
the FBI do not include any such warning banner.  The OIG confirmed with the FBI that this is accurate.  
However, the notice on the FBI’s computer system applies to “all devices [or] storage media attached 
to this network or to a computer on this network,” and alerts users that they “have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding any communication transmitted through or data stored on this 
information system.  At any time the government may monitor, intercept, search and/or seize data 
transmitted through or data stored on this information system.”  In addition, a recent Department 
training stated, “DOJ systems are not your personal systems.  That means you have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy about maintaining any personal information, data, or applications on 
Department systems, networks, or devices.” Department of Justice, Office of the Chief Information 
Officer, 2018 Annual DOJ Cybersecurity Awareness Training, at 14. 
210  For example, FBI Records Management Training warns FBI employees to be careful about 
what they say in emails and text messages: 
Remember, that emails and texts messages should be treated the same way as paper 
correspondence.  So be aware of what you write.  It may be released through FOIA, 
and be made widely available one day. 
Of course, many of our records also end up in court.  In civil cases, the FBI must turn 
over all relevant evidence, including emails and text messages.  While all documents 
are viewed for privilege and redacted prior to release, there is no claim of privilege 
covering inappropriate or embarrassing statements.  Such as, the governor is a block 
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potentially implicate the FBI’s or prosecutors’ disclosure obligations in any 
prosecutions resulting from the investigations at issue.211 
We do not question that the FBI employees who sent these messages are 
entitled to their own political views.  Indeed, federal statutes and regulations 
explicitly protect the right of federal employees to “express...opinion[s] on political 
subjects and candidates” and to “exercise fully, freely, and without fear of penalty 
or reprisal, and to the extent not expressly prohibited by law, their right to 
participate or to refrain from participating in the political processes of the Nation”—
provided such expression “does not compromise his or her efficiency or integrity as 
an employee or the neutrality, efficiency, or integrity of the agency or 
instrumentality of the United States Government in which he or she is 
employed.”212  While these employees did not give up their First Amendment rights 
when they became employed by the FBI, Supreme Court decisions make clear that  
the FBI retains the authority—particularly as a law enforcement agency—to impose 
                                       
head.  Although what we turn over in criminal cases can be more targeted, such as 
witness statements and exculpatory and impeachment evidence.  Just as in civil cases, 
emails and text messages that fit into one of these categories must be turned over 
regardless whether they are embarrassing or worded inappropriately.... 
Even though it’s a casual medium, we can’t take a casual attitude towards email.  All 
email, even a text or a PIN message, can be instantly copied, archived, filed, and 
disseminated.  Just like a memo or a 302, emails reflect on the professionalism of the 
employee, and potentially the FBI as a whole.  Inappropriate, offensive language, ill-
advised humor, off-color references, and poorly thought out remarks have no place in 
any FBI communication.  And it doesn’t matter if that communication was intended as 
a record or a non-record. 
211  See USAM § 9-5.001, Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment 
Information; see also United States v. Johnson, 14-CR-00412-TEH, 2015 WL 2125132, at 3-4 (N.D. 
Cal. May 6, 2015) (ordering the disclosure of racist text message(s) sent or received by a police officer 
involved in maintaining a crime scene); Linetsky v. City of Solon, Case No. 1:16-CV-52, 2016 WL 
5402615 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2016) (ordering an assistant prosecutor to produce in discovery all text 
messages between the prosecutor and law enforcement personnel pertaining to the plaintiff’s prior 
criminal case); United States v. Marcus Mumford, Case No. 3:17-CR-0008-JCC, 2017 WL 652448, at 
2-3 (D. Ore. Feb. 16, 2017) (finding, during prosecution of Ammon Bundy’s attorney in connection 
with a scuffle with U.S. Deputy Marshals, that “the Marshals’ government issued cell phones are 
subject to discovery and should any texts reveal hostility towards Defendant or in any way casts doubt 
on their credibility, they must be produced.”). 
212  5 U.S.C. §§ 7321, 7323(c); 5 C.F.R. § 734.402.  FBI policy similarly provides that FBI 
employees retain the right to participate in various specified political activities, as long as such activity 
is not performed in concert with a political party, partisan political group, or a candidate for partisan 
political office.  The list of political activities includes the right of an FBI employee to “[e]xpress his or 
her opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates,” and to 
“otherwise participate fully in public affairs, except as prohibited by other Federal law, in a manner 
which does not compromise his or her efficiency or integrity as an employee or the neutrality, 
efficiency, or integrity of the agency or instrumentality of the United States Government in which he 
or she is employed.”  FBI Office of Integrity and Compliance, FBI Ethics and Integrity Program Policy 
Directive and Policy Guide, § 7.4.2 (Feb. 2, 2015).  
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certain restrictions on its employees’ speech in the interest of providing effective 
and efficient government.213 
We believe the messages discussed in this chapter—particularly the 
messages that intermix work-related discussions with political commentary—
potentially implicate provisions in the FBI’s Offense Code and Penalty Guidelines, 
which provides general categories of misconduct for which FBI employees may be 
disciplined.  This includes the provisions relating to Offense Codes 1.7 
(Investigative Deficiency – Misconduct Related to Judicial Proceedings), 3.6 (Misuse 
of Government Computer(s)), 3.11 (Misuse of Government Property, Other), 5.21 
(Unprofessional Conduct – Off Duty), and 5.22 (Unprofessional Conduct – On 
Duty).214  However, we did not identify any prior FBI misconduct investigations 
under these provisions that involved a similar fact pattern or similar issues.215   
At a minimum, we found that the employees’ use of FBI systems and devices 
to send the identified messages demonstrated extremely poor judgment and a 
gross lack of professionalism.  This is not just because of the nature of the 
messages, but also because many of the messages commented on individuals 
(Clinton and Trump) who were inextricably connected to the Midyear and Russia 
investigations.  The FBI is charged with the investigation of many important and 
sensitive matters, including some that generate intense public interest and debate.  
It is essential that the public have confidence that the work of the FBI is done 
without bias or appearance of partiality, and that those engaged in it follow the 
                                       
213  The Supreme Court has held that public employees do not forfeit their right to freedom of 
speech by virtue of their public employment.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  
However, when a citizen enters government service, he accepts certain limitations on his First 
Amendment rights.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).  In Pickering, the Supreme 
Court recognized that a public employer has an interest in regulating the speech of its employees.  
The Court strove to “arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”  To strike this 
balance, the Supreme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry to determine whether a public employee’s 
speech is entitled to protection.  See Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014).  First, the court 
must determine the threshold question of whether the employee spoke as a private citizen on a 
matter of public concern. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  If not, the employee has no First Amendment 
claim.  If so, the second step is to establish “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.”  Id. 
214  These messages may also implicate other Department-wide Rules, such as Department of 
Justice Information Technology Security Rules of Behavior for General Users Version 10 (January 1, 
2017). 
215  In 2012, “racy texts” exchanged between two FBI agents and an FBI informant were used 
to impeach the agents in the prosecutions of several defendants for violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.  According to a Washington Post article about the case, which ended without 
convictions, the foreman of the jury stated that the “texts were one of many things that point[ed] to 
an absolutely amateurish operation” by the government.  See Del Quentin Wilbur, Racy Texts Hurt 
Justice’s Largest Sting Operation Targeting Foreign Bribery, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2013.  This case and 
the Washington Post article about the impact of the text messages are used in the Department’s 
training on electronic discovery as an example of what not to say in text messages.  However, the OIG 
learned that the agents involved in that case were not investigated or disciplined for misconduct, and 
that their text messages were handled as a performance issue.  Both agents remain employed by the 
FBI. 
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facts and law wherever they may lead and without any agenda or desired result 
other than to see that justice is done. 
Although we found no documentary or testimonial evidence directly 
connecting the political views these employees expressed in their text messages 
and instant messages to the specific Midyear investigative decisions we reviewed in 
Chapter Five, the messages cast a cloud over the FBI investigations to which these 
employees were assigned.  Ultimately, the consequences of these actions impact 
not only the senders of these messages but also others who worked on these 
investigations and, indeed, the entire FBI. 
We therefore refer this information to the FBI for its handling and 
consideration of whether the messages sent by the five employees listed above 
violates the FBI’s Offense Code of Conduct.  
Additionally, we recommend that the FBI (1) assess whether it has provided 
adequate training to employees about the proper use of text messages and instant 
messages, including any related discovery obligations, and (2) consider whether to 
provide additional guidance about the allowable uses of FBI devices for any non-
governmental purpose, including guidance about the use of FBI devices for political 
conversations.  
II. Use of Personal Email 
As mentioned above, we identified several instances in which Comey and 
Strzok used personal email accounts for official government business.  When 
questioned, Page also told us she used personal email for work-related matters at 
times.  We briefly discuss these issues below. 
On September 21, 2016, the Department issued a Policy Statement detailing 
the records retention policy for email communications.  The Policy Statement 
contained the following guidance for the use of personal email accounts: 
In general, DOJ email users should not create or send record emails or 
attachments using non-official email accounts.  However, should 
exigent circumstances require the use of a personal account to conduct 
DOJ business, the DOJ email user must ensure that the communicated 
information is fully captured in a DOJ recordkeeping system within 20 
days.  If sending the email from a non-official account, the email user 
must copy his or her DOJ email address as a recipient.  If receiving a 
DOJ business-related email on a non-official account, the DOJ email 
user must forward the business-related email to his or her DOJ email 
account.  Once the user has ensured the capture of the email 
information in the DOJ account, the DOJ email should be removed 
from the non-official account. 
See DOJ Policy Statement, Electronic Mail and Electronic Messaging Records 
Retention (approved on September 21, 2016). 
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A. Comey 
We identified numerous instances in which Comey used a personal email 
account (a Gmail account) to conduct FBI business.  We cite five examples of such 
use in this section and include information provided by Comey and Rybicki about 
Comey’s use of a personal email account. 
On November 8, 2016, Comey forwarded to his personal email account from 
his unclassified FBI account a proposed post-election message for all FBI employees 
that was entitled “Midyear thoughts.”  This document summarized Comey’s 
reasoning for notifying Congress about the reactivation of the Midyear investigation.  
In late December 2016, Comey forwarded to his personal email account from his 
unclassified FBI account multiple drafts of a proposed year-end message to FBI 
employees.  On December 30, 2016, Comey forwarded to his personal email 
account from his unclassified FBI account proposed responses to two requests for 
information from the Office of Special Counsel.216  The forwarded email included 
two attachments:  (1) a certification for Comey to sign; and (2) a list of FBI 
employees with information responsive to this request, including their titles, office, 
appointment status, contact information, and duty hours.  On January 6, 2017, 
Comey forwarded to his personal email account from his unclassified FBI account an 
email from Rybicki to Kortan highlighting language that needed to be corrected in a 
Wall Street Journal article.  In mid-March 2017, Comey sent from his personal 
email account to his own and Rybicki’s unclassified FBI accounts multiple drafts of 
Comey’s proposed opening statement for his March 20, 2017 testimony to the 
House Intelligence Committee. 
We asked Comey about his use of personal email for FBI business and 
showed him the November 8, 2016 email with Rybicki as an example.  Comey 
stated: 
I did not have an unclass[ified] FBI connection at home that worked.  
And I didn’t bother to fix it, whole ‘nother story, but I would either use 
my BlackBerry, must have been or Samsung...my phone, I had two 
phones—a personal phone and a government phone.  Or if I needed to 
write something longer, I would type it on my personal laptop and 
then send it to Rybicki, usually I copied my own address....  Yeah.  
And so I would use, for unclassified work, I would use my personal 
laptop for word processing and then send it into the FBI. 
We asked Comey if he had any concerns about conducting FBI business on his 
personal laptop or personal email.  Comey stated that he did not and explained: 
Because it was incidental and I was always making sure that the work 
got forwarded to the government account to either my own account or 
Rybicki, so I wasn’t worried from a record-keeping perspective and it 
                                       
216  This refers to the federal agency responsible for investigating violations of the Hatch Act, 
not to Special Counsel Robert Mueller III. 
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was, because there will always be a copy of it in the FBI system and I 
wasn’t doing classified work there, so I wasn’t concerned about that. 
Comey stated that he did not use his personal email or laptop for classified or 
sensitive information, such as grand jury information.  Comey told us that he only 
used his personal email and laptop “when I needed to word process an unclassified 
[document] that was going to be disseminated broadly, [such as a] public speech 
or public email to the whole organization.”  We asked Comey if the use of personal 
email in this manner was in accordance with FBI regulations.  Comey replied, “I 
don’t know.  I think so, but I don’t know.  I remember talking to Jim [Rybicki] 
about it at one time, and I had the sense that it was okay.” 
We also asked Rybicki about Comey’s use of a personal email account.  In 
response to the OIG’s questions and in consultation with Comey, Rybicki sent the 
OIG an email on April 20, 2017, that stated: 
In rare circumstances during his tenure, Director Comey sends 
unclassified emails from his official FBI.gov email account address to 
[his Gmail account].  This permits him to open attachments and use 
his personal laptop to then work on a speech or other content intended 
for wide dissemination. He then sends drafts or the completed text to 
his official FBI.gov email account or to another FBI.gov email account 
from [his Gmail account].  He opened this personal account at about 
the time he became Director.... 
To ensure a high level of cybersecurity, Director Comey routinely 
deletes all emails from his [Gmail] account each day, and then clears 
the deleted messages folder.  He began this practice about two years 
ago. 
The Director does not recall receiving and/or seeking advice 
concerning the use of these accounts. 
We found that, given the absence of exigent circumstances and the 
frequency with which the use of personal email occurred, Comey’s use of a personal 
email account on multiple occasions for unclassified FBI business to be inconsistent 
with the DOJ Policy Statement. 
B. Strzok and Page 
During our review, we identified several instances where Strzok used his 
personal email account for government business.  Examples included an email chain 
forwarded to Strzok’s personal email account on December 10, 2016, discussing a 
draft congressional response, and draft versions of emails on his personal email 
account that Strzok eventually sent to other FBI employees using his government 
account.  Most troubling, on October 29, 2016, Strzok forwarded from his FBI 
account to his personal email account an email about the proposed search warrant 
the Midyear team was seeking on the Weiner laptop.  This email included a draft of 
the search warrant affidavit, which contained information from the Weiner 
investigation that appears to have been under seal at the time in the Southern 
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District of New York and information obtained pursuant to a grand jury subpoena 
issued in the Eastern District of Virginia in the Midyear investigation.217   
We asked Strzok about these emails and his use of personal email account 
for FBI business.  Strzok stated: 
My general practice was not to use personal email for FBI business.  
The times that I did it was when it wasn’t possible or there, there were 
problems with the FBI systems.  In the case of I think the one issue 
that came out was...the one about the draft affidavit for the Weiner 
laptop. 
Our phones at the time had significant limitations specifically to that.  
You couldn’t view redlines.  And so, and, but yet you could on an 
iPhone.  So I remember in the case of that search warrant forwarding 
it over so I could see what DOJ changed and their comment bubbles in 
regard to that.  There were some other times where I was either out of 
the office.  I think a lot of those were either I was on travel or 
certainly over the weekends.  It is very cumbersome on the old 
iPhones, or on the old Samsungs of the Bureau because of the way 
they autocorrect spelling and the nature of the...keyboard, it is difficult 
to write anything of length whatsoever.  So there were times that, I 
mean, I think there’s one where I was very aggravated with a set of 
circumstances that had unfolded.  I was going to tell my boss about it, 
and I remember talking with Lisa [Page] saying, hey look, did I hit the 
right tone in this because I wanted to, you know, just be respectful, 
but at the same time convey my frustration.   
I wrote that on my home computer, because it’s easier to type it out.  
I think there was one that might be a holiday greeting that I sent to 
Bill [Priestap].  But, again, the sort of thing that, you know, for, for 
convenience, but because on the one hand it was bulky to, our 
technology was crappy, and it was impossible on the rare occasion I 
would write these things.  And then send them to, you know, my 
account and forward it on.  So it got incorporated and picked up into 
the FBI system. 
Strzok told us that his understanding was that FBI policy discouraged the use of 
personal email and devices, but “there are allowances made” where “it is not 
practical or possible to use your [FBI] device.”  Strzok stated that he would double 
delete any work-related emails in his personal account.218 
                                       
217  The OIG previously notified the respective U.S. Attorney’s Offices about Strzok’s actions. 
218  We requested access to Strzok’s personal email account.  Strzok agreed to produce copies 
of work-related emails in his personal account but declined to produce copies of his personal emails.  
Strzok subsequently told the OIG that he had reviewed the emails residing in his personal mailboxes 
and found no work-related communications.  We determined that we lacked legal authority to obtain 
the contents of Strzok’s personal email account from his email provider, which requires an Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) search warrant to produce email contents.  Strzok’s email 
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We also identified numerous references in text messages between Page and 
Strzok about using “Imessage” (or “Imsg”) or a personal email account.  A number 
of these messages reference work-related discussions on those forums.  We asked 
Strzok and Page about this.  Strzok stated, “Typically, we would iMessage personal 
things.”  We asked Strzok if he and Page ever exchanged work-related information 
on iMessage.  Strzok told us, “I do not recall that.  I can’t exclude it ever, ever 
happening, but I don’t recall ever sending work-related stuff on, on iMessage.” 
Page told us that references to these other forums reflected “mostly personal 
use” as opposed to using them for work purposes.  However, she stated that she 
and Strzok sometimes used these forums for work-related discussions due to the 
technical limitations of FBI-issued phones.  Page explained: 
[I]n particular, the autocorrect function is the bane of literally every 
agent of the FBI’s existence because those of us who care about 
spelling and punctuation, which I realize is a nerdy thing to do, makes 
us crazy because it takes legitimate words that are spelled correctly 
and autocorrects them into gobbledygook.  And so, it is not uncommon 
for either one of us to just either switch to our personal phones or, or 
in this case, where it was going to be a, a fairly substantive thing that 
he was writing, to just save ourselves the trouble of not doing it on our 
Samsungs.  Because they are horrible and super-frustrating.  
Page also noted that she and Strzok would often use personal email accounts to 
send news articles to one another. 
We refer to the FBI the issue of whether Strzok’s use of personal email 
accounts violated FBI and Department policies.  As noted above, Page left the 
Department on May 4, 2018. 
III. Allegations that Department and FBI Employees Improperly 
Disclosed Non-Public Information 
Among the issues we reviewed were allegations that Department and FBI 
employees improperly disclosed non-public information.  We found that Department 
and FBI officials raised considerable concerns about alleged leaks of information, 
particularly in October 2016, regarding the Midyear investigation and the Clinton 
Foundation investigation. 
                                       
provider’s policy applies to opened emails and emails stored for more than 180 days, which ECPA 
otherwise permits the government to obtain using a subpoena and prior notice to the subscriber.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(B)(i); COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS at 
129-30 (2009).  In addition, although we learned that a non-FBI family member had access to 
Strzok’s personal email account in 2017, Strzok told the OIG that no one else had access to his 
personal email account during the period in question (i.e., late October 2016). 
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As we describe in Chapter Eleven of this report, Lynch and Comey discussed 
their concerns about leaks on October 31, 2016.  Additionally, on October 26, 2016, 
Lynch raised her concerns about leaks with McCabe and the head of the FBI New 
York Field Office (NYO), with specific focus on leaks regarding the FBI’s high-profile 
investigation into the death of Eric Garner, as we detailed in our February 2018 
misconduct report concerning McCabe.219  McCabe told us that he “never heard 
[Lynch] use more forceful language.”  The head of FBI NYO confirmed that the 
participants got “ripped by the AG on leaks.”  These widespread concerns about 
leaks led Comey, following the 2016 election, to instruct the FBI’s Inspection 
Division (INSD) to investigate whether confidential information was being 
improperly disclosed by any FBI employees.220 
Concerns about the impact of possible leaks on the Midyear investigation, 
particularly in the October 2016 time period, are described in Chapters Ten and 
Eleven.  Several FBI officials told us that their concerns about potential leaks were 
a factor that influenced them in the discussions about the possibility of sending a 
notification letter to Congress on October 28, 2016, regarding the FBI’s discovery of 
Clinton-related emails on the Weiner laptop.  As then FBI General Counsel Baker 
starkly characterized that decision to us, “[I]f we don't put out a letter, somebody 
is going to leak it.” 
Against this backdrop, and as noted at the time the OIG announced this 
review, we examined allegations that Department and FBI employees improperly 
disclosed non-public information.  We focused, in particular, on the April/May and 
October 2016 time periods.  We have profound concerns about the volume and 
extent of unauthorized media contacts by FBI personnel that we have uncovered 
during our review. 
Our ability to identify individuals who have improperly disclosed non-public 
information is often hampered by two significant factors.  First, we frequently find 
that the universe of Department and FBI employees who had access to sensitive 
information that has been leaked is substantial, often involving dozens, and in some 
instances, more than 100 people.  We recognize that this is a challenging issue, 
because keeping information too closely held can harm an investigation and the 
supervision of it.  Nevertheless, we think the Department and the FBI need to 
consider whether there is a better way to appropriately control the dissemination of 
sensitive information. 
                                       
219  U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Report of 
Investigation of Certain Allegations Relating to Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe,   
Oversight & Review Report (February 2018), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/o20180413.pdf 
(accessed May 14, 2018). 
220  One of those investigations led to INSD raising questions about McCabe’s conduct and 
resulted in the OIG taking over the matter from INSD.  Ultimately, the OIG found that McCabe himself 
had authorized others in the FBI to disclose information regarding the FBI’s Clinton Foundation 
investigation just days prior to the election. 
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Second, although FBI policy strictly limits the employees who are authorized 
to speak to the media, we found that this policy appeared to be widely ignored 
during the period we reviewed.221  We identified numerous FBI employees, at all 
levels of the organization and with no official reason to be in contact with the 
media, who were nevertheless in frequent contact with reporters.  The large 
number of FBI employees who were in contact with journalists during this time 
period impacted our ability to identify the sources of leaks.  For example, during the 
periods we reviewed, we identified dozens of FBI employees that had contact with 
members of the media.  Attached to this report as Attachments G and H are link 
charts that reflects the volume of communications that we identified between FBI 
employees and media representatives in April/May and October 2016.222 
In addition to the significant number of communications between FBI 
employees and journalists, we identified social interactions between FBI employees 
and journalists that were, at a minimum, inconsistent with FBI policy and 
Department ethics rules.  For example, we identified instances where FBI 
employees received tickets to sporting events from journalists, went on golfing 
outings with media representatives, were treated to drinks and meals after work by 
reporters, and were the guests of journalists at nonpublic social events.  We will 
separately report on those investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the 
Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy. 
The harm caused by leaks, fear of potential leaks, and a culture of 
unauthorized media contacts is illustrated in Chapters Ten and Eleven, where we 
detail the fact that these issues influenced FBI officials who were advising then 
Director Comey on consequential investigative decisions in October 2016.  The FBI 
updated its media policy in November 2017, restating its strict guidelines 
concerning media contacts, and identifying who is required to obtain authority 
before engaging members of the media, and when and where to report media 
contact.  We do not believe the problem is with the FBI’s policy, which we found to 
be clear and unambiguous.  Rather, we concluded that these leaks highlight the 
need to change what appears to be a cultural attitude.  Accordingly, we recommend 
that the FBI evaluate whether (a) it is sufficiently educating its employees about 
both its media contact policy and the Department’s ethics rules, and (b) its 
disciplinary penalties are sufficient to deter such improper conduct. 
  
                                       
221  The Media Policy in effect both at the time of these events and currently authorizes only 
four employees at FBI Headquarters to speak directly to the media without prior authorization.  This 
list includes the Director, Deputy Director, Associate Deputy Director, and the Assistant Director of the 
Office of Public Affairs (OPA).  All other headquarters employees are required to coordinate with OPA 
prior to any contact with the media.  In FBI Field Offices (FO), only the head of the FO and a 
designated Public Affairs Officer are authorized to speak to the media.  The policies require these 
authorized FO officials to coordinate with OPA on stories with national interest. 
222  These charts do not reflect communications that occurred between media representatives 
and FBI employees who were working in a public affairs capacity or were otherwise authorized to 
speak directly to the media. 
431 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN:  
WHETHER FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR ANDREW MCCABE 
SHOULD HAVE RECUSED FROM CERTAIN MATTERS 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter we address whether former FBI Deputy Director Andrew 
McCabe should have recuse himself from the Clinton email server and Clinton 
Foundation investigations prior to November 1, 2016.223  We also address whether 
McCabe violated his recusal obligations after he recused himself from those 
investigations on November 1, 2016.224 
II. Timeline of Key Events 
Aug 10, 2014 Andrew McCabe becomes Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI 
Washington Field Office (WFO).   
 
Feb 25, 2015 McCabe’s wife, Dr. Jill McCabe, receives a call from the Virginia 
Lieutenant Governor’s office asking her to consider a state 
senate run. 
 
Mar 7, 2015 McCabe accompanies Dr. McCabe to Richmond and the two 
meet with Governor McAuliffe to discuss her potential run for 
state senate. 
 
Mar 9-13, 2015 McCabe contacts Director Comey’s Chief of Staff and Deputy 
Director Giuliano to discuss Dr. McCabe’s potential run. 
 
Mar 11, 2015 McCabe obtains advice from FBI ethics official Patrick Kelley and 
FBI General Counsel Baker. 
 
Mar 12, 2015 Dr. McCabe announces candidacy for state senate. 
 
April 29, 2015 McCabe documents his recusal from all Virginia public corruption 
cases. 
                                       
223  This chapter has been written to avoid reference to Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) 
information.  Attached to this report at Appendix Two is a non-public LES appendix containing the 
complete, unmodified version of Chapter Thirteen. 
224   The OIG’s review focused on McCabe’s conflict of interest obligations.  Other allegations 
against McCabe arising from his wife’s 2015 campaign for state senate were not within the OIG’s 
jurisdiction and therefore not within the scope of this review.  Specifically, in a December 1, 2017, 
letter to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein, Senator Charles Grassley expressed concern that 
McCabe may have violated the Hatch Act.  See The Honorable Charles Grassley, letter to Rod 
Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, December 1, 2017.  The Hatch Act 
generally governs the political activity of federal employees to protect the federal workforce from 
partisan political influence.  The law’s restrictions on political activity are codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-
7326.  The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) has jurisdiction over potential Hatch Act violations. 
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July 10, 2015 FBI opens the Clinton email investigation. 
 
Fall 2015 Dr. McCabe’s campaign committee (McCabe for Senate) receives 
a combined total of ~ $675,000 from a Political Action 
Committee controlled by McAuliffe ($467,500 in monetary 
contributions) and from Virginia Democratic Party ($207,788 in 
in-kind contributions).  McCabe states he was not aware of 
these contributions until October 2016. 
 
Sep 6, 2015 McCabe leaves WFO and becomes Associate Deputy Director for 
the FBI. 
 
Nov 3, 2015  Dr. McCabe defeated in state senate election. 
 
January 2016 FBI opens Clinton Foundation investigations. 
 
Feb 1, 2016  McCabe becomes Deputy Director for the FBI. 
 
Oct 23, 2016 The Wall Street Journal publishes article disclosing McAuliffe 
contributions to Dr. McCabe’s campaign, triggering discussions 
with Director Comey about whether McCabe should be recused 
from Clinton-related investigations. 
 
Nov 1, 2016 McCabe formally recuses himself from participating in Clinton-
related investigations, but the decision is not announced 
externally and only to a limited group internally. 
III. Relevant Standards and Procedures 
In this section we summarize the statutes, regulations, and FBI policies 
relevant to the conflict of interest and recusal issues. 
A. Financial Conflict of Interest Statute 
18 U.S.C. § 208 is the criminal conflict of interest statute addressing financial 
interest conflicts.  It prohibits an executive branch employee from “participating 
personally and substantially” in a particular matter in which the employee knows he 
(or other persons whose interests are imputed to him, including the employee’s 
spouse) have a disqualifying financial interest.  The particular matter must also 
have “a direct and predictable effect” on the financial interest.  5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.402.  Direct and predicable effect is defined by regulations to include “a 
close causal link between any decision or action to be taken in the matter and any 
expected effect of the matter on the financial interest.”  5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(b)(1).  
However, a particular matter does not have a direct effect on a financial interest, “if 
the chain of causation is attenuated or is contingent upon the occurrence of events 
that are speculative or that are independent of, and unrelated to, the matter.”  Id. 
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B. Executive Branch Regulations Addressing Appearance Concerns 
and Impartiality in Performing Official Duties 
The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) promulgates the Standards of Ethical 
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards of Ethical Conduct or 
OGE regulations).  See 5 C.F.R. Chapter XVI, Subchapter B., Part 2635.  5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.101 identifies general principles applying to all executive branch employees.  
One principle addresses appearance concerns and states that:  “[e]mployees shall 
endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the 
law or the ethical standards set forth in this part.”225  5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(14).  
See also Executive Order 12674 (as modified by Executive Order 12731) on 
Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees, section 
101(n). 
Conflicts of interest for federal employees are addressed in the OGE 
regulations at 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.401 – 2635.403 and 2635.501 – 2635.503.  
Section 502(a), relating to “Personal and business relationships,” provides: 
Where an employee knows that a particular matter involving specific 
parties is likely to have a direct and predictable effect on the financial 
interest of a member of his household, or knows that a person with 
whom he has a covered relationship is or represents a party to such 
matter, and where the employee determines that the circumstances 
would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts 
to question his impartiality in the matter, the employee should not 
participate in the matter unless he has informed the agency designee 
of the appearance problem and received authorization from the agency 
designee in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section. 
5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a). 
Section 502(a) thus identifies two categories of circumstances creating 
conflicts of interest that require recusal.  The first is where an employee knows that 
a “particular matter involving specific parties is likely to have a direct and 
predicable effect on the financial interest of a member of his household.”  Section 
402(b)(1) defines “direct and predicable effect,” as described above in connection 
with 18 U.S.C. § 208. 
The second category of conflict requiring recusal occurs if the employee 
knows that a person with whom the employee has a “covered relationship” is or 
represents a party to the “particular matter.”  Section 502(b) defines “covered 
relationships” to include, among other things, persons who are members of the 
employee’s household, persons who are relatives with whom the employee has a 
                                       
225  5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8) is the general principle which states that “[e]mployees shall act 
impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual.”  In this 
chapter we address McCabe’s recusal obligations and do not discuss whether McCabe’s conduct 
demonstrated that he acted with bias or partiality. 
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“close personal relationship,” and persons with whom the employee has certain 
financial relationships.  5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(b). 
Where either of these two circumstances is present and the employee 
determines that these circumstances “would cause a reasonable person with 
knowledge of the relevant facts to question [the employee’s] impartiality in the 
matter, the employee should not participate in the matter” unless he or she has 
obtained authorization to do so from a designated agency ethics official.  5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.502(a).  Thus, the “reasonable person” test is the standard for determining 
whether the circumstances could raise a fair question about an employee’s 
impartiality thereby creating an appearance concern.226  Section 502 encourages 
the employee to seek the assistance of his supervisor, an agency ethics official, or 
the agency designee in making a recusal determination.  5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.502(a)(1).  Section 502 also empowers the employee’s supervisor to 
request the agency designee to make a determination about whether recusal is 
required.  5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(c).  The agency designee may also make such a 
determination on his or her own initiative.  Id. 
In addition to the specific circumstances described above, section 502(a)(2) 
contains a catchall provision that addresses impartiality concerns in any “other 
circumstances.”  It states: 
An employee who is concerned that circumstances other than those 
specifically described in this section would raise a question regarding 
his impartiality should use the process described in this section to 
determine whether he should or should not participate in a particular 
matter. 
Section 502(a)(2) gives the employee the option to invoke the section 502 
process (i.e., seeking a recusal determination or waiver from the agency designee) 
for these “other circumstances.”  See also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.501(a).  For example, 
where the unique circumstances of “a personal friendship, or a professional, social, 
political or other association not specifically treated as a covered relationship” raise 
an appearance question, the employee may elect to use the section 502 process.  
Office of Government Ethics (OGE) 99 x 8, Memorandum to Designated Agency 
Ethics Officials Regarding Recusal Obligation and Screening Arrangements, April 26, 
1999 at 2. 
The OGE has made clear that while employees are “encouraged” to 
use the process provided by section 502 (a)(2), “[t]he election not to use 
that process should not be characterized, however, as an ‘ethical lapse.’”  
OGE 94 x 10(1), Letter to a Departmental Acting Secretary, March 30, 1994; 
see also, OGE 01 x 8 Letter to a Designated Agency Ethics Official, August 
23, 2001.  Further, a note in section 502 states that “[n]othing in this section 
                                       
226  The “reasonable person” standard is also the test for the general appearance principle in 
section 101 referenced above.  5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(14) (“Whether particular circumstances create 
an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the 
perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.”). 
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shall be construed to suggest that an employee should not participate in a 
matter because of his political, religious or moral views.” 
A recused employee is prohibited from participating in the matter unless 
authorized by the agency designee based on a determination that the Government’s 
interest “in the employee’s participation outweighs the concern that a reasonable 
person may question the integrity of the agency’s programs and operations.”  
5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).  The authorization could allow for partial participation by 
adjusting the employee’s duties to “reduce or eliminate the likelihood that a 
reasonable person would question the employee’s impartiality.”  5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.502(d)(6). 
C. Department of Justice Regulation Requiring Disqualification 
Arising from Personal or Political Relationships 
28 C.F.R. § 45.2 is a Department of Justice regulation which addresses 
recusal arising from a Department employee’s personal or political relationships.227  
Section 45.2(a) states that no Department employee “shall participate in a criminal 
investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with” any 
person or organization that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution or with 
any person or organization that the employee “knows has a specific and substantial 
interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the investigation or 
prosecution.” 
Section 45.2(c)(1) defines “political relationship” to mean: 
[A] close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether or 
not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a 
campaign organization, arising from service as a principal adviser 
thereto or a principal official thereof. 
In an April 2017 memorandum, the FBI’s then-chief ethics official, while 
acknowledging that the syntax of this definition is not “crystal clear,” wrote that 
section 45.2(c)(1) appears to require that in order to have a “close identification” 
with an elected official or candidate, the “employee must be or have been a 
‘principal adviser’ to the official or candidate.”228 
Section 45(c)(2) defines “personal relationship” in part to mean “a close and 
substantial connection of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality.”  It 
presumes an employee has a personal relationship with a parent, sibling, child, or 
spouse, and states that whether an employee’s relationships are “‘personal’ must 
                                       
227  28 C.F.R. § 45.2 implements 28 U.S.C § 528, which states that the Attorney General shall 
promulgate rules and regulations which require the disqualification of Department Employees “from 
participation in a particular investigation or prosecution if such participation may result in a personal, 
financial, or political conflict of interests, or the appearance thereof.” 
228  Patrick W. Kelley, Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official & Assistant Director, Office of 
Integrity and Compliance, FBI, memorandum for the FBI Deputy Director, Recusal, April 11, 2017.  
Kelley retired from the FBI on February 28, 2018. 
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be judged on an individual basis with due regard given to the subjective opinion of 
the employee.” 
Unlike other ethics provisions that contain language imputing to the 
employee a relative or spouse’s conflicts of interest, section 45.2 does not have 
language imputing to the Department employee a relative or spouse’s political or 
personal relationships. 
Section 45.2(b) requires an employee “who believes that his participation 
may be prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section” to report the matter to his 
supervisor.  If the supervisor determines that the employee has a personal or 
political relationship as described in paragraph (a), “he shall relieve the employee 
from participation” unless he determines that the relationship will not render the 
employee’s “service less than fully impartial and professional,” and the 
“participation would not create an appearance of a conflict of interest likely to affect 
the public perception of the integrity of the investigation or prosecution.” 
D. What Constitutes “Participation” Under the Regulations 
18 U.S.C. § 208 prohibits an employee from participating “personally and 
substantially” in a matter in which he has a disqualifying financial interest.  See also 
18 U.S.C § 207(a)(1).  The OGE regulations define “personal and substantial” and 
states in part:  “[t]o participate substantially means that the employee’s 
involvement is of significance to the matter…it requires more than official 
responsibility, knowledge, perfunctory involvement, or involvement on an 
administrative or peripheral issue.”  5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(b)(4). 
In contrast, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 and 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 both use the term 
“participate” without qualification and neither the OGE nor DOJ regulations contain 
definitions describing the type of “participation” to be avoided by recused 
employees.  Section 502(e) states that “[d]isqualification is accomplished by not 
participating in the matter.”  The OGE has provided general guidance on the scope 
of an employee’s recusal obligations and stated that a proper recusal requires “that 
an employee avoid any official involvement in a covered matter.”  OGE 99 x 8 at 2.  
The OGE has offered the following advice to ethics officials to share with employees 
who “may not fully appreciate the meaning of the term ‘recuse’”: 
An employee should refrain, abstain, refuse, relinquish, forebear, 
forgo, hold off, keep away, give up, decline, desist, discontinue, end, 
cancel, close, quit, terminate, stop, halt, cease, drop, stay away, shun, 
avoid participation in the matter before him or her.  In other words, 
just don’t do it. 
Id. at n.2. 
E. FBI Procedures and Ethics Officials 
The Department’s ethics program is administered by the Designated Agency 
Ethics Official (DAEO), the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, and the 
Departmental Ethics Office.  See DOJ Order 1200.1, part 11, chapter 11-1, B.1, 4.  
437 
The Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official (Deputy DAEO) is the person to 
whom the DAEO delegates the responsibility and authority for the management of 
the ethics program within each Department component.  Id. at B.3.  Patrick W. 
Kelley was the FBI’s Deputy DAEO and Assistant Director for the FBI’s Office of 
Integrity and Compliance during the time period of our review. 
The FBI Director’s authority as the FBI’s Agency Designee has been 
delegated to the FBI’s Deputy DAEO.  See James B. Comey, Director, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, memorandum for Lee J. Lofthus, Assistant Attorney 
General for Administration, Department of Justice, November 12, 2013 at 2.  
Consequently, for FBI employees—including the Deputy Director of the FBI—the 
FBI’s Deputy DAEO may make ethics determinations on his own, without approval 
or consultation with the Department’s DAEO, the Departmental Ethics Office, or the 
FBI Director.229 
Within the FBI, all Chief Division Counsel (CDC) and other employees 
designated by the Deputy DAEO may act as “ethics counselors.”  FBI Ethics and 
Integrity Program Policy Guide, 2.2.3(a).  Ethics counselors’ duties include 
providing advice regarding the standards of ethical conduct to employees in their 
offices, channeling questions requiring formal ethics determinations to the Deputy 
DAEO and forwarding any written advice to the Deputy DAEO.  Id at 2.2.3(b).  
Employees with ethics questions are directed to contact the ethics counselors 
designated in their respective offices.  Id. at 2.3(b).  FBI policy states that 
disciplinary action is generally not taken against an employee who engaged in 
conduct relying in good faith on the advice of an ethics counselor.  Id. at 2.3(c) 
IV. Factual Findings 
A. Background Facts 
1. Andrew McCabe 
McCabe began his career with the FBI in 1996 as a Special Agent in the New 
York Field Office.  McCabe served in a variety of leadership positions in the FBI 
during his career, including as Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division 
and Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch.  He served as 
Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) of the FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) from 
August 2014 until September 2015.  On September 6, 2015, McCabe became 
Associate Deputy Director of the FBI, responsible for the FBI’s non-operational 
divisions.  On February 1, 2016, McCabe became Deputy Director of the FBI, 
overseeing all FBI domestic and international investigative and intelligence 
activities.  McCabe became Acting Director of the FBI on May 9, 2017, when FBI 
Director James Comey was fired.  McCabe served as Acting Director until August 2, 
2017, when Christopher Wray became the new FBI Director.  At that time, McCabe 
                                       
229  Ethics determinations for the Director are made by the Deputy Attorney General.  See DOJ 
Order 1200.1 at part 11, chapter 11-1, C2.1. 
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resumed his duties as Deputy Director, a position he held until January 29, 2018, at 
which point he went on annual leave but remained an FBI employee.  In February 
2018, the OIG issued a misconduct report regarding McCabe to the FBI.230  On 
March 16, 2018, Attorney General Sessions terminated McCabe’s employment with 
the FBI. 
2. FBI Clinton Investigations 
The FBI opened the Clinton server email investigation when McCabe was the 
ADIC of WFO and opened the Clinton Foundation investigations after McCabe 
became FBI Associate Director.   
3. Dr. McCabe Meets Governor McAuliffe in February 2014 
In February 2014, then-Governor Terry McAuliffe visited the hospital where 
Dr. Jill McCabe practiced to advocate for expansion of Medicaid coverage in Virginia.  
McCabe told us that, by coincidence, his wife, Dr. McCabe, was working at the 
hospital that day and was present at the time of Governor McAuliffe’s visit.  McCabe 
told the OIG that Dr. McCabe had not previously met Governor McAuliffe until his 
visit to her hospital that day. 
4. Recruitment to Run for Virginia State Senate in February 
2015 
A year later, on February 25, 2015, Dr. McCabe received a phone call from 
an aide to then-Virginia Lieutenant Governor Ralph Northam.  That day, Dr. McCabe 
emailed her husband and said the aide had asked if she would consider running for 
Virginia State Senate against the incumbent in District 13.  McCabe told us that Dr. 
McCabe had not previously met Lieutenant Governor Northam. 
McCabe said that Dr. McCabe was subsequently invited to, and agreed to 
attend, a Democratic caucus meeting in Richmond on March 7, 2015, which would 
provide an opportunity for her to discuss a potential run with other elected officials.  
According to McCabe, a Virginia State Senator told Dr. McCabe that Governor 
McAuliffe was scheduled to speak at the meeting and they might have an 
opportunity to speak to him as well, although it was “not a guarantee” that they 
would talk with the Governor. 
5. The McCabes’ Meeting with Governor McAuliffe in March 
2015 
McCabe accompanied Dr. McCabe on her trip to Richmond on March 7. 
                                       
230  See U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), A Report of 
Investigation of Certain Allegations Relating to Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, Oversight 
and Review Division (February 2018). 
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a. Conversation with Richmond Special Agent in 
Charge (SAC) on March 6 
McCabe said the day before the March 7 trip he spoke to the Special Agent in 
Charge of the FBI’s Richmond Field Division (Richmond-SAC), to let him know he 
would be in Richmond with Dr. McCabe because she was considering a state senate 
run and they were going to a meeting “to talk with more people about this 
prospect.”  McCabe also said he talked to Richmond-SAC to get his impressions on 
Richmond and the state legislature and that Richmond-SAC “was very positive 
about it.” McCabe told the OIG that Richmond-SAC was the first FBI employee with 
whom he discussed the March 7 trip.   
Richmond-SAC told us that McCabe called to tell him he would be coming to 
Richmond with his wife to meet with the Governor as she was considering a run for 
office.  Richmond-SAC said McCabe asked if he would “get in the way of anything” 
by going to meet with state legislators.  Richmond-SAC said he did not have any 
investigative concerns with him meeting the Governor or state legislators, although 
he warned McCabe that if McCabe met with Governor McAuliffe, he would “be 
tethered to the Clintons” forever, and this could impact McCabe’s future in 
government. 
b. The McCabes’ Meeting with McAuliffe on March 7 
McCabe told us that on March 7 he and Dr. McCabe drove to Richmond for 
the Democratic caucus meeting where they met with a Virginia State Senator.  
According to McCabe, the State Senator told them “there’s been a change of plans” 
and that Governor McAuliffe wanted to speak to Dr. McCabe at the Governor’s 
mansion.  The three then drove to the mansion in the McCabes’ car. 
McCabe said they met with Governor McAuliffe at the mansion for 30 to 45 
minutes.  He said the Governor made it very clear that his number one priority was 
expanding Medicaid, and that “they” (from the context, apparently referring to the 
Virginia Democratic Party and himself) planned to target a few state senate seats.  
McCabe said the Governor explained why they thought Dr. McCabe would be a good 
candidate and that he said she could expect to spend a lot of time fundraising.  
According to McCabe, Governor McAuliffe said that he and the Democratic Party 
would support Dr. McCabe’s candidacy.  However, McCabe told us to the best of his 
recollection they did not discuss financial support nor did they say they would 
support Dr. McCabe “in the form of financial backing.”  McCabe also said there was 
no mention of the Governor’s Political Action Committee (PAC), the Clintons, or 
Clintons’ associates providing financial assistance.  McCabe said that Dr. McCabe 
asked McAuliffe questions about the nature, demands, and logistics of the 
legislative session and the amount of time she would have to spend in Richmond 
because she “had no intention ever of leaving her medical profession.”  McCabe 
said the Governor asked him about his occupation and McCabe told him he worked 
for the FBI but that they did not discuss McCabe’s work or any FBI business. 
According to McCabe, after the meeting at the Governor’s mansion, he and 
Dr. McCabe rode with the Governor to a hotel, where the Governor delivered his 
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speech.  McCabe said they were at the hotel for 20 to 25 minutes, standing in the 
audience listening to the speech and returned with the Governor to the mansion 
where the McCabes had left their car.  McCabe said they stayed for another 20 to 
30 minutes at the mansion for an unrelated event before returning home in their 
car.231  McCabe told us the March 7 meeting was the first and only time he had ever 
met McAuliffe. 
c. Follow-up Conversation with Richmond SAC on 
March 8 
Richmond-SAC told us that McCabe called him probably the following day 
(March 8) and described the meeting with Governor McAuliffe.  According to 
Richmond-SAC, McCabe said it was a “surreal meeting” with the Governor at the 
mansion.  Richmond-SAC said McCabe told him that from the mansion they were 
whisked away to a function at a hotel and that the Governor, without Dr. McCabe 
having committed to a run, introduced her as someone that they believed could 
unseat the incumbent senator in District 13.  Richmond-SAC said McCabe told him 
that he would address any ethics issues. 
6. Dr. McCabe’s Campaign 
Dr. McCabe announced her run for the Virginia State Senate on March 12, 
2015.  In FBI responses to Congressional inquiries in December 2016, the FBI 
stated that, to the best of McCabe’s recollection, his role in Dr. McCabe’s campaign 
“included providing transportation to his spouse in their personal vehicle on two 
occasions to public events; attending one public debate as a spectator; and 
appearing in a family photo which was used in a campaign mailer.”232 
Dr. McCabe’s campaign committee, McCabe for Senate, received substantial 
monetary contributions in 2015 from Common Good VA, a PAC controlled by then-
Governor McAuliffe, as well as in-kind contributions from the Virginia Democratic 
Party.  According to state campaign finance records, Common Good VA donated a 
total of $467,500 to McCabe for Senate, the vast majority of which was contributed 
in October 2015.  The Virginia Democratic Party provided a total of $207,788 in the 
form of campaign mail production in September and October 2015.  The combined 
total of $675,288 from the Governor’s PAC and the party represents approximately 
40 percent of the total contributions raised by Dr. McCabe for her state senate 
campaign during the 2015 election cycle, according to the records.   
On June 26, 2015, Hillary Clinton was the featured speaker at a fundraiser in 
Fairfax, Virginia hosted by the Virginia Democratic Party and attended by Governor 
McAuliffe.  News accounts at the time indicated that the party raised more than 
                                       
231  McCabe said he did not remember what the unrelated event was about. 
232  The FBI also stated in the letter that McCabe’s campaign activities were permissible under 
the Hatch Act.  We discuss the FBI’s Congressional responses in further detail below. 
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$1,000,000 at the fundraiser.233  McCabe told us he was not aware of the June 
2015 fundraiser until the October 2016 news accounts and that neither he nor his 
wife attended the event.234 
McCabe told us that during his wife’s campaign he was generally unaware of 
the nature and source of donations to her campaign, including the contributions 
from Governor McAuliffe’s PAC and the Virginia Democratic Party.  According to 
McCabe, he learned of these details for the first time from the October 23, 2016, 
Wall Street Journal article, discussed below.  He told us he was not aware of the 
Clintons or anyone on their behalf ever contributing to Dr. McCabe’s campaign. 
B. McCabe Discusses Wife’s Candidacy with FBI Officials, Seeks 
Ethics Advice, and Recuses from Various FBI Investigations 
1. Meeting with Comey’s Chief of Staff; Extent of Director 
Comey’s Knowledge or Approval 
McCabe said that the week following the March 7 meeting with Governor 
McAuliffe, he spoke to Chuck Rosenberg, Director Comey’s then-Chief of Staff.  He 
said he told Rosenberg that his wife was considering a state senate run and that 
they had traveled to Richmond and met with Governor McAuliffe.  McCabe said they 
had a “fulsome discussion about everything that was involved,” and that he 
described the information they had gathered, although he could not recall whether 
he flagged for Rosenberg the fact that his wife’s campaign could receive financial 
support from the Democratic Party or other sources influenced by McAuliffe.  
McCabe said he told Rosenberg that his wife would not run if the Director had “any 
concerns about it reflecting negatively” on the FBI or McCabe.  McCabe said that 
Rosenberg called him back a few hours later and said he had spoken to the Director 
“and he’s totally comfortable with it.”  McCabe told us the ethics issues were 
foremost on his mind and that he believed he talked to Rosenberg about the efforts 
he (McCabe) would take with the FBI’s chief ethics official, Patrick Kelley, to 
address conflict of interest and recusal issues.  McCabe said he believed that the 
Director’s approval would have been with the understanding that McCabe would 
address all conflict and recusal issues as required. 
Rosenberg told us that he recollected one brief in-person conversation in his 
office with McCabe at the time his wife was considering a run for the state senate.  
Rosenberg said that McCabe told him that his wife was considering a run and asked 
whether Rosenberg thought that would be problematic.  Rosenberg said he told 
                                       
233  See Jim Nolan, Clinton Rouses Virginia Democrats at Party Fundraiser at GMU, RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jun. 27, 2015, 2015 WLNR 19664828; Patrick Wilson, Clinton Makes Her First 
Campaign Appearance in Virginia, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jun. 27, 2015, 2015 WLNR 18860380; Rachel 
Weiner, At George Mason Arena, Clinton Goes on the Attack, WASH. POST, Jun. 28, 2015, 2015 WLNR 
18937709. 
234  Clinton also appeared with Governor McAuliffe at a campaign rally in Alexandria, Virginia 
on October 23, 2015.  Laura Vozzella, Clinton Stirs Up Crowd in Alexandria, Va., at Afternoon Rally, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/10/23/clinton-stirs-up-crowd-in-alexandria-va-at-afternoon-rally (accessed March 
27, 2018).  McCabe also told us that neither he nor his wife attended this event. 
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McCabe he did not believe there would be any issues with it, but that McCabe 
should talk to Kelley.  He told us he probably also said to McCabe that he would 
think about it further and let McCabe know if something ended up concerning him 
about the situation.  Rosenberg said he told McCabe that his wife was a private 
citizen and so long as her campaign does not interfere with his FBI work, he did not 
see why there would be an issue.  Rosenberg said he did not recall a subsequent 
conversation with Director Comey about this issue, but he believed McCabe’s 
recollection that Rosenberg called McCabe back and said the Director had no issue 
with it was correct because that sounded like what he would have done. 
Rosenberg said the conversation with McCabe was at “a fairly abstract level” 
and he assumed that that the ethics questions would be addressed with Kelley.  
Rosenberg said he told McCabe as long as “he was careful about recusals” and 
talked to Kelley it seemed okay to him. 
Comey told us he did not recall Rosenberg having asked him whether he had 
any concerns with a potential run for office by ADIC McCabe’s wife at the time she 
was considering a run.  Comey said he believes he learned for the first time that Dr. 
McCabe had run for office in a causal conversation with her at an event in July 2016 
(about 8 months after she lost the election), and that he recalled being surprised 
about that fact.  Comey told us that assuming McCabe’s recollection was accurate, 
then it is likely that Rosenberg described the issue in passing to him and said he 
had “checked it out and it’s all good” and Comey said “ok, no sweat.” 
2. Conversation with Deputy Director Giuliano 
McCabe told us he also spoke about his wife’s potential run with his direct 
supervisor, then-Deputy Director Mark Giuliano, on March 9, the Monday after their 
visit to Richmond.  McCabe said he described the “whole situation” to Giuliano in a 
“robust conversation” in which he described why his wife was interested in a 
possible run and the “sensitivities” of her run relative to his position, and that he 
identified WFO’s public corruption program.  He said Giuliano responded by 
directing him to talk to Kelley to identify a “clear path forward” that avoided any 
Hatch Act or recusal problems.  McCabe said Giuliano did not express any 
reservations and that Giuliano said “…good for her…she’s getting involved and 
trying to do the right thing.” 
By contrast, Giuliano told us that he advised McCabe, when McCabe told him 
that his wife was planning to run, that it was a “bad idea.”  According to Giuliano, 
McCabe responded by saying, “she’s supported me for all these years; I need to 
support her; what do I need to do?”  Giuliano said he told McCabe to consult Kelley 
and FBI attorneys, and that he believes McCabe ultimately “dotted every ‘I’ and 
crossed every ‘T’ that he needed to” on the issue.  Giuliano also told us that he 
ensured that McCabe was recused from appropriate WFO investigations. 
3. Meeting with Acting Chief Division Counsel on March 10 
McCabe and WFO’s Acting Chief Division Counsel (A-CDC), met on March 10, 
2015, the day before a meeting McCabe scheduled with Kelley.  McCabe said he 
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had an in-depth conversation with A-CDC when they met and that he asked her to 
attend the meeting with Kelley. 
A-CDC confirmed that she and McCabe had a conversation on March 10 in 
which McCabe described to her many details, including that he and his wife had met 
that weekend with McAuliffe at the governor’s mansion.  A-CDC told us, and her 
contemporaneous notes corroborate, that McCabe identified public corruption 
investigations and other areas of potential conflicts.  She said that he wanted her to 
identify the conflict parameters he would work under if his wife decided to run.  She 
responded by suggesting a “taint team” review process to identify potential conflict 
cases.  A-CDC said that McCabe was also very concerned with telling WFO 
employees about his wife’s run for fear that they would feel pressured to vote for 
her.  A-CDC said that McCabe told her that he had already notified the Director and 
the Deputy Director. 
4. Meeting with Kelley and Baker on March 11 
McCabe met with Kelley at his office at FBI Headquarters on March 11, 2015.  
The meeting was also attended by A-CDC and FBI General Counsel James Baker, 
who joined halfway through the meeting.  According to McCabe, Kelley addressed 
two areas in their discussions:  the Hatch Act restrictions on McCabe’s activities 
during the campaign, and conflict of interest and other issues to consider in the 
event Dr. McCabe won her race.  They did not discuss how to address donations to 
Dr. McCabe’s campaign or the possibility that they could create an appearance of a 
conflict of interest if made by individuals who may be under investigation by the 
FBI, or closely affiliated with individuals under investigation by the FBI.  McCabe 
said that they also discussed a process in which ongoing and future cases would be 
identified for potential recusal, with A-CDC serving as a “filter” of cases and the 
WFO’s Special Agents in Charge (SACs) tasked with bringing potential conflict cases 
to A-CDC for a recusal decision.  McCabe said that in the meeting they “hammered 
out the details of how they would do this collaboratively” and that Kelley was 
satisfied that such a process was “an abundantly cautious way to approach the 
issue.”  McCabe said that they had minimal discussion regarding considerations in 
the event Dr. McCabe won, but that Kelley said a win by her might trigger other 
recusal issues and that they would “cross that bridge” when they got to it. 
According to McCabe, the filtering arrangement they discussed was to take 
effect immediately.  McCabe told us that in the March 11 meeting it was his “strong 
belief” that his wife would run because the “all-clear report” from Rosenberg was 
the “last hurdle” prior to her decision to run.  Dr. McCabe announced her run for the 
state senate the next day, March 12, 2015. 
According to A-CDC, during the March 11 meeting Kelley and Baker were 
concerned with potential Hatch Act violations and said they did not think there 
would be case conflict of interest issues unless Dr. McCabe won her election.  A-
CDC told us that McCabe said they should nonetheless proceed as if there are 
conflicts of interest. 
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Kelley told us that Hatch Act considerations were the focus of most of the 
March 11 meeting.  Kelley said that once the Hatch Act questions were resolved 
they discussed what to do with WFO investigations and that McCabe, A-CDC, or 
both said they had put measures in place to screen investigations for conflicts.  
Kelley’s notes of the March 11 meeting are contained in an Ethics Advice Tracker, 
an OIC electronic form used to memorialize advice provided.  The Tracker stated 
that in the meeting they “reviewed disqualification/recusal requirements” and that 
McCabe had “already put in place filtering arrangements within his office.”  A-CDC 
said that they did not memorialize a filter process or issue written instructions 
immediately, but that they put in place a “stopgap measure” of funneling all public 
corruption matters through the Criminal Division SAC, Acting SAC, or someone from 
the CDC’s office to assess potential conflicts until they had implemented a formal 
process. 
McCabe told us that after the March 11 meeting, he expected A-CDC to 
document the recusal, speak to the Acting SAC about the filtering process, and 
work with the Acting SAC to list any cases from which he would be recused.  
McCabe said that he did not necessarily expect to hear about the specific cases that 
he had been recused from.  McCabe told us that at a regularly scheduled meeting of 
the WFO SACs, the same week as the March 11 meeting, he informed the SACs of 
his wife’s decision to run for state senate and of the filtering arrangement that they 
had put in place for identifying potential conflict cases. 
5. McCabe Recusal EC Issued on April 29 
The A-CDC documented McCabe’s recusals in an Electronic Communication 
(EC) dated April 29, 2015, which was approved by McCabe.235  The EC was sent to 
all of the WFO’s SACs and began by referencing Dr. McCabe’s run for state senate 
and stating that prior to her announcement, McCabe had consulted FBI officials “to 
identify limitations on his participation in her campaign and to identify areas where 
Dr. McCabe’s campaign may present potential conflicts of interest.”  It then 
referenced the March 11 meeting and stated that they had “also addressed with AD 
Kelley and GC Baker the potential for conflicts of interest.”  The EC stated that A-
CDC and the Acting SAC of the Criminal Division (A-SAC), in which the public 
corruption squads were located, had “identified several areas” where McCabe’s 
“dissociation would be appropriate,” including: 
[A]ll public corruption investigations arising out of or otherwise 
connected to the Commonwealth of Virginia present potential conflicts, 
as Dr. McCabe is running for state office and is supported by the 
                                       
235  A-CDC told us she drafted the EC on her own and did not coordinate the writing of the EC 
with Kelley or any others in OIC or OGC.  A-CDC said McCabe was the approving official on the EC 
because he was her direct supervisor.  When we asked Kelley whether McCabe’s supervisor or some 
other official should have approved the EC given that its subject matter was about his recusal, he said 
he believed it was “fine” for McCabe to approve it and make a record of the recusal in the system.  
Kelley provided two reasons.  First, he said the EC work flow process requires a supervisor to approve 
its creation and McCabe is A-CDC’s supervisor.  Second, he said that substantively the EC does not so 
much reflect on the decision to recuse as it describes the administrative measures that would be taken 
to implement the recusal protocols. 
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Governor of Virginia.  Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, the 
ADIC will be excluded from any involvement in all such cases. 
The April 29 EC then stated that supervising case agents in the WFO’s Criminal 
Division had conducted “an initial review” of pending investigations to identify cases 
that present a potential conflict of interest, that these cases were identified to A-
CDC and would be included in the matters in which McCabe “may take no part, 
either by being briefed or in the decision-making process.” 
The EC next identified a screening protocol for future or other ongoing cases 
requiring the CDC to review any investigations that may present “an actual or 
perceived conflict of interest” and make the recusal determination.  The EC 
concluded by stating:  “This protocol will be reassessed and adjusted as necessary 
and at the conclusion of Dr. McCabe’s campaign in November, 2015.” 
A-CDC told us she did not recall why she did not document the recusal until 
April 29 and that it was “always the plan” to memorialize the recusal in an EC. 
C. No Reassessment of Conflict/Recusal when McCabe becomes 
ADD or after Dr. McCabe Loses Election 
McCabe left the WFO and became the FBI’s Associate Deputy Director (ADD) 
in September 2015, while his wife’s campaign was ongoing.  The ADD primarily has 
administrative responsibilities rather than operational ones. 
When we asked McCabe if he had any conversations with anyone about 
whether the April 29 EC and its provisions traveled with him to his new position as 
ADD, he said he did not recall having any such conversations. 
Dr. McCabe lost her race for the state senate on November 3, 2015.  As 
noted above, the April 29 EC stated that the recusal protocol would “be reassessed 
and adjusted … at the conclusion of Dr. McCabe’s campaign in November 2015.”  
When we asked McCabe about the language related to reassessment, he told us no 
one approached him at the end of his wife’s campaign to discuss the issue with him. 
D. Participation in Clinton Email and Clinton Foundation 
Investigations 
1. McCabe Not Recused as ADIC, ADD, or DD 
As described in this report, until he recused himself from the Clinton email 
and Clinton Foundation investigations on November 1, 2016, McCabe had an active 
role in the supervision of the Clinton email investigation after he became the 
Deputy Director in February 2016.  He also had oversight of the Clinton Foundation 
investigations when he became Deputy Director.  When McCabe served as ADD, he 
did not have supervision over the Clinton email investigation, but he was 
occasionally present at meetings where the matter was discussed, according to 
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McCabe and an FBI response to Congressional inquiries.236  In July 2015, when the 
Clinton email investigation was opened, McCabe was serving as the ADIC in the 
WFO.  He told us he had no recollection of participating in any discussions about the 
opening of the case and only learned after the fact that the WFO had provided 
personnel to the Clinton email investigation team. 
2. Recusal Concerns Related to Clintons Raised in May 2015 
when McCabe is ADIC 
McCabe said that he never heard of any concerns that his wife’s run for office 
presented a conflict for him in Clinton matters until October 2016, as detailed 
below.  He also told us that until that time, he did not consider addressing a 
potential Clinton conflict because neither he nor his wife had any connection to 
Hillary Clinton, his wife’s campaign received no support from her, and whatever 
relationship Hillary Clinton had to Governor McAuliffe did not appear to McCabe to 
be grounds for a conflict.  We found one instance prior to October 2016 in which 
concerns were raised about a potential conflict for McCabe in Clinton-related 
matters, although we found no evidence that these concerns were brought to 
McCabe’s attention.  As described below, these concerns were raised by WFO 
personnel in May 2015, shortly after the April 29 EC was issued. 
a. Complaint Regarding Clinton 
On May 4, 2015, a private attorney emailed Director Comey to request that 
the FBI open a public corruption investigation into Hillary Clinton, citing public 
allegations related to the Clinton Foundation and her use of a private email server 
while she was Secretary of State.  Comey forwarded the complaint to Deputy 
Director Giuliano, who in turn forwarded it the next day to McCabe, stating: 
“[p]rovided to WFO for whatever action you deem appropriate.” 
On May 5, 2015, McCabe, who was out of the country on vacation, forwarded 
the email to A-SAC and directed her to have the complaint reviewed and to contact 
the private attorney and “conduct a standard assessment of these allegations.”  
McCabe copied Giuliano on this email.  A few hours later, McCabe sent a follow up 
email to A-SAC stating, “To be clear, we are info gathering at this point.  Please do 
not open a case or assessment until we have the chance to discuss further.”  A-SAC 
responded by stating she understood and added that they had “already discussed 
the issue in coordination with [the Department’s Public Integrity Section] and [FBI 
Headquarters] as this is not the first complaint on this matter.  We are following 
established protocol and guidelines for these types of complaints.”  McCabe 
responded to A-SAC, “Great.  Thanks.”  He also forwarded to Chuck Rosenberg the 
                                       
236  McCabe told us that when he was ADD and Deputy Director Giuliano was absent, McCabe 
filled in for him at meetings, although McCabe said he did not recollect doing so at any meetings 
related to the Clinton email investigation.  Giuliano also told us that for a period of about two weeks 
before he departed the FBI and McCabe became the Deputy Director, McCabe shadowed Giuliano and 
he coached McCabe as he took over his new position. 
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first email he sent to A-SAC and described to Rosenberg his subsequent instructions 
to A-SAC to hold off on opening a case or assessment. 
Rosenberg told us he vaguely recalled the email thread but he did not recall 
McCabe’s email to him or his response to McCabe, which was “[u]nderstood... 
[e]njoy your vacation”.  He said he does not recall the email thread prompting any 
concerns at headquarters about McCabe working on Clinton matters and that he 
would not have made a connection with a Clinton matter and Dr. McCabe and 
Governor McAuliffe. 
b. Supervising Case Agent and A-SAC Raise Concerns 
About McCabe Participating in Decisions Related to 
Clinton 
A-SAC forwarded the email thread to a supervising case agent in the Criminal 
Division the same day who replied “ADIC should recuse himself from this matter in 
my opinion.”  The supervising case agent told us he was concerned because, among 
other things, he knew “the Clintons and McAuliffe are hard to separate,” and that 
McAuliffe ran her 2008 campaign for President.  He also described his concerns as 
being protective of McCabe’s interests by anticipating how any participation by him 
on a Clinton matter would play out in the press since “the ADIC’s wife has benefited 
from her relationship to McAuliffe.” 
A-SAC told us that her concern on the nature of a potential Clinton conflict 
“was overall [public corruption], and Clinton specifically because of just the broader 
relationship between McAuliffe and Clinton.”  A-SAC said she spoke to A-CDC who 
reached out to Kelley.  A-SAC said she also addressed her concerns with another 
SAC in WFO and the then-Chief of the Public Corruption Section of CID (PCS-Chief). 
PCS-Chief told us he recalls speaking to A-SAC about concerns she had although he 
did not recall the specifics of those concerns or the identity of the matter.   PCS-
Chief told us he passed along A-SAC’s concerns to one of his superiors.  A-SAC said 
she did not know whether PCS-Chief or anyone else prompted McCabe in the May 5 
time period about a potential Clinton conflict. 
c. A-CDC and Kelley’s Communications and Nonrecusal 
Decision 
On May 5, A-CDC emailed Kelley and stated: 
I have an issue I would like to run by you regarding ADIC McCabe’s 
potential conflicts of interest and his wife’s campaign.  Should be fairly 
quick, but I would appreciate your opinion on how we are handling a 
particular matter. 
A-CDC’s email to Kelley did not identify the subject of the potential conflict of 
interest.  Kelley and A-CDC spoke by phone the following morning, May 6, which 
Kelley documented in an Ethics Advice Tracker dated May 7, 2015.  In the Tracker, 
Kelley summarized the advice he provided to A-CDC as follows: 
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Q re necessity of recusal of her ADIC.  Relates to ADIC’s spouse 
running for partisan office which we have discussed and worked out 
recusal arrangements, etc.  This matter concerns a separate 
investigation where there may be a relationship between certain 
persons.  Advised that relationship in the investigations was not 
enough to warrant recusal.  Details too sensitive to be included here. 
A-CDC told us she did not remember why she reached out to Kelley and did not 
recall discussing with anyone a potential McCabe conflict with Clinton-related 
matters.  Likewise, Kelley told us that he did not recall his conversation with A-CDC 
or whether the advice memorialized in the Tracker related to a potential conflict 
regarding Clinton.  (The Tracker did not reference Clinton or otherwise identify the 
subject of the potential conflict of interest.) 
Kelley said that the first time he remembers hearing about a recusal question 
regarding Clinton-matters was in October 2016, as discussed below.  Kelley also 
told us that in the May 2015 time frame he would have said there is no need for 
McCabe to recuse from Clinton-matters on the basis of the relationship between 
Governor McAuliffe and Clinton because their relationship is tangential:  “[T]he 
question is, are McAuliffe’s relationships to Clinton imputed to Ms. McCabe.  And 
frankly, I think that’s a bridge too far.  I can’t see that we should impute all of 
McAuliffe’s relationships to McCabe.” 
We found no evidence that McCabe was ever made aware of the concerns 
raised by A-CDC, A-SAC, or the supervising case agent.  We also found no evidence 
that Kelley consulted with or questioned McCabe, who was out of the country on 
vacation, regarding A-CDC’s concerns before reaching his conclusions and providing 
the advice to A-CDC on May 7. 
E. Clinton Email and Clinton Foundation Investigations Recusals 
1. October 23, 2016 Wall Street Journal Article 
On October 23, 2016, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published online an 
article stating that a political-action committee (PAC) run by Virginia Governor 
McAuliffe and the Virginia Democratic Party (over which the article reported 
McAuliffe “exerts considerable control”) collectively donated nearly $675,000 to the 
2015 unsuccessful state senate campaign of the wife of Andrew McCabe.237  The 
article described McAuliffe as “an influential Democrat with long-standing ties to Bill 
and Hillary Clinton” and noted that McCabe was an FBI official “who later helped 
oversee the investigation into Mrs. Clinton’s email use.”  The article contained an 
official FBI statement that McCabe “played no role” in his wife’s 2015 state senate 
campaign and was promoted to FBI Deputy Director months after his wife’s defeat 
                                       
237  See Devlin Barrett, Clinton Ally Aided Campaign of FBI Official’s Wife, WALL ST. J, Oct. 23, 
2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/clinton-ally-aids-campaign-of-fbi-officials-wife-1477266114 
(accessed June 11, 2018).  A print version of the article was published in the WSJ on Monday, October 
24, 2016. 
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“where,…he assumed for the first time, an oversight role in the investigation into 
Secretary Clinton’s emails.”238  According to the article, FBI officials stated that 
McCabe’s supervision of the Clinton email investigation in 2016 did not present a 
conflict or ethics issues because his wife’s campaign was over by then.  The article 
went on to note that when the Clinton email investigation was launched in July 
2015, Mr. McCabe was “running the FBI’s Washington, D.C., field office, which 
provided personnel and resources to the Clinton email probe.” 
Among other things, the article stated that McAuliffe could recall having met 
only once with McCabe, on March 7, 2015, when he and other state Democrats met 
with the couple to urge Dr. McCabe to run.  It stated that after the March 7 
meeting, McCabe sought ethics advice from the FBI “and followed it, avoiding 
involvement with public corruption cases in Virginia, and avoiding any campaign 
activities or events.” 
2. Internal Deliberations and Recusals from Clinton Email 
and Clinton Foundation Investigations 
Immediately following online publication of the October 23 WSJ article, there 
was substantial public discussion as to whether McCabe’s oversight of the Clinton 
email investigation had been appropriate in light of the information in the article.  
In the week that followed the article, discussions ensued within the FBI over 
whether McCabe should recuse from Clinton-related matters.  These discussions 
took on additional significance on October 27, when Comey was briefed by the FBI 
Clinton email investigation team regarding the Weiner laptop issue. 
a. Comey and Baker Responses to Article 
Comey told us he was “frustrated” that he had not known about the facts 
raised in the October 23 WSJ article earlier and that he had a conversation with 
McCabe about this.  Had he known them earlier, Comey said he believed it “highly 
likely as a prudential matter” that he would have had someone else take on 
McCabe’s role in the Clinton email investigation, even if presented with an opinion 
from Kelley finding no requirement for recusal under the ethics rules.  Comey said 
although he did not believe there was an actual conflict, “because of the nature of 
the [Clinton email] matter” he would not have permitted McCabe to participate as it 
would have been “used to undercut the credibility of the institution.”  He said, “I 
don’t buy this.  I think it’s crap, but it brings a vector of attack to this institution 
                                       
238  The “played no role” reference in the FBI statement was derived from information provided 
by McCabe and was approved in advance by McCabe.  Soon after publication of the October 23 WSJ 
article, the “played no role” statement came under public criticism.  Subsequently, in its December 14 
letter to Senator Grassley (described below) relating to alleged conflict of interest issues involving 
McCabe, the FBI removed the “played no role” language from a draft of the letter and instead stated 
in its final letter: “To the best of his recollection, Mr. McCabe’s only activities related in any way to the 
campaign included providing transportation to his spouse in their personal vehicle on two occasions to 
public events; attending one public debate as a spectator; and appearing in a family photo which was 
used in a campaign mailer, all of which are permissible under the Hatch Act.” 
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and why would I open a vector of attack to this institution, its credibility is its 
bedrock, when I don’t need to.” 
Comey said that while as a lawyer he could see the alleged conflict was a 
“triple bank shot,” a few days after the October 23 WSJ article the necessity of 
seeking a search warrant on the Weiner laptop was a “mushroom cloud” making 
“much more significant” the question of whether to notify Congress.  He said that 
given these elevated stakes he did not need the “baggage” of an alleged conflict for 
McCabe brought into the decisions that would be “heavily scrutinized” and he did 
not have time to “get a legal opinion” or even for “thoughtful analysis” on whether 
McCabe should participate in the decisions.  He said there was enough in the news 
articles to counsel against McCabe’s involvement.  He said that while initially he 
viewed the conflict allegations as “a PR thing” that needed to be managed, “it 
became hugely significant to me once [the Clinton email investigation] awoke from 
the dead.”  Comey said he told McCabe, “I don’t need you on this because I don’t 
see it as that close a call.”239 
Baker told us that in the wake of the October 23 WSJ article, he and Comey 
had one-on-one conversations in which they discussed the issues it raised.  Baker 
said that he believes he and Comey first learned from the October 23 WSJ article 
that Dr. McCabe’s campaign received large contributions attributed to McAuliffe.  He 
said he and Comey concluded that McCabe should recuse himself from the Clinton 
email investigation “out of an abundance of caution.”  Baker said that they agreed 
that it would be best if McCabe recused himself rather than being recused by 
Comey and that Comey instructed Baker to attempt to persuade McCabe to do so. 
b. McCabe Excluded from Weiner Laptop Meeting on 
October 27 
As described above in Chapter Nine, on October 27 at 10:00 a.m., Comey 
held a meeting with the Clinton email investigation team to discuss obtaining a 
search warrant for a set of Clinton-related emails the FBI had discovered on a 
laptop belonging to Anthony Weiner, and taking additional steps in the Clinton 
email investigation.  Lisa Page, McCabe’s special counsel, attended the meeting.  
McCabe was out of town, but joined the meeting via conference call.  After the 
meeting began, Baker suggested, and Comey agreed, that McCabe should leave the 
call.  Comey told us that he asked McCabe to drop off the call, and McCabe was 
“very unhappy about it.” 
Accounts differ about the reason stated on the October 27 call for excluding 
McCabe.  McCabe told the OIG that the reason stated on the call for dropping him 
related to the potential for discussion about classified information.  However, 
Comey, Baker, and Page all told us that Comey asked McCabe to leave the call out 
of an abundance of caution because of appearance issues following revelations in 
                                       
239  Comey told us he did not recall his weighing in on whether McCabe should recuse from the 
Clinton Foundation investigation and said he did not remember knowing that McCabe ultimately 
recused from the Clinton Foundation investigation at the same time he recused from the Clinton email 
investigation. 
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the October 23 WSJ article about the campaign donations to Dr. McCabe from 
McAuliffe-associated PACs. 
McCabe discussed the issue of his participation in the Clinton email matter 
further with Comey and Baker by telephone later that day.  After these 
conversations, McCabe sent a text message to Page stating, “I spoke to both.  Both 
understand that no decision on recusal will be made until I return and weigh in.” 
c. Baker and Kelley Meet on October 27 
Baker and Kelley met on October 27 to discuss the allegation of a conflict of 
interest raised by the October 23 WSJ article.  Kelley said that he concluded, along 
with Baker, that although the facts did not require McCabe to recuse, it was 
“desirable” to recuse because of appearance concerns, so he recommended it.  
Baker told us that Kelley concluded that while McCabe was not legally required to 
recuse from Clinton matters he recommended recusal because of appearance 
concerns and out of an abundance of caution. 
An Ethics Advice Tracker from the October 27 meeting memorializing the 
discussion and advice Kelley rendered states: 
Cited to and discussed DOJ rule at 28 C.F.R. 45.2, conflict of interest 
statute at 18 USC 208, SOC rules on impartiality at 5 CFR 2635.502, 
and appearance standard at 5 CFR 2635.101(b)(14).  Based on facts, 
advised that I saw no legal requirement for disqualification but, on 
balance, there was an appearance issue and would recommend 
recusal. 
d. Kelley’s Rationale for Recusal 
Although Kelley did not issue a formal opinion in October 2016, he told us 
that if he had put his advice in writing he was “confident” he would have said 
recusal of McCabe in the Clinton-related matters was not required.  He said his 
recommendation that it was nonetheless desirable for McCabe to recuse was based 
on the allegations in the press and potential adverse publicity for the FBI were 
McCabe not to recuse, the fact that the FBI could “avoid a fight” while “preserving 
its equities” in having another senior leader take on McCabe’s role, and, on a 
personal level, making “life easier for the people who are under attack or under 
scrutiny.”  While Kelley said McCabe’s recusals were desirable, he also told us that 
the question of whether a recusal is required under the standards of conduct is 
based on the reasonable person standard, see 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(14), and not 
on the “Washington Post test,” i.e., the likelihood that certain facts may become 
the subject of a news article.  He said that while the likelihood of adverse publicity 
could factor into the reasonable person standard and that “we all have in the back 
of our mind how is this going to read in the Post…we have to make the decision 
based not on what’s in the Washington Post but on what a reasonable person would 
take away if that person knew the relevant facts, and sometimes that’s very 
nuanced.”  In a memorandum Kelley wrote in April 2017, Kelley described McCabe’s 
Clinton-related investigation recusals as “not required by law or regulation” and 
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done by McCabe “out of an abundance of caution, and to avoid further speculation 
in some quarters about the propriety of [his] continued participation.” 
Kelley told us he did not believe that a reasonable person would question 
McCabe’s impartiality because Dr. McCabe had no relationship to Clinton, and while 
the relationship between the Governor and Clinton is close, he did not believe that 
meant “we can impute that relationship or should impute that relationship to Ms. 
McCabe and then turn around and impute that imputed relationship to Mr. 
McCabe…it’s too tangential to say recusal is required.” 
e. Baker and McCabe Conversation on October 31 
McCabe and Baker spoke about recusal by phone while McCabe was out of 
town on October 27, but no decision was made.  McCabe told us he had 
conversations with Baker after returning to the office on October 31 and that Baker 
said to him that Kelley’s view was that he should recuse.240  Baker told us that he 
had a series of conversations with McCabe culminating in a “very intense” 
conversation in which Baker told McCabe that he believed he needed to recuse 
himself and that it was better that he do it “than have the boss order him to do it.”  
He said McCabe “was not happy about it” and “had lots of questions” and they had 
a “good argument back and forth.” 
McCabe said that he had numerous discussions with Baker and Page during 
this time in which he expressed his view that he should not recuse out of 
abundance of caution as it “would unfairly create a negative inference over the 
work that the [Clinton email investigation] team had done with [his] participation 
over the previous” months.  McCabe said Baker presented him with his argument 
that there existed connections among Hillary Clinton and McAuliffe and his wife, but 
it seemed to McCabe to be too “attenuated” to call for recusal. 
McCabe said that the size of the contributions that came to light in the 
October 23 WSJ article was a relevant new fact for Baker in creating an appearance 
concern.  McCabe said he countered by arguing that the size of the contributions 
should not determine whether a conflict is present, that you have a conflict at $1 as 
you do at $200,000, and while Baker agreed with his analysis that there was no 
legal conflict, Baker was focused on the “external impression of my involvement in 
the case.” 
McCabe said Baker’s response to his concerns was to acknowledge that while 
he may be right on the law and facts that he was not required to recuse, Baker 
believed he should recuse in light of the news article, in an abundance of caution, 
for the sake of perception, and given Kelley’s view.  McCabe said he believed there 
was “a very clear inevitable negative impact to being overly cautious.”  McCabe said 
that in his discussions with Baker he asked whether he would be ordered to recuse 
                                       
240  McCabe and Page both told us that neither of them spoke directly to Kelley about Clinton 
matter recusals in October 2016, but wished they had because they would learn in 2017 that Kelley’s 
view was the same as theirs — that there was no basis in fact or law that required McCabe to recuse 
from the Clinton matters. 
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and Baker told him “if the Director thinks you should, then it’s better to recuse 
yourself than to be…directed; [b]etter to recuse voluntarily, than involuntarily.” 
f. McCabe and Comey Meeting on November 1 
On November 1, McCabe and Comey spoke in the Director’s office.  McCabe 
told us he said to Comey that he did not believe he should recuse from the Clinton 
email investigation and presented the arguments he made to Baker in their earlier 
conversations.  McCabe said that Comey responded by saying he made a good 
argument but told him that in light of the external perception from the negative 
media attention he should recuse.  McCabe told us that when he argued that his 
recusal at this late stage may call into question his earlier participation, Comey 
acknowledged that recusal could have such a negative impact, but said that given 
the media attention he should nonetheless recuse.  McCabe said that although 
Comey did not explicitly order him to recuse, given what Baker said about a request 
from the Director to recuse, he told Comey that he would recuse. 
Comey told us that in his conversation with McCabe, McCabe said that the 
allegations of conflict as to the Clinton email investigation were akin to a “triple 
cushion bank shot” and that therefore it was unreasonable for him to seek an 
opinion from Kelley on the alleged Clinton conflict.  Comey said McCabe also told 
him that, although he did not believe there was a legal basis for recusal, he thought 
it was “prudent” for him to step aside. 
Comey also said that in a conversation with McCabe he “made clear to him 
[his] disappointment” that these facts were not brought to his attention earlier. 
g. November 1 Recusal Emails 
On November 1, soon after his meeting with Comey, McCabe sent emails to 
FBI executives and officials overseeing the Clinton Foundation investigation and the 
Clinton email investigation informing them that he was recusing himself from those 
investigations.  The emails stated: 
As of today I am voluntarily recusing myself for the ongoing [Clinton 
email investigation / Clinton Foundation investigation].  I will continue 
to respond to congressional requests for historical information as 
necessary. 
McCabe told us that the timing of the recusals from the Clinton Foundation and 
Clinton email investigations were not on different tracks and he believed that a 
recusal rationale based on a perceived Clinton-related conflict as to the Clinton 
email investigation logically extended to the Clinton Foundation investigation. 
The FBI did not publicize McCabe’s recusals from these Clinton investigations 
despite the rationale that the recusals were at least in part intended to address the 
public perception of a potential conflict.  In fact, even within the FBI, McCabe’s 
recusal decision was only shared with a limited audience, primarily those copied on 
the email and those aware of the recusal discussions.  McCabe told us that he 
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thought the decision to recuse was a mistake, so to be “very public” and publicize it 
“would just compound the mistake.” 
3. Participation in Clinton Foundation Investigation after 
November 1 
In this section we summarize three instances in which McCabe took actions 
related to the Clinton Foundation investigation after his November 1 recusal. 
a. Call to NY ADIC Following November 3 Wall Street 
Journal Article 
On November 3, 2016, the WSJ published another story on the Clinton 
Foundation investigation.241  That evening, McCabe emailed the ADIC of the FBI 
New York Office, William Sweeney, and stated, “This is the latest WSJ article.  Call 
me tomorrow.”  According to Sweeney’s calendar notes on November 4 and 
testimony to the OIG, McCabe and Sweeney spoke for approximately 10 minutes 
around 7 a.m., regarding “leaks and WSJ article” and that McCabe was “angry.”  
Sweeney’s calendar notes also reflect that McCabe expressed to him:  “will be 
consequence[s] and get to bottom of it post elect[ion].  Need leaks to stop.  
Damaging to org.”242 
McCabe told the OIG that he did not recall the details of the conversation on 
November 4, but it was “probably about leaks” to the media.  McCabe said he 
would not have viewed his conversation with Sweeney as participating in the 
Clinton Foundation investigation but rather as a “logical follow-up to an ongoing 
conversation” he had been having with Sweeney for several weeks over the general 
issue of leaks coming out of the New York office.  He said he was not transacting on 
the case, making decisions, or asking about the case, but rather telling Sweeney 
that he needed to address unauthorized media disclosures by getting his “people 
under control.”  Additionally, McCabe told us he did not believe his recusal from the 
Clinton Foundation investigation encompassed his general responsibilities to 
address the issue of FBI leaks. 
b. Email to Kortan on November 3 Wall Street Journal 
Article 
Also on the evening of November 3, McCabe emailed the latest WSJ article to 
Kortan and stated:  “I am curious as to why I keep stumbling across these things 
with no notice whatsoever from my OPA machine?...  I would like to discuss 
solutions tomorrow.”  Kortan told us he did not recall the email from McCabe or any 
subsequent conversation with McCabe.  McCabe said his email to Kortan was 
                                       
241  See Devlin Barrett and Christopher Matthews, Secret Recordings Fueled FBI Feud in 
Clinton Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-recordings-fueled-fbi-
feud-in-clinton-probe-1478135518 (accessed June 11, 2018). 
242  As detailed in a separate OIG misconduct report, McCabe had himself authorized the 
disclosure of sensitive information about the Clinton Foundation investigation to the Wall Street 
Journal, which was included in an article published on October 30 as well as in the November 3 article 
he discussed with Sweeney. 
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intended to address a “persistent frustration” he had over not receiving timely 
notice by OPA of news articles of interest.  McCabe told us he did not know if he 
had a subsequent conversation with Kortan in which Kortan provided an explanation 
for why OPA did not send him the article.  However, McCabe said that Kortan may 
not have brought the November 3 WSJ article to his attention in the first place 
because McCabe had recused himself from the Clinton Foundation investigation.  
When we asked McCabe whether in retrospect he should have asked Kortan to be 
briefed or kept up to speed on matters he was recused from, he said, “no, no” and 
reiterated that may have been why Kortan did not bring the article to his attention. 
F. Decision Not to Disclose McCabe’s Recusals to Congress 
Soon after the publication of the October 23 WSJ article, the FBI received 
three Congressional requests for information regarding the facts and allegations in 
the article.  One was a letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to Director Comey 
dated October 28, 2016, requesting answers to 12 questions, including one which 
stated: “What steps are you taking to mitigate the appearance of a conflict of 
interest in the Clinton email investigation and to reassure Congress and the 
American people that the investigation was not subject to political bias?” 
On December 14, 2016, the FBI sent its response to Senator Grassley’s 
letter, signed by the then-Acting Assistant Director (AAD) for the FBI’s Office of 
Congressional Affairs (OCA).  The December 14 letter did not explicitly address 
Senator Grassley’s question concerning mitigation steps taken or otherwise disclose 
McCabe’s November 1 recusal from the Clinton email investigation.  Instead, the 
last two sentences of the corresponding paragraph in the final December 14 letter 
stated: 
Dr. McCabe lost the election for state senate on November 3, 2015, 
months before Mr. McCabe, as DD, assumed responsibility for the 
Clinton email investigation. Based on these facts, it did not appear that 
there was a conflict of interest – actual or apparent – that required 
recusal or waiver. 
We attempted to determine who made the decision not to disclose the 
November 1 recusal of McCabe from the Clinton email investigation in the 
December 14 response to Senator Grassley, and for what reason. 
Beginning in early December 2016, the OCA AAD and another OCA staff 
member circulated several drafts of the response to Senator Grassley.  One draft 
included the sentence: “On October [?], 2016, out of an abundance of caution, Mr. 
McCabe recused himself from further participation in the [Clinton email] 
investigation.”  Lisa Page responded in an email that stated, “No way on [that] 
sentence.  During our conversation with Jim [Baker] last week, both of us 
express[ed] our overwhelming interest in protecting that fact as long as possible.”  
Page told us she believed the “both of us” reference was to herself and McCabe, but 
was not sure.  Page told us she believed that McCabe’s recusal, if revealed, would 
have been misused for political purposes and further inflamed the claims that 
Comey and McCabe were biased in favor of Clinton.  Page also said she was not 
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sure who made the ultimate decision on whether to disclose McCabe’s recusal.  She 
said that she did not know whether McCabe weighed in on this decision. 
McCabe told us he did not have a recollection of any discussion, including 
with Comey, regarding whether to reveal his recusal from the Clinton email 
investigation in the December 14 letter.  He said Page’s “protect the fact” comment 
in her email reflected their thinking at the time that to reveal that information 
would create a “potentially damaging misimpression of the case” and that although 
he did not recall specifically discussing this issue with Comey, he believed Comey 
was also of that view. 
Comey said he had “some recollection” that his Chief of Staff, James Rybicki, 
presented him with two options being considered, one sentence urged by McCabe 
and his staff would respond narrowly, the other would volunteer the fact of 
McCabe’s recusal.  Comey told us he did not recall the details of his participation in 
the decision on how to answer, but he said he recalled seeing the proposed 
language and hearing about an internal conflict that McCabe did not want the FBI to 
volunteer that he had recused from the Clinton email investigation.  Comey told us 
that although he does not recall how he responded to the issue as it was presented 
to him, he assumes he would have agreed to the final language so long as it was 
“technically accurate I’m okay with answering it narrowly.”  Rybicki told us he had a 
vague recollection of the Grassley letter, but could not recall any discussions 
regarding whether to disclose McCabe’s November 1 recusal to Congress or whether 
the issue was presented to Comey. 
The OCA AAD told us he did not specifically recall who made the decision not 
to disclose McCabe’s recusal, but that he believes McCabe likely made the decision.  
However, the OCA AAD said he did not remember having a conversation with 
McCabe about disclosing his recusal in the December 14 letter or providing him a 
draft with the proffered recusal language in it. 
V. OIG Analysis 
A. Recusal Issues 
In this section we analyze whether McCabe should have been recused from 
the Clinton investigations prior to November 1, 2016 and whether he adhered to 
the terms of his recusal once he was recused. 
1. Summary of Findings 
We found that McCabe was not required to recuse from the Clinton-related 
investigations under section 502(a) or any of the other relevant authorities.  We 
also determined that, at the time McCabe became Deputy Director and thus had 
authority over Clinton-related investigations, no one in the FBI considered the 
question of whether Dr. McCabe’s campaign raised recusal concerns as to Clinton-
related investigation.  This issue was not considered until after publication of the 
October 23 WSJ article and led to McCabe recusing himself from Clinton-related 
investigations on November 1, 2016.  We found that McCabe did not fully comply 
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with his November 1 recusal in a few instances related to the Clinton Foundation 
investigation as detailed below. 
We found that FBI ethics officials and attorneys did not fully appreciate the 
potential significant implications to McCabe and the FBI from campaign donations to 
Dr. McCabe’s campaign.  The FBI did not implement any review of campaign 
donations to assess potential conflicts or appearance issues that could arise from 
the donations.  On this issue, we believe McCabe did what he was supposed to do 
by notifying those responsible in the FBI for ethics issues and seeking their 
guidance.  Had the FBI put in place a system for reviewing campaign donations to 
Dr. McCabe, which were public under Virginia law, the sizable donations from 
McAuliffe’s PAC and the Virginia Democratic Party may have triggered prior 
consideration of the very appearance concerns raised in the October 23 WSJ article. 
2. Recusal from Clinton-Related Investigations 
We agree with FBI chief ethics officer Kelley and found that the relevant 
authorities did not require McCabe to recuse himself from Clinton-related 
investigations.  With regard to the financial conflicts provisions in Sections 208 and 
502(a), there is no evidence of any financial or business ties between the McCabes 
and the Clintons or their Foundation.  Further, there is no evidence that Hillary 
Clinton provided political or financial support to Dr. McCabe’s 2015 senate 
campaign.  The fact that McAuliffe supported Dr. McCabe’s campaign, and was a 
known associate of Hillary Clinton, did not create any connection between the 
Clinton email investigation and Dr. McCabe’s financial interests.  Indeed, by the 
time McCabe became Deputy Director and assumed supervisory responsibilities for 
any Clinton-related matters, Dr. McCabe had already lost her election, and no 
developments in the Clinton-related matters could have any plausible impact on Dr. 
McCabe’s financial interests, let alone a direct and predictable one as required 
under Sections 208 or 502(a). 
In addition, because neither McCabe nor Dr. McCabe had a political or 
personal relationship with Clinton, McCabe was not obligated to recuse under 28 
C.F.R. § 45.2.  As discussed above, “political relationship” under section 45.2 is 
defined to mean “a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether 
or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign 
organization, arising from service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official 
thereof.”  “Personal relationship” is defined as a “close and substantial connection 
of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality.”  Neither McCabe nor Dr. 
McCabe, who had never even met Clinton, served as a “principal adviser” to Clinton 
or had a “close and substantial connection” to Clinton sufficient to meet the 
definitions of political and personal relationships in section 45.2. 
Although McCabe was not required by law or regulation to recuse from the 
Clinton-related investigations, he recused from these investigations on November 1, 
2016, at the urging of Director Comey, who told us that he did not learn about 
McAuliffe’s financial support of Dr. McCabe’s candidacy until it was revealed in the 
October 23 WSJ article.  Voluntary recusal is always permissible with the approval 
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of a supervisor or ethics official, even where the elements in section 502(a) are not 
present. 
We did not find fault with McCabe for not considering, prior to the October 23 
WSJ article, whether to recuse himself under the “other circumstances” provision of 
section 502(a)(2) or the “appearance” provision of section 101(b)(14) of the 
Standards of Ethical Conduct.243  However, we were troubled by the fact that the 
FBI ethics officials and attorneys did not fully appreciate the potential significant 
implications to McCabe and the FBI from campaign contributions to Dr. McCabe’s 
campaign and did not implement any review of those campaign donations.  Thus, 
while the same factual circumstances that led to McCabe’s recusal on November 1, 
2016 were present at the time McCabe became Deputy Director on February 1, 
2016, the FBI ethics officials, McCabe, and Comey only learned of them as a result 
of the October 23 WSJ article.  Had the FBI put in place a mechanism to review the 
campaign’s donation information, it would have been in a position to consider these 
issues earlier. 
We believe McCabe did what he was supposed to do by notifying those 
responsible in the FBI for ethics issues and seeking their guidance.  Thereafter, he 
was entitled to rely on those ethics officials to identify any ethics issues that were 
implicated by Dr. McCabe’s candidacy.   
Campaign donations to a spouse’s campaign present complicated questions 
under section 502(a), as well as under the financial conflict of interest statute.  
They also may present significant appearance issues under section 502(a)(2).  The 
fact that the FBI did not apparently recognize the issues, and the potential 
importance of them, became evident when the October 23 WSJ article was 
published.  Under Virginia law, the identity of contributors and their donation 
amounts was available to the public.  Had the FBI reviewed the campaign donations 
to Dr. McCabe, they would have observed the $675,288 from McAuliffe’s PAC and 
the Virginia Democratic Party, which may have resulted in earlier consideration of 
the very appearance concerns raised in the October 23 WSJ article.  The predictable 
result of the WSJ article triggered the October 2016 controversy, which led to 
Comey’s decision to ask McCabe to recuse himself from Clinton-related 
investigations. 
We further determined that the FBI’s decision to keep McCabe’s recusal from 
Clinton matters a secret made no sense.  The apparent purpose of that recusal was 
to address allegations concerning the propriety of McCabe’s continued participation 
in the Clinton-related investigations, which would be used to undercut the FBI’s 
credibility.  This purpose is generally accomplished by informing the public that 
McCabe was recused.  However, the FBI did not publicize McCabe’s recusal.  As a 
related matter, we do not believe that the FBI acted wisely in deciding not to reveal 
McCabe’s recusal to Senator Grassley in response to a question to which this fact 
                                       
243  As noted above, McCabe told us that neither he nor his wife attended the June 2015 
fundraiser in Virginia and that he was unaware that the Clintons or anyone on their behalf ever 
contributed to Dr. McCabe’s campaign.  He said neither he nor his wife have ever met the Clintons. 
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was reasonably responsive.  Again, the recusal decision served no function in 
protecting the FBI’s reputation if it was kept secret. 
We considered whether McCabe violated his voluntary recusal from Clinton-
related matters after November 1.  Recusal “is accomplished by not participating in 
the matter.”  5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(e).  Exposure to case related information by a 
recused employee when attending a meeting or briefing, including receiving 
information about news articles related to the recused matter, is a form of 
participation that must be avoided.  We found no evidence that McCabe continued 
to supervise investigative decisions in the Clinton-related matters after that day.  
We did find that McCabe, prompted by a follow-up WSJ article of November 3, 
2016, made inquiries about the steps the FBI was taking to address media leaks 
relating to the Clinton Foundation and exhorting managers to stop the leaking.  
McCabe’s conduct in inquiring about media leaks appears to have been consistent 
with instructions that Comey told us he gave McCabe about taking action on media 
leaks in the Clinton Foundation investigation.  However, McCabe’s conduct was not 
fully consistent with his recusal, as the discussion of the Clinton Foundation 
investigation in the November 3 WSJ article was the very basis for his call and 
admonitions to Sweeney, the NY ADIC.  McCabe told us he did not believe his 
recusal from the Clinton Foundation investigation encompassed his general 
responsibilities to address FBI leaks.  But McCabe’s November 1 recusal email 
contained one exception, which allowed him to continue to respond to 
Congressional requests for information, and it did not carve out an exception 
allowing him to continue addressing the leaks about the Clinton Foundation 
investigation. 
Similarly, McCabe encroached on his recusal obligations when he forwarded 
the November 3 WSJ article to OPA chief Kortan and asked why he (McCabe) kept 
seeing such articles without prior notice from OPA.  While McCabe told us that his 
email to Kortan was intended to express a generalized frustration with lack of prior 
notice by OPA, McCabe acknowledged that he should not have asked Kortan to keep 
him up to speed on matters he was recused from.  McCabe also said that may have 
been the very reason Kortan did not bring the November 3 WSJ article to his 
attention.244 
                                       
244  In March 2017, news accounts reported allegations that McCabe failed to disclose in his 
Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278e) for 2016, the amount of salary his wife received 
from her employer and the campaign donations she received in 2015.  However, such disclosures are 
not required by OGE Form 278e.  First, the OGE regulation addressing the financial disclosure report 
expressly states that the report does not need to disclose the amount of the spouse’s income.  See 5 
C.F.R. § 2634.309(1).  Second, according to the OGE regulations, while campaign funds need not be 
included in the financial disclosure report “if the individual has authority to exercise control over the 
fund's assets for personal use rather than campaign or political purposes, that portion of the fund over 
which such authority exists must be reported.”  5 C.F.R. § 2634.311(a).  However, the OGE 
regulations do not require reporting gifts that are received by a spouse “totally independent” of the 
spouse’s relationship to the filer.  5 C.F.R. § 2634.309(a)(2).  While we did not investigate individual 
donations to Dr. McCabe’s campaign committee, during our review we did not find evidence 
suggesting that Dr. McCabe received campaign donations because of McCabe. 
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B. Conclusion 
We agreed with Kelley, the FBI’s chief ethics official, that McCabe was not at 
any time required to recuse from the Clinton-related investigations under the 
relevant authorities.  However, following the October 23 WSJ article and discussions 
with Comey, McCabe recused from the Clinton-related investigations on November 
1, 2016.  Once McCabe recused himself, he was required to cease participation in 
those matters.  Voluntary recusal is always permissible with the approval of a 
supervisor or ethics official, even where the elements in section 502(a) are not 
present.  We found that McCabe did not fully comply with his recusal in a few 
instances related to the Clinton Foundation investigation. 
We also found that the FBI ethics officials and attorneys did not fully 
appreciate the potential significant implications to McCabe and the FBI from 
campaign contributions to Dr. McCabe’s campaign and did not implement any 
review of those campaign donations.  We therefore recommend that ethics officials 
consider implementing a review of campaign donations when Department 
employees or their spouses run for public office.   
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN:  
WHETHER FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PETER J. KADZIK SHOULD HAVE RECUSED FROM CERTAIN 
MATTERS 
I. Introduction 
This chapter addresses allegations that former Department of Justice 
(Department or DOJ) Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for the Office of Legislative 
Affairs (OLA) Peter J. Kadzik improperly disclosed non-public information to the 
Clinton campaign and/or should have been recused from participating in certain 
matters. 
The allegations regarding Kadzik stem from the public release of certain 
emails of John D. Podesta, Jr., the 2016 chairman of the Hillary Clinton presidential 
campaign and longtime friend of Kadzik.  Beginning in October 2016, Wikileaks 
released Podesta emails, including emails between Kadzik and Podesta.  Among the 
emails released by WikiLeaks was a May 19, 2015 email from Kadzik to Podesta 
with the subject line “Heads up” and which included information concerning a 
Department Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation and a congressional 
oversight hearing.  Shortly before that email, Kadzik had made efforts to assist his 
son in obtaining a position with the 2016 Clinton campaign. 
On or about November 2, 2016, Department leadership determined that 
Kadzik’s May 19, 2015 “Heads up” email to the chairman of the Clinton campaign 
created an appearance of a conflict of interest and required Kadzik to recuse 
himself from Clinton-related matters.  The Department’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) subsequently conducted an inquiry and determined that Kadzik 
did not disclose privileged or confidential Department information in the email to 
Podesta. 
The OIG’s investigation included reviewing investigative materials, 
documents, and emails from several DOJ components including OLA, OPR, and the 
Civil Division.  The OIG also interviewed numerous witnesses, including Kadzik, 
then Principal Assistant Deputy Attorney General (PADAG) Matt Axelrod, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools, and the current and former Departmental 
Ethics Directors.  Two relevant witnesses who worked in OLA under Kadzik, but are 
no longer with the Department, declined our request for an interview or were 
unable to schedule an interview.245 
As detailed below, we found that Kadzik demonstrated poor judgment by 
failing to recuse himself under Section 502(a)(2) of the Standards of Ethical 
Conduct prior to November 2, 2016.  First, Kadzik did not recognize the appearance 
of a conflict that he himself had created when he initiated an effort to obtain 
                                       
245  The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, does not provide the OIG with the 
authority to compel non-Department employees to participate in interviews. 
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employment for his son with the Clinton campaign while he was participating in 
senior staff meetings where Clinton-related matters were discussed and signing 
letters to Congress regarding Clinton-related matters on behalf of the Department.  
Second, Kadzik created an appearance of a conflict when he sent Podesta the 
“Heads up” email that included government information about the FOIA litigation in 
an effort to be helpful to the Clinton campaign without knowing whether the 
information had yet been made public.  His willingness to do so raised a reasonable 
question about his ability to act impartially on Clinton-related matters in connection 
with his official duties. 
Additionally, although Department leadership ultimately decided to recuse 
Kadzik from Clinton-related matters upon learning of Kadzik’s “Heads up” email to 
Podesta, Kadzik subsequently forwarded several emails communicating information 
related to Clinton-related matters within the Department and indicated his intent to 
speak with staff about those matters.  We therefore concluded that Kadzik 
exercised poor judgment by failing to strictly adhere to his recusal. 
Lastly, because the government information in the “Heads up” email had in 
fact been released publically, we did not find that Kadzik released non-public 
information or misused his official position. 
II. Timeline of Key Events 
Jun 17, 2014 Kadzik is confirmed as AAG for OLA. 
Jan 25, 2015 FOIA litigation is initiated seeking the release of former 
Secretary of State Clinton’s emails. 
Mar 2, 2015 The New York Times reports that Clinton exclusively used 
personal email to conduct government business while Secretary 
of State. 
Apr 12, 2015 Clinton announces candidacy for President of the United States.  
John Podesta serves as her campaign chairman; Brian Fallon, 
former DOJ Office of Public Affairs Director, serves as her 
campaign spokesman; and Jennifer Palmieri serves as her 
Director of Communications. 
Apr 23, 2015 Kadzik emails Fallon asking for a job for his son with the Clinton 
campaign. 
Apr 30, 2015 Fallon emails Kadzik asking for his son’s resume and stating that 
Palmieri would be reviewing resumes over the weekend.  Kadzik 
replies, sending his son’s resume and noting that Kadzik’s wife 
and Palmieri went to college together. 
May 5, 2015 Kadzik’s son emails Podesta his resume and asks for a job with 
the Clinton campaign.  Podesta forwards the email to Palmieri, 
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who replies that Kadzik’s wife had contacted her and that she 
told Kadzik’s wife that there were currently no openings with the 
campaign but positions might become available in July.  (Email 
released by WikiLeaks). 
May 18, 2015 Department files a proposed schedule for the release of the 
Clinton emails with the court in the FOIA litigation. 
 Politico reports on the Department FOIA filing and proposed 
schedule for the release of the Clinton emails. 
May 19, 2015 Kadzik sends Podesta the “Heads up” email about the FOIA filing 
and proposed schedule for the release of the Clinton emails, and 
about a congressional oversight hearing, which could include 
questions about the Clinton emails.  (Email released by 
WikiLeaks). 
Civil Division Chief testifies at the congressional oversight 
hearing. 
Jul 10, 2015  FBI opens the Clinton email investigation. 
Jan 2016  FBI opens Clinton Foundation investigation. 
Nov 1, 2016 WikiLeaks releases the May 5 email chain that begins with 
Kadzik’s son asking Podesta for a job with the Clinton campaign. 
Nov 2, 2016 WikiLeaks releases Kadzik’s May 19 “Heads up” email to 
Podesta. 
~ Nov 2, 2016 PADAG Axelrod tells Kadzik to recuse himself from Clinton-
related matters. 
Nov 8, 2016 Presidential Election 
Dec 2016 OPR conducts an inquiry and finds that Kadzik did not send 
privileged or confidential information in his May 19, 2015 
“Heads up” email to Podesta. 
Jan 19, 2017 Kadzik’s last day with the Department. 
III. Relevant Standards  
In this section we identify the regulations from the Standards of Ethical 
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch Standards of Ethical Conduct), 5 
C.F.R. Part 2635, relevant to our analysis. 
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A. Personal and Business Relationships Creating an Appearance of 
a Conflict 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 
Personal and Business Relationships Creating an Appearance of a Conflict 5 
C.F.R. § 2635.502 (Section 502) establishes the analytical framework for 
determining when a federal employee has an appearance of a conflict of interest.  
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Thirteen of this report, Section 502 
requires an employee to consider the appearance of his participation in a particular 
matter involving specific parties (1) that is likely to have a direct and predictable 
effect on the financial interest of a household member or (2) if the employee has a 
covered relationship with someone who is a party or represents a party to the 
matter.  Section 502 also includes catchall provision which may apply to “other 
circumstances” that would lead a reasonable person to question an employee’s 
impartiality in a matter. 
A recused employee is prohibited from participating in the matter unless 
authorized by the agency designee based on a determination that the Government’s 
interest “in the employee’s participation outweighs the concern that a reasonable 
person may question the integrity of the agency’s programs and operations.”  5 
C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).  According to OGE, a proper recusal requires “that an 
employee avoid any official involvement in a covered matter.”  OGE 99 x 8 at 2. 
B. Use of Non-public Information 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703 
Section 703 of the Standards of Ethical Conduct, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703, states:  
“An employee shall not…allow the improper use of nonpublic information to further 
his own private interest or that of another, whether through advice or 
recommendation, or by knowing unauthorized disclosure.” 
C. Use of Public Office for Private Gain 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 
Section 702 of the Standards of Ethical Conduct, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702, states:  
“An employee shall not use his public office…for the private gain of friends, 
relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental 
capacity….” 
According to commentary to Section 702, “[i]ssues relating to an individual 
employee’s use of public office for private gain tend to arise when the employee’s 
actions benefit those with whom the employee has a relationship outside the 
office…”.  57 Fed. Reg. 35030 (Aug. 7, 1992). 
IV. Factual Findings 
A. Background 
1. Peter J. Kadzik 
Peter J. Kadzik was confirmed as the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for 
the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) on June 17, 2014, and served in the position 
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until January 19, 2017.  As OLA AAG, Kadzik reported to the Deputy Attorney 
General.  Kadzik had re-joined the Department as a Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in OLA in 2013 after several decades in private practice.  Early in his legal 
career, Kadzik served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. 
Kadzik is married to “LM.”  LM previously served as a political appointee in 
former-President Bill Clinton’s administration.  “RS” is Kadzik’s child from a prior 
marriage, who was 24 years old at the time of these events.246 
2. John D. Podesta, Jr. 
John D. Podesta, Jr. is an attorney who served as chairman of the 2016 
Clinton presidential campaign.  During his career, Podesta also served in various 
high-level positions in both the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama administrations, 
including as White House Chief of Staff to Bill Clinton and as Counselor to Obama. 
Kadzik and Podesta have a long standing personal and professional 
relationship which, during the Bill Clinton administration, included Kadzik serving as 
Podesta’s lawyer in 1998 during the Independent Counsel investigation.  Kadzik’s 
relationship with Podesta was known at the time of and raised during his 
confirmation for the OLA AAG position. 
Kadzik told the OIG that neither he nor his wife had any business, 
contractual, or financial relationship with Podesta or the Clinton campaign while he 
served as OLA AAG.  He said that he did not serve as an officer, director, trustee, 
general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor, or employee of Podesta, 
Clinton, or the Clinton campaign.  Kadzik said that neither he nor Podesta had 
performed any legal work for the other in the past five years. 
3. Office of Legislative Affairs 
The Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) is responsible for managing the 
Department’s relationship with Congress and advancing its interests on Capitol Hill.  
Among its responsibilities, OLA prepares nominees for confirmation hearings and 
Department witnesses for congressional hearings; responds to congressional 
inquiries and oversight requests; advises and assists Department leadership on a 
variety of congressional matters; and advocates for the Department’s legislative 
priorities.  When answering congressional inquiries and preparing nominees and 
employees for hearings, OLA routinely coordinates with the relevant DOJ 
investigative, litigation, and administrative components. 
As OLA AAG, Kadzik reviewed and signed letters on behalf of the Department 
responding to Congressional inquiries, prepared the highest level nominees and 
witnesses for congressional testimony, and represented OLA at the daily senior staff 
                                       
246  We have anonymized Kadzik’s wife and son by giving them initials as pseudonyms.  We 
refer to Kadzik’s wife as “LM” and his son as “RS.” 
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meetings.  Senior staff meetings were generally attended by the Attorney General 
(AG) and members of her staff, the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and her 
Principal Assistant Deputy Attorney General (PADAG), as well as the Directors of 
OLA and the Office of Public Affairs (OPA).247  At the senior staff meeting, among 
other things, attendees discussed sensitive information regarding Department cases 
and investigations and coordinated matters and information that were expected to 
become public or to be the source of public commentary and questions. 
Kadzik told the OIG that his role was that of the Department’s liaison with 
Congress and that as such, he was “not involved” in Department investigations.  He 
stated that, “[t]o the extent that I corresponded with Congress, it was based on 
information provided to my office by the relevant component within the 
Department.  So I didn't participate in any investigations.” 
Department cases and investigations are often the subject of Congressional 
inquiries.  As discussed below, OLA received numerous congressional inquiries 
related to the Clinton matters. 
4. Ethics Training and Obligations 
All Department employees are responsible for complying with Department 
policies as well as the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch, codified in 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, which include rules and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest, use of nonpublic information, and misuse of position.  
The Department provides training and resources to ensure all employees are aware 
of their ethical responsibilities and are able to obtain ethics advice as specific 
questions and situations arise.  The ethics program includes annual mandatory 
ethics training, and a Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official (DDAEO) in each 
Department component, among other things.  A designated DDAEO works within 
OLA. 
Kadzik acknowledged participating in the Department’s annual ethics 
training.  He also acknowledged that OLA employees are subject to the same ethics 
rules and regulations as all other Departmental employees even though OLA 
employees are not assigned to investigative or litigation teams. 
5. Kadzik’s Recusals 
As a presidential appointee, Kadzik was required to enter an ethics 
agreement indicating that he understood and would comply with the conflict of 
interest laws and regulations and submit the financial disclosure form required by 
the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.248  After he was confirmed, 
                                       
247  The Office of Public Affairs is the Department’s principal point of contact for the news 
media. 
248  The Ethics Agreement was signed by Kadzik and Lee Lofthus, the AAG for Administration 
and the Department’s Designated Ethics Official, and sent to the Director of Office of Government 
Ethics (OGE). 
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Kadzik also sent a 2014 recusal memorandum to various Department components 
(including OLA) listing the matters from which he was recused and identifying the 
OLA DDAEO as the individual who would evaluate his need to recuse himself (serve 
as his “gatekeeper”) and the individuals who would serve in his capacity as Acting 
OLA AAG on those matters.249 
Kadzik’s 2014 recusal memorandum stated that for matters from which he 
had recused, all communications should be with the Acting OLA AAG and “in no 
event should there be any discussions with [Kadzik].”  Email shows that after the 
initial 2014 memorandum, Kadzik emailed the OLA DDAEO when he recused himself 
from additional matters involving clients of his former law firm, clients of his wife’s 
business, and personal matters.  Kadzik told the OIG that he likely orally informed 
the OLA DDAEO, his deputies, and chief of staff when he was recused from Clinton-
related matters on or about November 2, 2016, as discussed below. 
B. Events Preceding the “Heads Up” Email from Kadzik to Podesta 
(March through May 2015) 
This section focuses on the events in the spring of 2015 leading up to the 
“Heads up” email from Kadzik to Podesta, which included information about the 
FOIA litigation and a congressional oversight hearing. 
1. OLA Clinton-Related Work 
On March 2, 2015, the New York Times reported that Clinton exclusively used 
a personal email account to conduct government business while serving as 
Secretary of State.  The same day, the Department filed its initial response 
(Answer) in a FOIA litigation seeking Clinton’s email and other documents during 
her tenure as Secretary of State.250 
At the time, both Lynch and Yates were awaiting confirmation for the 
positions of Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, respectively.251  In 
order to prepare Lynch and Yates to answer questions related to the former 
Secretary of State’s exclusive use of a personal email account (and the applicable 
federal laws and regulations), Kadzik’s principal deputy drafted the briefing paper 
on the topic on March 18, 2015, and Kadzik added edits on March 21, 2015, after 
the document was reviewed by personnel in the Office of the Attorney General 
(OAG), Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), and the OPA.252  The briefing 
                                       
249  Emails show that Kadzik coordinated his recusal memorandum with OLA’s DDAEO.  The 
individual who served as OLA’s DDAEO under Kadzik has since retired from the Department and 
declined our requests for an interview. 
250  The FOIA litigation discussed in this report is Leopold v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 15-cv-123 
(D.D.C.). 
251  Congress confirmed Attorney General Lynch on April 23, 2015, and Deputy Attorney 
General Yates on May 13, 2015. 
252  Despite the OIG’s repeated attempts, Kadzik’s principal deputy in OLA, who is no longer 
with the Department, was unable to accommodate the OIG’s request for an interview. 
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paper contained potential questions and the Department’s vetted answers on the 
topic as approved by personnel in OLA, the Civil Division, and the Office of the 
Attorney General.  Briefing papers are used to help prepare nominees and 
employees to speak publicly on a Department issue or concern.253  Emails show that 
OLA (in conjunction with other components) scheduled “moots” or preparatory 
sessions with Lynch and Yates to prepare them to answer questions related to the 
State Department emails, among other issues, in March, April, and May 2015. 
OLA also responded to congressional inquiries related to Clinton’s use of 
email during her tenure as Secretary of State.  Emails show that Kadzik coordinated 
with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House with respect to 
nominee-Lynch’s response to an April 2, 2015 congressional inquiry asking whether 
Lynch would commit to an investigation into Clinton’s use of an email server and 
appoint a special counsel.  Kadzik also replied on May 21, 2015, on behalf of the 
Attorney General, to an April 22, 2015 Congressional inquiry into whether Clinton 
was lobbied while Secretary of State by an unregistered agent of a foreign power 
associated with the Clinton Foundation. 
In addition to preparing nominees Lynch and Yates, OLA participated in the 
preparation of the Director of the Office of Information Policy (OIP) and the Chief of 
the Civil Division to answer questions related to the State Department emails at 
their respective hearings.  The OIP Director testified on a panel addressing open 
government at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on May 6, 2015.254  After the 
hearing, the OLA employee who accompanied the OIP Director emailed Kadzik that 
the majority of questions were directed to the panelist from the State Department 
regarding Clinton’s emails. 
The Civil Division Chief testified on a panel on general oversight at a House 
Judiciary Committee hearing on May 19, 2015.255  Although prepared to answer, the 
Civil Division Chief was not asked questions related to the State Department emails 
at the hearing.  After the hearing, Kadzik sent an email complementing the several 
DOJ division leaders who testified. 
On May 18, the evening prior to the Civil Division Chief’s testimony before 
the House Judiciary Committee, the Department filed a proposed schedule for the 
production of former Secretary of State Clinton’s emails as required by the court in 
the FOIA litigation.  According to the proposed schedule, the State Department 
emails would be released in January 2016. 
                                       
253  At the time, both Lynch and Yates were U.S. Attorneys and therefore they could be 
provided with Department information as part of their briefing materials. 
254  The hearing was titled “Ensuring an Informed Citizenry:  Examining the Administration’s 
Efforts to Improve Open Government.” 
255  The hearing was before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial 
and Antitrust Law and titled “Ongoing Oversight:  Monitoring the Activities of the Justice Department’s 
Civil, Tax and Environment and Natural Resources Divisions and the U.S. Trustee Program.” 
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2. 2016 Clinton Campaign Staffed and Announced 
In early 2015, Clinton was preparing to announce her candidacy for 
President.  Prior to her announcement, in February 2015, Podesta left his position in 
the White House as Counselor to the President to become Chief of Staff for the 
Clinton campaign.  In mid-March 2015, Brian Fallon announced that he would be 
leaving his position as the Director of OPA at the end of the month to become the 
Clinton campaign’s national spokesperson.  Clinton formally announced her 
candidacy for President on April 12, 2015. 
Kadzik told the OIG that neither he nor his wife sought employment with the 
campaign or discussed the prospect of employment with the campaign with Podesta 
or other campaign members. 
3. Kadzik Assists Son’s Job Search 
Also in early 2015, Kadzik’s son “RS” was looking for employment 
opportunities and sought a job with the Clinton campaign.  Emails show that 
Kadzik’s wife forwarded Kadzik her edited version of RS’s resume on March 22, 
2015, and that RS sent his resume to Kadzik and his wife for their “final review” on 
April 1, 2015. 
According to RS’s resume, he lived in New York City and had worked for 
Kadzik’s wife’s public affairs firm since December 2014 (approximately 3 months).  
Emails indicate that RS was paid for hourly work performed from January to March 
2015. 
Kadzik told the OIG that he did not support his son financially other than 
paying for his cell phone.  He said that he did not declare his son a dependent on 
his 2015 tax returns and provided a redacted copy of his 2015 return to the OIG. 
On April 23, 2015, shortly after he left the Department and on the day Lynch 
was confirmed as Attorney General, Fallon sent an email from his Clinton campaign 
address to Kadzik’s Department address that included a single word on the subject 
line “Congrats!”  Kadzik replied: 
Thanks!  Hope all is well with you, [Fallon’s wife], the kids, and the 
candidate.  Let me know if you or someone else needs a great assistant; my 
25 year old son is ready for [Hillary Rodham Clinton]. 
One week later, on April 30, 2015, Fallon replied to Kadzik: 
Can you send me his resume?  Unfortunately I do not get an assistant but 
Palmieri is hiring one and will be looking over resumes this weekend. 
Within the hour, Kadzik emailed RS asking for his current resume and then 
forwarded RS’s resume to Fallon stating “Here you go.  Again, thanks.  FYI, 
[Palmieri] and my wife [LM], went to college together.” 
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Kadzik told the OIG that he did not recall sending Fallon the emails 
requesting a job for his son.  Kadzik also said that his son was neither hired nor 
offered a job by the Clinton campaign and that he found employment with a digital 
education company in New York City in August 2015. 
4. Kadzik’s Son Separately Seeks Employment with the 
Clinton Campaign 
According to an email released by Wikileaks, on May 5, 2015, one week after 
Kadzik emailed Fallon his son’s resume, RS emailed his resume directly to 
Podesta.256  In his email to Podesta, RS said he was sending Podesta his resume at 
the suggestion of Kadzik and his wife, LM.  Podesta then forwarded RS’s email to at 
least two other campaign workers, one of whom was Palmieri, the campaign’s 
Director of Communications.  Podesta’s email stated “Do you need any help in 
[headquarters] or states?  [Kadzik] and [LM’s] son.”  Palmieri replied: 
Heard from [LM], too.  Told her we did not have openings for rest of quarter 
but can open back up in July. 
Kadzik told the OIG that he did not recall when RS applied for a position with 
the Clinton campaign, whether he and his wife suggested that RS send his resume 
to Podesta, or whether he spoke to his wife about any discussions with Palmieri on 
RS’s behalf.  Kadzik also said that he did not know whether his wife or son ever 
followed up with Podesta, Fallon, Palmieri, or anyone else associated with the 
campaign for a job for RS, but that he (Kadzik) did not. 
5. Kadzik Gives Podesta a “Heads Up” 
On May 19, 2015, Kadzik sent from his personal email account the “Heads 
up” email to Podesta.  There is no timestamp on the email.  Kadzik wrote: 
                                       
256  This email was published by WikiLeaks on November 1, 2016.  WikiLeaks obtained emails 
from Podesta’s personal email account and released those emails online in the weeks leading up to the 
November 2016 election.  Some of these emails, including this email from RS to Podesta, were not 
sent to or from a DOJ email address, and as such we were not able to authenticate them.  Where the 
only source for an email was the WikiLeaks publication, we have identified the email as such. 
“In January of [2017], our Intelligence Community determined that Russian military 
intelligence—the GRU—had used WikiLeaks to release data of US victims that the GRU had obtained 
through cyber operations[.]”  Director Pompeo Delivers Remarks at CSIS, April 13, 2017, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2017-speeches-testimony/pompeo-
delivers-remarks-at-csis.html (accessed April 25, 2018).  The OIG is cognizant of the fact that the 
release of emails discussed in this chapter may be part of this cyber operation and our review of this 
material is in no way intended to validate or justify WikiLeaks’ data releases. 
We note that the fact that the email became public after Podesta’s email was allegedly hacked 
and then released by WikiLeaks did not excuse or minimize Kadzik’s conduct.  While Department 
leadership did not publically acknowledge the authenticity of the illegally hacked emails, Axelrod 
confronted Kadzik (who then authenticated the email), recognized the appearance of the conflict and 
its impact on the integrity of the Department, and ensured Kadzik’s recusal. 
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There is a [House Judiciary Committee] oversight hearing today where the 
head of our Civil Division will testify.  Likely to get questions on State 
Department emails.  Another filing in the FOIA case went in last night or will 
file in this am that indicates it will be awhile (2016) before the State 
Department posts the [Clinton] emails.257 
Kadzik told the OIG that he did not recall, but does not deny sending the 
“Heads up” email to Podesta and that he “apparently” sent the email to Podesta to 
identify two important events of the day. 
Kadzik told the OIG that no one in the Clinton campaign asked him for 
information regarding the FOIA litigation and that he did not send the email to try 
to help his son get a job with the campaign.  Kadzik also said he did not send any 
other “heads up” type emails or otherwise communicate about Department matters 
to Podesta.258 
Kadzik also said he did not speak with Podesta about Clinton after the 
Department opened an investigation into the Clinton email server in July 2015. 
Kadzik told the OIG that he distinguished speaking to Podesta about the FOIA 
litigation and the Clinton email investigation.  “Whether [the email server 
investigation] was criminal or a security review, [], it was now the Department 
doing something as a Department, rather than the Department defending FOIA 
litigation, which was all public.” 
C. Kadzik’s Subsequent OLA Work Related to or Referencing 
Clinton 
In the time between spring 2015 and the day in November 2016 when 
Kadzik was recused from Clinton-related matters, the FOIA litigation continued and 
the FBI opened an investigation into Clinton’s use of a private email server and an 
investigation related to the Clinton Foundation.  These cases generated Clinton-
related inquiries from Congress to which Kadzik responded both in testimony and in 
letters. 
OLA continually responded to congressional inquiries and prepared 
Department employees to respond to congressional inquiries related to Clinton’s 
email server and the Department’s investigation.  The inquiries corresponded to 
various aspects of the Department’s actions and investigative choices including:  
                                       
257  Wikileaks published this email on November 2, 2016.  We have no independent source for 
this email.  Kadzik told us he did not recall it, but did not allege that it was inauthentic or inaccurate.  
Moreover, Kadzik acknowledged its authenticity to Axelrod when the “Heads up” email was released. 
258  Kadzik’s “Heads Up” email was not the only email of this type sent to the Clinton 
campaign.  According to emails later released by WikiLeaks, on May 18, 2015, the same evening the 
Department filed its proposed schedule for releasing the emails, an unidentified Department employee 
emailed the FOIA filing to Fallon at Fallon’s personal email address and wrote “This was filed tonight.”  
Fallon forwarded the email to campaign members including Podesta.  As noted above, Fallon left the 
Department at the end of March 2015 to join the campaign.  Kadzik told the OIG that he had no 
participation in, or knowledge of, the May 18 email to Fallon with the FOIA filing. 
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requests to appoint a special counsel; decisions to grant immunity; potential 
perjury charges; the Lynch/Bill Clinton tarmac conversation; Comey’s July 5, 2016 
and Lynch’s July 6, 2016 announcements regarding the email server investigation 
and declination; congressional access to FBI investigative documents; additional 
FOIA inquiries; and Comey’s October 28 and November 6, 2016 letters to Congress 
regarding the FBI review of additional Clinton related emails.259  OLA also 
coordinated its hearing preparation and congressional responses with the 
appropriate components which, with respect to the Clinton-related matters, 
included, depending on the specific question, the OAG, ODAG, OPA, the Civil 
Division, the National Security Division (NSD), and the FBI.  Thus while Kadzik had 
no role in the conduct of the underlying Clinton litigation and investigation, he 
reported on and defended the Department’s actions with respect to its handling of a 
wide variety of Clinton-related matters. 
In addition, Kadzik, along with his FBI counterpart (the then Acting Assistant 
Director of the FBI’s Office of Congressional Affairs), and representatives from the 
Department of State and Office of the Director of National Intelligence were called 
to testify before Congress on September 12, 2016, to address congressional access 
to and redactions of FBI investigative material from the email server investigation. 
The last letters that Kadzik signed before the 2016 election were sent on 
October 31, 2016, to several senators who had written to the Attorney General and 
FBI Director after receiving the FBI Director’s October 28, 2016 letter announcing 
the review of additional Clinton related emails.  Kadzik wrote, in part, “We assure 
you that the Department will continue to work closely with the FBI and together 
dedicate all necessary resources and take appropriate steps as expeditiously as 
possible.” 
Kadzik told the OIG that he had no role in the email server investigation and 
that to his memory, in response to a congressional inquiry, met with Department 
attorneys on the investigative team on only one occasion to discuss the terms of 
the immunity agreements. 
With respect to letters from Congress, Kadzik approved standardized 
language which OLA used to respond with consistency.  For example, when asked 
about the Clinton email investigation, OLA consistently responded:  “Any 
investigation related to this referral will be conducted by law enforcement 
professionals and career attorneys in accordance with established Department 
policies and procedures which are designed to ensure the integrity of all ongoing 
investigations” and when asked about a special counsel OLA consistently responded 
by acknowledging the authority and stating that the “authority is rarely exercised.” 
Axelrod also told the OIG that Kadzik had “no role” in the email server 
investigation.  Axelrod said that the investigative information pertaining to that 
investigation was closely held, not discussed in senior staff meetings, and not 
                                       
259  We note that upon receiving a September 2016 congressional inquiry requesting the 
appointment of special counsel, Kadzik specifically requested the latest Department filing in the FOIA 
litigation. 
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discussed with Kadzik.  However, Axelrod stated that Kadzik worked “on things 
related to [the Clinton email investigation].”  Axelrod also said that Kadzik likely 
had more access to information regarding the FOIA litigation for the Clinton emails 
since that was a civil matter in litigation and discussed in senior staff meetings. 
D. Response to WikiLeaks Release 
The WikiLeaks release of Podesta/Kadzik emails on November 1 and 2, 2016, 
generated inquiries about Kadzik’s conduct from several sources. 
Axelrod told us that when WikiLeaks released the “Heads up” email, he 
contacted Kadzik, who authenticated the email and, after searching his emails, 
assured Axelrod that there were no other similar emails (referencing Departmental 
matters) that could be released by WikiLeaks. 
The Acting Director of OPA emailed Kadzik on November 2 stating that he 
wanted to speak with Kadzik.  The same day the OPA Acting Director informed the 
press that Kadzik’s “Heads up” email contained “public information” that Kadzik 
sent “in his personal capacity” and was not sent “during work hours.”  The OPA 
Acting Director told us that he made the statements attributed to him in the press 
and said that while he did not specifically recall the conversation with Kadzik, he did 
not dispute that the information came from Kadzik.260 
The then Director of the DOJ Ethics Department told us that she contacted 
the OLA DDAEO about the “Heads up” email and asked whether it contained non-
public Departmental information.  She said the OLA DDAEO assured her that the 
information in the email was public when Kadzik sent the email.  The then Ethics 
Director nevertheless expressed concern to us that a Department leader had sent 
an email to a third party without knowing whether the Department-related 
information in the email had been made public. 
Also following the disclosure, the Department’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) initiated an inquiry into whether Kadzik had disclosed 
privileged or confidential Department information to the Clinton campaign.  OPR 
submitted questions for Kadzik’s written response and, in December 2016, closed 
the inquiry after determining that the Kadzik’s “Heads up” email contained only 
public information and personal opinion.  Among other things, OPR found that on 
May 18, 2015, the Department filed with the court the document containing the 
proposed schedule for the release of the Clinton emails; the media reported the 
schedule the same evening; and Kadzik sent his “Heads up” email to Podesta on 
May 19, 2015, the following day.  OPR concluded that Kadzik’s email did not include 
privileged or confidential information.  OPR did not consider Kadzik’s conduct in 
terms of other ethical standards including recusal. 
                                       
260  The Acting OPA Director said that he spoke to the reporter off the record and should not 
have been quoted because the Department did not want to acknowledge illegally obtained emails. 
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E. Kadzik Is Recused 
Axelrod told us that after Wikileaks posted the “Heads up” email, he 
concluded that Kadzik should be recused from all Clinton-related matters.  He 
stated the email created an appearance problem because high level DOJ employees 
should not be giving a “heads up” to a campaign and that Kadzik had admitted he 
did not know whether the schedule in the FOIA litigation had been publicly filed at 
the time he sent Podesta the email.  Axelrod stated that the recusal was not 
because of Kadzik’s personal relationship with Podesta but because Kadzik sent the 
“Heads up” email.  Axelrod said that “it was a feeling that, right, DOJ folks, 
especially like senate confirmed senior leaders, but really anyone in DOJ shouldn’t 
be, you know, it wasn’t good practice to be emailing sort of people involved in sort 
of political campaigns to, right.  It’s not our job to give campaigns a head’s up.  It’s 
our job to do our work free from politics.” 
Axelrod said that because Kadzik was a presidential appointee, Axelrod 
probably discussed the matter with the Deputy Attorney General and possibly the 
Attorney General and Associate Deputy Attorney General.  Axelrod said that in 
those discussions, “the decision was made was made [that Kadzik] should...be 
screened off from...things Clinton related.” 
Axelrod said that he told Kadzik that he needed to be recused on all Clinton-
related matters and that Kadzik should recuse himself.  Axelrod said that Kadzik 
“understood” but was not “wild about” the need to recuse himself.  He said that 
Kadzik was not on the email server investigative team or the FOIA litigation team 
but it was an appearance issue and someone else needed to sign the Department’s 
letters to Congress. 
Associate Deputy Attorney General (ADAG) Scott Schools told the OIG that 
after the “Heads up” email was posted, Axelrod called him and they agreed that 
Kadzik should be recused from Clinton-related matters because of the appearance 
problem.  In a subsequent telephone call, Axelrod informed Schools that Kadzik did 
not agree with, but was willing to abide by, the decision to recuse himself from the 
Clinton-related matters.  Axelrod also asked if Kadzik’s recusal needed to be 
documented.  Schools said that there was no requirement to document the recusal 
and told the OIG that while the decision to recuse was not difficult, the rationale 
was nuanced and might be over scrutinized if the document was subject to a FOIA 
request. 
According to Schools, Kadzik’s principal deputy in OLA later called him to ask 
whether OLA should be informed of Kadzik’s recusal.  Schools told her that she 
could inform OLA personnel about Kadzik’s recusal but told the OIG that he did not 
know if she had.261 
Kadzik told us Axelrod called him “on or about November 2, 2016” and said 
that “in light of the controversy, I should recuse myself from anything further 
                                       
261  As noted above, despite the OIG’s repeated attempts, Kadzik’s principal deputy, who is no 
longer with the Department, was unable to accommodate the OIG’s request for an interview. 
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concerning the Clinton emails.”  Kadzik said that since he “had nothing to do with 
the Hillary Clinton email investigation or [FOIA] litigation,” the recusal only meant 
he would not review and sign anymore letters to Congress about the matters. 
Kadzik said that he would have informed his OLA deputies, OLA DDAEO, and 
chief of staff of his recused status but did not recall the conversation or who stood 
in his place as Acting OLA AAG for those matters.  He said it was likely that it was 
his principal deputy, as she was “the oversight person.” 
Axelrod said that Kadzik’s principal deputy took over his responsibilities on 
Clinton-related matters – that she took Kadzik’s place in the discussions related to 
the Clinton email investigation during the week before the election and then 
generally handled the Clinton related matters through the rest of Kadzik’s term as 
OLA AAG, which ended on January 19, 2017. 
Kadzik told the OIG that he could not recall how Axelrod defined the scope of 
his recusal but that, as a practical matter, Kadzik understood that he would no 
longer sign letters to Congress on behalf of the Department that were related to the 
Clinton emails and that he was not aware that any letters came in after November 
2, 2016.  Kadzik said that he “wasn't participating in anything with respect to 
Hillary Clinton and the emails other than signing letters to Congress.”  Kadzik also 
said that despite his recusal, he never had to leave a meeting because the Clinton 
email server investigation was never discussed.  However, Axelrod and the OPA 
Acting Director told us that Kadzik was replaced by his principal deputy for a time 
at senior staff meetings after WikiLeaks released the “Heads up” email.  Axelrod 
said that the principal deputy replaced Kadzik because the discussions involved 
Clinton-related matters. 
Though Kadzik said he told his deputies and the OLA DDAEO that he was 
recused, emails show that Kadzik subsequently sent and received emails about 
Clinton-related matters. 
Kadzik forwarded various congressional inquiries about Clinton-related 
matters to ODAG, OAG, OAAG, OLA, and FBI personnel that had also been sent to 
his principal deputy.  When we asked why he did not leave the matter for his 
principal deputy to handle, Kadzik said he forwarded the emails to the persons who 
he thought could respond to the inquiries and that action was no different than 
reminding his principal deputy that he was recused. 
We also asked Kadzik about two Clinton-related emails forwarded to him by 
his principal deputy.  Kadzik’s principal deputy sent one email on November 3, 
2016, with the notation “FYSA” (for your situational awareness) and another on 
November 6, 2016, with the notation “I’ve got it.  (Calls throughout today.  All the 
right people looped.)”  Kadzik said he did not know why his principal deputy sent 
him emails after he was recused, that he had not asked her to keep him informed 
of the matter despite his recused status, and that he did not believe the ”looped in” 
email “[broke] the recusal.”  As noted previously, we were unable to ask the 
principal deputy about these emails because she did not make herself available for 
an interview. 
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There is evidence that on two other occasions, Kadzik may have spoken with 
his principal deputy and DDAEO directly about Clinton-related matters.  On 
November 4, 2016, Kadzik’s principal deputy forwarded him an email from a Senate 
Judiciary staffer asking whether there would soon be an official update on the 
Weiner laptop email review.  Kadzik replied, “Call me later this am.”  Kadzik told 
the OIG that he did not recall receiving the email, responding to his principal 
deputy, or whether he ultimately spoke with her.  On November 28, 2018, when 
the OLA DDAEO asked Kadzik and his principal deputy about the Mills immunity 
agreements with respect to a FOIA request, Kadzik replied “Will circle back with 
both of you tomorrow.”  Kadzik said he asked that they circle back to “find out what 
she was asking about.” 
In contrast, emails also show that with respect to other (non-Clinton related 
matters) on which Kadzik was recused, he reminded or informed the persons on the 
email of his recused status. 
V. Analysis 
We analyze Kadzik’s actions with respect to three regulations from the 
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards of 
Ethical Conduct), 5 C.F.R. Part 2635:  Personal and business relationships, 5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.502 (Section 502); Use of non-public information, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703 
(Section 703); and Use of public office for private gain, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 
(Section 702). 
A. Whether Kadzik Should Have Been Recused Prior to November 
2 from Clinton-Related Matters under Section 502 of the 
Standards of Ethical Conduct 
Section 502 of the Standards of Ethical Conduct, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 
establishes the analytical framework for determining when a federal employee has 
an appearance of a conflict of interest that merits recusal.  As discussed above, 
Section 502 requires an employee to consider the appearance of his participation in 
a particular matter involving specific parties (1) that is likely to have a direct and 
predictable effect on the financial interest of a household member, or (2) if the 
employee has a covered relationship with someone who is a party or represents a 
party to the matter.  Section 502 also includes catchall provision which may apply 
to “other circumstances” that would lead a reasonable person to question an 
employee’s impartiality in a matter. 
1. Whether There Was a Particular Matter Involving Specific 
Parties 
The threshold issue for a Section 502(a) analysis is whether there is a 
“particular matter involving specific parties” before the Department.  A “particular 
matter involving specific parties” denotes a specific proceeding which affects the 
legal rights of the parties such as an investigation or litigation.  5 C.F.R. 
§ 2640.102(l). 
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During Kadzik’s tenure as OLA AAG, the Department defended the 
Department of State in a FOIA litigation filed in January 2015 seeking emails from 
Clinton’s personal server during her tenure as Secretary of State, among other 
things.  The Department also initiated the Clinton email investigation in July 2015.  
Both the FOIA litigation and the email server investigation are “particular matters 
involving specific parties,” as each is a discrete litigation or investigation.  Clinton 
and others were specific subjects of the Clinton email investigation, and the FOIA 
litigation involved particular plaintiffs and defendants.262  Therefore, we include 
both the FOIA litigation and the email server investigation in our analysis (and for 
the ease of the reader refer to both as “Clinton-related matters.”) 
2. Whether Kadzik Should Have Recused Because of his 
Son’s Efforts to Obtain Employment with the Clinton 
Campaign 
We next considered whether Kadzik was required to recuse from the Clinton-
related matters because of Kadzik and his son RS’s efforts to obtain employment 
for his son with the Clinton campaign. 
Under the “financial interests” provisions of Section 502(a), recusal would be 
required if the Clinton-related matters were likely to have a direct and predictable 
effect on the financial interest of a member of Kadzik’s household.  A direct and 
predictable effect requires a causal link between a decision on the matter and the 
effect on the specified financial interest and cannot be attenuated or dependent on 
the occurrence of speculative events.  5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.502(b)(2), 2635.402(b)(1). 
Kadzik told the OIG that his son lived in New York City and supported himself 
financially.  Kadzik also provided a redacted copy of his 2015 federal tax returns on 
which he did not declare his son as a dependent. 
Even if the Clinton-related matters could affect his son’s financial interests, 
RS was not a member of Kadzik’s household.  Therefore, we found that RS’s efforts 
to obtain employment with the Clinton campaign did not require Kadzik to recuse 
himself from Clinton-related matters under the financial interest provision of 
Section 502(a). 
Under the “covered relationship” provision of Section 502(a), recusal would 
be required if Kadzik had a covered relationship with a party or with someone who 
represents a party to a matter.  Section 502 defines “covered relationship” to 
include a “person for whom the employee's…dependent child is, to the employee's 
knowledge,…seeking to serve as an…contractor or employee.”  This is the only 
category of “covered relationship” potentially applicable with respect to Kadzik’s 
                                       
262  Although Clinton was not a named party to the FOIA litigation, it is possible that she would 
be considered a “party” within the meaning of Section 502 because the litigation centered around her 
use of a private server and sought emails stored on it.  OGE does not take a narrow or strictly legal 
view of what it means to be a party under Section 502.  OGE letter 01 x 8.  As detailed below, we 
were not required to reach this issue.  The FOIA litigation indisputably had specific parties, even if 
Clinton was not one of them. 
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son.263  If RS was a dependent child, Kadzik would have had a covered relationship 
with a party to the particular matter since RS was seeking employment with the 
Clinton campaign and Clinton was clearly a party to the Clinton email investigation 
and may have been a party to the FOIA litigation.  5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(b)(1)(iii). 
We did not find that RS was a “dependent child.”  In April 2015, Kadzik’s son 
was 24 years old.264  Kadzik said that his son was supporting himself financially 
while living in New York City and that Kadzik only covered the cost of his son’s cell 
phone.  Kadzik also told the OIG that he did not declare his son as a dependent on 
his 2015 tax returns and provided a redacted copy of his 2015 return to the OIG 
confirming this fact.  Thus we found no evidence of a covered relationship based on 
Kadzik and his non-dependent son’s efforts to obtain employment for his son with 
the Clinton campaign.265 
The “other circumstances” provision in Section 502 applies when a federal 
employee is concerned that “other circumstances” would cause a reasonable person 
to question his impartiality.  As with all Section 502 provisions, the conflict may be 
self-identified by the employee or directed by management.  OGE Memorandum 04 
x 5. 
Kadzik did not self-identify a potential appearance of a conflict under the 
“other circumstances” provision based on his, his wife’s, and his son’s efforts to get 
his son a job with the Clinton campaign.  In April and May 2015, Kadzik, his wife, 
and son reached out to personal acquaintances in the Clinton campaign in an 
attempt to obtain a job for his son RS with the campaign.  At the same time, Kadzik 
was participating in senior staff meetings where Clinton-related matters were 
discussed and signing letters to Congress regarding Clinton-related matters on 
behalf of the Department. 
We believe that these circumstances would cause a reasonable person to 
question Kadzik’s impartiality in Clinton-related matters during the time RS was 
seeking employment with the Clinton campaign.  We therefore concluded that 
under the “other circumstances” provision of Section 502(a)(2), Kadzik should have 
either recused himself from Clinton-related matters beginning in April 2015, when 
he initiated employment solicitations to the Clinton campaign, until RS was no 
longer seeking employment with the campaign, or disclosed these circumstances to 
the appropriate Department ethics officer so that the Department could have 
considered whether Kadzik should be recused. 
According to OGE, self-identification under the “other circumstances” 
provision is permissive, but not required, and therefore the failure to recuse under 
                                       
263  Although RS was a relative of Kadzik’s with whom he who presumably had a “close 
personal relationship,” this fact did not create a “covered relationship” because RS was not a party to 
the Clinton-related investigations, nor did he represent a party. 
264  Kadzik wrote in the email to Fallon that his son was 25 years old; however, his son would 
not turn 25 until later in the year. 
265  Because RS was not a dependent child, and no other “covered relationship” appears to be 
in issue, we were not required to determine whether Clinton was a “party” to the FOIA litigation. 
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the provision is not an ethics violation.  “Employees are encouraged to use the 
process provided by [the “other circumstances” provision], [but] the ‘election not to 
use that process cannot appropriately be considered to be an ethical lapse.’”  OGE 
letter 01 x 08 citing OGE letter 94 x 10(2); see also OGE 97 x 8, OGE 95 x 5; OGE 
94 x 10.  Instead, according to the former Departmental Ethics Director, the failure 
to self-identify under the “other circumstances” is evidence of an employee’s 
judgment and may reflect on whether the employee has the judgment necessary 
for a particular Department position. 
Although Kadzik did not commit an ethics violation by failing to recuse 
himself under Section 502(a)(2), we found that his failure to recognize the 
appearance of a conflict by participating in Clinton-related matters when he, his 
wife, and his son were trying to get his son a job with the Clinton campaign 
demonstrated poor judgment. 
3. Whether Kadzik Should Have Recused from Clinton-
Related Matters in May 2015 by Reason of Sending the 
“Heads Up” Email to Podesta 
According to Kadzik, Axelrod told him he should recuse himself from Clinton-
related matters “on or about” November 2, 2016, after learning that Kadzik had 
sent the “Heads up” email to Podesta on May 19, 2015.  Axelrod told us that the 
“Heads up” email to Podesta raised appearance concerns because Kadzik 
communicated with a partisan campaign about Department matters and provided 
information without knowing whether it had yet been made public.266 
As noted, Kadzik sent the “Heads up” email in May 2015.  He continued to 
participate in senior staff meetings, prepare Department employees for hearings, 
and respond to inquiries about Clinton-related matters between May 19 and 
November 2, when Axelrod instructed him to recuse himself.  We therefore 
analyzed whether Kadzik should have recused himself under Section 502 in May 
2015 rather than waiting for Axelrod to do it a year and a half later. 
We determined that the “Heads up” email did not require Kadzik to recuse 
under the personal or financial interests provision of Section 502(a).  Neither 
sending the email nor any other aspect of Kadzik’s relationship with Podesta or the 
                                       
266  We also note that long standing Department policies addressing employee participation in 
political activity place greater restrictions on the political activities of presidential appointees than does 
the Hatch Act.  The Department’s stated purpose for further restricting the political activities of 
political appointees is to ensure that “there is not an appearance that politics plays any part in the 
Department’s day to day operations.”  Among other things, Department policy prohibited Kadzik from 
participating in political activity “in concert” with a political party, partisan group, or candidate for 
partisan political office, even when off duty.  We believe that it is a close question whether Kadzik 
violated Department policy by acting “in concert” with the campaign when he sent Podesta the “Heads 
up” email.  Even if Kadzik did not violate the letter of the Department’s policy, he certainly intended to 
provide assistance, however small, directly to Podesta, the campaign Chairman, which was 
inconsistent with the stated intent of the policy.  See James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, memorandum for All Department of Justice Non-Career Employees, July 14, 
2014, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/03/24/pol-activ-dag-noncareer-
employees.pdf (accessed June 6, 2018). 
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Clinton campaign gave Kadzik or a member of his household a financial interest 
that would be affected by the outcome of the Clinton-related investigations.  We are 
not aware of any evidence that Kadzik or any member of his household had any 
business, contractual, or financial relationship of any kind with Podesta, Clinton, or 
the Clinton campaign, or any other financial interest that would be affected by any 
Clinton-related matters pending in the Department of Justice. 
Nor did the facts create a “covered relationship” within the definition in 
Section 502(b)(1).  For example, Kadzik did not serve as, or seek to serve as, an 
officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor, or 
employee of Podesta, Clinton, or the Clinton campaign.  See 5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635.502(b)(1). 
We therefore turned to the question of whether Kadzik’s “Heads up” email to 
the Clinton campaign was an “other circumstance” that would raise a question 
about Kadzik’s impartiality with respect to Clinton-related matters within the 
meaning of Section 502(a)(2).  As noted above, according to OGE, self-
identification under the “other circumstances” provision is permissive, but not 
required.  Therefore, the failure to recuse oneself under the provision may be bad 
judgment, but not an ethics violation. 
The “Heads up” email reflected an effort by Kadzik to be helpful to the 
Clinton campaign.  Kadzik sent government information (the proposed schedule for 
the release of the Clinton emails in the FOIA litigation) to a partisan campaign 
without knowing whether it had been made public.  Kadzik’s May 2015 “Heads up” 
email explicitly stated that he did not know whether the Department had yet filed 
the proposed schedule in court.  Similarly, according to Axelrod, Kadzik admitted in 
November 2016 that he did not know whether the information had been released 
publically when he sent the email to Podesta.  Because Kadzik admittedly did not 
know that the information had been released publically when he sent the “Heads 
up” email to Podesta, Department leadership decided that Kadzik should be recused 
from Clinton-related matters.  As discussed below, Kadzik actually used information 
he acquired in his official position with the intention to assist the campaign in a 
manner that would have been a misuse of office but for a fact that Kadzik did not 
definitely know — that the proposed schedule had already been made public.267 
                                       
267  After reviewing a draft of this chapter, Kadzik’s attorney submitted a letter to the OIG 
which, among other things, stated that “Mr. Kadzik learned the information he shared with Mr. 
Podesta from the Politico article.”  However, Kadzik’s attorney provided no evidentiary basis for the 
statement, and it conflicts with the content of the May 19, 2015 “Heads up” email and is inconsistent 
with Kadzik’s previous statements to the Department.  The Politico article (that Kadzik provided to 
OPR in response to the inquiry that arose because of his “Heads up” email) clearly states that the 
proposed schedule was “filed in U.S. District Court in Washington” on “Monday night.”  Yet Kadzik 
wrote in his Tuesday morning email that he did not know if the document had yet been filed and 
admitted the same to Axelrod in November 2016.  In addition, in his December 2016 written response 
to OPR’s inquiry, Kadzik wrote that he “did not recall” the source from which he learned the 
information in his email and cited the Politico article only to establish that the information had been 
made public when he sent it to Podesta. 
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Kadzik’s willingness to do that raised a reasonable question about whether he 
would be willing or inclined to act partially toward the Clinton campaign in 
connection with his official duties, which sometimes touched on Clinton-related 
matters.  At minimum, this created an appearance problem with respect to Kadzik’s 
ability to act impartially that justified Axelrod in recusing him from further 
participation in Clinton-related matters. 
We believe that Kadzik used poor judgment not only in sending the email to 
a partisan campaign without knowing whether its content was public, but also in 
failing to recognize how his action would impact the Department and in failing 
thereafter to recuse himself from Clinton-related matters pursuant to Section 
502(a)(2). 
B. Whether Kadzik Violated the Terms of his Recusal after 
November 2, 2016 
In this section, we discuss whether Kadzik violated the terms of his recusal 
after Axelrod instructed him to recuse from Clinton-related matters on or about 
November 2, 2016. 
Shortly after his confirmation, Kadzik signed an ethics agreement with JMD 
(for OGE’s approval) which identified the scope of his recusals and sent a 2014 
memorandum to various leadership components and OLA identifying the specific 
matters from which he would be recused.  Kadzik’s memorandum stated that no 
one should communicate with him about the matters from which he was recused.  
Furthermore, Kadzik demonstrated his knowledge that a recusal included 
communications when he received emails related to other recused matters and 
replied notifying the sender that he was recused. 
Communicating about a matter is considered participation and employees 
should not communicate with others about matters from which they have been 
recused.268  Occasionally, a recused employee may receive communications about 
the matter in an email, telephone call, or meeting.  On those occasions, recused 
employees are trained to clearly identify their recusal to the sender of the email, 
the caller, or meeting attendees (as the employee leaves the meeting room or the 
discussion is tabled).  While an inadvertent communication would not be considered 
“participation” in violation of the recusal, repeated and unaddressed 
communications may evidence a violation of the recusal or a lack of respect for 
both the process and the Department that would represent poor judgment. 
We found that Kadzik forwarded several emails communicating information 
related to Clinton-related matters within the Department after his recusal and 
indicated his intent to speak with staff about those matters.  In each of those 
                                       
268  We recognize that Kadzik did not have complete visibility into all Department matters 
(particularly the closely-held Clinton email investigation).  However, recusals not only serve to prevent 
an employee from affecting a particular investigation or litigation, but also serve to prevent an 
employee from receiving and misusing Department information.  Once an employee is recused from a 
matter, the employee must fully respect the recusal and cease all participation or seek a 
determination by the agency designee under section 502(d). 
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instances his principal deputy also was copied on the incoming email and aware of 
Kadzik’s recusal.  In none of those instances did Kadzik either respond to the 
incoming email informing the sender that he was recused from Clinton-related 
matters or advise the recipients of his forwarded emails that he was recused from 
Clinton-related matters.  By contrast, when Kadzik received emails related to other 
matters from which he was recused, he appropriately responded to the senders 
alerting them to or reminding them of his recusal. 
We therefore found that Kadzik understood his responsibilities when 
contacted about matters from which he was recused, and that he exercised poor 
judgment when he failed to fully respect his post-November 2 recusal.  Kadzik 
argued that his post-recusal participation was not substantial.  However, even if 
this was a mitigating factor, we could not substantiate his assertion because Kadzik 
told us he was unable to recall details of his activities during this time.  In addition, 
as noted previously, his principal deputy and his ethics advisor (OLA DDAEO), 
neither of whom still work for the Department, did not make themselves available 
to speak with us. 
Ultimately, once Department leadership made the decision that Kadzik should 
be recused from Clinton-related matters, Kadzik was required to cease all 
participation. 
C. Whether Kadzik Improperly Used Non-Public information in 
Violation of the Standards of Ethical Conduct 
We next consider whether Kadzik violated Section 703 of the Standards of 
Ethical Conduct, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703, which states:  “An employee shall not…allow 
the improper use of nonpublic information to further his own private interest or that 
of another, whether through advice or recommendation, or by knowing 
unauthorized disclosure.” 
In December 2016, OPR conducted an inquiry to consider whether Kadzik 
disclosed privileged or confidential Department information to the Clinton campaign 
and determined that Kadzik’s “Heads up” email contained public information and 
personal opinion.  Among other things, OPR found that on May 18, 2015, the 
Department filed with the court the document containing the proposed schedule for 
the release of the Clinton emails; the media reported the schedule the same 
evening; and Kadzik sent his “Heads up” email to Podesta on May 19, 2015, the 
following day.  OPR concluded that Kadzik’s email did not include privileged or 
confidential information. 
Although OPR did not specifically address Kadzik’s compliance with Section 
703, the fact that the information in Kadzik’s “Heads up” email did not include 
nonpublic information also requires the finding that Kadzik did not violate Section 
703. 
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D. Whether Kadzik Misused His Public Office for Private Gain in 
Violation of the Standards of Ethical Conduct 
We next consider whether Kadzik violated Section 702 of the Standards of 
Ethical Conduct, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702, which states:  “An employee shall not use his 
public office…for the private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the 
employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity…”.  According to commentary 
to Section 702, “[i]ssues relating to an individual employee’s use of public office for 
private gain tend to arise when the employee’s actions benefit those with whom the 
employee has a relationship outside the office…”.  57 Fed. Reg. 35030 (Aug. 7, 
1992). 
We found that Kadzik learned of the proposed schedule for the release of the 
Clinton server emails in his capacity as a Department employee.  We also found 
that Kadzik sent the information to a longtime personal friend and professional 
colleague, Podesta, with whom Kadzik had a relationship outside the office.  
Further, we found that Kadzik believed that the information would be of benefit to 
the Clinton campaign.269  However, as discussed above, the information included in 
the “Heads up” email was public at the time that Kadzik sent it.  Therefore we did 
not find that these facts amounted to a violation of Section 702. 
  
                                       
269  In his email, Kadzik also said that the Civil Division Chief may be asked questions about 
the Clinton emails in the congressional hearing scheduled that day.  However, Kadzik’s opinion was 
not based on nonpublic information, as notice of the hearing had been posted on the committee’s 
website and congressional interest in the Clinton emails was public information.  We note that the Civil 
Division Chief was not asked questions about the Clinton email server during the hearing. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN:  
FBI RECORDS VAULT TWITTER ANNOUNCEMENTS 
I. Introduction 
On November 1, 2016, in response to multiple Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests, the FBI Records Management Division’s Records/Information 
Dissemination Section (RIDS) posted records to the FBI Records Vault, a page on 
the FBI’s public website, concerning the “William J. Clinton Foundation” (Clinton 
Foundation).  The bulk of those records concerned the 2001 investigation into the 
pardon of Marc Rich.  The @FBIRecordsVault Twitter account announced this 
posting later that same day.270  This Twitter announcement or “tweet” followed a 
series of 20 tweets released from the @FBIRecordsVault account on October 30, 
2016, after a year-long dormant period during which no tweets announcing FOIA 
releases on the FBI Records Vault had been issued.  One of the 20 tweets on 
October 30, 2016, concerned a release of records for Fred C. Trump, the father of 
then candidate Donald Trump. 
Several newspaper reports suggested that the timing of the Clinton 
Foundation tweet—coming four days after FBI Director James Comey had 
announced the re-opening of the Hillary Clinton email investigation—was “further 
evidence of FBI meddling” in the 2016 election. 
The FBI Inspection Division (INSD) conducted a review of the circumstances 
leading to the Clinton Foundation tweet that focused particularly on the causes of 
the one-year dormant period and the circumstances surrounding the release of 20 
tweets on October 30, 2016, which as noted above included the Fred C. Trump 
information.  INSD’s investigation found that:  (1) the materials responsive to the 
FOIA requests were “properly posted” to the FBI Records Vault and (2) a technical 
malfunction that began in October 2015 and went unnoticed caused the 
@FBIRecordsVault Twitter account to cease posting automatic Twitter 
announcements about records posting to the Vault.  The malfunction was corrected 
with a software update on October 30, 2016.  After this correction, INSD found that 
the tweet function operated properly—automatically posting overdue tweets on the 
@FBIRecordsVault Twitter feed for FOIA releases posted during the dormant period 
on the FOIA Vault page—and then functioning as intended from that point forward, 
to include the November 1, 2016 tweet concerning the Clinton Foundation.  
Therefore, INSD concluded that the tweet concerning the Clinton Foundation was 
not affected by the software malfunction that prevented the issuance of other 
tweets for the one-year period. 
The OIG conducted this follow-up review focused in particular on the 
circumstances surrounding the November 1, 2016 FOIA posting on the FBI Records 
                                       
270  The posting date for the records on the Vault is October 31, 2016, but the RIDS Section 
Chief and a RIDS analyst told us that October 31 reflects the date when the records were uploaded 
into the system to be reviewed by RIDS and OPA personnel, but not the date the records were 
published for the public. 
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Vault and the subsequent tweet announcing the posting.  The purpose of this 
review was to determine whether there was any evidence that improper political 
considerations were a factor in the timing of these events.  As part of this 
investigation, the OIG reviewed FOIA requests received by the FBI on the Clinton 
Foundation prior to November 1, 2016, documents associated with the FBI’s 
processing of these requests, and email records for individuals involved in 
processing and releasing the requests.  The OIG interviewed eight individuals from 
RIDS and the FBI’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA). 
Based on our investigation, we found no evidence to indicate that improper 
political considerations influenced the FBI’s processing and release of the Clinton 
Foundation documents or the use of an FBI Twitter account to publicize the release.  
The evidence indicates that the FOIA requests related to the Clinton Foundation 
were processed according to RIDS’ internal procedures like other similarly-sized 
requests.  Likewise, we found no evidence to indicate that the FOIA response was 
either expedited or delayed in order to impact the 2016 Presidential election.  Below 
are the factual findings and conclusions reached by the OIG’s investigation. 
II. Background 
This section discusses the laws, regulations, guidance, and procedures 
governing the FBI’s activities in receiving, researching, processing, and responding 
to FOIA requests and, in appropriate cases, publicly releasing documents produced 
in response to FOIA requests by posting such documents on the FBI Records Vault. 
A. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA), requires federal 
agencies to make agency records available to the public and sets forth the specific 
requirements to do so along with guidance on records and information exempt from 
public release.  On June 30, 2016, the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 (the FOIA 
Improvement Act), Public Law No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538, updated 5 U.S.C. § 552 
with a notable change pertinent to this case regarding when an agency must 
release previously-requested records to the public.  Before the FOIA Improvement 
Act, FOIA permitted agencies to proactively release records, “which, because of the 
nature of their subject matter, the agency determines have become or are likely to 
become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the same records.”271  
This wording, often referred to as the “frequently requested record” provision of 
FOIA, allowed agencies latitude to decide when to make these records available and 
for how long.272  However, the FOIA Improvement Act now also requires agencies to 
publicly release records once they have received three or more requests for the 
same or substantially similar records.  This is commonly referred to as the “rule of 
                                       
271  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2009). 
272  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2009). 
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three.”273  An agency may also pre-emptively release the records if it believes they 
will receive additional requests for the records.274 
Under FOIA, agencies are authorized to withhold information from public 
release that is specifically exempt from release under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), 
traditionally referred to as FOIA exemptions.  Exemptions cover material such as 
classified information, trade secrets, personnel and medical files, and law 
enforcement information.275  Under this provision however, the agency is tasked 
with redacting the information that cannot be disclosed, but releasing as much of 
the requested information as possible.276 
In sensitive law enforcement matters, FOIA allows a law enforcement agency 
to “treat the records as not subject to the requirements of [FOIA].”277  This is 
known as a FOIA exclusion, which “provide[s] protection in three limited sets of 
circumstances where publicly acknowledging even the existence of the records 
could cause harm to law enforcement or national security interests.”278  The first 
exclusion protects records in an ongoing criminal investigation, the release of which 
could “reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”279  The 
second exclusion protects from the acknowledgment of confidential informant 
records.280  The last exclusion protects the FBI’s classified foreign intelligence, 
counterintelligence, and international terrorism records.281  The Department’s Office 
of Information Policy (OIP) requires Department components—including the FBI—to 
obtain OIP’s approval to use a FOIA exclusion.282 
FOIA allows agencies to expedite the processing of records in cases where 
the requester can “demonstrate[] a compelling need” or in other situations as 
defined by each agency.283  A “compelling need” is defined in FOIA as a situation 
where not receiving the requested records quickly “could reasonably be expected to 
pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual” or in 
situations where individuals who disseminate information demonstrate an “urgency 
                                       
273  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2016). 
274  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)(ii). 
275  5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
276  5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
277  5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1). 
278  Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy, Implementing FOIA’s Statutory 
Exclusion Provisions, Aug. 15, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-guidance-6. 
279  5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
280  5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(2). 
281  5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(3). 
282  36 C.F.R. § 16.6(g)(1) (2017). 
283  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i). 
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to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity.”284  If 
the agency grants the request, it must process the FOIA request “as soon as 
practicable.”285 
B. The FBI FOIA Process 
RIDS oversees the FBI’s FOIA program.  This section describes the RIDS 
FOIA process, their coordination with other FBI entities on “high visibility” and “rule 
of three” requests, and the posting of FOIA requests on the FOIA Vault. 
1. Records/Information Dissemination Section’s FOIA 
Process 
FBI Policy Directive 0481D, Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act 
Requests, February 8, 2012, establishes the FBI’s FOIA and Privacy Act programs 
and provides top-level guidance.  It sets forth that the FBI’s policy is to respond to 
FOIA and Privacy Act requests within 20 business days (the requirement set forth in 
the FOIA) and establishes an over-arching list of responsibilities for various offices 
within the FBI to assist RIDS to meet that goal.  Policy Directive 0481D provides no 
additional procedural guidance beyond this top-level listing of roles and 
responsibilities.  With the exception of Policy Directive 0481D, RIDS does not have 
any formal rules or manuals that outline the FBI’s FOIA process.286 
FOIA requests received by the FBI are initially reviewed during a weekly 
meeting by senior RIDS personnel, including the section chief, assistant section 
chief, and unit chiefs.  During that meeting, “high visibility” and complex requests 
are identified, as well as those that may qualify for expedited treatment (if 
requested).  RIDS personnel told us that high visibility requests are generally those 
dealing with current political issues; anything dealing with a significant issue or 
person of interest to the public and the FBI; or items that have potential to impact 
the FBI.  According to RIDS personnel, the RIDS Section Chief and Assistant 
Section Chief normally determine which requests will be designated high visibility 
requests.  As detailed below, responses to high visibility requests receive a higher 
level of supervisory review at the end of the process, and are also made available 
to the public on the FBI Records Vault. 
Following intake, a FOIA request is then submitted to the Work Process Unit 
(WPU) in RIDS for initial processing.  FOIA analysts send the requestor an 
acknowledgement of the request and provide them a FOIA number.  They then 
search the FBI’s central records system, including Sentinel and the Automated Case 
Support (ACS) system, and contact relevant FBI personnel to locate responsive 
                                       
284  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v).  The Department’s FOIA Regulations add two more categories 
in which the Department may grant expedited processing:  the loss of substantial due process rights 
or matters of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about 
the government’s integrity that affects public confidence.  28 C.F.R. § 16.5(e)(1)(i)-(iv). 
285  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(iii). 
286  As a result, the following description of the FBI’s process is based on interviews with RIDS 
managers and analysts.  
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records.  If no records are found, the FBI communicates this fact to the requestor.  
If responsive records are identified, they are compiled, quality checked, and then 
uploaded into the FOIA Document Processing System. 
Once the collection of documents has been completed, the response is placed 
in a workflow “queue” to await processing by a RIDS disclosure analyst in one of 
the RIDS processing units.  The FBI has established four separate workflow 
“queues” based on the volume of responsive documents.  Responses that qualify for 
expedited treatment under FOIA are moved to the front of the appropriate workload 
queue.  All other responses enter the queue from the back, in a “First In, First Out” 
order. 
According to the RIDS Section Chief, requests with 50 or fewer pages of 
responsive documents enter the “small” queue and are typically processed within 
approximately 4 months from the date of the request to the date of the 
response.287 
Requests generating between 50 and 950 pages of responsive documents are 
directed to the “medium” queue and are typically completed in approximately 9 to 
10 months.  Completion time for requests placed in the “large” queue, those that 
generate 950 to 8,000 pages of relevant documents, is approximately 2 and a half 
years.  The fourth queue, for extra-large requests that generate over 8,000 pages 
of responsive documents, can take upwards of 4 years to fulfill.  For larger 
requests, requestors do not have to wait the full time period for documents; RIDS 
provides interim releases in batches of 500 pages at a time. 
RIDS personnel explained that once a request has worked its way to the 
front of the appropriate workflow queue, a supervisor assigns the responsive 
documents to a disclosure analyst for processing.  Processing the documents 
involves a line-by-line review of the documents to identify and redact information 
exempt from release under the FOIA.  After the disclosure analyst’s review is 
complete, RIDS experts and supervisors conduct a quality review.  If the request is 
not a high visibility request, the analyst finalizes the release, sends the appropriate 
correspondence to the requestor, and closes the matter. 
Responses to high visibility requests are subject to additional management 
review before being released to the requestor or posted to the FBI Vault, including 
by the RIDS Section Chief and the FOIA attorney supporting RIDS, to ensure 
accurate and proper application of exemptions, classification decisions, and 
redactions and to spot any other potential issues.  The processing analyst drafts a 
“high visibility” memorandum to accompany the package through these additional 
reviews.  According to the RIDS Section Chief, the designation of a request as “high 
visibility” does not mean it will be processed quicker than any other request, unless 
it otherwise qualifies for expedited treatment.  Rather, these requests are 
processed according to the same prioritization procedures as other FOIA requests. 
                                       
287  The average processing times are based on regular analysis of queue processing times by 
RIDS personnel in order to provide estimated completion dates to FOIA requestors. 
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2. Release of FOIA Documents on the FBI Vault  
The FBI Records Vault is a page on the FBI.gov public website.  Requests 
posted to the FBI Records Vault fall into one or both of the following categories:  
high visibility requests or requests that meet the “rule of three” standard as defined 
in the 2016 updates to FOIA. 
Although OPA manages the overall FBI.gov public website, RIDS is 
responsible for the content and postings for the FBI Records Vault page.  According 
to RIDS personnel, in the fall of 2016, once RIDS management determined that a 
post would be made to the FBI Records Vault, RIDS would notify the RMD chain of 
command, OPA’s National Press Office, and often the General Counsel’s FOIA 
Litigation Unit Chief of the upcoming post.  To assist historians and researchers who 
use the FBI Records Vault, RIDS would often ask the FBI Historian to draft a 
summary of the documents to accompany the posting on the FBI Records Vault.  
The purpose of RIDS’s notification to the National Press Office was to allow the 
National Press Office an opportunity to prepare for any media inquiries and to notify 
OPA management and FBI executive management as necessary. 
Ultimately, once all these offices had been notified of the upcoming post, and 
a summary had been drafted to be posted with the responsive documents, the 
RIDS Section Chief made the final determination of when to post the documents.288  
Postings could be delayed by the Section Chief and Assistant Section Chief of RIDS, 
as well as the Office of Public Affairs and FBI executive management.  The RMD 
Section Chief told us that postings could only be delayed for short periods of time to 
give FBI executive management notice that information with high public interest 
was about to be posted.  Once the release was posted to the FBI Records Vault, the 
@FBIRecordsVault Twitter account was configured to automatically announce (auto-
tweet) the addition of new content to the FBI Records Vault. 
III. Findings 
This section presents our findings with regard to the timeline of events and 
our analysis of whether there were any improper political considerations involved 
with the timing of the FOIA release and its associated tweet. 
A. Facts 
1. Timeline 
Nov 10, 2015 FBI Records Management Division (RMD) receives the first FOIA 
request for documents relating to the Clinton Foundation.  
Several subsequent requests for the same or similar materials 
are later combined with the initial request for processing. 
 
                                       
288  The Assistant Section Chief of RIDS could make the determination in the absence of the 
Section Chief. 
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Dec 17, 2015 Records/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) analysts 
begin searching for responsive documents. 
 
May 12, 2016 RIDS analysts complete the search for responsive documents.  
The resulting collection (the “Clinton Foundation documents”) is 
placed in the “medium workflow queue” to await processing for 
release on a “First In, First Out” basis. 
 
Aug 15, 2016 RIDS begins reviewing the Clinton Foundation documents for 
exempt and classified material. 
 
Oct 25, 2016 RIDS completes its review and redaction of the documents.  
Because RIDS had designated this release as a “high visibility” 
response, it receives review by the RIDS Assistant Section Chief 
and the FBI Office of Public Affairs (OPA) prior to release to the 
requesters and to the FBI Records Vault.  The FBI Historian is 
asked to draft a summary of the documents’ contents to 
accompany the release to the Vault. 
 
Oct 28, 2016 OPA informs RIDS that it concurs with the proposed release of 
the Clinton Foundation documents. 
 
Oct 31, 2016 OPA requests RIDS to postpone posting the Clinton Foundation 
documents for one day because of workload resulting from 
Director Comey’s October 28 letter to Congress announcing 
reactivation of the Clinton email investigation. 
 
Nov 1, 2016 RIDS publishes the Clinton Foundation documents on the FBI 
Records Vault.  The posting is announced on a system-
generated tweet from @FBIRecordsVault. 
2. Detailed Chronology 
The first Clinton Foundation request received by RMD on November 10, 2015, 
sought any and all records about the Clinton Foundation.  Between November 11 
and December 15, 2015, the request was pending assignment for initial processing.  
The Work Processing Unit opened a request for the Clinton Foundation on December 
15.  Materials from six subsequent, similar requests were later combined with this 
request.289  These multiple requests met the “rule of three” standard for posting on 
the FBI’s FOIA Vault page.  The Clinton Foundation request was designated as a 
high visibility request during processing due to its subject and the expectation it 
could attract media attention.  The request was not designated for “expedited” 
treatment. 
                                       
289  The subsequent requests were dated April 1, 2016; July 13, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 
16, 2016; August 17, 2016; and August 30, 2016. 
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Between December 17, 2015, and May 12, 2016, RIDS analysts searched for 
and gathered material responsive to the request.  During this initial phase, RIDS 
identified additional documents that were responsive to the FOIA request but 
potentially qualified for a FOIA exclusion.  The RIDS Section Chief stated to the OIG 
that when they located these documents, he coordinated with the relevant 
investigative section chief and determined the FBI should seek Department 
approval to use a FOIA exclusion.  The RIDS Section Chief explained to the OIG 
that the Department’s policies required the FBI to “write up an exclusion” for 
approval by OIP.  The Director of OIP ultimately approved the FBI’s use of an 
exclusion for these documents on July 25, 2016. 
Responsive materials also included documents involving a closed 2001 FBI 
investigation probing whether donations to the Clinton Foundation had been made 
to influence former President Clinton to pardon Marc Rich.  After discovering the 
Marc Rich records on May 9, 2016, the RIDS Section Chief released the records to 
the medium processing queue. 
In the three months between May 12 and August 15, 2016, the documents 
collected in response to the request (the “Clinton Foundation documents”) were in 
the medium workflow queue awaiting processing.  During this timeframe, additional 
relevant records were located and added to the documents already in the queue, 
but the request remained in the medium queue. 
On August 16, 2016, the Clinton Foundation request entered the processing 
and review phase in which the analyst reviewed the pages for exempted material 
and performed a declassification review, and the supervisor performed a quality 
review.  Because the Clinton Foundation request had been designated as a high 
visibility request, it received additional review by the FOIA Unit Chief, the RIDS 
Assistant Section Chief and the RIDS Section Chief. 
On October 25, 2016, the RIDS Assistant Section Chief notified two 
individuals in OPA’s National Press Office—the Unit Chief and a Public Affairs 
Specialist—and the FBI Historian via email that documents responsive to the Clinton 
Foundation request, a high visibility FOIA release, were ready for their review prior 
to release.  The Assistant Section Chief noted in his email that RIDS planned to post 
the FOIA response to the FBI Records Vault on October 28 or 31, 2016.  The 
Assistant Section Chief noted in his email that “the timing, of course, may draw 
attention” to this release and provided a copy of the high visibility memo drafted by 
the FOIA review unit, which provided a brief overview of the substance of the 
release.  The Assistant Section Chief told us and the recipients stated that they 
understood this statement to refer to the short time before the 2016 election and 
thus the expected media interest in any release involving the Clintons.  In the email 
the Assistant Section Chief also requested that the FBI Historian write a synopsis 
for the FBI Records Vault posting. 
On October 26, the National Press Office Unit Chief sent an email to the 
Public Affairs Specialist in her office and the FBI Historian stating, “Can you give 
this [reviewing the Clinton Foundation documents] priority in the event we need to 
consider timing?”  According to the Unit Chief, her timing concern involved the 
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election being close and with the potential media coverage, needing to allot time to 
review documents to be prepared for any issues that might arise after the 
documents were released.  The Unit Chief told us that the press office wanted to 
review the documents in order to determine whether to alert FBI executive 
management, potentially including the FBI Director, to the potential media 
coverage.  She stated that her reference to the timing was not to make it a high 
priority to ensure that it was released prior to the election, but that it meant “that 
they need[ed] to stop what they’re doing and review this so that we can make a 
decision if we need to, or raise it to another level.” 
On October 27, the Public Affairs Specialist provided the high visibility 
memorandum and about 15 pages of the FOIA release documents to the Assistant 
Director (AD) of OPA, Michael Kortan, for his review.  The FBI Historian told us that 
in response to the request from RIDS and the National Press Office Unit Chief, he 
drafted a synopsis to accompany the release of records and sent it to the National 
Press Office Unit Chief on October 27, 2016.  That same day, the FBI Historian also 
emailed the Assistant Section Chief with a short summary of the release to 
accompany the FBI Records Vault posting, and cautioned the Assistant Section 
Chief not to make the post “live” before checking back with the Public Affairs 
Specialist on whether OPA was ready for the release. 
On Friday, October 28, the Public Affairs Specialist emailed RIDS to say that 
OPA reviewed the FOIA response, and had no issues with the proposed release. 
On Monday, October 31, the Public Affairs Specialist sent an inquiry to RIDS 
at 9:17 a.m. asking whether the responsive materials had been released to the 
requester yet.  When the RIDS Assistant Section Chief responded that they were in 
the process of posting it to the FBI Records Vault, the Public Affairs Specialist 
requested an hour delay to give AD Kortan an additional heads-up.  As a result, 
RIDS planned for an 11:30 a.m. release and informed OPA.  The Public Affairs 
Specialist then called the RIDS Section Chief and requested to delay the posting for 
a full day.  The RIDS Section Chief stated that the Public Affairs Specialist told him 
they needed the delay because they were overwhelmed by the reaction to Director 
Comey’s announcement regarding the Clinton email investigation and “that there’s 
not any way [the National Press Office] can deal with this today.”  However, the 
Public Affairs Specialist told us she could not recall the reason for the delay.  The 
National Press Office Unit Chief stated that this was a typical delay needed to 
ensure that AD Kortan had the time to review the documents and make 
notifications to executive management.  The RIDS Section Chief agreed to delay the 
posting until the next day. 
On the morning of November 1, the RIDS Section Chief sent an email to 
members of his team as well as individuals in OPA stating that RIDS was ready to 
make the Clinton Foundation documents public on the FBI Vault site.  In the 
absence of further delay requests or other inputs from OPA, the RIDS Section Chief 
approved the public posting of the materials and instructed one of his subordinates, 
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a Supervisory Government Information Specialist (SGIS), to publish it on the FBI 
Records Vault.  The SGIS then posted the FOIA records.290 
Witnesses told us that the fact that the presidential election was just a week 
ahead was not a factor in deciding when to release the Clinton Foundation 
documents to the public, though they knew the timing would call attention to their 
release.  They stated that the FBI does not take into account elections in deciding 
how to process FOIA requests or when to release responsive documents to the 
public.  Witnesses told us that there was no FOIA equivalent to the Election Year 
Sensitivities guidance that addresses overt investigative steps and the timing of 
charges.  Further, they told us that there were no discussions about delaying the 
release of the Clinton Foundation documents until after the election and that the 
fact that the release occurred the week before the election was a coincidence. 
In response to OIG inquiries regarding the processing and the timing of the 
release, the RIDS Assistant Section Chief emphasized that FOIA is a release statute 
and presumes release:  “[T]he legal duty under the FOIA is to release 
something...when it’s ready to be released...[i]rrespective of any timing, 
irrespective of any election.  [The] FOIA statute says when something is ready to 
be released, we release it.”  He also stated, “We deal with the most sensitive 
issues...every day....  [Y]ou have to stick to the process.”  The RIDS Section Chief 
told us that the only guidance they received regarding the timing of FOIA releases 
came “from the Director himself when he released [a summary of Hillary Rodham 
Clinton’s July 2, 2016 interview with the FBI].”291  The FBI had received criticism for 
releasing the documents on a Friday to minimize press attention.  The Section Chief 
told us that, in a message to the FBI, he understood Comey to say that the FBI 
does not “hold onto anything for political purposes” and “when it’s ready it goes 
out.”  The attorney supporting RIDS stated that in her interactions with RIDS 
management, “they have always been very clear that the FOIA process operates 
rather independently of any politics with a small p or the big P for that matter, that 
may be going on.”  She added: 
[T]he way that RIDS works, it’s such a massive beast that it’s 
essentially a machine....  And it could be the dogcatcher case next to 
the Hillary Clinton case, and you’re going to handle them the same.  
The next one in your queue pops up, you’re going to work it until it’s 
done, and then you’re going to move onto your next one.  So, the 
FOIA process...does not sort of cherry pick the things that we want to 
handle at any particular time in any particular way, either fast or slow. 
                                       
290  The public FBI Records Vault webpage indicates that the Clinton Foundation documents 
were posted on October 31, 2016.  However, the RIDS Section Chief and the SGIS told us that this 
date refers to when the documents were uploaded to the system for review by RIDS and OPA.  The 
documents were not made available to the public until November 1, 2016. 
291  On September 2, 2016, the FBI posted Hillary Clinton’s July 2, 2016 interview with the FBI 
concerning allegations that classified information was improperly stored or transmitted on a personal 
email server she used during her tenure. 
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Later on November 1, a system-generated tweet from @FBIRecordsVault 
announced the posting on FBI’s Records Vault.  Shortly thereafter, NPO began 
receiving inquiries from the media questioning the timing of the posting of the 
records and the associated tweet.  The SGIS stated that he received multiple 
inquiries about the tweet because individuals within OPA and RMD were concerned 
that he had manually tweeted the release.  The SGIS told us he informed the 
individuals who called that he had not manually tweeted concerning the release.  
He then checked the Twitter feed on his phone and realized the attention it was 
getting, so he looked into what happened.  The SGIS stated he then learned about 
the issues with the automatic Twitter feed, that those issues had been corrected on 
October 30, and that upon correction the system released multiple tweets 
concerning posts over the prior year. 
B. Analysis 
In order to determine whether the Clinton Foundation release was impacted 
by any improper political motivation, we examined two issues.  First, we explored 
whether the Clinton Foundation request was handled differently than other 
similarly-sized, high visibility FOIA requests.  Next, we also examined whether any 
FBI officials improperly attempted to affect the timing of the processing or release 
of the responsive documents to either advance or harm the prospects of either 
presidential candidate. 
We found no evidence that the Clinton Foundation request was handled any 
differently than other FOIA requests.  Within RIDS, all of the individuals we 
interviewed told us that the Clinton Foundation request was processed just like any 
other FOIA request.  The RIDS Section Chief told us the FOIA process is a 
regimented process based on workload queues, and that the Clinton Foundation 
request “just fell right into line with this [process]” and this request “was a number 
on somebody’s spreadsheet.”  The RIDS Assistant Section Chief said that they 
followed “the business process at the time.” 
We found no evidence that anyone in RMD or OPA expedited or delayed the 
processing or posting of the request for any improper purpose.  The RIDS Section 
Chief stated that the Clinton Foundation request was processed according to its size 
queue and consistent with that queue’s processing timeline.  Our review of the 
timeline for the processing of this request confirmed the Section Chief’s 
assessment.  RIDS located over 500 pages responsive to the request, putting the 
request in the medium queue with a stated average processing time of 9-10 
months.292  The request was received on November 10, 2015, and was posted on 
November 1, 2016—just under 12 months.  The RIDS Section Chief told the OIG 
that the response did not meet the average processing time because it was “an 
unusual request” due to the potential FOIA exclusion, “which totally skew[ed] what 
happen[ed].”  However, the RIDS SGIS who monitors the FOIA processing time 
                                       
292  We did not perform an independent audit of RIDS’ medium queue, but utilized the 
averages as reported to us by the RIDS Section Chief and Assistant Section Chief. 
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statistics, told the OIG that the time it took RIDS to produce this response “wasn’t 
off of the, off-timing,” and he did not think anyone had rushed it or slowed it down. 
Additionally, the individuals we interviewed told us that there were no efforts 
to delay the release of the Clinton Foundation documents until after the election or 
efforts to expedite the release before the election.  In fact, all of the witnesses we 
spoke to said that at no time were there any discussions about holding the Clinton 
Foundation release until after the election or ensuring that it was released before 
the election.  The RIDS Section Chief told us that “there was no actual timing 
involvement to get it out before the election.”  The RIDS Assistant Section Chief 
said there were no internal discussions about whether to hold the release until after 
the election.  He told us that “FOIA is a disclosure action....  There was no 
consideration of [timing].”  The National Press Office Unit Chief told us that 
documents are released when they are ready for release, regardless of the date or 
time period they fall under.  She stated that OPA might ask for a delay of a few 
hours or a day or two if they needed time to review the documents, but would not 
hold back releasing information for a substantial period of time.  The witnesses 
interviewed denied taking any action, or delaying any action, with regard to the 
FOIA request in order to assist or harm either candidate’s prospects in the election. 
None of the witnesses had knowledge of any attempt to do so. 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. Conclusions 
The Clinton email investigation was one of the highest profile investigations 
in the FBI’s history; however, it is just one of thousands of investigations handled 
each year by the approximately 35,000 FBI agents, analysts, and other 
professionals who dedicate their careers to protecting the American people and 
upholding the Constitution and the rule of law.  Through the collective efforts of 
generations of FBI employees, the FBI has developed and earned a reputation as 
one of the world’s premier law enforcement agencies. 
The FBI has gained this reputation, in significant part, because of its 
professionalism, impartiality, non-political enforcement of the law, and adherence 
to detailed policies, practices, and norms.  However, as we outline in this report, 
certain actions during the Midyear investigation were inconsistent with these long-
standing policies, practices, and norms. 
First, we found that several FBI employees who played critical roles in the 
investigation sent political messages—some of which related directly to the Midyear 
investigation—that created the appearance of bias and thereby raised questions 
about the objectivity and thoroughness of the Midyear investigation.  Even more 
seriously, text messages between Strzok and Page pertaining to the Russia 
investigation, particularly a text message from Strzok on August 8 stating “No.  No 
he’s not.  We’ll stop it.” in response to a Page text “[Trump’s] not ever going to 
become president, right?  Right?!,” are not only indicative of a biased state of mind 
but imply a willingness to take official action to impact a presidential candidate’s 
electoral prospects.  This is antithetical to the core values of the FBI and the 
Department of Justice.  While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence 
that improper considerations, including political bias, directly affected the specific 
investigative actions we reviewed in Chapter Five, the conduct by these employees 
cast a cloud over the entire FBI investigation and sowed doubt about the FBI’s work 
on, and its handling of, the Midyear investigation.  It also called into question 
Strzok’s failure in October 2016 to follow up on the Midyear-related investigative 
lead discovered on the Weiner laptop.  The damage caused by these employees’ 
actions extends far beyond the scope of the Midyear investigation and goes to the 
heart of the FBI’s reputation for neutral factfinding and political independence. 
Second, in key moments, then Director Comey chose to deviate from the 
FBI’s and the Department’s established procedures and norms and instead engaged 
in his own subjective, ad hoc decisionmaking.  In so doing, we found that Comey 
largely based his decisions on what he believed was in the FBI’s institutional 
interests and would enable him to continue to effectively lead the FBI as its 
Director.  While we did not find that these decisions were the result of political bias 
on Comey’s part, we nevertheless concluded that by departing so clearly and 
dramatically from FBI and Department norms, the decisions negatively impacted 
the perception of the FBI and the Department as fair administrators of justice.  
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Moreover, these decisions usurped the authority of the Attorney General and upset 
the well-established separation between investigative and prosecutorial functions 
and the accountability principles that guide law enforcement decisions in the United 
States. 
As we further outline in this report, there was a troubling lack of any direct, 
substantive communication between Comey and then Attorney General Lynch in 
advance of both Comey’s July 5 press conference and his October 28 letter to 
Congress.  With regard to the July 5 events, Comey affirmatively concealed his 
intentions from Lynch.  When he did finally call her on the morning of July 5—after 
the FBI first notified the press—he told her that he was going to be speaking about 
the Midyear investigation but that he would not answer any of her questions, and 
would not tell her what he planned to say.  During that call, Lynch did not instruct 
Comey to tell her what he intended to say at the press conference.  With respect to 
the October 28 letter, Comey chose not to contact Lynch or then Deputy Attorney 
General Yates directly; rather, he had FBI Chief of Staff Rybicki advise Yates’s 
senior advisor (then PADAG Axelrod) that Comey intended to send a letter to 
Congress and that Comey believed he had an obligation to do so.  Given these 
circumstances, Lynch and Yates concluded it would be counterproductive to speak 
directly with Comey and that the most effective way to communicate their strong 
opposition to Comey about his decision was to relay their views to him through 
Axelrod and Rybicki.  We found it extraordinary that, in advance of two such 
consequential decisions, the FBI Director decided that the best course of conduct 
was to not speak directly and substantively with the Attorney General about how 
best to navigate these decisions and mitigate the resulting harms, and that 
Comey’s decision resulted in the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
concluding that it would be counterproductive to speak directly with the FBI 
Director. 
This is not the first time the Department and the FBI have conducted a 
politically-charged investigation, and it will not be the last.  To protect the 
institutions from allegations of abuse, political interference, and biased enforcement 
of the law, the Department and the FBI have developed policies and practices to 
guide their decisions.  In the vast majority of cases, they are followed as a matter 
of routine.  But they are most important to follow when the stakes are the highest, 
and when the pressures to divert from them—often based on well-founded concerns 
and highly fraught scenarios—are the greatest.  No rule, policy, or practice is 
perfect, but at the same time, neither is any individual’s ability to make judgments 
under pressure or in what may seem like unique circumstances.  It is in these 
moments—when the rationale for keeping to the ordinary course fades from view 
and the temptation to make an exception is greatest—that the bedrock principles 
and time-tested practices of the Department and the FBI can serve their highest 
purpose.  This notion was most effectively summarized for us by DAAG George 
Toscas, who was the most senior career Department official involved in the daily 
supervision of the Midyear investigation: 
One of the things that I tell people all the time, after having been in 
the Department for almost 24 years now, is I stress to people and 
people who work at all levels, the institution has principles and there’s 
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always an urge when something important or different pops up to say, 
we should do it differently or those principles or those protocols you 
know we should—we might want to deviate because this is so 
different.  But the comfort that we get as people, as lawyers, as 
representatives, as employees and as an institution, the comfort we 
get from those institutional policies, protocols, has, is an unbelievable 
thing through whatever storm, you know whatever storm hits us, 
when you are within the norm of the way the institution behaves, you 
can weather any of it because you stand on the principle. 
And once you deviate, even in a minor way, and you’re always going 
to want to deviate.  It’s always going to be something important and 
some big deal that makes you think, oh let’s do this a little differently.  
But once you do that, you have removed yourself from the comfort of 
saying this institution has a way of doing things and then every 
decision is another ad hoc decision that may be informed by our policy 
and our protocol and principles, but it’s never going to be squarely 
within them. 
There are many lessons to be learned from the Department’s and FBI’s 
handling of the Midyear investigation, but among the most important is the need 
for Department and FBI leadership to follow its established procedures and policies 
even in its highest-profile and most challenging investigations.  By adhering to 
these principles and norms, the public will have greater confidence in the outcome 
of the Department’s and the FBI’s decisions, and Department and FBI leaders will 
better protect the interests of federal law enforcement and the dedicated 
professionals who serve these institutions. 
II. Recommendations 
For these reasons, and as more fully described in previous chapters, we 
recommend the following: 
1. The Department and the FBI consider developing practice guidance 
that would assist investigators and prosecutors in identifying the 
general risks with and alternatives to permitting a witness to attend a 
voluntary interview of another witness, in particular when the witness 
is serving as counsel for the other witness. 
2. The Department consider making explicit that, except in situations 
where the law requires or permits disclosure, an investigating agency 
cannot publicly announce its recommended charging decision prior to 
consulting with the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. 
Attorney, or his or her designee, and cannot proceed without the 
approval of one of these officials. 
3. The Department and the FBI consider adopting a policy addressing the 
appropriateness of Department employees discussing the conduct of 
uncharged individuals in public statements. 
500 
4. The Department consider providing guidance to agents and 
prosecutors concerning the taking of overt investigative steps, 
indictments, public announcements, or other actions that could impact 
an election. 
5. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General consider taking steps to 
improve the retention and monitoring of text messages Department-
wide. 
6. The FBI add a warning banner to all of the FBI’s mobile phones and 
mobile devices in order to further notify users that they have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
7. The FBI consider (a) assessing whether it has provided adequate 
training to employees about the proper use of text messages and 
instant messages, including any related discovery obligations, and 
(b) providing additional guidance about the allowable uses of FBI 
devices for any non-governmental purpose, including guidance about 
the use of FBI devices for political conversations 
8. The FBI consider whether (a) it is appropriately educating employees 
about both its media contact policy and the Department’s ethics rules 
pertaining to the acceptance of gifts, and (b) its disciplinary provisions 
and penalties are sufficient to deter such improper conduct. 
9. Department ethics officials consider implementing a review of 
campaign donations when Department employees or their spouses run 
for public office. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: 
FROM: 
Michael E. Horowitz 
Inspector General 
U.S. Department o 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of the Deputy Attorney General 
Wadlington, O.C. 20S30 
June 11, 2018 
SUBJECT: Response to "A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election" 
The Department of Justice (Department) appreciates the review your offic.e conducted 
regarding various actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department in 
advance of the 2016 election and the resulting report of investigation. This response addresses 
only the report and recommendations as they pertain to the Department as the FBI is responding 
separately. 
Based on the findings in the report, your office made six recommendations for the 
Department to consider. The Department concurs in Recommendations 1-5 and 9 and will 
expeditiously consider taking steps in response to them. 
cc: Hon. John Demers 
Assistant Attorney General 
National Security Division 
Hon, Christopher Wray 
Director 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz 
Inspector General 
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Washington. D.C. 
Dear Mr. Horowitz: 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigatio n 
Washington, D.C. 20535-000/ 
June 12. 2018 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) greatly values the opportunity to review 
and respond to the fo rthcoming Report entitled ··A Review of Various Actions by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election." The FBI's 
formal response is enc losed, including a Law Enforcement Sensitive portion appended at the end. 
The FBI recognizes and appreciates the importance of the Inspector General's 
oversight role and thanks you for the thoroughness of your Report and recommendations 
regardi ng FBI actions and policies. 
Enclosure 
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FBI RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF  
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 
 
 The mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or Bureau) is to protect the 
American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States.  Within this mission, the FBI 
has certain priorities, including protecting the United States against terrorist attack, foreign 
intelligence operations and espionage, cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes, 
combatting public corruption at all levels, protecting civil rights, and combating major criminal 
offenses.   Sometimes, the investigations and operations conducted by the FBI in furtherance of 
its mission may cut against the personally held views of certain Special Agents and other 
employees supporting those cases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with this; indeed, the 
Constitution contains robust protections for personally held and espoused beliefs and the 
freedom of association.  The FBI endeavors to, and as reflected in the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) “A Review of Various Actions by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election” Report, 
succeeds in its efforts, to maintain separation between personally held views and the actual work 
of the FBI.  Nevertheless, proper oversight is required in order to ensure this separation remains 
effective, that the mission comes first regardless of personal view, that all investigations proceed 
objectively, and that the American people maintain their trust and confidence that the critically 
important work of the FBI remains unbiased and apolitical.  The FBI appreciates the key role of 
the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in the oversight process.   
 Below, the FBI sets forth a response to the findings and recommendations contained in 
the OIG Report.  The FBI recognizes that mistakes were made.  These mistakes were errors of 
judgment, violations of or disregard for policy, or, when viewed with the benefit of hindsight, 
simply not the best courses of action.  They were not, in any respect, the result of bias or 
improper considerations.  Further, the OIG Report focuses on the conduct of several individuals 
acting in extraordinary and unprecedented circumstances.  None of the actions or conduct faulted 
by the OIG impugn the integrity of the FBI as an institution, or of the Bureau’s dedicated 
37,000-person workforce as a whole.    
I. Summary of FBI Response 
The FBI identified eight (8) focal points, specific to the FBI, in the OIG Report:  (1) 
conduct creating a perception that political bias could have influenced certain actions or 
decisions; (2) violation of or disregard for DOJ or FBI policies by former Director James 
Comey’s July 5, 2016, announcement and October 28, 2016, letter; (3) issues involving media 
contacts, leaks, and ethics rules on acceptance of gifts; (4) former Deputy Director Andrew 
McCabe’s recusal obligations; (5) the use of personal email accounts; (6) missteps in certain 
investigatory processes; (7) insubordination by former Director Comey; and (8) the potentially 
improper use of FBI systems and devices to exchange messages, the related referrals for 
investigation, and the creation of additional warning banners and guidance.  
The FBI’s accepts the OIG’s findings that certain text messages, instant messages, and 
statements, along with a failure to consistently apply DOJ and FBI interview policies, were 
inappropriate and created an appearance that political bias might have improperly influenced 
investigative actions or decisions.  The Bureau also agrees with the OIG that, despite these errors 
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and the damage they may have caused to the FBI’s reputation, there was no evidence of bias or 
other improper considerations affecting the handling of the Midyear Exam (MYE) investigation.  
The FBI is taking immediate remedial actions to reinforce the importance of maintaining a work 
environment free from the appearance of political bias.  This includes a review of whether the 
intermixing of work-related discussions with political commentary implicates any of the FBI’s 
Offense Codes and Penalty Guidelines.  It will further include political bias training, Hatch Act 
training, and, as applicable, will also include a review of how the FBI staffs, structures, and 
supervises sensitive investigations.   
The FBI also accepts the OIG’s findings that former Director Comey’s July 5, 2016, 
announcement violated DOJ’s media policy and may have violated regulations regarding the 
public release of information, and that his October 28, 2016, letter was a serious error in 
judgment.  In the judgment of the OIG, there was no evidence that these actions were the result 
of bias, political preference, or an effort to influence the election.   The Bureau takes seriously its 
obligations to control public statements, especially those related to charging recommendations in 
criminal investigations and uncharged conduct.  Accordingly, the FBI has issued a revised media 
policy, will act to further ensure that all personnel are aware of the new policy and the serious 
consequences for non-compliance, and will provide further training on media contact and the 
limited authority to release information.   
The OIG also identified a need to change the “cultural attitude” regarding media contacts 
and leaks at the FBI.  The Director has ordered the Office of Integrity and Compliance (OIC), the 
Office of the General Counsel (OGC), and the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) to 
review how personnel are trained regarding the media policy and related ethics rules, including 
those related to the acceptance of gifts, and whether current disciplinary penalties are adequate to 
deter unauthorized media contact or leaks.   
The OIG made several determinations regarding former Deputy Director McCabe’s 
recusal from the Clinton-related investigations.  Because he may not have fully complied with 
his voluntary recusal obligations, the FBI OIC has been instructed to review recusal policy and 
training, and make updates as necessary to help more quickly identify and mitigate actual or 
perceived conflicts of interest.1  The FBI OGC and OIC have also been directed to work together 
to develop a framework for earlier notification of potential conflicts caused by campaign 
contributions to covered persons and to provide additional training on recusal obligations and 
conflicts of interest.  The Director has called for the framework to be completed within 60 days. 
Upon finding that former Director Comey, Lisa Page, and Peter Strzok used personal 
email accounts for unclassified FBI business, the OIG referred Mr. Strzok for an investigation 
into whether his actions violated FBI and DOJ policies.  This referral will be investigated and 
adjudicated pursuant to FBI and DOJ policies.  While, there is no finding or indication that any 
classified material ever transited former Director Comey’s, Ms. Page’s, or Mr. Strzok’s personal 
devices or accounts, the FBI OGC and OIC have been tasked to evaluate whether additional 
training and messaging would reinforce the existing policies and protocols on the use of non-FBI 
                                                          
1 The OIG’s findings and recommendations related to other recusal issues and contained in the 
Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) Appendix Two, are addressed separately in the appended LES 
response.   
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devices and accounts and further minimize any non-compliance, and to report back to the 
Director on their findings within 60 days.     
The OIG concluded that certain MYE investigatory missteps were made.  The FBI 
accepts the OIG’s conclusions that, in hindsight, it could have taken additional or different 
investigatory actions, including moving more quickly to secure a search warrant for Anthony 
Weiner’s laptop, and staffing the investigation differently so as to avoid affecting the MYE 
investigation when senior members of the MYE team were assigned to the Russia investigation.  
The FBI appreciates, however, that the OIG recognized that many of the identified missteps were 
judgment calls by seasoned investigators and prosecutors, and that there was no evidence that 
any decision was made as the result of bias or other improper considerations.  This includes the 
decision not to seek personal devices from former Secretary Clinton’s senior aides, the 
prioritization of the Russia investigation at the time, and the delay in seeking a search warrant for 
the Weiner laptop.  The FBI is convening a working group to provide recommendations, within 
120 days, for the staffing, structuring, and supervision of sensitive investigations to help avoid or 
mitigate similar missteps in the future.   
The OIG also stated that former Director Comey was insubordinate by intentionally 
concealing from DOJ his intentions regarding the July 5, 2016, announcement and instructing his 
subordinates to do the same.  The FBI does not condone insubordination at any level.  
Compliance with policy – and the chain of command as appropriate – will be reinforced through 
training. 
In its review of collected materials, the OIG found that several FBI employees had 
exchanged text messages, instant messages, or both, that included political statements hostile to 
or favoring particular candidates, and appeared to mix political opinion with discussions about 
the MYE investigation.  The OIG found no evidence to connect the political views expressed by 
these employees with the specific investigative decisions, but referred five employees for 
investigation into whether the messages violated the FBI’s Offense Codes and Penalty 
Guidelines.  The FBI will handle these referrals pursuant to the FBI’s disciplinary investigation 
and adjudication processes, and will impose disciplinary measures as warranted.  The OIG 
separately recommended that the FBI add privacy warning banners to FBI-issued mobile devices 
and consider assessing whether employees are properly trained on the use of text messages and 
instant messages, as well as whether it should provide additional guidance about the use of FBI 
devices for non-governmental purposes.  Although the FBI has clear and unambiguous warnings 
related to the use of FBI Information Technology and Systems, including FBI-issued devices, the 
Executive Assistant Director of the Information and Technology Branch has been directed to 
implement the suggested warnings in the most technologically expeditious and feasible manner.  
The Bureau will also provide renewed training on the governing policies related to device use.      
Each of these areas is discussed in more detail below.   
II. Detailed Response to the Eight Focal Points of the OIG Report 
While the OIG Report contains several findings of poor judgment, violations of or 
disregard for policy, and investigatory actions that might have benefitted from a better decision-
making process, it contains no finding that any error in judgment, violation of policy, or 
investigatory action was motivated by political bias or other improper considerations.   This is 
critical to the operation of the FBI and the ability of the American people to count on the FBI to 
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act impartially and objectively.  For the same reasons, it is equally important to note again that 
the OIG Report is narrowly focused on the handful of individuals who were the most deeply 
involved in running the MYE investigation, and does not generally find fault with the FBI’s 
policies, practices, or procedures as they pertain to investigations, ethical conduct, or media 
contacts.    
1. Conduct creating a perception that political bias could have influenced certain 
actions or decisions 
The OIG identified several separate acts that created an appearance that political bias 
could have influenced certain actions or decisions.  The FBI accepts that text messages 
exchanged over FBI-issued devices by certain FBI employees, primarily Peter Strzok and Lisa 
Page, demonstrated extremely poor judgment and a lack of professionalism.  The FBI also 
accepts that the content of these messages, critical of political candidates, brought discredit upon 
those exchanging them and harmed the FBI’s reputation.  Similarly, the FBI accepts that the 
decision to allow Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson to be present during the interview of 
former Secretary Clinton was inconsistent with typical investigative strategy and created an 
appearance that political bias could have influenced this decision, especially when viewed in the 
light of messages exchanged between Mr. Strzok and Ms. Page.2    
Despite the appearance of bias created by these actions, the OIG found no evidence that 
bias affected any investigatory decision or action.  As determined by the OIG, there was no 
evidence of bias or other improper considerations in former Director Comey’s instruction to 
complete the MYE investigation “promptly.”  Likewise, the OIG considered multiple decisions 
and actions taken by the MYE team related to obtaining evidence, interview timing and 
procedures, and the use of consent or immunity agreements.  No evidence of bias or other 
improper considerations was found by the OIG in the MYE team’s:  use of consent, rather than 
subpoenas, search warrants, or other legal process to obtain evidence; decisions regarding how to 
limit consent agreements; decision not to seek personal devices from former Secretary Clinton’s 
senior aides; decisions to enter into immunity agreements; decisions regarding the timing and 
scoping of former Secretary Clinton’s interview, or to proceed with the interview with Cheryl 
Mills and Heather Samuelson present; and, the decision to obtain testimony and other evidence 
from Ms. Mills and Ms. Samuelson by consent agreement and with act-of-production immunity.   
Although no bias or other improper consideration was found in the FBI’s decisions or 
actions, the appearance of bias is disconcerting and potentially damaging to the FBI’s ability to 
perform its mission.  Accordingly, the FBI is instituting new political bias training, drawing 
from, among other sources, the training, guidance, and practices of the federal judiciary.  To 
commence within 120 days, training will begin with senior leadership and the Senior Executive 
Service (SES) ranks, with the objectives of discussing the OIG Report, lessons learned, and the 
need for scrupulous, unwavering adherence to the policies and procedures intended to combat 
potential political bias.  After this initial training, the Director will require all employees to 
                                                          
2 Identifying a different type of potential bias, the OIG Report also found it improper for Ms. 
Page to comment on or consider how the approach to interviewing former Secretary Clinton 
might affect the FBI’s interests if she won the presidency.  The FBI agrees with this finding.   
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undergo similar training to reinforce the importance of maintaining a work environment free 
from political bias.  The training will cover multiple areas, including at a minimum ethics and 
integrity, objectivity, and the avoidance of political bias, and will occur across multiple settings, 
such as Special Agent in Charge onboarding, Senior Executive Service onboarding, Senior 
Leader courses, Leading People courses, and the Basic Field Training Course.  If necessary, 
supplementary Hatch Act and ethics training may also be required.   
Additionally, the Director has tasked the Associate Deputy Director with establishing a 
working group to provide recommendations, within 120 days, on the staffing, structuring, and 
supervising of sensitive investigations in order to ensure that the full suite of the FBI’s 
investigative strengths, a balance of operational experience, and proper resources are provided 
such that every future sensitive investigation is conducted to the highest standards of the Bureau.  
This will include, among other things, consideration of when and whether to increase field office 
participation in such matters, and when and whether it would be beneficial to team agents from 
different components and backgrounds to leverage respective skill sets and experiences, e.g., 
drawing on the experience of public corruption agents when conducting counterintelligence 
investigations.   
Disciplinary referrals from the OIG Report will be handled pursuant to the FBI’s 
disciplinary investigation and adjudication processes.  Any allegation of misconduct by an FBI 
employee is reviewed, and if merited, investigated by either the FBI Inspection Division or the 
DOJ OIG, as occurred here.  At the conclusion of the investigation, the matter is referred to the 
FBI’s OPR for adjudication.  FBI employees must maintain the highest standards of personal and 
institutional responsibility.  The FBI OPR ensures that the FBI maintains its rigorous standards 
of integrity and professionalism by impartially adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct.  
OPR’s prompt, thorough, and fair adjudication of employee misconduct cases materially 
enhances confidence in and support for the FBI and its mission.  With that said, the FBI OPR has 
already opened and is conducting investigations, or has concluded misconduct investigations 
arising out of or related to the conduct identified in the Report.  It would not be appropriate to 
comment here on any particular individual who was or may be the subject of such an 
investigation.   
2. Violation of or disregard for DOJ or FBI policies by former Director James 
Comey’s July 5, 2016, announcement and October 28, 2016, letter 
The OIG found that former Director Comey violated DOJ’s media policy, and potentially 
regulations related to the public release of information, when he made his July 5, 2016, 
announcement.  He was also found to have committed a serious error in judgment by sending his 
October 28, 2016, letter, in disregard of FBI and DOJ policy, without DOJ approval, and in 
usurpation of the Attorney General’s authority.  The FBI does not contest these findings.   
The FBI will implement the OIG’s recommendation that the FBI adopt a policy on the 
appropriateness of employees addressing uncharged conduct in public statements.  The Director 
is also tasking the FBI’s OGC to develop, within 30 days, guidance requiring prior consultation 
with DOJ preceding any public reference to FBI charging recommendations in criminal 
investigations.   
Pursuant to the new FBI media policy, FBI personnel authorized to communicate with the 
media must abide by DOJ guidelines contained in 28 CFR 50.2 “Release of information by 
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personnel of the [DOJ] relating to criminal and civil proceedings,” and in the U.S. Attorney’s 
Manual Title 1-7.000 “Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy.”  This would include 
receiving advanced approval by the appropriate United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney 
General before communicating with the media about a pending investigation or case, except in 
emergency circumstances.  Training on these policies will be included in the training described 
above. 
3. Issues involving media contacts, dissemination of information, and leaks 
The OIG’s conclusion that there is a need to change the “cultural attitude” regarding 
media contacts and leaks at the FBI is troubling.  The FBI is acutely aware of the damage 
unauthorized communications or leaks can cause to investigations, prosecutions, the personal 
lives of those involved in the case or who may be subjects or targets, and the reputation of the 
Bureau.  Leaks or unauthorized communications are not taken lightly, are never condoned, and 
may result in discipline, up to and including termination, and potentially prosecution.  Given the 
conclusions reached in the OIG report, the Director instructed the Assistant Director of OPR to 
review whether current disciplinary penalties are adequate to deter unauthorized media contact or 
leaks and to report back on their adequacy, or the need for additional penalties, within 30 days.   
The FBI protects information on a need-to-know basis and, to reinforce the limitations on 
sharing that information, revised its media policy effective November 15, 2017.  As an additional 
step, the FBI will ensure that, within 30 days, all personnel are fully aware of the media policy 
and the serious potential consequences for noncompliance.  The new media policy restricts who 
is authorized to communicate with the media (i.e., within FBI Headquarters, the Director, Deputy 
Director, Associate Deputy Director, Assistant Director of the Office of Public Affairs, and 
designated OPA staff; in a field office, the Assistant Director in Charge or Special Agent in 
Charge, designated public affairs officer, or other personnel specifically authorized by the field 
office head).  The new policy requires that “all contact with members of the media about FBI 
matters must be reported” to the relevant Headquarters or field office officials.  It also requires 
that personnel “must immediately notify their supervisors if contact with a member of the media 
concerns suspected classified or grand jury subject matter.”  The policy also requires 
conformance with DOJ guidelines contained in 28 CFR 50.2 “Release of information by 
personnel of the [DOJ] relating to criminal and civil proceedings,” and in the U.S. Attorney’s 
Manual Title 1-7.000 “Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy.”  The FBI’s policies, training, 
and disciplinary measures related to media contact and ethics rules, combined with any 
additional policies and training developed after this review, will sufficiently mitigate the risk and 
continue to deter this type of misconduct.      
4. Former Deputy Director Andrew McCabe’s recusal obligations 
The OIG found that the former Deputy Director and the Bureau acted appropriately with 
regard to his involvement in and recusal from the Clinton-related investigations.  The OIG 
concurred with the FBI’s determination that former Deputy Director McCabe was not required to 
recuse from those investigations and found that he notified the appropriate persons in the FBI to 
seek guidance on ethics issues.  The OIG Report also makes clear that former Deputy Director 
McCabe generally abided by his voluntary recusal from Clinton-related matters after November 
1, 2016, in that there is no evidence that he continued to supervise investigative decisions in 
those matters after his recusal.  The FBI agrees with the OIG that in a few instances, the former 
Deputy Director did not fully comply with his voluntary recusal.   
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Based on the OIG’s findings related to the analysis of recusal decisions and recusal 
obligations, in particular the finding that FBI ethics officials and attorneys did not fully 
appreciate the potential significant implications of campaign contributions to Dr. McCabe’s 
campaign, and the ninth recommendation in the OIG Report, the FBI’s OGC and OIC have been 
directed to work together to develop a framework for earlier notification of potential conflicts 
caused by campaign contributions to covered persons and to provide additional training on 
recusal obligations and conflicts of interest.  The Director has mandated that the framework be 
completed within 60 days. 
5. The use of personal email accounts by former Director Comey and Peter Strzok 
The OIG found that former Director Comey used personal email accounts for unclassified 
FBI business, absent exigent circumstances, in contravention of FBI and DOJ policy.  The OIG 
also found that Peter Strzok and Lisa Page used personal email accounts for unclassified FBI 
business.  Although former Director Comey and Ms. Page are no longer employed by the FBI, 
the OIG referred Mr. Strzok for an investigation into whether his use of personal email accounts 
violated FBI or DOJ policy.  The FBI will handle this referral pursuant to the FBI’s disciplinary 
investigation and adjudication processes.  The FBI notes that there is no finding or indication in 
the OIG Report that any classified material ever transited former Director Comey’s, Ms. Page’s, 
or Mr. Strzok’s personal devices or accounts. 
The Bureau will evaluate whether additional training and messaging would clarify and 
reinforce the existing policies and protocols on the use of non-FBI devices and accounts and 
further minimize any non-compliance by FBI personnel.  Further, the Director has tasked the 
Executive Assistant Director of the Information and Technology Branch with evaluating the 
benefits of consolidating existing relevant policies and guidance concerning the use of personal 
devices and accounts for FBI business, in order to underscore the requirement for exigency in 
such use.      
6. Missteps in certain investigatory processes 
Two complex, exceptionally important investigations were being conducted concurrently 
by the FBI in 2016, MYE and the Russia influence investigation.  The FBI sought to staff both 
investigations with the people it thought at the time were the best qualified (as it always does).  
Both were close-hold, sensitive, and multifaceted.  At the highest levels of leadership then in the 
FBI, judgment calls and decisions were made regarding how each investigation should proceed 
and how investigatory actions should be prioritized.  The OIG questioned some of the judgment 
calls and decisions, including reassigning senior members from the MYE team to the Russia 
influence investigation, the delay in seeking a search warrant for Anthony Weiner’s laptop, and 
the decision by agents and prosecutors not to subpoena or seek search warrants for the personal 
devices of three senior aides to former Secretary Clinton.  The FBI agrees that it could have 
moved more quickly to secure a search warrant for Weiner’s laptop and could have staffed the 
two investigations differently to minimize any detrimental effect to the MYE investigation.  The 
addition of staff or resources may have impacted how agents and prosecutors decided what 
devices to seek and review, even if their judgment that certain devices were likely of limited 
evidentiary value remained the same.    
While the OIG was critical of these judgment calls and decisions, it did not find that these 
were the result of bias or other improper considerations.  Rather, the OIG specifically concluded 
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that there was no evidence of bias or improper considerations in the decision not to seek the 
personal devices from former Secretary Clinton’s senior aides, the lack of urgency in seeking a 
search warrant for the Weiner laptop, and the prioritization of the Russia influence investigation.    
As previously described, in an effort to learn from its past decisions, good and bad, the 
FBI is establishing a working group to provide recommendations for the staffing, structuring, 
and supervision of sensitive investigations to help avoid or mitigate similar missteps in the 
future. 
7. Insubordination by former Director Comey 
The OIG found that former Director Comey was insubordinate when he intentionally 
concealed from DOJ his intentions regarding the July 5, 2016, announcement and instructed his 
subordinates to do the same.  The FBI does not condone insubordination at any level and will 
institute training to ensure compliance with policy and the chain of command, as appropriate.   
8. The potentially improper use of FBI systems and devices to exchange messages, 
the related referrals for investigation, and the recommendations to create 
additional warning banners and guidance. 
The OIG found that several FBI employees had exchanged text messages, instant 
messages, or both that included political statements.  The OIG also found that some messages 
appeared to mix political opinion with discussions about the MYE investigation.  The OIG 
concluded there is no evidence to connect the political views expressed by these employees with 
the specific MYE investigative decisions.  Regarding the messages, the FBI will handle the 
OIG’s referrals pursuant to its disciplinary investigation and adjudication processes and will 
impose disciplinary measures as warranted. 
Based on its review of these messages, the OIG separately recommended that the FBI add 
privacy warning banners to FBI-issued mobile devices and consider assessing whether 
employees are properly trained on the use of text messages and instant messages and whether it 
should provide additional guidance about the use of FBI devices for non-governmental purposes.  
FBI employees sign a Rules of Behavior Agreement expressly consenting to the monitoring of 
data communications over FBI information systems (emails, facsimile, computer database use 
and data storage, digital transmission of data, but not voice communications). This agreement 
form must be signed before access to any FBI Information Technology or Information Systems is 
granted.  Existing policy also advises employees that “FBI personnel using FBI information 
systems have no reasonable expectation of privacy.”  Further, the warning banners that appear at 
login on the FBI’s computer systems expressly apply to “all devices [or] storage media attached 
to this network or to a computer on this network.”  Although the FBI has clear and unambiguous 
warnings related to the use of FBI Information Technology and Systems, including FBI-issued 
devices, the Executive Assistant Director of the Information and Technology Branch has been 
directed to implement the suggested warnings in the most technologically expeditious and 
feasible manner.  The Bureau will also provide enhanced training on the governing policies 
related to device use, including but not limited to the use of FBI Information Technology and 
Systems for political conversations.  
* * * * 
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In addition to the focal points addressed above, which the FBI believes are responsive to 
findings and recommendations in the OIG report, one other specific and narrow recommendation 
deserves a brief response.   
The OIG recommends that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) consider 
taking steps to improve the retention and monitoring of text messages Department-wide.  The 
Bureau already goes to great lengths, within the restrictions imposed by existing technology and 
practicality, to capture and retain text messages sent or received on FBI-issued devices.  Still, the 
FBI stands ready to work with ODAG to improve its processes and capabilities.   
III. Conclusion 
The FBI appreciates the role of the OIG, its dedication to its task, and the thoroughness of 
its investigation in bringing to light ways in which the FBI can improve the performance of its 
mission.  The Bureau also appreciates the finding that there was no evidence that bias or 
improper considerations affected its investigative actions or decisions.  Further, while the OIG 
Report focused on only a handful of individuals, as described above, the FBI is reviewing the 
recommendations of the OIG and will be taking action that applies far more broadly to FBI 
leadership, career Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts, and all the various personnel that 
make the FBI the premiere law enforcement and national security agency in the world.  The FBI 
is extraordinarily cognizant of the need to maintain impartiality and objectivity, and to make 
certain that the American people trust it to always do so. 
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STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) 
Friday, May 06, 2016 6:08 PM 
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Understood and will do. 
From: MCCABE, ANDREW G. (DO) (FBI) 
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 5:32 PM 
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(FBI) 
Subject: FW: Midyear Exam ·-- UNCLASSIAED 
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============ ========================================= 
Folks: 
The Director composed the below straw man in an effort to compose what a "final" statement might look like in the 
context of a press conference. This was really more of an exercise for him to get his thoughts on the matter in order, 
and not any kind of decision about venue, strategy, product, etc. 
The Director asked me to share this with you four, but not any further. The only additional people who have seen this 
draft are Jim Rybicki and Jim Baker. Please do not disseminate or discuss any further. 
I do not know if the boss will want to discuss this at the Monday update but please review it before the meeting just in 
case. 
Thanks 
Andrew G. McCabe 
Deputy Director 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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TRANSITORY RECORD 
I've been trying to imagine what it would look like if I decided to do an FBI only press event to 
close out our work and hand the matter to DOJ. To help shape our discussions of whether that, 
or something different, makes sense, I have spent some time crafting what I would say, which 
follows. In my imagination, I don't see me taking any questions. Here is what it might look like: 
Good afternoon folks. I am here to give you an update on our investigation of Secretary Clinton's use 
of a private email system, which began in late August. 
After a tremendous amount of work, the FBI has completed its investigation and has referred the case 
to the Department of Justice for a prosecutive decision. What I would like to do today is tell you three 
things: (1) what we did; (2) what we found; (3) what we have recommended to DOJ. 
But I want to start by thanking the many agents, analysts, technologists, and other FBI employees who 
did work of extraordinary quality in this case. Once you have a better sense of how much we have 
done, you will understand why I am so grateful and proud of their efforts. 
So, first: what we have done over the last eight months. 
The investigation began as a referral from the Intelligence Community Inspector General in connection 
with Secretary Clinton's use of a private email server during his time as Secretary of State, focused on 
whether classified information was transmitted on that private system. 
Our investigation focused on whether there is evidence that classified information was improperly 
stored or transmitted on that private system, in violation of a federal statute that makes it a felony to 
mishandle classified information either intentionally or in a grossly negligent way, or a second statute 
that makes it a misdemeanor to remove classified information from appropriate systems or storage 
facilities. 
Consistent with our counterintelligence responsibilities, we have also investigated to determine 
whether there is evidence of computer intrusion in connection with the private email server by any 
foreign power, or hackers on behalf of a foreign power. 
I have so far used the singular term, "email server," in describing the referral that began our 
investigation. It turns out to have been more complicated than that. Secretary Clinton used several 
different servers and providers of those servers during her four years at the State Department, and used 
numerous mobile devices to view and send email on that private domain. As new servers and 
providers were employed, older servers were taken out of service, stored, and decommissioned in 
various ways. Piecing all of that back together to gain as full an understanding as possible of the ways 
in which private email was used for government work has been a painstaking undertaking, requiring 
thousands of hours of effort. 
For example, when one of Secretary Clinton's original private servers was decommissioned in 20:xx, 
the email software was removed. Doing that didn't remove the email content, but it was like removing 
the frame from a huge finished jigsaw puzzle and dumping the pieces on the floor. The effect was that 
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millions of email fragments end up unsorted in the server's un-used- or "slack" - space. We went 
through all of it to see what was there, and what parts of the puzzle could be put back together. 
FBI investigators have also read all 34,000 emails provided by Secretary Clinton to the State 
Department in spring 2015. Where an email was assessed as possibly containing classified 
information, the FBI referred the email to the U.S. government agency that was the likely "owner" of 
the information in the email so that agency could make a determination as to whether the email 
contained classified information at the time it was sent or received, or whether there was reason to 
classify the email now, even if its content was not classified at the time it was sent (this is the process 
sometimes referred to as "up classifying"). 
From that group of34,000 emails that had been returned to the State Department in 2015, the FBI sent 
xxxx emails to agencies for classification detenninations. Of those, xxxx have been determined to 
contain classified information at the time they were sent or received. Xxxx of those contained 
information that was Top Secret at the time they were sent; xxxx contained Secret information at the 
time; and xxxx contained Confidential information. Separate from those, a total of xx.xx additional 
emails were ''up classified" to make them Secret or Confidential; the information in those had not been 
classified at the time the emails were sent. 
The FBI also discovered xx.xx work-related emails that were not in the group of 34,000 that were 
returned by Secretary Clinton to State in 2015. We found those additional emails in a variety of 
ways. Some had been deleted over the years and we found traces of them on devices that supported or 
were connected to the private email domain. Others we found by reviewing the archived government 
email accounts of people who had been government employees at the same time as Secretary Clinton, 
including high-ranking officials at other agencies, with whom a Secretary of State might naturally 
correspond. This helped us recover work-related emails that were not among the 34,000 produced to 
State. Still others we recovered from the laborious review of the millions of email fragments dumped 
into the slack space of the server decommissioned in 20xx. 
All told, we found xx.xx emails that were not among those produced to the State Department last 
year. Of those, we assessed that xx.xx possibly contained classified information at the time they were 
sent or received and so we sent them to other government agencies for classification 
determinations. To date, agencies have concluded that xxxx of those were classified at the time they 
were sent or received, xxx at the Secret level and xxxx at the Confidential level. There were no 
additional Top Secret emails found. Finally, none of those we found have since been "up classified." 
I should add here that we found no evidence that any of the additional work-related emails we found 
were intentionally deleted in an effort to conceal them. Our assessment is that, like many users of 
private email accounts, Secretary Clinton periodically deleted emails or emails were purged from the 
system when devices were changed. Because she was not using a government account, there was no 
archiving of her emails, so it is not surprising that we discovered emails that were not on Secretary 
Clinton's system in 2015, when she produced the 34,000 emails to the State Department. 
It could also be that some of the additional work-related emails we recovered were among those 
deleted as "personal" by Secretary Clinton's lawyers when they reviewed and sorted her emails for 
production in 2015. We have conducted interviews and done technical examination to attempt to 
understand how that sorting was done. Although we do not have complete visibility because we are 
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not fully able to reconstruct the electronic record of that sorting, we believe our investigation has been 
sufficient to give us reasonable confidence there was no intentional misconduct in connection with that 
sorting effort. 
The lawyers doing the sorting for Secretary Clinton in 2015 did not individually read tens of thousands 
of emails, as we did; instead, they used search terms to try to find all work-related emails among the 
more than 60,000 total emails remaining on Secretary Clinton's private system in 2015. It is highly 
likely their search terms missed some work-related emails, and that we found them, for example, in the 
mailboxes of other officials or in the slack space of a server. It is also likely that there are other work-
related emails that they did not produce to State and that we did not find elsewhere, and that are now 
gone because they deleted all emails they did not return to State, and the lav,ryers cleaned their devices 
in a such a way as to preclude forensic recovery. 
And, of course, in additional to our technical work, we interviewed many people, from those involved 
in setting up and maintaining the various iterations of Secretary Clinton's private server to staff 
members with whom she corresponded on email, to those involved in the email production to State, 
and finally, Secretary Clinton herself. 
Lastly, we have done extensive work with the assistance of our colleagues elsewhere in the Intelligence 
Community to understand what indications there might be of compromise by hostile actors in 
connection with the private email operation. 
That's what we have done. Now let me tell you what we found. 
There is evidence to support a conclusion that Secretary Clinton, and others, used the private email 
server in a manner that was grossly negligent with respect to the handling of classified 
information. For example, seven email chains concern matters that were classified at the TS/SAP level 
when they were sent and received. These chains involved Secretary Clinton both sending emails about 
those matters and receiving emails from others about the same matters. There is evidence to support a 
conclusion that any reasonable person in Secretary Clinton's position, or in the positon of those 
government employees with whom she was corresponding about these matters, should have known that 
an unclassified system was no place for such an email conversation. Although we did not find clear 
evidence that Secretary Clinton or her colleagues intended to violate laws governing the handling of 
classified information, there is evidence that they were extremely careless in their handling of very 
sensitive, highly classified information. 
Similarly, the sheer volume of information that was properly classified as Secret at the time it was 
discussed on email (that is, excluding the "up classified" emails) supports an inference that the 
participants were grossly negligent in their handling of that information. 
We also developed evidence that the security culture of the State Department in general, and with 
respect to use of unclassified email systems in particular, was generally lacking in the kind of care for 
classified information found elsewhere in the government. 
With respect to potential computer intrusion by hostile actors, we did not find direct evidence that 
Secretary Clinton's personal email system, in its various configurations since 2009, was successfully 
hacked. But, given the nature of the system and of the actors potentially involved, we assess that we 
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would be unlikely to see such direct evidence. We do assess that hostile actors gained access to the 
private email accounts of individuals with whom Secretary Clinton was in regular contact from her 
private account. We also assess that Secretary Clinton's use of a private email domain was both known 
by a large number of people and readily apparent. Given that combination of factors, we asses it is 
reasonably likely that hostile actors gained access to Secretary Clinton's private email account. 
So that's what we found. 
Finally, with respect to our recommendation to the Department of Justice. In our system, the 
prosecutors make the decisions about whether charges are appropriate based on evidence the FBI has 
helped collect. Although we don't normally make public our recommendations to the prosecutors, we 
frequently make recommendations and engage in productive conversations with prosecutors about what 
resolution may be appropriate, given the evidence. In this case, given the importance of the matter, I 
think unusual transparency is in order. 
Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statute proscribing gross negligence in the 
handling of classified information and of the statute proscribing misdemeanor mishandling, my 
judgment is that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case. At the outset, we are not aware of a 
case where anyone has been charged solely based on the "gross negligence" prohibition in the 
statute. All charged cases of which we are aware have involved the accusation that a government 
employee intentionally mishandled classified information. In looking back at our investigations in 
similar circumstances, we cannot find a case that would support bringing criminal charges on these 
facts. All the cases prosecuted involved some combination of: (1) clearly intentional misconduct; (2) 
vast quantities of materials exposed in such a way as to support an inference of intentional misconduct; 
(3) indications of disloyalty to the United States; or (4) efforts to obstruct justice. We see none of that 
here. 
Accordingly, although the Department of Justice makes final decisions on matters such as this, I am 
completing the investigation by expressing to Justice my view that no charges are appropriate in this 
case. 
I know there will be intense public disagreement in the wake of this result, as there was throughout this 
investigation. What I can assure the American people is that this investigation was done competently, 
honestly, and independently. No outside influence of any kind was brought to bear. I know there were 
many opinions expressed by people who were not part of the investigation -- including people in 
government - but none of that mattered to us. Opinions are irrelevant, and they were all uninformed by 
insight into our investigation, because we did the investigation in a professional way. Only facts 
matter, and the FBI found them here in an entirely apolitical and professional way. I couldn't be 
prouder to be part of this organization. 
### 
--==-=---============================================= 
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 
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Statement by FBI Director James R Corney on the h1vestigatfon 
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[As Prepared for Delivery l 
Good n1orning, T'rn hete to give you an update cn1 the FBI's investigatfon of Secretary 
Clinton)s use of a personal email system during her til:ne as Secretary of State. 
,1\frer a tremendous amount ofvvork over the last , the FBI is completing its 
investigation and referring the case to the Depa:rtrnent of J ustic:e for a prosec:utive decision. 
\Vhat I would like to do today is tell you three things: what we did; v:hat we found~ and what we 
are recommending Ui the Departr:nent of Justice. 
This will be an unusual statement in at kact a couple v/ays. First. I am going to include 
more detail about our proces.s than l ordinarily \\'Ollld, because I think.1l1e American people 
deserve those details in a case of intense public interest Second, I have not coordinated or 
,reviewed this statement in any way \Vith the Department ofJustice or any other part of the 
go,,emment Th.ey do not kno\v what I am about to say, 
I want to start by thanking the FBI ernployccs who did remarkable work in this case. 
Once you have a better sense of how much we have done, you \Vill understand ,vhy I am so 
grateful and proud of their efforts, 
So, first, what we have done: 
The investigation began as a referral from the .Intelligence Community Inspector General 
in corrnection \\<1th Secretary Clinton's use of a personal. email server during her time as 
Secretdt,Y of State. referral focused on \vliethcr classi information ,vas transmitted on 
that personal system. 
Our investigation looked at ,xhether there is evidence classified infonnation was 
improperly stored or transmitted on that persona! system, violation a federal statute making 
it a felony to mishandle classified information either intentionally or in a grossly negligent \Vay, 
or a second statute making it a misdemeanor to knowingly remove classified information from 
appropriate systems or storage fad t l tics. 
Consistent with our counter-intelligence responsibilities,\\\:' have also investigated to 
determine whether there is evidence of computer intrusion in connection ,vitb the personal email 
server by any foreign power, or other hostile actors. 
I have so far used the singular term.,, "email ~erver," in describing the referral that began 
our investigation, It turns out to have been r:nore complicated than that. Secietary Clinton used 
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several different servers and administrators of those servers during her four years at the State 
Department, and used numerous mobile devices to view and send email on that personal. domain. 
As new servers and equipment were employed. older servers were taken out of.service, stored, 
and decommissioned in various ways. Piecing all of that back together - to gain as fuH 
an understanding as possible of the ways in which personal email was used for government work 
WW has been a painstaking undertaking. requiring thou&'a!lds ofhours of effort. 
For example~ when one of Secretary Clinton's original personal servers was 
decommissioned in 2013. the email software \-Vas removed. Doing that didn't remove the email 
content. but it was like removing the frame from a huge finished jigsaw puztle and dumping the 
pieces on the floor. The effect was that millions of email fragments end up unsorted in the 
server1 s un-used - or ~-slack~, - space. We searched through aH of it to see what •.:vas there, and 
what parts ofthepuzzJe could be put back together. 
FBI investigators have also re-ad aU of the approximately 30,000 emails provided by 
Secretary Clinton to the State Department in December 2014. Where an email was assessed as 
possibly containing classified information, the FBI ref.erred the email to any U.S. government 
agency that was a likely "ovmer'' ofinfrmnatlon in the email, so that agency could make a 
determination as to whether the email contained classified information at the time it was sent or 
received, or whether there was reason to classify the email now) even if its content was not 
classified at the time it was sent (that is the process sometimes referred to as ··up-cfassifying'l 
From the group of 30,000 emails returned to the State Department, 110 emails in 52 
email chains have been determined by the o-w1ling agency to contain classified infomi.ation at the 
time they were sent or received. Eight of those chains contained infom1ation that was Top Secret 
at the time they vvere sent; 36 chains contained Se,wt information at the time; and 8 contained 
Confidential information, which i.s the lowest level of classificatiorL Separate from those) about 
2,000 additional emails were ''up-classified'' to make them Confidential; the information in those 
had not been classified at the time the emails were sent. 
The FBI also discovered several thousand work-related entails that were not in the group 
of 30,000 that were returned by Secretary Clinton to State in 2(H 4. We found those additional 
emails in a variety of ways. Some had been deleted over the years and we found traces of them 
on devices that supported or were connected to the private email domain. Others we found by 
revieWin.g the archived government email accounts of people who had been government 
employees at the same time as Secretary Clinton; including high-ranking officials at other 
agencies, people with whom a Secretary of State might naturally correspond. 
This helped us recover work~related emails that were not among the 30,000 produced to 
State. Still others we recovered from the laborious review of the miUions of email fragments 
dumped into the slack space of the server decommissioned in 2013. 
\:Vithrespect to the thousands of emails ,ve found that were not among those produced to 
State, agencies have concluded that 3 of those were classified at the time they were sent or 
received,, 1 at the Secret level and 2 at the Confidential level, There were no additional Top 
Secret emails found. Fin.ally, none of those we found have since been "urH~lassified" 
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I should add here that vve found no evidence that any of the additional work ~related 
emails ,vereintentionally deleted in an effort to conceal them .. Our assessment is that, like many 
email u...;;ers. Secretary Clinton periodically deleted .emails or emails were purged from the system 
when devices ,:vere changed. Because she was not using a government account - or even a 
commercial account like GmaiJ - there was no archiving at all of her emails. so it is not 
surprising that ive discovered emails that were not on Secretary Clinton's system in 2014, when 
she produced th.e 30J>OO emails to the State Department. 
lt could also be thatsome oft.he additional work~.related emails we recovered were 
among those deleted as "personal" by Secreta.ryClinton•s la:wyers \:Vhen they reviewed and 
sorted her emails for production in 2014. 
The lawyers doing the sorting for Secretary Clinton in 2014 did not individually read the 
content of all of her emails, as ,:ve did for those availahle to us; instead, they relied on header 
information and used search terms to try to :find all workMtelated emails among the reportedly 
more than 60,000 total emails remaining on Secretary Clinton's personal system in 2014. It is 
highly likely their search terms missed some work .. related emails, and that we later found them, 
for example, in the mail.boxes of other officials or in the slack space of a server. 
It is also likely that there are other work•related emails that they did not produce to State and that 
we did not find elsewhere, and that are now gone because they deleted all emails they did not 
return to State, and the la\.\ryers cleaned their devices in such a way as to preclude complete 
forensic recovery. 
V./e have conducted interviews and done technical examination to attempt to understand 
how that sorting was done by her attorneys. Although we do not have complete visibility 
because we are not able to fully reconstruct the electronic record of that sorting, we believe our 
investigation has been sufficient to give us reasonable confidence there \:Vas no intentional 
misconduct in connection, ~ith that sorting effort 
And, of course, in addition to our technical work, we interviewed many people, from 
those involved in setting up and maintaining the various iterations ofSecret.ary Clintonis 
personal server, to staff members with \Vhom she corresponded on email, to those involved in the 
email prt1duction to State, and finally, Secretary Clinton herself. 
Lasti we have done extensive work to understand what in4ications there .might be of 
compromise by lmstile actors in connection with the personal email operatic.m. 
That's what we have done. Now let me tell you what we found: 
Although we did not :find clear evidence that Secretary Clinton or her colleagues intended 
to violate laws governing the handling of cfossified information, there is evidenc-e that they were 
extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information. 
For exan1ple, seven ema:il chains concern matters that were classified at the Top 
Secret/Spe:cial Access Program level ,vhen they were sent and received. These .chains involved 
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Secretary Clinton both sending emails about those matters and receiving emails :from others 
about the same matter~. There is evidence to support a conclusion that any reasonable person in 
Secretary Clinton's position, or in the _position of those government employees v.-ith whom she 
,:vas corresponding about these matters, should have kno\\-n that an unclassified system was no 
place for that conversation. Jn addition to this highly sensitive information, we also .found 
in.formation that was properly classified as Secret by the U.S. Intelligence Co11unu11ity at the time 
it was discussed on email (that is, excluding the later "up~classifie-d." emails). 
None of these emaHs should have been on any kind of unclassified system; but their 
presence is especially concerning because all of these emails were housed on unda.Ssified 
personal servers not even supported by full-time security staff, like those found at Departments 
and Agencies of the U.S. Government - or even ·vvith a commercial service like Gmail. 
Separately, it is important to say something about the marking of classified informatio11. 
Only a very small number of the emails containing classified information bore markings 
indicating the presence of classified information. But even if infom1ation is not marked 
Hclassified" in an email, participants who know or should know that the subject matter is 
classified are still obligatedtQ protect it 
\Vhile not the focus of our investigation, we also developed evidence that the security 
culture of the State Department in general, and with respect to use of unclassified email systems 
in particular, was generally lacking in the kind of care for classified information found elsewhere 
in the government 
With respect to potential c-omputer intru.~fon by hostile actors, we did not :find direct 
evidence th.at Secretary Clinton's person.al er:nail domain, in its various c-onfigurations since 
2009; was success.fully hacked. But, given the nature of the system and of the actors potentially 
involved, we assess that we would be unlikely to see such. direct evidence. We do assess that 
hostile actors gained access to the private commercial en:mil accounts of people with 1-vhom 
Secretary Clinton was in regular contact from her personal account. We also assess that 
Secretary Clinton's use of a personal email domain was both known by a large number of people 
and readily apparent She al.so used her personal email extensively while outside the United 
States, including sending and receiving work-related emails in the territory of sophisticated 
adversaries. Given that combination of factors, we assess it is possible that hostile actors gained 
access to Secretary Clinton's person.al email account. 
So that's what we found. Finally, with respect to our recommendation to the Department of 
Justice: 
In our system, the prosecutors make the dec-isions about whether charges are appropriate 
based on evidence the .FBI has helped collect. Although we don't no.rmally make public our 
recommendations to the prosecutors, we :frequently make recommendations and engage in 
productive conversations with prosecutors about what resolution may be appropriate, given the 
evidence. In this case. given the importance of the matter, I think. unusual transparency is in 
order, 
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·;t: 
Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statutes regarding the handling of 
classifiedinformation, our judgment is that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case. 
Prosecutors necessarilyweigh a number of factors before bringing charges. Th.ere are obvious 
considerations; like the strength of the evidence, especially regarding intent. Responsible 
decisions also consider the context of a person's actions~ and how similar situations have been 
handled in the past 
In looking back at our investigations into mishandling or removal of classified 
information,, we cannot find a case that would support bringing criminal charges on these facts. 
All the cases prosecuted involved some combination of: clearly intentional and \\illful 
mishandling of classified information; or vast quantities of materials exposed in such a way as to 
support an inference of intentional misconduct; or indications of disloyalty to the United States; 
o:r efforts to obstruct justice. We do not see those things here. 
To be clear. this is not to suggest th.at in similar circumstances, a person who engaged in 
this activity ,vou1d face no consequences. To the contrary, those individuals are often subject to 
security or administrative sanctions. But that is not what we are deciding now. 
As a result, although the Department of Justice makes final decisions on matters like this, 
we are expressing to Justice our vie,v that no charges are appropriate in. this case. 
I know there will be intense public debate in the wake of this recommendation, as there 
was throughout this investigation. What I can assure the American people is that this 
investigation was done competently, honestly, and independently. No outside influence of any 
kind was brought to bear. 
I know there were many opinions expressed by people who were not part of the 
investigation -including people in government - but none of that mattered to us. Opinions are 
irrelevant, and they were all uninformed by insight into our investigation, because we did the 
investigation the right -..vay. Only facts matter~ and the FBI found them here in an entirely 
apolitical ~d professional way. I couldn 'tbe prouder to be part of this organization, 
### 
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ATTACHMENT 
E 
Honorable Richard M. Burr 
Chairman 
Select Committee on Intelligence 
Honorable Charles E. Grassley 
Chairman 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Honorable Richard Shelby 
Chairman 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science 
and Related Agencies 
Honorable Ron Johnson 
Chairman 
Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 
Dear Messrs Chairmen: 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Washington . D.C. 205]5 
October 28, 2016 
Honorable Devin Nunes 
C hairman 
Pennanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
Honorable Robert Goodlatte 
Chairman 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Honorable John Culberson 
Chaim,an 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science and Related Agencies 
Honorable Jason Chaffetz 
Chaim,an 
Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 
In previous congressional testimony, l referred to the fact that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) had completed its investigation of former Secretary Clinton's personal email 
server. Due to recent developments, I am writing to supplement my previous testimony. 
In connection with an unrelated case, the FBI has learned of the existence of emails that 
appear to be pertinent to the investigation. I am writing to inform you that the investigative team 
briefed me on this yesterday, and I agreed that the FBI should take appropriate investigative 
steps designed to allow investigators to review these emails to determine whether they contain 
classified information, as well as to assess their importance to our investigation. 
A lthough the FBI cannot yet assess whether or not this material may be significant, and l 
cannot predict how long it will take us to complete this additional work, I believe it is important 
to update your Committees about our efforts in light of my previous testimony. 
Sincerely yours, 
I - Honorable Dianne Feinstein 
Vice Chairman 
Select Committee on Intelligence 
United States Senate 
Washington, DC 20510 
I - Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 
Ranking Member 
Committee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate 
Washington, DC 20510 
1 - Honorable Barbara Mikulski 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science 
and Related Agencies 
United States Senate 
Washington DC 20510 
1 - Honorable Thomas R. Carper 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 
United States Senate 
Washington, DC 20510 
1 - Honorable Adam B. Schiff 
Ranking Member 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, DC 20515 
1 - Honorable John Conyers Jr. 
Ranking Member 
Committee on the Judiciary 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, DC 20515 
1 - Honorable Michael Honda 
Ranking Member 
Comm ittee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce Justice, Science 
and Related Agencies 
.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, DC 205 I 5 
I - Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, DC 20515 
 
 
 
ATTACHMENT 
F 
Honorable Richard M. Burr 
Chairman 
Select Committee on Intelligence 
Honorable Charles E. Grassley 
Chairman 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Honorable Richard Shelby 
Chairman 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science and Related Agencies 
Honorable Ron Johnson 
Chairman 
Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 
Dear Messrs. Chairmen: 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Washington, D. C. 20535 
November 6, 2016 
Honorable Devin Nunes 
Chairman 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
Honorable Robert Goodlatte 
Chairman 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Honorable John Culberson 
Chairman 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science and Related Agencies 
Honorable Jason Chaffetz 
Chairman 
Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 
I write to supplement my October 28, 2016 letter that notified you the FBI would be 
taking additional investigative steps with respect to former Secretary of State Clinton' s use of a 
personal email server. Since my letter, the FBI investigative team has been working around the 
clock to process and review a large volume of emails from a device obtained in connection with 
an unrelated criminal investigation. During that process, we reviewed all of the communications 
that were to or from Hillary Clinton while she was Secretary of State. 
Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that we expressed in July 
with respect to Secretary Clinton. 
I am very grateful to the professionals at the FBI fo r doing an extraordinary amount of 
high-quality work in a short period of time . 
cc: Sec next page 
I - Honorable Dianne Feinstein 
Vice Chairman 
Select Committee on Intelligence 
I - Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 
Ranking Member 
Committee on the Judiciary 
I - Honorable Barbara Miku lsk i 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science and Related Agencies 
I - Honorable Thomas R. Carper 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 
I - Honorable Adam B. Schiff 
Ranking Member 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
I - Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 
Ranking Member 
Committee on the Judiciary 
I - Honorable Michael Honda 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science, and Related Agencies 
I - Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 
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The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a 
statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter 
waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to 
promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s operations. 
To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ 
programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the 
DOJ OIG Hotline at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499. 
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